DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application is being examined under the pre-AIA first to invent provisions.
Response to Amendment
The amendment filed on January 27, 2026 cancelled no claims. No claims were amended and no new claims were added. Thus, the currently pending claims addressed below are claims 1-60.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims 1-60 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
Independent claim(s) 1, 16, 31 and 46 have been amended to recite: “providing an at least one interface token that corresponds to the stored portable universal profile, the token structured as obtaining, by a requestor, interface display information for the portable universal profile” and “providing updated portable universal profile interface display information, in which the provided updated portable universal profile interface display information is structured as updating the display of instances of the portable universal profile user interface”. However, the examiner has been unable to find support for these limitations, as amended, in the applicant’s disclosure. No where in the applicant disclosure is it disclosed that a token is structured in any way much less a “token structured as obtaining, …, interface display information”. Additionally, the examiner has been unable to find support for “updated portable universal display interface display information” being structure in any way, much less “updated portable universal display interface display information structured as updating the display instances of the portable universal profile user interface”. As such, it is clear that independent claims 1, 16, 31 and 46, as amended, fail to comply with the written description requirement.
Dependent claim(s) 9-10, 24-25, 39-40, and 54-55 have been amended to recite: “in which the at least one interface token is structured as effectuating the display…”. However, the examiner has been unable to find support for these limitations, as amended, in the applicant’s disclosure. No where in the applicant disclosure is it disclosed that an interface token is structured in any way much less an “interface token structured as effectuating the display…”. As such, it is clear that dependent claims 9-10, 24-25, 39-40, and 54-55, as amended, fail to comply with the written description requirement.
Dependent claims 2-15, 17-30, 32-45, and 47-60 fail to correct the deficiencies of the claims from which they depend and, as such, are rejected by virtue of dependency.
For the purpose of prosecuting the claims the examiner is going to interpret the limitation “providing an at least one interface token that corresponds to the stored portable universal profile, the token structured as obtaining, by a requestor, interface display information for the portable universal profile” as if it recited “providing an at least one interface token that corresponds to the stored portable universal profile, the token usable by a requestor to obtain interface display information for the portable universal profile”; the limitation “providing updated portable universal profile interface display information, in which the provided updated portable universal profile interface display information is structured as updating the display of instances of the portable universal profile user interface” as if it recited “providing updated portable universal profile interface display information, in which the provided updated portable universal profile interface display information is usable to update the display of instances of the portable universal profile user interface”; and the limitation “in which the at least one interface token is structured as effectuating the display…” as if it recited “in which the at least one interface token is usable to effectuate the display…” because these interpretations are supported by the applicant’s disclosure.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1-60 are directed to an apparatus, a computer program product, a system, and a process which would be classified under one of the listed statutory classifications (i.e., 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance (hereinafter “PEG”) “PEG” Step 1=Yes).
However, claims 1-60 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more. Independent claim(s) 1, 16, 31 and 46 recite(s) the following abstract idea:
receiving interactive display and attribute information for a portable universal profile;
generating a portable universal profile based on the received interactive display and attribute information;
storing the generated portable universal profile, in which the stored generated portable universal profile includes interface display information;
providing an at least one interface token that corresponds to the stored portable universal profile, the token structured as obtaining, by a requestor, interface display information for the portable universal profile;
receiving a request based on one of the at least one provided interface tokens from a requestor;
retrieving portable universal profile interface display information based on the received request;
providing the retrieved portable universal profile interface display information to the requestor, in which the requestor may use the provided portable universal profile interface display information for the display of an instance of portable universal profile user interface to at least one user;
receiving interaction data associated with provided portable universal profile interface display information;
updating the stored portable universal profile based on the received interaction data; and
providing updated portable universal profile interface display information, in which the provided updated portable universal profile interface display information is structured as updating the display of instances of the portable universal profile user interface.
The limitations as detailed above, as drafted, falls within the “Certain Method of Organizing Human Activity” grouping of abstract ideas namely managing personal behavior or relationships between people and/or advertising, marketing, or sales related activities or behaviors. Accordingly, the claim recites an abstract idea (i.e. “PEG” Revised Step 2A Prong One=Yes).
This judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application because the claim only recites the additional elements of:
a computer with at least one processor and at least one memory executing software (e.g., component collection), and a database.
The following limitations, if removed from the abstract idea and considered additional elements, merely perform generic computer function of processing, communicating (e.g., transmitting and receiving), and displaying:
receiving interactive display and attribute information for a portable universal profile (receiving data);
storing the generated portable universal profile, in which the stored generated portable universal profile includes interface display information (storing data);
providing an at least one interface token that corresponds to the stored portable universal profile, the token structured as obtaining, by a requestor, interface display information for the portable universal profile (transmitting data);
receiving a request based on one of the at least one provided interface tokens from a requestor (receiving data);
providing the retrieved portable universal profile interface display information to the requestor, in which the requestor may use the provided portable universal profile interface display information for the display of an instance of portable universal profile user interface to at least one user (transmitting data);
receiving interaction data associated with provided portable universal profile interface display information (receiving data); and
providing updated portable universal profile interface display information, in which the provided updated portable universal profile interface display information is structured as updating the display of instances of the portable universal profile user interface (transmitting data).
The additional technical elements above are recited at a high-level of generality (i.e. as a generic processor performing a generic computer function of processing, communicating (e.g. transmitting and receiving), and displaying) such that it amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component. The claim(s) does/do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the additional technical elements above do not integrate the abstract idea/judicial exception into a practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. More specifically, the additional elements fail to include (1) improvements to the functioning of a computer or to any other technology or technical field (see MPEP 2106.05(a)), (2) applying or using a judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition (see Vanda memo), (3) applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine (see MPEP 2106.05(b)), (4) effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing (see MPEP 2106.05(c)), or (5) applying or using the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception (see MPEP 2106.05(e) and Vanda memo).
Rather, the limitations merely add the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea (see MPEP 2106.05(f)), or generally link the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use (see MPEP 2106.05(h)).
Thus, the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea (i.e. “PEG” Revised Step 2A Prong Two=Yes)
When considering Step 2B of the Alice/Mayo test, the claim(s) does/do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the claims do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea.
