DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Response to Amendment
Amendment received on 02/13/2026 is acknowledged and entered. Claims 1, 13 and 18 have been amended. Claims 1-20 are currently pending in the application.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter.
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, the Examiner is guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217-18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75-77 (2012)); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010); 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019); the October 2019 Update of the 2019 Revised Guidance (Oct. 17, 2019); 2024 Guidance Update on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, Including on Artificial Intelligence (July 17, 2024), and the USPTO’s Paten Subject Matter Eligibility Memorandum of August 4, 2025.
Step 1
Claims are eligible for patent protection under § 101 if they are in one of the four statutory categories and not directed to a judicial exception to patentability (i.e., laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas). Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U. S. ____ (2014). Claim 1 is directed to a statutory category, because a series of steps for classifying and labeling electronic messages satisfies the requirements of a process (a series of acts). Claim 13 is directed to a statutory category, because a non-transitory computer-readable medium comprising computer-readable instructions satisfies the requirements of a product. The broadest reasonable interpretation of claim 18 encompasses a computer system (e.g., hardware such as a processor and memory) that implements the recited steps. If assuming that the system comprises a device or set of devices, then the system is directed to a machine, which is a statutory category of invention. (Step 1: Yes).
Next, the claim is analyzed to determine whether it is directed to a judicial exception.
Step 2A – Prong 1
Claim 1 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more of classifying and labeling electronic messages. The claim recites:
1. A method comprising:
receiving, over a network, by a computing device, a message from a sender;
identifying, by the computing device, an optimal classification approach that optimizes classification performance without compromising classification accuracy, the optimal classification approach identification comprising:
parsing, by the computing device, the message, and identifying message data; analyzing, by the computing device, based on an aggregation strategy, the message data;
determining, by the computing device, based on the aggregation strategy analysis, whether the message data corresponds, at least to a threshold degree of similarity, to the xcluster of messages;
when the determination indicates that the message data corresponds, at least to a threshold degree of similarity, to a xcluster of messages, using a group classification approach comprising:
adding said message to the xcluster;
applying a grid classifier to the xcluster of messages, said grid classifier application comprising determining and applying a multi-dimensional label to the xcluster of messages including the message;
when the determination indicates that the message data does not correspond, at least to a threshold degree of similarity, to the xcluster of messages,
further analyzing the message data to make a determination that the message does not match any cluster of messages and determining to use a non- group classification approach based on the determination made from further analysis of the message data, using the non-group classification approach comprising:
determining a type of online classifier based on the determination made from further analysis of the message data;
applying the determined type of online classifier to the message, said online classifier application of the determined type of online classifier comprising using the message data to determine the multi-dimensional label to apply to the message, and
communicating, over the network, to a device of a recipient of the message, the multi-dimensional label determined for the message using the data of the message, the communicating causing an electronic messaging application to display the multi-dimensional label determined for the message with the message in an electronic messaging mailbox of the recipient, and
executing a feedback loop with data produced for labeling the message to recursively train one or both of the grid classifier and online classifier.
The limitations of receiving, identifying, parsing, analyzing, determining, adding, classifying, applying, communicating, displaying, and retraining the classifier, as drafted, is a process that, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance of the limitation in the mind, and/or certain methods of organizing human activity but for the recitation of generic computer components. (Note: the Examiner’s language (e.g. “receiving”, “identifying”, “parsing,” etc.) is an abbreviated reference to the detailed claim steps and is not an oversimplification of the claim language; the Examiner employing such shortcuts (that refer to more specific steps) when attempting to explain the rejection). That is, other than reciting “by a processor,” nothing in the claim element precludes the step from practically being performed in the mind, and/or performed as organized human activity, such as following instructions. Aside from the general technological environment (addressed below), it covers purely mental concepts and/or certain methods of organizing human activity processes, and the mere nominal recitation of a generic network appliance (e.g. an interface for inputting or outputting data, or generic network-based storage devices and displays) does not take the claim limitation out of the mental processes and/or certain methods of organizing human activity grouping.
