DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
This Office Action is responsive to the Reply to Office Action filed July 7, 2025. The Examiner acknowledges the amendments to claims 8 and 25, and the cancellation of claim 12. Claims 1-11 and 13-25 are currently pending.
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s arguments, see remarks, filed , with respect to the claim objection of claim 8 and the rejection of claim 25 under 35 USC 112(b) have been fully considered and are persuasive. The previous claim objection of claim 8 and the previous rejection of claim 25 under 35 USC 112(b) have been withdrawn.
Regarding applicant’s arguments, filed July 7, 2025, with respect to the rejection of the claims under 35 USC 103 unpatentable over Tadi as modified by Lee and Ramos as modified by Lee, applicant argues the prior art does not teach or suggest the use for neurorehabilitation of the registered signals which include visual evoked potentials and where the visual evoked potentials include event related potentials (ERPs), which in turn allows a control of a device. Furthermore, applicant argues none of the cited references teach or suggest the integration of ERP-based visual stimuli as both user-selectable targets and as catalysts for motor-related cortical activation. Applicant asserts that Tadi and Ramos fail to disclose or suggest the user of ERP signals for controlling a rehab device or for initiating cortical processes related to motor action. Applicant further argues that Lee teaches the use of ERP signals for selecting items in a video game or virtual keyboard, but does not teach using ERP to control a rehab robot to engage in motor training, and additionally that Lee fails to provide any disclosure for using ERP to rehabilitate lost motor function or to control a robotic rehab device. Moreover, Applicant argues that modifying the systems of Tadi or Ramos by Lee to incorporate ERPs would not be obvious.
The Examiner respectfully disagrees with these arguments. Applicant's arguments fail to comply with 37 CFR 1.111(b) because they amount to a general allegation that the claims define a patentable invention without specifically pointing out how the language of the claims patentably distinguishes them from the references. In response to applicant's argument that the references fail to show certain features of the invention, it is noted that the features upon which applicant relies (i.e., the integration of ERP-based visual stimuli as both user-selectable targets and as catalysts for motor-related cortical activation) are not recited in the rejected claim(s). Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually (i.e., that though Lee teaches the use of ERP signals for selecting items in a video game or virtual keyboard, Lee does not teach using ERP to control a rehab robot to engage in motor training), one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Lee teaches a brain-computer interface apparatus based on a head mounted display, wherein the brain-computer interface apparatus implements a method of recognizing user intention by estimating brain signals (see Lee, abstract). The brain computer interface apparatus uses training images to cause brain signals that correspond to specific brain-computer interface paradigms (see Lee, par 0010-0013), wherein the brain-computer interface paradigms include motor imagery potential, a steady-state visual/auditory/somatosensory evoked potential, and an event-related potential (see Lee, par 0011-0013, 0021, 0023, 0071). The brain signals are estimated and are used by a classification model to recognize a user intention derived from a user looking at images that elicit brain signals corresponding to one of the specific brain-computer interface paradigms (i.e., event-related potentials of a user are learned and used to determine user intention by the brain-computer interface based upon received brain signals when a user is looking at an image that elicits event-related potentials of a user) (see Lee, par 0025, 0053, 0079, 0104, 0125-0129, 0138, 0151, figs. 5, 14A & 14B). Therefore, though Lee does not teach using ERP to control a rehab robot to engage in motor training, the extraction and use of visual evoked potentials and specifically ERPs enable the recognition of a user intention (as taught by Lee) which can be used to control a device (i.e., the devices of Tadi and Ramos respectively) based upon the recognized user intention (see Lee, par 0138, 0140). As such, the claims are still rejected under 35 USC 103 over Tadi in view of Lee and Ramos in view of Lee. See 35 USC 103 rejections below.
Claim Interpretation
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(f):
(f) Element in Claim for a Combination. – An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The following is a quotation of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The claims in this application are given their broadest reasonable interpretation using the plain meaning of the claim language in light of the specification as it would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim element (also commonly referred to as a claim limitation) is limited by the description in the specification when 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is invoked.
As explained in MPEP § 2181, subsection I, claim limitations that meet the following three-prong test will be interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
(A) the claim limitation uses the term “means” or “step” or a term used as a substitute for “means” that is a generic placeholder (also called a nonce term or a non-structural term having no specific structural meaning) for performing the claimed function;
(B) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is modified by functional language, typically, but not always linked by the transition word “for” (e.g., “means for”) or another linking word or phrase, such as “configured to” or “so that”; and
(C) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is not modified by sufficient structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function.