More specifically, as discussed above with respect to integration of the abstract idea into a practical application, the additional elements of using a computer with at least one processor and at least one memory executing software (e.g., component collection), and a database to perform the claimed functions amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component.
“Generic computer implementation” is insufficient to transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention (See Affinity Labs, _F.3d_, 120 U.S.P.Q.2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2016), citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2352, 2357) and more generally, “simply appending conventional steps specified at a high level of generality” to an abstract idea does not make that idea patentable (See Affinity Labs, _F.3d_, 120 U.S.P.Q.2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2016), citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1300). Moreover, “the use of generic computer elements like a microprocessor or user interface do not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter (See FairWarning, 120 U.S.P.Q.2d. 1293, citing DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). As such, the additional elements of the claim do not add a meaningful limitation to the abstract idea because they would be generic computer functions in any computer implementation. Thus, taken alone, the additional elements do not amount to significantly more than the above-identified judicial exception (the abstract idea). Looking at the limitations as an ordered combination adds nothing that is not already present when looking at the elements taken individually. There is no indication that the combination of elements improves the functioning of the computer or improves any other technology. Their collective functions merely provide generic computer implementation.
The Examiner notes simply implementing an abstract concept on a computer, without meaningful limitations to that concept, does not transform a patent-ineligible claim into a patent-eligible one (See Accenture, 728 F.3d 1336, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2013), citing Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1280), limiting the application of an abstract idea to one field of use does not necessarily guard against preempting all uses of the abstract idea (See Accenture, 728 F.3d 1336, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2013), citing Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231), and further the prohibition against patenting an abstract principle “cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the [principle] to a particular technological environment” (See Accenture, 728 F.3d 1336, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2013), citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 584), and finally merely limiting the field of use of the abstract idea to a particular existing technological environment does not render the claims any less abstract (See Affinity Labs, _F.3d_, 120 U.S.P.Q.2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2016), citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358; Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294; Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Applicant herein only requires a general-purpose computer and general-purpose computer components (as evidenced from paragraphs 305-308 of the applicant’s specification and the Affinity v DirecTV decision); therefore, there does not appear to be any alteration or modification to the generic activities indicated, and they are also therefore recognized as insignificant activity with respect to eligibility. Finally, the following limitations, if removed from the abstract idea and considered additional elements, would be considered insignificant extra solution activity as they are directed to merely receiving, storing and/or transmitting data:
receiving interactive display and attribute information for a portable universal profile (receiving data);
storing the generated portable universal profile, in which the stored generated portable universal profile includes interface display information (storing data);
providing an at least one interface token that corresponds to the stored portable universal profile, the token structured as obtaining, by a requestor, interface display information for the portable universal profile (transmitting data);
receiving a request based on one of the at least one provided interface tokens from a requestor (receiving data);
providing the retrieved portable universal profile interface display information to the requestor, in which the requestor may use the provided portable universal profile interface display information for the display of an instance of portable universal profile user interface to at least one user (transmitting data);
receiving interaction data associated with provided portable universal profile interface display information (receiving data); and
providing updated portable universal profile interface display information, in which the provided updated portable universal profile interface display information is structured as updating the display of instances of the portable universal profile user interface (transmitting data).
Thus, taken individually and in combination, the additional elements do not amount to significantly more than the above-identified judicial exception (the abstract idea) (i.e. “PEG” Step 2B=No).
The dependent claims 2-15; 17-30, 32-45; and 47-60 appear to merely further limit the abstract idea by further limiting the interaction data which is considered part of the abstract idea (Claims 2, 4, 7, 17, 19, 22, 32, 34, 37, 47, 49 and 52); further limiting display environment information which is considered part of the abstract idea (Claim 3, 18, 33, and 48); further limiting the provided portable universal profile interface display information which is considered part of the abstract idea (Claims 5, 8, 15, 20, 23, 30, 35, 38, 45, 50, 53 and 60); further limiting the displayed portable universal profile user interface which is outside of the scope of the applicant’s invention and as such considered part of the abstract idea (Claims 6, 21, 36, and 51); further limiting the at least one interface token which is considered part of the abstract idea (Claims 9-10, 24-25, 39-40, and 54-55); further limiting the interactive display and attribute information which is considered part of the abstract idea (Claims 11-13, 26-28, 41-43, and 56-58); adding an additional step of reconciling received interaction data with existing data stored the stored portable universal profile which is considered part of the abstract idea (Claims 14, 29, 44, and 59), and therefore only further limit the abstract idea (i.e. “PEG” Revised Step 2A Prong One=Yes), does/do not include any new additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception, and as such are “directed to” said abstract idea (i.e. “PEG” Step 2A Prong Two=Yes); and do not add significantly more than the idea (i.e. “PEG” Step 2B=No)..
Thus, based on the detailed analysis above, claims 1-60 are not patent eligible.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed January 27, 2026 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
The applicant indicates in paragraph 15 of the arguments that the claims have been “amended herein”. However, there are no claim marking or status indicators indicate that the claims filed January 27, 2026 were amended. As such, the examiner assumes that this is a typographical error and that no claims were currently amended.
With regards to the 35 USC 101 rejections, the applicant asserts that the office action mischaracterized the claims, the law, and is in err. The examiner strongly disagrees. The claims have been properly characterized a recited an abstract idea without significantly more. The characterization is consistent with all USPTO guidelines, MPEP 2106, and all presential case law. The applicant appears to have misconstrued the USPTO guidelines, MPEP 2106, and the law. The examiner will address the proper way to construe the USPTO guidelines, MPEP 2106, and the law, for each of specific arguments presented by the applicant in the order argued below. Thus, the applicant’s arguments are not convincing and the rejections have been maintained.
With regards to the 35 USC 101 rejections, the applicant asserts that both the 2025 USPTO Kim Memorandum, and the 2024 Guidance update including computer software must be considered and abided by as clarifying guidance to application of the MPEP 2106 Subject Matter Eligibility Test. The examiner disagrees. Nothing in the 2025 USPTO Kim Memorandum, and the 2024 Guidance update changed the manner in which subject eligibility is determined in MPEP 2106. Instead, they were just reminders of what is already disclosed in MPEP 2106. Nonetheless, the 35 USC 101 rejection of the claims in the instant application is consistent with the requirements in MPEP 2106, the 2025 USPTO Kim Memorandum, and the 2024 Guidance. Thus, the applicant’s arguments are not convincing and the rejections have been maintained.