Specifically, regarding receiving, identifying, parsing, analyzing, determining, adding, classifying, applying, communicating, displaying, and retraining the classifier steps, - the utilizing logical or mathematical tools to process data and to output estimated values - said functions could be performed by a human using mental steps or basic critical thinking, which are types of activities that have been found by the courts to represent abstract ideas (e.g., mental comparison regarding a sample or test subject to a control or target data in Ambry, Myriad CAFC, or the diagnosing an abnormal condition by performing clinical tests and thinking about the results in In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (Grams)). In Grams, the recited functions require obtaining data or patient information (from sensors), and analyze that data to ascertain the existence and identity of an abnormality or estimated responses, and possible causes thereof. As per utilizing machine learning computational techniques and algorithms to process parsed data in order to identify and classify said data - this represents a well-known modeling techniques, which is similar to the algorithm for converting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary form in Benson (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65, 93 S.Ct. 253, 254, 34 L.Ed.2d 273 (1972)(“While said functions are performed by a computer, they are in essence a mathematical algorithm, in that they represent "[a] procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem."), and which is similar to the mathematical formula for computing “alarm limits” in a catalytic conversion process in Flook. (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 (1978)(“if a claim is directed essentially to a method of calculating, using a mathematical formula, even if the solution is for a specific purpose, the claimed method is [patent-ineligible subject matter].” (quoting In re Rickman, 563 F.2d 1026, 1030 (CCPA 1977)”).
And regarding parsing and extracting the data, - in Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, National Ass’n, Nos. 13-1588,-1589, 14-1112, -1687 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 23, 2014) the Federal Circuit affirmed that such limitations were generally directed to “the abstract idea of 1) collecting data, 2) recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and 3) storing that recognized data in a memory.” The Court explained that ”[t]he concept of data collection, recognition, and storage is undisputedly well-known,” and noted that “humans have always performed these functions.” Id. The Court then rejected CET’s argument that the claims were patent eligible because they required hardware to perform functions that humans cannot, such as processing and recognizing the stream of bits output by the scanner. Comparing the asserted claims to “the computer-implemented claims in Alice,” the Court concluded that the claims were “drawn to the basic concept of data recognition and storage,” even though they recited a scanner. Id. at 8. Mental processes, e.g., parsing and extracting data, as recited in claim 1, remain unpatentable even when automated to reduce the burden on the user of what once could have been done with pen and paper. CyberSource Corp. at 1375 (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalkv. Benson, [409 U.S. 63 (1972)].”).
Additionally, the reviewing court has concluded, absent additional limitations, “a process that employs mathematical algorithms to manipulate existing information to generate additional information is not patent eligible.” Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Also, the recited limitations of receiving an email, identifying and analyzing message data, determining whether the message data corresponds to a particular group of messages, and communicating the email to a recipient’s device also can be characterized as “Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity” grouping of abstract ideas, such as commercial or legal interactions including marketing or sales activities and business relations, as well as following rules or instructions.
As per the use of artificial intelligence and/or machine learning techniques (AI/ML), as recited in dependent claims 3, 15 and 20, said recitation does not make the claim patent eligible, because said tools are utilized merely for data gathering and comparing, and are not utilized in express manipulation and control of functional aspects and/or hardware components/equipment of real-world processes and systems using output of AI models (e.g., manufacturing processes and equipment, medical treatments, communications processes and systems, logistics systems and hardware, interactive smart phone apps, etc.).
It is similar to other abstract ideas held to be non-statutory by the courts. See, e.g., Recentive Analytics, Inc. v. Fox Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2025), wherein the court noted that "iterative training," a claimed feature, was inherent to all machine learning models and thus did not confer eligibility. Additionally, applying machine learning to analyzing and classifying messages, an activity predating computers, did not transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
See, also, TLI Communications LLC v. AV Automotive LLC 823 F.3d 607, 118 U.S.P.Q.2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2016) Recording, transmitting and administering digital images; Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015)—tailoring sales information presented to a user based on, e.g., user data and time data; Electric Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) - collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis,” where the data analysis steps are recited at a high level of generality such that they could practically be performed in the human mind; Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co. 850 F.3d 1315, 121 U.S.P.Q.2d 1928 (Fed Cir. 2017) - mobile interface for accessing remotely stored documents, and retrieving data from a database using an index of XML tags and metafiles.)