Use of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim with functional language creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites sufficient structure, material, or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Absence of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is not to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is not interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites function without reciting sufficient structure, material or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Claim limitations in this application that use the word “means” (or “step”) are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action. Conversely, claim limitations in this application that do not use the word “means” (or “step”) are not being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action.
This application includes one or more claim limitations that do not use the word “means,” but are nonetheless being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, because the claim limitation(s) uses a generic placeholder that is coupled with functional language without reciting sufficient structure to perform the recited function and the generic placeholder is not preceded by a structural modifier. Such claim limitation(s) is/are: a device for registering brain activity in claim 1.
Because this/these claim limitation(s) is/are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, it/they is/are being interpreted to cover the corresponding structure described in the specification as performing the claimed function, and equivalents thereof. As described in the specification, the device for registering brain activity is an electroencephalograph (EEG), a near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) device, or a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) device.
If applicant does not intend to have this/these limitation(s) interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, applicant may: (1) amend the claim limitation(s) to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph (e.g., by reciting sufficient structure to perform the claimed function); or (2) present a sufficient showing that the claim limitation(s) recite(s) sufficient structure to perform the claimed function so as to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
Claim(s) 1-4, 6-7 & 9-10 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US Patent Application Publication 20160235323 --as previously cited--, hereinafter referenced as "Tadi", in view of US Patent Application Publication 20190121431 --as previously cited--, hereinafter referenced as "Lee".
With respect to claim 1, Tadi teaches a neurorehabilitation system (see Tadi, abstract, and par 0001) comprising:
a visual display device (i.e., virtual reality (VR) device) (see Tadi, par 0008, 0014, 0100, 0125 & 0170);
a device for registering brain activity (i.e., using EEG, MRI, or MEG sensors for brain monitoring) (see Tadi, par 0032, 0039, 0085, 0089, fig. 1a);
a robotic device 31, 41 for impacting a trained object (i.e., a functional electrical stimulation (FES) device or a robotic actuator device) (see Tadi, par 0036, 0170, fig. 2d);
and a computer with a database and a software (i.e., a hybrid brain computer interface) wherein the computer is configured to recognize and extract registered signals of a brain activity and interpret the extracted registered signals using the database (see Tadi, par 0089, 0144), wherein the computer with the software is configured to transmit commands formed on the basis of the interpretation of the registered signals of the brain activity to the robotic device and/or to the visual display device on a transmit-receive basis (see Tadi, par 0053, 0139, 0170-0171, 0173).
Tadi fails to teach the registered signals comprise visual evoked potentials, wherein the visual evoked potentials include event related potentials (ERPs).
Lee teaches a brain-computer interface apparatus based on a head mounted display, wherein the brain-computer interface apparatus implements a method of recognizing user intention by estimating brain signals (see Lee, abstract). The brain computer interface apparatus uses training images to cause brain signals that correspond to specific brain-computer interface paradigms (see Lee, par 0010-0013), wherein the brain-computer interface paradigms include motor imagery potential, a steady-state visual/auditory/somatosensory evoked potential, and an event-related potential (see Lee, par 0011-0013, 0021, 0023, 0071). The brain signals are estimated and are used by a classification model to recognize a user intention derived from a user looking at images that elicit brain signals corresponding to one of the specific brain-computer interface paradigms (i.e., event-related potentials of a user are learned and used to determine user intention by the brain-computer interface based upon received brain signals when a user is looking at an image that elicits event-related potentials of a user) (see Lee, par 0025, 0053, 0079, 0104, 0125-0129, 0138, 0151, figs. 5, 14A & 14B).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the system of Tadi such that in the system, the registered signals comprise visual evoked potentials, wherein the visual evoked potentials include event related potentials (ERPs) because the extraction and use of visual evoked potentials and specifically ERPs enable the recognition of a user intention which can be used to control a device based upon the recognized user intention (see Lee, par 0138, 0140).
With respect to claim 2, Tadi in view of Lee teaches the neurorehabilitation system according to claim 1. Tadi further teaches that a virtual reality device is used as the visual display device (see Tadi, par 0008, 0014, 0100, 0125 & 0170).
With respect to claim 3, Tadi in view of Lee teaches the neurorehabilitation system of claim 1. Tadi further teaches the robotic device comprises an exoskeleton (i.e., a robotic actuator) (see Tadi, par 0036, 0170, fig. 2d).