First, the applicant has misconstrued the “apply it” section of the Kim Memorandum. The “apply it” section of the Kim Memorandum is mentioned under section II(B) titled “Step 2A, Prong 2. This section of the Kim Memorandum recites “Examiners should use the considerations discussed in MPEP 2106.04(d), subsection I in accordance with the procedure described in MPEP 2106.04(d), subsection II to evaluate whether the additional elements integrate the judicial exception into a practical application”, and “Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer”. Perhaps, the applicant is misconstruing the term “additional element” as used in MPEP 2106, 2025 USPTO Kim Memorandum, and the 2024 Guidance update. “Additional elements” are defined as those elements of a claim which are not part of the abstract idea itself. In the instant case, the only additional elements in the claims are a computer with at least one processor and at least one memory executing software (e.g., component collection), and a database which amount to no more than a general-purpose computer with generic computer components. Every other limitation of the claims is part of the abstract idea itself. As such, the only possible way the instant claims can be interpreted is that they recite an abstract idea which is merely applied using a general-purpose computer with generic computer components. Thus, the examiner’s characterization of the claims in the 35 USC 101 rejections are entirely consistent with the Kim Memorandum. Therefore, the applicant’s arguments are not convincing and the rejections have been maintained.
Second, the applicant misconstrues section II(A) of the Kim Memorandum. Section II(A) of the Kim Memorandum is discussing the “Mental Process” grouping of abstract ideas. As explained in the Kim Memorandum, claims and/or claim limitations that are part of an abstract idea characterized as a “Mental Process” must be capable of being performed in the human mind. This section of the Kim Memorandum is irrelevant to the claims of the instant invention because the claims have been identified as reciting “Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity”. None of the instant claims and/or claim limitations have been identified as reciting a “Mental Process”. As such, it is immaterial whether any of the instant claims and/or claim limitation can be carried out in the human mind because such a requirement is not imposed on claims and/or claim limitations that recite “Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity”. Thus, the examiner’s characterization of the claims in the 35 USC 101 rejections are entirely consistent with the Kim Memorandum. Therefore, the applicant’s arguments are not convincing and the rejections have been maintained.
Third, the applicant somehow misconstrues Kim Memorandum in such a way that requires examiner not to disregard technical elements that are performed by a processor as somehow generic simply because they take place via a processor. The examiner strongly disagrees. Nowhere does the Kim Memorandum even mention the term “processor”, much less require examiner not to disregard technical elements that are performed by a processor as somehow generic simply because they take place via a processor. While it is true that the Kim Memorandum states “While an additional limitation (or combination) that merely applies the judicial exception on a generic computer may not render a claim eligible on its own, an additional limitation (or combination) that meaningfully limits the judicial exception can render it eligible, the statement is with regard to an “additional limitation” and not a limitation of the abstract idea itself. As explained in MPEP 2106.05(a), “It is important to note, the judicial exception alone cannot provide the improvement” and in MPEP 2106.05(a)(II), “However, it is important to keep in mind that an improvement in the abstract idea itself (e.g. a recited fundamental economic concept) is not an improvement in technology”. Improvements of this nature are improvements to an abstract idea which are improvements in ineligible subject matter (see the SAP v. Investpic decision: Page 2, line 22 through Page 3, line 13 - Even assuming that the algorithms claimed are groundbreaking, innovative or even brilliant, the claims are ineligible because their innovation is an innovation in ineligible subject matter because they are nothing but a series of mathematical algorithms based on selected information and the presentation of the results of those algorithms. Thus, the advance lies entirely in the realm of abstract ideas, with no plausible alleged innovation in the non-abstract application realm. An advance of this nature is ineligible for patenting; and Page 10, lines 18-24 - Even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is limited to particular content, or a particular source, that limitations does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract.). Given that the only limitations which are considered additional limitations in the instant claims are a general-purpose computer with generic computer components which is merely used as a tool to apply the abstract idea, any improvement obtained by practicing the claimed invention is an improvement rooted solely in the abstract idea which is merely being applied using the general-purpose computer with generic computer components. As such, said improvement, whether the applicant considered it to be a technical improvement or not, is an improvement to an abstract idea and, as such, an improvement in ineligible subject matter. Thus, the examiner’s characterization of the claims in the 35 USC 101 rejections are entirely consistent with the Kim Memorandum. Therefore, the applicant’s arguments are not convincing and the rejections have been maintained.
The applicant appears to mischaracterize the examiner rejection to somehow indicate that software cannot make non-abstract improvements to computer technology. The examiner’s rejection indicates no such thing. There are numerous examples in precedential decision where “additional elements” which are software are capable of transforming an abstract idea into a practical application under Step 2a, Prong 2 and/or be considered “significantly more” under Step 2b. For example, the claims in the BASCOM decision comprised two devices, both of which were “additional elements”, each device performing a significant step of an abstract idea, wherein these significant steps were implemented in software. In this example, it was the arrangement of devices and the specific significant software steps each device was required to perform that resulted in an improvement that overcame the 101 rejections. The claims in the CoreWireless decision recited an “additional element” of a graphical user interface with specific functionality, implemented in software, that was deemed to be in improved graphical user interface which overcome the 101 rejections. The claims in the Enfish decision recited and “additional element” of a self-referential database that was implemented in software and operated in a different manner than traditional databases. It was this additional software element that provided the improvement that overcame the 101 rejections. In the claims of the Desjardin decision, the “additional element” of the applicant invented machine learning model, which is merely software, that was considered an improved machine learning model that did not internally operate in the same manner as traditional machine learning models and, as such, overcame the 101 rejections. The distinction between the claims in each of these cases and the claims of the instant invention, is that in the above precedential decisions the improvement was rooted in the “additional elements” of the claim, whereas, in the instant invention the purported improvement is rooted in the abstract idea itself which is merely applied using the additional element of a general-purpose computer with generic computer components. Improvements of this nature are improvements to an abstract idea which is an improvement in ineligible subject matter. Thus, the examiner’s position is that software merely programed to execute the abstract idea itself, when executed by a general-purpose computer with generic computer components is incapable of overcoming a 101 rejection under Step 2a, Prong 2 and/or Step 2b. As such, the applicant’s mischaracterization of the examiner position is clearly incorrect, and the rejections have been maintained.