As per receiving, storing and/or sending data limitations, it has been held that “As many cases make clear, even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract.” SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citation omitted); see also In re Jobin, 811 F. App’x 633, 637 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (claims to collecting, organizing, grouping, and storing data using techniques such as conducting a survey or crowdsourcing recited a method of organizing human activity, which is a hallmark of abstract ideas).
All these cases describe the significant aspects of the claimed invention, albeit at another level of abstraction. See Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240-41 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("An abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction. As the Board has done, the claimed abstract idea could be described as generating menus on a computer, or generating a second menu from a first menu and sending the second menu to another location. It could be described in other ways, including, as indicated in the specification, taking orders from restaurant customers on a computer."). Therefore, if a claim limitation, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance of the limitation in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer components, then it falls within the “Mental Processes” and/or “Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity” grouping of abstract ideas. Accordingly, the claim recites an abstract idea. (Step 2A – Prong 1: Yes).
Step 2A – Prong 2
In Prong Two, the Examiner determines whether claim 1, as a whole, recites additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application of the exception, i.e., whether the additional elements apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is no more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54-55. If the additional elements do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, then the claim is directed to the judicial exception. See id., 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. “An additional element [that] reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field” is indicative of integrating a judicial exception into a practical application. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
The Examiner determined that this judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application, because there are no meaningful limitations that transform the exception into a patent eligible application. In particular, the claim recites additional elements – using a processor to perform the receiving, identifying, parsing, analyzing, determining, adding, classifying, applying, communicating, displaying, and retraining the classifier steps. However, the processor in each step is recited (or implied) at a high level of generality, i.e., as a generic processor performing a generic computer functions of processing data, including receiving, storing, comparing, and outputting data. This generic processor limitation is nor more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component. The processor that performs the recited steps merely automates these steps which can be done mentally or manually. Thus, while the additional elements have and execute instructions to perform the abstract idea itself, this also does not serve to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application as it merely amounts to instructions to "apply it." The claim only manipulate abstract data elements into another form, and does not set forth improvements to another technological field or the functioning of the computer itself and, instead, uses computer elements as tools in a conventional way to improve the functioning of the abstract idea identified above. As per utilizing the machine learning techniques to process parsed data in order to identify and classify said data, said steps are nothing more than an attempt to recycle preexisting artificial intelligence or machine-learning (AI/ML) technologies to apply for communication applications. There are no improvements in said AI/ML techniques, such as advances in the field of computer science itself, or designing a new neural network, and there is no controlling of a technological process using the outcome of said AI/ML operations.
Further, looking at the limitations as an ordered combination adds nothing that is not already present when looking at the elements taken individually. There is no indication that the combination of elements improves the functioning of a computer or improves any other technology, including AI/ML techniques; their collective functions merely provide conventional computer implementation. None of the additional elements "offers a meaningful limitation beyond generally linking 'the use of the [method] to a particular technological environment,' that is, implementation via computers." Alice Corp., slip op. at 16 (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 610, 611 (U.S. 2010)). Thus, the recited steps do not control or improve operation of a machine (MPEP 2106.05(a)), do not effect a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing (MPEP 2106.05(c)), and do not apply the judicial exception with, or by use a particular machine (MPEP 2106.05(b)), but, instead, require receiving, comparing, storing and outputting data.
Regarding the use of AI/ML techniques, said steps are nothing more than an attempt to recycle preexisting AI/ML technologies to apply for a particular computing application. There are no improvements in said AI/ML techniques, such as advances in the field of computer science itself, or designing a new neural network, and there is no controlling of a technological process using the outcome of said AI/ML operations.
Thus, the use of a trained machine learning model does not integrate the abstract idea of limitation into a practical application, because, under its broadest reasonable interpretation when read in light of the specification, the analyzing and classifying messages encompasses mental processes practically performed in the human mind by observation, evaluation, judgment, and opinion. See MPEP 2106.04(a)(2), subsection III. Similar to Recentive Analytics, the pending claims recite conventional machine learning models without specific improvements to the technology itself. The court noted that "iterative training," a claimed feature, was inherent to all machine learning models and thus did not confer eligibility. Claim 1 does not articulate "how" a technological improvement is achieved.