With respect to claim 4, Tadi in view of Lee teaches the neurorehabilitation system according to claim 1. Tadi further teaches the device for registering brain activity is an electroencephalograph (see Tadi, par 0032, 0039, 0085, 0089, fig. 1a).
With respect to claim 6, Tadi in view of Lee teaches the neurorehabilitation system according to claim 1. Tadi further teaches the device for registering brain activity is a magnetic resonance imaging device (see Tadi, par 0032).
With respect to claim 7, Tadi in view of Lee teaches the neurorehabilitation system according to claim 1. Tadi further teaches the device for registering brain activity registers magnetic fields resulting from electrical activity of the brain (i.e., an MEG device is used for brain monitoring) (see Tadi, par 0032).
With respect to claim 9, Tadi in view of Lee teaches the neurorehabilitation system according to claim 1. Tadi further teaches that the system comprises an electrical stimulator (i.e., a functional electrical stimulation device (FES)) (see Tadi, par 0036, 0054, 0060, 0086, 0170-0172).
With respect to claim 10, Tadi in view of Lee teaches the neurorehabilitation system according to claim 1. Tadi further teaches that the system comprises an electromyograph (see Tadi, par 0033, 0039, 0092, 0119-0122, fig. 6).
Claim(s) 1, 3-11, 13-25 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US Patent Application Publication 20170325705, hereinafter referenced as "Ramos" --as previously cited--, in view of US Patent Application Publication 20190121431 --as previously cited--, hereinafter referenced as "Lee".
With respect to claim 1, Ramos teaches a neurorehabilitation system (see Ramos, par 0014-0021) comprising:
a visual display device (i.e., a screen or display) (see Ramos, par 0024);
a device for registering brain activity 10 (i.e., using intracortical microelectrodes, a functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) device, a functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) device, a magnetoencephalography device, or an electroencephalograph (EEG) to register brain neurosignals) (see Ramos, par 0059, fig. 1);
a robotic device for impacting a trained object 30 (i.e., a body actuator such as a functional electrical stimulator (FES) or a robotic exoskeleton) (see Ramos, 0021, fig. 1);
a computer with a database and a software (i.e., a hybrid brain-machine interface) for recognizing and extracting a registered signal of brain activity and interpreting the extracted recorded signal using a database (see Ramos, par 0017-0020, 0032, 0035-0041) wherein the computer with the software is configured to transmit commands formed on the basis of the interpretation of the registered signals of brain activity to the robotic device and/or to the visual display device on a transmit-receive basis (see Ramos, par 0017-0020, 0032, 0035-0041).
Ramos fails to teach the registered signals comprise visual evoked potentials, wherein the visual evoked potentials include event related potentials (ERPs).
Lee teaches a brain-computer interface apparatus based on a head mounted display, wherein the brain-computer interface apparatus implements a method of recognizing user intention by estimating brain signals (see Lee, abstract). The brain computer interface apparatus uses training images to cause brain signals that correspond to specific brain-computer interface paradigms (see Lee, par 0010-0013), wherein the brain-computer interface paradigms include motor imagery potential, a steady-state visual/auditory/somatosensory evoked potential, and an event-related potential (see Lee, par 0011-0013, 0021, 0023, 0071). The brain signals are estimated and are used by a classification model to recognize a user intention derived from a user looking at images that elicit brain signals corresponding to one of the specific brain-computer interface paradigms (i.e., event-related potentials of a user are learned and used to determine user intention by the brain-computer interface based upon received brain signals when a user is looking at an image that elicits event-related potentials of a user) (see Lee, par 0025, 0053, 0079, 0104, 0125-0129, 0138, 0151, figs. 5, 14A & 14B).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the system of Ramos such that in the system, the registered signals comprise visual evoked potentials, wherein the visual evoked potentials include event related potentials (ERPs) because the extraction and use of visual evoked potentials and specifically ERPs enable the recognition of a user intention which can be used to control a device based upon the recognized user intention (see Lee, par 0138, 0140).
With respect to claim 3, Ramos in view of Lee teaches the neurorehabilitation system of claim 1. Ramos further teaches that the robotic device comprises an exoskeleton 30 (see Ramos, par 0021, 0056, 0065, 0072-0073, fig. 1).
With respect to claim 4, Ramos in view of Lee teaches the neurorehabilitation system according to claim 1. Ramos further teaches the device for registering brain activity is an electroencephalograph (see Ramos, par 0059).