The applicant somehow thinks that the examiner sees a technical claim limitation that was not able to be found in the prior art. Nothing could be further from the truth. The 35 USC 101 analysis under Step 2a, Prong 2 and Step 2b is completely different from determining whether or not a claim limitation is found in the prior art under 35 USC 102/103. Under 35 USC 102/103, an examiner is to determine whether a limitation of the claim is found in the prior art. This determination is made irrespective of whether the limitation is a technical claim limitation. Conversely, under 35 USC 101, Step 2a, Prong 2 and Step 2b, an examiner is to analyze whether an technological improvement is rooted in the additional elements of the claim such that it either transforms the abstract idea into a practical application or is considered “significantly more” under Step 2b. In the instant claims, instead of the examiner indicating that a specific technical claim limitation is not found in the prior art as the applicant asserts, the examiner indicated that he was unable to find one or more limitations of the claim in the prior art. As such, the applicant’s argument is a logical fallacy. If one were to properly characterize the examiner rejection in the manner used by the applicant, they could only conclude that since the examiner indicated that the only “additional element” found in the claim is a general-purpose computer with generic computer component, then the one or more claim limitation which were unable to be found in the prior art had to be limitations which were part of the abstract idea itself. As such, the applicant’s arguments are not convincing and the rejections have been maintained.
The applicant asserts that the claims of the instant application are similar to the claims of the Desjardins decision and, as such, should overcome the 35 USC 101 rejection. The examiner disagrees. As explained above, the claims in the Desjardins decision recited an “additional element” that resulted in an improvement that overcame the 35 USC 101 rejection. In the Desjardin decision, the machine learning model Desjardin invented was an improved machine learning model that did not operate in a manner consistent with traditional machine learning models. Traditional machine learning models when initially trained generate a machine learning algorithm based on the initial training data. When such traditional machine learning models are retrained with additional data, the machine learning model generates a new algorithm based on the original training data and the newly added training data and discard the original machine learning algorithm. Thus, the original machine learning algorithm (e.g., the original state) is not maintained. The inner workings of the Desjardins invented machine learning model do not perform in the same manner as these traditional machine learning algorithms because in Desjardins invented machine learning model the original machine learning algorithm (e.g, state) is maintained, even when it is trained with additional data. This provides an improvement over traditional machine learning models in that one can revert the machine learning model to a previous state if one determines the output being obtained after the machine learning model was trained with the additional data is not what was expected. Thus, the improvement is an improvement machine learning model that operates in a manner different from traditional machine learning models. It is important to note that the improvement is to the inner workings of the machine learning model, and not based on the type of data said machine learning model was trained or the amount training iterations that occur. Which is markedly different from the precedential Recentive Analytics decision, which states that irrespective of the type of data with which a machine learning model is trained, or the number of training iterations, the machine learning model is incapable of overcoming the 101 rejections because it is merely applying a known machine learning model as a tool to implement an abstract idea. In the Recentive Decision, the inner workings of the traditional machine learning models remains the same, whereas in the Desjardins decision it was the inner workings of the newly invented machine learning model which made it an “additional elements” that provided the improvement. In contrast, the instant claims recite no machine learning model whatsoever. Additionally, the only additional elements in the claims are a general-purpose computer with generic computer components which is merely used to apply the abstract idea. As such, any purported improvement obtained by practicing the claims of the instant invention is an improvement rooted solely in the abstract idea itself which is merely applied using the general-purpose computer with generic computer components. Hence, the instant claims bear no resemblance whatsoever to the claims of the Desjardin decision. Therefore, the applicant’s arguments are not convincing and the rejections have been maintained.
The applicant where when the machine learning models was trainedegarding “additional elements” of the claim The examiner has made no such statement. Instead, the examiner has found a claim limitation that is not found in the prior art. The examiner in no way believes that said limitation t, is that the impr that operatwas cons is able to improve a computer techno make the Berkheimer memo . Section II(A) of the Kim Memorandum is discussing the “Mental Process” grouping of abstract ideas “analyzing the claims under Step 2a, Prong 2 requires aoffice action mischaracterized the claims, the law, and is in err. The examiner strongly disagrees. The claims have been properly characterized a recited an abstract idea without significantly more. The characterization is consistent with all USPTO guidelines, MPEP 2106, and all presential case law. The applicant appears to have misconstrued the USPTO guidelines, MPEP 2106, and the law. The examiner will address the proper way to construe the USPTO guidelines, MPEP 2106, and the law, for each of specific arguments presented by the applicant in the order argued below. Thus, the applicant’s arguments are not convincing and the rejections have been maintained.
While the applicant copies parts of MPEP 2106 and pastes them into their arguments, the applicant has misconstrued the requires of said pasted sections. As such, the examiner disagrees with each and every argument put forth by the applicant with regards to the claims being mischaracterized based on the disclosures in MPEP 2106. MPEP 2106(I) explains that: “First, the claimed invention must be to one of the four statutory categories”; and “Second, the claimed invention also must qualify as patent-eligible subject matter, i.e., the claim must not be directed to a judicial exception unless the claim as a whole includes additional limitations amounting to significantly more than the exception”. Thus, MPEP 2106(I) clearly describes how a claim which recites an abstract idea can still be patent eligible subject matter. Note that, according to MPEP 2106(I), the only way in which a claim which recites an abstract idea can be patent eligible is if “the claim as a whole includes additional limitations amounting to significantly more than the exception. Thus, in order for an invention that recites an abstract idea to overcome a 35 USC 101 rejection is if the improvement recited in claim is rooted in the ”additional elements” of the claim in a manner other than merely applying the abstract idea using a general-purpose computer with generic computer components. As noted previously, MPEP 2106.04(d)(I) which describes relevant considerations for evaluating whether additional elements integrate a judicial exception into a practical application under Step 2a, Prong 1. This section of MPEP 2106.04, requires the examiner to perform an evaluation of whether the claimed additional elements demonstrate that a claim is directed to patent-eligible subject matter and states that examples of additional elements that may integrate the exception into a practical application include: “an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to another technology or technological field”. MPEP 2106.05(a) further explains this where it states “It is important to note, the judicial exception alone cannot provide the improvement” and MPEP 2106.05(a)(II) where it states “However, it is important to keep in mind that an improvement in the abstract idea itself (e.g. a recited fundamental economic concept) is not an improvement in technology”. Thus, only when one correctly understands the meaning of the term “additional elements” can on properly understand MPEP 2106, MPEP 2106.04, and MPEP 2106.05. “Additional elements” are those elements that are not part of the abstract idea itself. It appears based on the applicant’s arguments below, that they have misconstrued MPEP 2106 because they do not understand the difference between an element of the claim that is part of the abstract idea itself, and an element of the claim which is an “additional element”.