As per receiving, storing and/or sending data limitations, these recitations amounts to mere data gathering and/or outputting, is insignificant post-solution or extra-solution component and represents nominal recitation of technology. Insignificant "post-solution” or “extra-solution" activity means activity that is not central to the purpose of the method invented by the applicant. However, “(c) Whether its involvement is extra-solution activity or a field-of-use, i.e., the extent to which (or how) the machine or apparatus imposes meaningful limits on the execution of the claimed method steps. Use of a machine or apparatus that contributes only nominally or insignificantly to the execution of the claimed method (e.g., in a data gathering step or in a field-of-use limitation) would weigh against eligibility”. See Bilski, 138 S. Ct. at 3230 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590, 198 USPQ 193, ___ (1978)). Thus, claim drafting strategies that attempt to circumvent the basic exceptions to § 101 using, for example, highly stylized language, hollow field-of-use limitations, or the recitation of token post-solution activity should not be credited. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230.
Thus, the method as a whole, outputs only data structure, - everything remains in the form of a code stored in the computer memory. Accordingly, even in combination, these additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because they do not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. Therefore, the claim is directed to an abstract idea. (Step 2A – Prong 2: No).
Step 2B
If a claim has been determined to be directed to a judicial exception under revised Step 2A, examiners should then evaluate the additional elements individually and in combination under Step 2B to determine whether the provide an inventive concept (i.e., whether the additional elements amount to significantly more than the exception itself).
The claim does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. As discussed above with respect to integration of the abstract idea into a practical application, the additional element of using a processor to perform the recited steps amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component. The claim is now re-evaluated in Step 2B to determine if it is more than what is well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field.
Based on the Specification, the invention utilizes existing, conventional communication networks, generic processors, which can be found in mobile devices or desktop computers, conventional memory and display devices. And the functions performed by said generic computer elements are basic functions of a computer - performing a mathematical operation, receiving, storing and outputting data - have recognized by the courts as routine and conventional activity. Specifically, regarding the receiving, parsing, analyzing, determining, adding, classifying, applying, communicating and displaying steps, MPEP 2106.05(d)(II) defines said functions as routine and conventional, or as insignificant extra-solution activity:
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); but see DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1258, 113 USPQ2d 1097, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Unlike the claims in Ultramercial, the claims at issue here specify how interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a desired result‐‐a result that overrides the routine and conventional sequence of events ordinarily triggered by the click of a hyperlink.” (emphasis added));
ii. Performing repetitive calculations, Flook, 437 U.S. at 594, 198 USPQ2d at 199 (recomputing or readjusting alarm limit values); Bancorp Services v. Sun Life, 687 F.3d 1266, 1278, 103 USPQ2d 1425, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The computer required by some of Bancorp’s claims is employed only for its most basic function, the performance of repetitive calculations, and as such does not impose meaningful limits on the scope of those claims.”); collecting and comparing known information in Classen 659 F.3d 1057, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d 1492 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
iii. Electronic recordkeeping, Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2359, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (creating and maintaining “shadow accounts”); Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716, 112 USPQ2d at 1755 (updating an activity log);
iv. Storing and retrieving information in memory, Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1681, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 2015); OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363, 115 USPQ2d at 1092-93;
v. Electronically scanning or extracting data from a physical document, Content Extraction and Transmission, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, 776 F.3d 1343, 1348, 113 USPQ2d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (optical character recognition); and
vi. A web browser’s back and forward button functionality, Internet Patent Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Below are examples of other types of activity that the courts have found to be well-understood, routine, conventional activity when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity:
i. Recording a customer’s order, Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1244, 120 USPQ2d 1844, 1856 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
iii. Restricting public access to media by requiring a consumer to view an advertisement,
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716-17, 112 USPQ2d 1750, 1755-56 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
iv. Presenting offers and gathering statistics, OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1362-63, 115 USPQ2d at 1092-93;
v. Determining an estimated outcome and setting a price, OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1362-63, 115 USPQ2d at 1092-93; and
vi. Arranging a hierarchy of groups, sorting information, eliminating less restrictive pricing information and determining the price, Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1331, 115 USPQ2d 1681, 1699 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Thus, the background of the current application does not provide any indication that the processor is anything other than a generic, off-the-shelf computer component, and the Symantec, TLI, and OIP Techs. court decisions cited in MPEP 2106.05(d)(II) indicate that mere collection or receipt of data over a network is a well‐understood, routine, and conventional function when it is claimed in a merely generic manner (as it is here). Accordingly, a conclusion that the collecting step is well-understood, routine, conventional activity is supported under Berkheimer Option 2. Mere instructions to apply an exception using a generic computer component cannot provide an inventive concept.