With respect to claim 5, Ramos in view of Lee teaches the neurorehabilitation system according to claim 1. Ramos further teaches the device for registering brain activity is a near-range infrared spectroscopy device (i.e., a fNIRS device) (see Ramos, par 0059).
With respect to claim 6, Ramos in view of Lee teaches the neurorehabilitation system according to claim 1. Ramos further teaches the device for registering brain activity is a magnetic resonance imaging device (i.e., using functional magnetic resonance imaging to register brain neurosignals) (see Ramos, par 0059).
With respect to claim 7, Ramos in view of Lee teaches the neurorehabilitation system according to claim 1. Ramos further teaches the device for registering brain activity registers magnetic fields resulting from electrical activity of the brain (i.e., magnetoencephalography is used to register brain neurosignals of a subject) (see Ramos, par 0059).
With respect to claim 8, Ramos in view of Lee teaches the neurorehabilitation system according to claim 1. Ramos further teaches there are at least two devices registering brain activity (see Ramos, par 0059).
With respect to claim 9, Ramos in view of Lee teaches the neurorehabilitation system according to claim 1. Ramos further teaches that the system comprises an electrical stimulator (i.e., a functional electrical stimulator device (FES)) (see Ramos, par 0021, 0056, 0065, 0072-0073).
With respect to claim 10, Ramos in view of Lee teaches the neurorehabilitation system according to claim 1. Ramos further teaches that the system comprises an electromyograph (see Ramos, par 0014-0020, 0065-0076).
With respect to claim 11, Ramos teaches a method for neurorehabilitation, the method comprising:
presenting on a visual display device a task, the task being a movement by a trained object (i.e., providing instructions relative to a series of exercises and/or tasks to be carried out with a paretic limb of a patient on a screen or display) (see Ramos, par 0024);
registering signals of a brain activity by a device for registering brain activity 10 (i.e., using intracortical microelectrodes, a functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) device, a functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) device, a magnetoencephalography device, or an electroencephalograph (EEG) to register brain neurosignals) (see Ramos, par 0059, fig. 1);
transmitting the registered signals of the brain activity to a computer with a software associated with a database (i.e., a brain-machine interface) (see Ramos, see par 0017-0020, 0032, 0035-0041);
extracting the registered signals for interpreting the brain activity by the computer with software (see Ramos, see par 0017-0020, 0032, 0035-0041),
interpreting the extracted registered signals by using the database (see Ramos, see par 0017-0020, 0032, 0035-0041, 0061-0072),
transmitting commands formed on the basis of the interpretation of registered signals of the brain activity to a robotic device and / or the visual display device (see Ramos, see par 0017-0020, 0032, 0035-0041, 0061-0072);
impacting the trained object by the robotic device (see Ramos, see par 0017-0020, 0032, 0035-0041, 0072),
transmitting a signal resulting from the impact to the visual display device (see Ramos, par 0024); and
displaying a visual presentation of the task being performed by the robotic on the visual display device (see Ramos, par 0024, 0092, see fig. 3).
Ramos fails to teach the registered signals comprise visual evoked potentials, wherein the visual evoked potentials include event related potentials (ERPs).
Lee teaches a brain-computer interface apparatus based on a head mounted display, wherein the brain-computer interface apparatus implements a method of recognizing user intention by estimating brain signals (see Lee, abstract). The brain computer interface apparatus uses training images to cause brain signals that correspond to specific brain-computer interface paradigms (see Lee, par 0010-0013), wherein the brain-computer interface paradigms include motor imagery potential, a steady-state visual/auditory/somatosensory evoked potential, and an event-related potential (see Lee, par 0011-0013, 0021, 0023, 0071). The brain signals are estimated and are used by a classification model to recognize a user intention derived from a user looking at images that elicit brain signals corresponding to one of the specific brain-computer interface paradigms (i.e., event-related potentials of a user are learned and used to determine user intention by the brain-computer interface based upon received brain signals when a user is looking at an image that elicits event-related potentials of a user) (see Lee, par 0025, 0053, 0079, 0104, 0125-0129, 0138, 0151, figs. 5, 14A & 14B).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the method of Ramos such that in the method, the registered signals comprise visual evoked potentials, wherein the visual evoked potentials include event related potentials (ERPs) because the extraction and use of visual evoked potentials and specifically ERPs enable the recognition of a user intention which can be used to control a device based upon the recognized user intention (see Lee, par 0138, 0140).