The applicant asserts that the examiner literally ignores and give no patentable weight to numerous unique/unconventional elements. The examiner strongly disagrees. First, the examiner has literally ignored no limitation of the claim, as each and every limitation of the claim has been indicated as either part of the abstract idea itself or an “additional element” of the claim. Second, the concept of “patentable weight” is typically applied with regards to an analysis of the claims under 35 USC 102/103. The analysis under 35 USC 101, is made with regards to which parts of a claim are part of the abstract idea and which parts of the claim are “additional elements”. Nonetheless, in the instant case, it is clear that the examiner has given every limitation of the claim patentable weight because each and every limitation in the claims have been identified as either part of the abstract idea or as an “additional element” of the claim. Thus, the applicant’s arguments are not convincing and the rejections have been maintained.
The applicant seems to assert that the different between an “additional element” of the claim and an element of the claim is somehow a novel interpretation of the MPEP and controlling 101 case law. This, clearly demonstrates that the applicant is misconstruing MPEP 2106 and all controlling 101 case law. The examiner has provided numerous examples above, in which the improvement must be rooted in the additional elements of the claim, and not merely the elements of the claim, in order for the claim to overcome a 35 USC 101 rejection under Step 2a, Prong 2 and/or Step 2b. Additionally, MPEP 2106 as cited numerous times above, clearly requires the improvement to be rooted in the “additional elements” of the claim in order to overcome a 35 USC 101 rejection under Step 2a, Prong 2 and/or Step 2b. In fact, every precedential decision mentioned by the applicant in the arguments supports the examiner’s correct and proper interpretation, as explained above. This is because the examiner’s correct and proper interpretation, as explained above, is in fact the only interpretation that is consistent with MPEP 2106, every USPTO Guidance, and every precedential decision made thus far. However, the examiner notes, that the applicant has yet to provide an example of single precedential decision in which an improvement rooted solely in the abstract idea itself which is merely applied using a general-purpose computer was determined to overcome a 35 USC 101 rejection. Thus, the rejections have been maintained.
The applicant argues that the instant claims are more technical than the claims of the CoreWireless decision, the DDR decision, the Enfish decision, and the Trading Technologies decision. The examiner disagrees. The claims of the CoreWireless decision, the DDR decision, the Enfish decision, and the Trading Technologies decision, all recited an improvement that was rooted in the “additional elements” of claim in a manner other than merely applying the abstract idea using a general-purpose computer. In the CoreWireless decision the “additional element” which was not part of the abstract idea itself was a graphical user interface with specific functionality which was considered an improved graphical user interface. In the DDR decision, the “additional element” which was not part of the abstract idea itself was the applicant invented hyperlink protocol that operated in a different manner than a traditional hyperlink protocol. In the Enfish decision, it was the “additional element” of the self-referential database which was not part of the abstract idea itself, which was an improvement over traditional databases. In the Trading Technologies decision, the claims recited an “additional element” of a graphical user interface with specific functionality that was not part of the abstract idea itself that was determined to be an improved graphical user interface. As such, each of these claims recited a technological improvement rooted in the additional element of the claims. In contrast, the instant claim recites no technological improvement rooted in the additional elements of the claims. MPEP 2106.05(a)(II) specifically states “However, it is important to keep in mind that an improvement in the abstract idea itself (e.g. a recited fundamental economic concept) is not an improvement in technology”. Thus, the instant claims cannot be said to be more technical than the claims of the CoreWireless decision, the DDR decision, the Enfish decision, and the Trading Technologies decision. While the instant claims might, arguably, be said to recite a more technically complex abstract idea than the abstract ideas of the CoreWireless decision, the DDR decision, the Enfish decision, and the Trading Technologies decision, such a distinction is irrelevant with regards to a determination under Step 2a, Prong 2 and/or Step 2b. Thus, the applicant’s arguments are not convincing and the rejections have been maintained.
The applicant argues that the instant claims are more technical than the claims of the Amdocs decision, the Berkheimer decision, the RTC decision, and the BASCOM decision. The examiner disagrees. In the Amdocs, Berkheimer, RTC, and BASCOM decisions, the “additional elements” either individually or as an order combination were determined to be significantly more than an abstract idea. In the Amdocs decision the “additional elements” of an unconventional distributed architecture each performing specific steps resulted in an arrangement of devices that resulted in the claims reciting “significantly more” than the abstract idea. In the Berkheimer decision, the “additional element” of storing a reconciled object structure in the archive without substantial redundancy was not proven to be a well-understood routine and conventional activity previously known in the industry and the specification indicated such storing was an improvement to the way traditional storing was done. As such, the claims overcame the 35 USC 101 rejection by reciting significantly more than the abstract idea. In the RTC decision, comparing the blue noise mask to a gray scale image to transform the gray scale image to a binary image array and converting the binary image array into a halftoned image were not a Mathematical Concept and, as such, were considered “additional elements”. These “additional elements” resulted in an improvement that was significantly more than the abstract idea itself. In the BASCOM decision, the courts indicated that if all the step were performed on the client device the claim would recite an abstract idea. Furthermore, if the remote ISP server was merely performing remote filtering the claims would not overcome the 101 rejections under Step 2a, Prong 2 or Step 2b. However, since both the client device and remote ISP server are positively recited within the scope of the claims, the arrangement of devices each performing significant steps of the abstract idea results in the ability for the remote ISP server to customize filtering for each user of said client device. This ability for a remote ISP server to customize filtering for each user of the client device resulted in an improvement over the way in which such filtering was traditionally done and, as such was considered significantly more than the abstract idea itself. As such, each of these claims recited a technological improvement rooted in the additional element of the claims. In contrast, the instant claim recites no technological improvement rooted in the additional elements of the claims. MPEP 2106.05(a)(II) specifically states “However, it is important to keep in mind that an improvement in the abstract idea itself (e.g. a recited fundamental economic concept) is not an improvement in technology”. Thus, the instant claims cannot be said to be more technical than the claims of the Amdocs decision, the Berkheimer decision, the RTC decision, and the BASCOM decision. While the instant claims might, arguably, be said to recite a more technically complex abstract idea than the abstract ideas of the claims of the Amdocs decision, the Berkheimer decision, the RTC decision, and the BASCOM decision, such a distinction is irrelevant with regards to a determination under Step 2a, Prong 2 and/or Step 2b. Thus, the applicant’s arguments are not convincing and the rejections have been maintained.