Further, the use of AI/ML techniques in various fields of research and development is very common, and is well-known in the art given that Donald Hebb created a model of brain cell interaction and described it in his book titled “The Organization of Behavior” in 1949. Hebb’s model involves altering the relationships between artificial neurons/nodes and the changes to individual neurons, wherein the relationship between two neurons/nodes strengthens if the two neurons/nodes are activated at the same time and weakens if they are activated separately, and wherein nodes/neurons tending to be both positive or both negative are described as having strong positive weights, and those nodes tending to have opposite weights develop strong negative weights.
Accordingly, utilizing machine learning computational techniques and algorithms to process parsed data in order to identify and classify the data, said steps are nothing more than an attempt to recycle preexisting AI/ML technologies to apply for particular electronic commerce applications. There are no improvements in said AI/ML techniques, such as advances in the field of computer science itself, or designing a new neural network, and there is no controlling of a technological process using the outcome of said AI/ML operations. Claim 1 neither specifies a specific technical purpose for which the method is used, nor the claim defines a specific technical implementation of the method, nor the claimed method is particularly adapted for that implementation in that its design is motivated by technical considerations of the internal functioning of the computer. Said AI/ML algorithms and computations are done inside of a computer, and do not have a real-world impact and are not tied to the functionality of the computer. Further, there is no evidence that the invention lies in the training or retraining phase or execution phase or both; said AI/ML recitation represents merely conventionally applying an existing model to an existing data with the result being not technological, but purely entrepreneurial.
However, AI/ML subject matter becomes patent-eligible only when it achieves a technical purpose and, at minimum, offers a technical effect that does more than performing the solution more quickly or efficiently. The general application of AI/ML techniques to solve a problem predictably is not eligible for patentability.
Similar to Electric Power Group v Alstom S.A. (Fed Cir, 2015-1778, 8/1/2016) (Power Group), claim’ invocation of computers, networks, and displays does not transform the claimed subject matter into patent-eligible applications. Claim 1 does not require any nonconventional computer, network, or display components, or even a “non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces,” but merely call for performance of the claimed information collection, analysis, and display functions on a set of generic computer components and display devices. Nothing in the claim, understood in light of the Specification, requires anything other than off-the-shelf, conventional computer, network, and display technology for gathering, analyzing, sending, and presenting the desired information. Analogous to Power Group, claim 1 does not even require a new source or type of information, or new techniques for analyzing it. As a result, the claim does not require an arguably inventive set of components or methods, such as measurement devices or techniques that would generate new data. Merely requiring the selection and manipulation of information - to provide a “humanly comprehensible” amount of information useful for users - by itself does not transform the otherwise-abstract processes of information collection and analysis into patent eligible subject matter. Merely obtaining and selecting information, by content or source, for collection, analysis, and display does nothing significant to differentiate a process from ordinary mental processes, whose implicit exclusion from § 101 undergirds the information-based category of abstract ideas. Therefore, the recited steps represent implementing the abstract idea on a generic computer, or “reciting a commonplace business method aimed at processing business information despite being applied on a general purpose computer” Versata, p. 53; Ultramerical, pp. 11-12.
Further, the recited functions do not improve the functioning of computers itself, including of the processor(s) or the network elements. There are no physical improvements in the claim, like a faster processor or more efficient memory, and there is no operational improvement, like mathematical computation that improve the functioning of the computer. Applicant did not invent a new type of computer; Applicant like everyone else programs their computer to perform functions. The Supreme Court in Alice indicated that an abstract claim might be statutory if it improved another technology or the computer processing itself. Using a (programmed) computer to implement a common business practice does neither. The Federal Circuit has recognized that "an invocation of already-available computers that are not themselves plausibly asserted to be an advance, for use in carrying out improved mathematical calculations, amounts to a recitation of what is 'well-understood, routine, [and] conventional.'" SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (citing Mayo v. Prometheus, 566 U.S. 66, 73 (2012)). Apart from the instructions to implement the abstract idea, they only serve to perform well-understood functions (e.g., receiving, storing, retrieving, comparing and transmitting data—see the Specification as well as Alice Corp.; Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2016); and Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015) covering the well-known nature of these computer functions). Looking at the limitations as an ordered combination adds nothing that is not already present when looking at the elements taken individually; there is no indication that the combination of elements improves the functioning of a computer or improves any other technology. Their collective functions merely provide conventional computer implementation.
Further, there are no improvements in said machine learning techniques, such as advances in the field of computer science itself, or designing a new neural network, and there is no controlling of a technological process using the outcome of said techniques. Said machine learning algorithms and computations are done inside of a computer, and do not have a real-world impact and are not tied to the functionality of the computer. Further, there is no evidence that the invention lies in the training phase or execution phase or both. However, machine learning subject matter becomes patent-eligible only when it achieves a technical purpose and, at minimum, offers a technical effect that does more than performing the solution more quickly or efficiently. The general application of machine learning techniques to solve a problem predictably is not eligible for patentability.
For example, in comparison to the decision in Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corporation, No. 2015-2044, slip op. at *11 (Fed. Cir. May 12, 2016) (Enfish), claim 1 of the current application does not provide specific improvements in computer capabilities. In Enfish, Court found that claims are directed to a specific improvement to the way computers operate, - a particular database technique - in how computers could carry out one of their basic functions of storage and retrieval of data. The present case is different: the focus of the claims is not on such an improvement in computers as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use computers as tools. There is no technological improvement described in the current application; the recited receiving, identifying, parsing, analyzing, determining, adding, classifying, applying, communicating and displaying steps do not improve the functioning of computers itself, including of the processor(s) or the network elements; do not recite physical improvements in the claim, like a faster processor or more efficient memory, and do not provide operational improvement, like mathematical computation that improve the functioning of the computer. The claimed invention merely utilizes conventional computing and network elements for transmitting and storing data. Thus, the current application’ solution to the problem of analyzing and classifying messages is not technological, but “business solution”, or “entrepreneurial. Accordingly, claim 1 does not provide a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology, but, instead, is directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery.
Furthermore, there is no transformation recited in the claim as understood in view of 35 USC 101. The recited steps merely represent abstract ideas which cannot meet the transformation test because they are not physical objects or substances. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963. Said steps are nothing more than mere manipulation or reorganization of data, which does not satisfy the transformation prong. It is further noted that the underlying idea of the recited steps could be performed via pen and paper or in a person's mind. Moreover, “We agree with the district court that the claimed process manipulates data to organize it in a logical way such that additional fraud tests may be performed. The mere manipulation or reorganization of data, however, does not satisfy the transformation prong.” and “Abele made clear that the basic character of a process claim drawn to an abstract idea is not changed by claiming only its performance by computers, or by claiming the process embodied in program instructions on a computer readable medium. Thus, merely claiming a software implementation of a purely mental process that could otherwise be performed without the use of a computer does not satisfy the machine prong of the machine-or-transformation test”. CyberSource, 659 F.3d 1057, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d 1492 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
Therefore, the claim does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception, because, when considered separately and in combination, the claim elements do not add significantly more to the exception. Considered separately and as an ordered combination, the claim elements do not provide an improvement to another technology or technical field; do not provide an improvement to the functioning of the computer itself; do not apply the judicial exception by use of a particular machine; do not effect a transformation or reduce a particular article to a different state or thing; and do not add a specific limitation other than what is well-understood, routine and conventional in the operation of a generic computer. None of the hardware recited "offers a meaningful limitation beyond generally linking 'the use of the [method] to a particular technological environment,' that is, implementation via computers." Id., slip op. at 16 (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 610, 611 (U.S. 2010)). As per “receiving, over a network, by a computing device, a message from a sender”; and “parsing, by the computing device, the message” recitation, these limitations do not add significantly more because they are simply an attempt to limit the abstract idea to a particular technological environment, that is, implementation via computers." Id., slip op. at 16 (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 610, 611 (U.S. 2010)). Limiting the claims to the particular technological environment of electronic commerce is, without more, insufficient to transform the claim into patent-eligible applications of the abstract idea at their core.