The applicant asserts that the claims improve processing efficiency. The examiner strongly disagrees. The total bandwidth of a network carrying the data transmitted by the claimed invention and/or received by the applicant’s invention is unchanged and is still able to transmit the same amount of data it always could. The processor still executes in the same manner it always has. The memory still stores data in the same manner that it always has. As such, the applicant’s invention does not improve the argued network, or the claims processor and/or memory. Any improvement obtained based on when or how much data is transmitted; the number of operations the processor must perform, or the amount of data the memory is required to store is rooted solely the performing the abstract idea of the claimed invention and, as such, would be rooted solely in the abstract idea itself which is merely being applied by the general-purpose computer. Improvements of this nature are improvements to an abstract idea which are improvements in ineligible subject matter. Thus, the applicant’s arguments are not convincing and the rejections have been maintained.
The applicant makes numerous spurious mischaracterizations of the examiner’s 35 USC 101 rejection and/or the previous response to argument, with the conclusion that this is “simply not the law”. While the examiner might agree that the applicant’s mischaracterization is not the law, all actual responses to the applicant’s invention and the 35 USC 101 rejection have absolutely and unequivocally been based on MPEP 2106, all USPTO Guidance, and all previous precedential 101 case law. The applicant has yet to provide an argument consistent with MPEP 2106, any USPTO Guidance, or any previous precedential 101 case law, which could be even marginally be considered to support the applicant’s position. As such, the applicant’s argument are not convincing and the rejections have been maintained.
The applicant argues that the office action has not provided any factual determinations with regards to Step 2b contrary to the 2106 test requirements. The examiner strongly disagrees. Once again, the applicant appears to misinterpret the requirements detailed in MPEP 2106, as well as the Berkheimer memo. According to both MPEP 2106 and the Berkheimer memo, an examiner is required to provide proof that the “additional elements” of a claim were well-understood, routine, and conventional. Contrary to the applicant’s assertion, the examiner has provided proof that the “additional elements” of a processor, a memory, and a database are well understood, routine, and conventional when he stated “Applicant herein only requires a general-purpose computer and general-purpose computer components (as evidenced from paragraphs 305-308 of the applicant’s specification and the Affinity v DirecTV decision)” in the 35 USC 101 rejection. If the applicant believes that he has invented a new processor that operates in a manner different from a traditional processor, a new memory that operates in a manner different from a traditional memory, and/or a new database that operates in a manner different from a traditional database, he is require to provide proof that this is the case by point the examiner to the part of the applicant’s specification that describes said processor as a new processor that operates in a different manner than a traditional processor, a new memory that operates in a manner different from a traditional memory, and/or a new database that operates in a manner different from a traditional database. In fact, the applicant’s assertion that the examiner is required to provide proof that such additional elements were well-understood, routine and conventional. Technically, the examiner which does not provide such proof is considered to have taken official notice that those elements were well-understood, routine, and conventional. The applicant can then force the examiner to provide proof that the additional elements were well-understood, routine, and conventional by providing specific argument’s detailing why the additional elements (which in this case are a processor, a memory, and a database) in the applicants claims and specification were not a generic processor, a generic memory, and/or a generic database, but instead were a different type of processor, memory or database that was not well-understood, routine, and conventional. Merely arguing that the examiner needs to provide proof is not a sufficient argument to overcome such official notice. As such, the applicant’s arguments are not convincing and the rejections have been maintained.
The applicant once again mischaracterized the examiner position as that once a claim or portion thereof is deemed abstract, all technical limitations of the claim can simply be unilaterally ignored. Nothing could be further from the truth. If an applicant is able to put forth a argument detailing why one or more of the limitations which have been included in the abstract idea are not involved in the, in this case, advertising, marketing or sales process, then the examiner must consider whether this argument is convincing. If the examiner, finds the applicants argument convincing, then the limitation would be removed from the abstract idea itself, and considered an “additional element” of the claimed invention with regards to the Step 2a, Prong 2 analysis and/or Step 2b analysis. However, no such argument has been put forth by the applicant. Instead, the applicant continues to misconstrue the required different between elements of a claim that are part of the abstract idea itself and elements of the claim that are “additional elements” and argues that such and such element of the claims should overcome the 35 USC 101 rejection even though the element is part of the abstract idea itself. This type of approach is unlikely to ever overcome the 35 USC 101 rejection, because improvements to an abstract idea are improvement in ineligible subject matter and, as such, incapable of overcoming a 35 USC 101 rejection under Step 2a, Prong 2 and/or Step 2b. As such, the rejections have been maintained.
The applicant once again mischaracterized the examiner position regarding the disclosure in the applicant’s specification with regards to the 35 USC 101 analysis. Thus, the examiner strenuously objects to this mischaracterization. The examiner never said that he need not consider the disclosure in the applicant’s specification when performing a 35 USC 101 rejection. Based on MPEP 2106, a 35 USC 101 analysis absolutely requires the examiner to consider the applicant specification when determining the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims. Additionally, it requires the examiner to looks to the applicant’s specification to determine the character of the “additional elements” of the claim. Are the “additional elements” of the claim something that the applicant has invented that is different from traditional additional elements which are similar in nature? Does the arrangement of the additional elements of the claim and the specific steps of the abstract idea each is performing result in an improvement that is described in the applicant’s specification? Thus, the examiner’s position is not that the disclosure in the specification is not used in a 35 USC 101 rejection as the applicant asserts. Instead, the examiner’s position is that he cannot read limitations from the abstract idea into the claims. Thus, he cannot construe a limitation that is part of the abstract idea in a narrower manner than the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim allows for. Addiitonally, he cannot interpret an additional element of the claim in a narrower manner than the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim allows for. Finally, he cannot interpret a claim to include an “additional element” which is not recited in the claim, just because such an “additional element” might be present in the applicant’s specification. As such, the rejections have been maintained.