Accordingly, claim 1 is not directed to significantly more than the exception itself, and is not eligible subject matter under § 101. (Step 2B: No).
Further, although the Examiner takes the steps recited in the independent claim 1 as exemplary, the Examiner points out that limitations recited in dependent claims 2-12 further narrow the abstract idea but do not make the claims any less abstract. Dependent claims 2-12 each merely add further details of the abstract steps recited in claim 1 without including an improvement to another technology or technical field, an improvement to the functioning of the computer itself, or meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of an abstract idea to a particular technological environment. These claims "add nothing of practical significance to the underlying idea," and thus do not transform the claimed abstract idea into patentable subject matter. Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716. Therefore, dependent claims 2-12 are also directed to non-statutory subject matter.
Because Applicant’s computer-readable storage medium claims 13-17 and apparatus claims 18-20 add nothing of substance to the underlying abstract idea, they too are patent ineligi-ble under §101.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed 02/13/2026 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
Regarding the “mental processes“ argument, the Examiner respectfully maintains that the recited functions still can be performed by a human mind even though such operations could be performed faster than without a computer. “Analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, [are] essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category.” Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354; see also Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2016). As per the argument that “billions of emails are handled by an electronic mail system every day” argument, the Examiner notes “[T]he fact that the required calculations could be performed more efficiently via a computer does not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Additionally, the reviewing court has concluded, absent additional limitations, “a process that employs mathematical algorithms to manipulate existing information to generate additional information is not patent eligible.” Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Further, mental processes, e.g., generating a message and label, as recited in claim 1, remain unpatentable even when automated to reduce the burden on the user of what once could have been done with pen and paper. CyberSource Corp. at 1375 (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalkv. Benson, [409 U.S. 63 (1972)].”).
Even hypothetically accepting Applicant’s arguments that some steps are required a machine, it also is insufficient, without more, to establish patent eligibility that “[t]he human mind is not equipped to execute the claimed method.” Although “a method that can be performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under § 101,” CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011), it does not automatically follow that methods requiring physical components, i.e., methods that arguably cannot be performed entirely in the human mind, are, therefore, not directed to abstract ideas. See, e.g., In re TLI Commc'ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[N]ot every claim that recites concrete, tangible components escapes the reach of the abstract-idea inquiry.”); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Latric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he inability for the human mind to perform each claim step does not alone confer patentability.”).
Regarding “a practical application” argument, the Examiner respectfully maintains, that there are no meaningful limitations that transform the exception into a patent eligible application. The additional limitations – a generic processor - is recited (or implied) at a high level of generality, i.e., as a generic processor performing a generic computer functions of processing data, including receiving, identifying, storing, comparing, and outputting data, and the claimed functions do not control or improve operation of a machine (MPEP 2106.05(a)), do not effect a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing (MPEP 2106.05(c)), and do not apply the judicial exception with, or by use a particular machine (MPEP 2106.05(b)), but, instead, require receiving, comparing, storing and outputting data. There are no physical improvements in the claim, like a faster processor or more efficient memory, and there is no operational improvement, like mathematical computation that improve the functioning of the computer. Further, there are no improvements in said machine learning techniques, such as advances in the field of computer science itself, or designing a new neural network, and there is no controlling of a technological process using the outcome of said techniques. Said machine learning algorithms and computations are done inside of a computer, and do not have a real-world impact and are not tied to the functionality of the computer. Further, there is no evidence that the invention lies in the training phase or execution phase or both. However, machine learning subject matter becomes patent-eligible only when it achieves a technical purpose and, at minimum, offers a technical effect that does more than performing the solution more quickly or efficiently. The general application of machine learning techniques to solve a problem predictably is not eligible for patentability. The claimed method as a whole, outputs only data structure, - everything remains in the form of a code stored in the computer memory. Accordingly, even in combination, these additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because they do not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea.