The applicant asserts that
as that once a claim or portion thereof is deemed abstract, all technical limitations of the claim can simply be unilaterally ignored. Nothing could be further from the truth. If an applicant is able to put forth a argument detailing why one or more of the limitations which have been included in the abstract idea are not involved in the, in this case, advertising, marketing or sales process, then the examiner must consider whether this argument is convincing. If the examiner, finds the applicants argument convincing, then the limitation would be removed from the abstract idea itself, and considered an “additional element” of the claimed invention with regards to the Step 2a, Prong 2 analysis and/or Step 2b analysis. However, no such argument has been put forth by the applicant. Instead, the applicant continues to misconstrue the required different between elements of a claim that are part of the abstract idea itself and elements of the claim that are “additional elements” and argues that such and such element of the claims should overcome the 35 USC 101 rejection even though the element is part of the abstract idea itself. This type of approach is unlikely to ever overcome the 35 USC 101 rejection, because improvements to an abstract idea are improvement in ineligible subject matter and, as such, incapable of overcoming a 35 USC 101 rejection under Step 2a, Prong 2 and/or Step 2b. As such, the rejections have been maintained..
The applicant argues with regards to the 35 USC 101 rejection that the examiner must consider the machine-or-transformation test of Bilski as evidence of “significantly more” and the examiner has not done so. The examiner disagrees. While the machine-or-transformation test can be a useful and important clue, and investigative tool” for determining whether a claim is patent eligible under § 101, it is not a stand-alone test for eligibility (see MPEP 2106.05(b)). As per the Mayo decision the Supreme Court emphasized that satisfying the machine-or-transformation test, by itself, is not sufficient to render a claim patent-eligible, as not all transformations or machine implementations infuse an otherwise ineligible claim with an 'inventive concept.'. Nonetheless, the instant claims do not pass the machine-or-transformation test. In the instant case, the machine is a general-purpose computer with generic computer components. It is important to note that a general-purpose computer that applies a judicial exception, such as an abstract idea, by use of conventional computer functions does not qualify as a particular machine (see MPEP 2106.05(b)(1). In regards to a transformation, the claim recites no transformation of a particular article to a different state or thing as required (see MPEP 2106.05(c). Instead, the claims merely receive data, generate a profile comprising data, store the profile, provide data in the form of a token, receive data in the form of a request, retrieve the profile comprising data, provide the data to the requestor, received interaction data, update the data stored in the profile, and provide the data. There is no transformation of a particular article to a different state or thing. As such, the claims clearly fail the machine-or-transformation test and the rejection has been maintained. Thus, the applicant’s arguments are not convincing and the rejections have been maintained.
The applicant’s arguments with regards to the 35 USC 112(a) rejections are not convincing.
The applicant argues that paragraphs 73 and item 2504 of figures 22, 25, and 25b support an interface token structured as effectuating the display. The examiner has reviewed the cited sections and can find no support for an interface token structured as effectuating the display.
In order to properly understand paragraphs 72-77 and figures 22, 25, and 25b, item 2504, one must first understand the different between a PUP, a portable universal profile, and a portable universal profile interface (PUP-I). According to at least paragraph 58 of the applicant’s disclosure a PUP is the “Portable Universal Profile Apparatuses, Processes and Systems”. According to at least paragraph 59, a “portable universal profile” is data, such as interactive display and attribute information, stored in a database. According to at least paragraph 66, the PUP (i.e., Portable Universal Profile Apparatuses, Processes and Systems) generates a portable universal profile interface (PUP-I); the portable user profile is data stored in a database comprising the received interactive display and attribute information; and the portable universal profile interface (PUP-I) is the claimed portable universal profile user interface. According to paragraphs 67-68 the portable universal profile interface (PUP-I) may be a widget or application. Thus, when reading the applicant’s claims it is important to keep in mind that the apparatus of claim 1, the computer program product of claim 16, the system of claim 31, and the process of claim 46 are the PUP (i.e., Portable Universal Profile Apparatuses, Processes and Systems) in the applicant’s disclosure, portable universal profile user interface claimed is the portable universal profile interface (PUP-I) and the portable user profile claimed is merely the interactive display and attribute information stored as a profile in the database.
First, claims 1, 16, 31, and 64 recite providing “an at least one interface token that corresponds to the stored portable universal profile, the token structured as obtaining, by a requestor, interface display information for the portable universal profile”. Thus, the claim merely requires the interface token to correspond to the stored portable universal profile. The first time the term “interface token” is mentioned in the applicant’s specification is paragraph 59. According to paragraph 59, the PUP (i.e., invention of claims 1, 16, 31, and 64), provide an at least one interface token that corresponds to the stored portable universal profile, the token being usable by a requestor to obtain interface display information for the portable universal profile; receive a request based on one of the at least one provided interface tokens from a requestor; retrieve portable universal profile interface display information from the database based on the received request; provide the retrieved portable universal profile interface display information to the requestor, wherein the requestor may use the provided portable universal profile interface display information for the display of an instance of a portable universal profile user interface to at least one user. As such, paragraph 59, is broad enough that the claimed interface token merely be data, such as the universal personal ID of paragraph 67, which can be used to identify the interface display information stored in the portable universal profile associated with the interface token. There is no disclosure in paragraph 59 which would require an interface token to have any type of structure, it can merely be alphanumeric text that a user can provide to the PUP (i.e., invention of claims 1, 16, 31, and 64), in order to obtain the interface display information stored in the portable universal profile associated with the interface token. As such, paragraph 59 cannot be said to support “the token structured as obtaining, by a requestor, interface display information for the portable universal profile” as recited in claims 1, 16, 31, and 64.