Regarding “retraining” and “Enfish” argument, the Examiner maintains that claim 1 of the current application does not provide specific improvements in computer capabilities. In Enfish, Court found that claims are directed to a specific improvement to the way computers operate, - a particular database technique - in how computers could carry out one of their basic functions of storage and retrieval of data. The present case is different: the focus of the claims is not on such an improvement in computers as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use computers as tools. There is no technological improvement described in the current application; the recited receiving, identifying, parsing, analyzing, determining, adding, classifying, applying, communicating and displaying steps do not improve the functioning of computers itself, including of the processor(s) or the network elements; do not recite physical improvements in the claim, like a faster processor or more efficient memory, and do not provide operational improvement, like mathematical computation that improve the functioning of the computer. As per “retraining” limitation, it is similar to Recentive Analytics, Inc. v. Fox Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2025), wherein the court noted that "iterative training," a claimed feature, was inherent to all machine learning models and thus did not confer eligibility. Additionally, applying machine learning to analyzing and classifying messages, an activity predating computers, does not transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. The claimed invention merely utilizes conventional computing and network elements for transmitting and storing data. Thus, the current application’ solution to the problem of analyzing and classifying messages is not technological, but “business solution”, or “entrepreneurial. Accordingly, claim 1 does not provide a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology, but, instead, is directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery.
Regarding substantially more argument, said argument is not persuasive at least because the features Applicant identifies, as called for in steps of optimizing classification performance without compromising classification accuracy, utilizing, based on an analysis of the message's message data, either a group classification approach or a non-group classification approach, and provisioning of the message's determined multi-dimensional label information for display at a recipient's device, are not additional elements to be considered in determining whether claim 1 includes an additional element or a combination of additional elements that adds specific limitations beyond the judicial exception that are not “well understood, routine, conventional activity” in the field. Instead, they are part of the abstract idea itself, which “cannot supply the inventive concept.” Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2019); see also BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (The abstract idea itself (the ineligible concept to which the claim is directed) “cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention “significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.’’). It could not be clearer from Alice, that under step two of the Mayo/Alice framework, the elements of each claim are considered both individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine whether the additional elements, i.e., the elements other than the abstract idea itself, “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible application. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217 (citation omitted); see also BSG Tech, 899 F.3d at 1290 (“It has been clear since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.”).
Here, as described above, the only additional elements recited in claim 1 beyond the abstract idea, i.e., “a network”, “a computing device” and “a device of a recipient” are generic computer components. Appellant cannot reasonably maintain that there is insufficient evidence of record to support a determination that the operation of these components is well-understood, routine, or conventional, where, as here, there is nothing in the Specification to indicate that the operations recited in claim 1 require any specialized hardware or inventive computer components or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer components to perform generic computer functions. The Federal Circuit, in accordance with Alice, has “repeatedly recognized the absence of a genuine dispute as to eligibility” where claims have been defended as involving an inventive concept based “merely on the idea of using existing computers or the Internet to carry out conventional processes, with no alteration of computer functionality.” Berkheimer, 890 F.3d at 1373. Accordingly, the claims at issue do not include any recitation directed to the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of the additional elements. The claims require only conventional, generic computer elements like a processor, a memory, displays, for receiving messages, and classifying messages based on the extracted data to a particular cluster. These generic computer elements are recited at a high level of generality and perform the basic functions of a computer that would be needed to apply the abstract idea via a computer. Merely using generic computer components to perform the above identified basic computer functions to practice or apply the judicial exception does not constitute a meaningful limitation that would amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Therefore, the claim does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception, because, when considered separately and in combination, the claim elements do not add significantly more to the exception. Considered separately and as an ordered combination, the claim elements do not provide an improvement to another technology or technical field; do not provide an improvement to the functioning of the computer itself; do not apply the judicial exception by use of a particular machine; do not effect a transformation or reduce a particular article to a different state or thing; and do not add a specific limitation other than what is well-understood, routine and conventional in the operation of a generic computer. None of the hardware recited "offers a meaningful limitation beyond generally linking 'the use of the [method] to a particular technological environment,' that is, implementation via computers." Id., slip op. at 16 (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 610, 611 (U.S. 2010)).
Further, in cases where decisions are rendered by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (or the previous Board of Appeals) the decision making of the Board is only binding upon the USPTO when the same issue and same subject matter were under consideration (Res Judicata). In cases where different claimed subject matter was under consideration by the Board, the decision making of the Board would not necessarily bind USPTO examiners to that position.
Conclusion
The prior art search has been conducted, with no significant prior art found.
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
/IGOR N BORISSOV/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3685 2/24/2026