The applicant’s specification next mentions an “interface token” in paragraph 73. However, paragraph 73 is not discussing the claimed “interface token” which is used to obtain interface display information. Instead, the interface token disclosed in paragraph 73 is disclosing what the PUP (i.e., invention of claims 1, 16, 31, and 64) does after it receives a request for a portable universal profile interface (PUP-I) as explained in paragraph 72. According to paragraphs 72-77 and figures 22, 25, and 25b, item 2504, the PUP (i.e., invention of claims 1, 16, 31, and 64), after receiving a request for a PUP-I, PUP-I is generated and provided for posting/publication as a widget or application that interacts with a hosting site and/or a pastable code snippet and/or like interface token. As such, paragraph 73 can be said to support the claimed “portable universal profile interface” being generated as a second interface token, but cannot be said to be relevant to the only “interface token” currently claimed. Arguably, the second, as yet unclaimed interface token” disclosed in paragraph 73, might be said to be software or a portion thereof, and as such have the structure of software, because it is recited as “like interface token”. However, one might also argue that it is not required to have any such structure. It would depend on how one interpreted the “like” portion of the disclosure. If like interpreted as “and/or other software executable code”, then it would be required to have executable software code structure. However, since a widget, application and/or pastable code snippet would appear to encompass all executable code type embodiments, it is just as likely that the “like” portion of the disclosure could merely be disclosing “or other means for obtaining the PUP-I software such as text requesting that the user send an email with the code “q4cfa0” and the system will reply to the email with the require software code for the PUP-I. With this interpretation, the ”like interface token” would not have any type of structure for executing an instance of the PUP-I, it would merely be a specific string of text the system used to determine which PUP-I to provide to the user. As such, paragraph 73 might not even support this second, as yet unclaimed, interface token have structure to execute an instance of a PUP-I. Nonetheless, it absolutely, does not support the “interface token” claimed having any type of structure much less the claimed “the token structured as obtaining, by a requestor, interface display information for the portable universal profile”.
The applicant’s specification next mentions “interface token” in paragraphs 312-313.considered. The disclosure in paragraphs 312-313 are consistent with the “interface token” in paragraph 59, in that it merely requires providing an interfaced token that corresponds to information stored in the portable universal profile, and receiving a request based on the interface token from the requestor. There is no disclosure in paragraphs 312-313 which would require an interface token to have any type of structure, it can merely be alphanumeric text that a user can provide to the PUP (i.e., invention of claims 1, 16, 31, and 64), in order to obtain the interface display information stored in the portable universal profile associated with the interface token. As such, paragraphs 313 cannot be said to support “the token structured as obtaining, by a requestor, interface display information for the portable universal profile” as recited in claims 1, 16, 31, and 64.
The applicant’s specification next mentions “interface token” in paragraphs 326-327. The disclosures in paragraphs 326-327 are consistent with the “interface token” in paragraph 59, in that it merely requires the applicant’s invented “PUP” to use the received interface token to access data which allows it to then generate a PUP-I which is then provided to a user such that when the user loads the PUP-I on a social networking service of a webpage the PUP-I is displayed on said social networking service or webpage. Nothing in these paragraphs could be said to support the interface token have a structure much less support “the token structured as obtaining, by a requestor, interface display information for the portable universal profile” as recited in claims 1, 16, 31, and 64.
The same is true for the remaining disclosures of “interface token” in the applicant’s disclosure. Paragraphs 374-375, 399-400, and 410-411 are all consistent with the interface token in paragraph 59. None of these disclosures require the “interface token” to have a structure much less support “the token structured as obtaining, by a requestor, interface display information for the portable universal profile” as recited in claims 1, 16, 31, and 64.
Likewise, the applicant’s arguments with regard to the “Coketags” in the applicant’s disclosure do not support the claimed “interface token” having a structure much less support “the token structured as obtaining, by a requestor, interface display information for the portable universal profile” as recited in claims 1, 16, 31, and 64. Based on at least paragraph 70 of the applicant’s specification CokeTags are the equivalent of the PUP-I, which makes sense because a CokeTag is merely a snippet of code. Thus, the Coketags recited in the applicant’s disclosure are equivalent of the “snippet of code” recited in paragraph 73, that is generated after the PUP (i.e., invention of claims 1, 16, 31, and 64), receives the claimed interface token. As such, the coketags cannot be said to support the “interface token” claimed, but instead might be said to support a second, as yet unclaimed, interface token which is a PUP-I, that the applicant’s invention generated after the receipt of the claimed “interface token”.
As such, the applicant’s arguments are not convincing and the rejections have been maintained.
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure.
Rothschild et al. (PGPUB: 2009/0030774) which discloses generating and storing a portable user profile based on interactive display and attribute information; generating modified URLs (interface tokens) that correspond to selected advertisement in the stored profile; embedding the advertisement in a message to be shared on a social network; upon a requester clicking on the URL, obtaining and displaying the advertisement information from the portable universal profile; wherein the requester can share the message and embedded advertisement with other users; updating the stored portable user profile based on received interactions.
Vanasco (PGPUB: 2010/0274815) which discloses a widget that managing, updating, and synchronizing information across widget instances so that changes are propagated to all synchronized widgets.
Trendhunter, DIY Facebook Apps: Coke Tags Promote Anything You Want, June 11, 2008, www.trendhunter.com/trends/coketag, pages 2-4 which discloses a Facebook app, that lets you create a customizable widget that bundles links into a convenient package, wherein the widget can be created then posted on social media. The widgets can be shared and interactions with the widgets are tracked.
Brance, Coke Tags James Reams, May 30, 2008, https://bluegrasstoday.com/ coke-tags-james-reams, pages 1-3 which discloses CokeTags as being a widget that runs on your Facebook page, presenting people with a list of links you recommend. Once a CokeTag is created other people can embed it on their own Facebook page. Any updates made to a CokeTag you have created updates the information in the Coketag anywhere it has been embedded or posted.
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to JOHN W VAN BRAMER whose telephone number is (571)272-8198. The examiner can normally be reached Monday-Thursday 5:30 am - 4 pm EST.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Spar Ilana can be reached on 571-270-7537. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/John Van Bramer/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3622
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