With respect to claim 13, Ramos in view of Lee teaches the method of neurorehabilitation according to claim 11. Ramos in view of Lee further teaches the registered signals comprise a motor imagination signal (i.e., a brain-computer interface paradigm, such as motor imagery potential, is used to extract brain signals corresponding to motor imagery potential for recognizing a user intention) (see Lee, par 0011-0013, 0021, 0023, 0071).
With respect to claim 14, Ramos in view of Lee teaches the method of neurorehabilitation according to claim 11. Ramos in view of Lee further teaches the registered signals comprise the visual evoked potential signal and a motor imagination signal (i.e., brain-computer interface paradigms, such as motor imagery potential, a steady-state visual/auditory/somatosensory evoked potential, and an event-related potential, are used to extract brain signals corresponding for recognizing a user intention) (see Lee, par 0011-0013, 0021, 0023, 0071, 0074).
With respect to claim 15, Ramos in view of Lee teaches the method of neurorehabilitation according to claim 11. Ramos further teaches that the registered signals derived from a brain activity associated with a healthy object are used to impact the trained object with the robotic device (i.e., the signals of brain activity of a healthy limb are registered to use as reference data for the signals of brain activity of a paretic limb) (see Ramos, par 0030-0031).
With respect to claim 16, Ramos in view of Lee teaches the method of neurorehabilitation according to claim 11. Ramos further teaches that, in addition to the signals of brain activity, signals of muscle activity are registered to control the robotic device (i.e., EMG signals are registered) (see par Ramos, par 0014, 0065-0076).
With respect to claim 17, Ramos in view of Lee teaches the method of neurorehabilitation according to claim 16. Ramos further teaches that the impact on the trained object by the robotic device is performed in accordance with a muscular activity of a healthy object (i.e., the muscular activity of a healthy limb is used as reference data for the muscular activity of a paretic limb) (see Ramos, par 0027-0031).
With respect to claim 18, Ramos in view of Lee teaches the method of neurorehabilitation according to claim 11. Ramos further teaches that a command to the visual display device is transmitted from the computer via the robotic device (i.e., the visual display provides feedback to a user emitted from an exoskeleton) (see Ramos, par 0092).
With respect to claim 19, Ramos in view of Lee teaches the method of neurorehabilitation according to claim 11. Ramos further teaches that the impact on the trained object by the robotic device is additionally accompanied by an electrical stimulation of muscles and nerves responsible for moving the trained object (i.e., functional electrical stimulation is used to train a user) (see Ramos, par 0021, 0056, 0065, 0072-0073).
With respect to claim 20, Ramos in view of Lee teaches the method of neurorehabilitation according to claim 11. Ramos further teaches automatically selecting or adjusting a software classifier used to form the database (i.e., neural networks are used to decode movement and movement trajectories of healthy patients that is used to compare to patients with paretic limbs) (see Ramos, par 0075).
With respect to claim 21, Ramos in view of Lee teaches the method of neurorehabilitation according to claim 11. Ramos further teaches that data of the interpretation of brain activity obtained from the task being performed by the robotic device is recorded in the database (i.e., brain neurosignals pertaining to a patient trying to move to accomplish a specific task in a training session are input into a movement decoder of the brain machine interface which decodes the neurosignals into parameters that define the desired body actuator control) (see Ramos, par 0061).
With respect to claim 22, Ramos in view of Lee teaches the method of neurorehabilitation according to claim 11. Ramos further teaches that an instant visual feedback on a degree of fulfillment of the task based on the registered signals of the brain activity is displayed on the visual display device (see Ramos, par 0092).
With respect to claim 23, Ramos in view of Lee teaches the method of neurorehabilitation according to claim 11. Ramos further teaches that the visual presentation on the visual display device of the task being performed is implemented in a manner that stimulates activation of mirror neurons (i.e., visual and proprioceptive sensory feedback is provided to the user on a display, which in turn can stimulate a user’s mirror neurons) (see Ramos, par 0092).
With respect to claim 24, Ramos in view of Lee teaches the method of neurorehabilitation according to claim 11. Ramos further teaches registering the signals and performing the task are divided into stages (see Ramos, par 0014), while at each stage of the task, a bioelectric activity can be registered by a different device (i.e., EEG & EMG) (see Ramos, par 0059, ), and actions can be performed with different parts of the trained object (i.e., different parts of the exoskeleton can be moved) (see Ramos, par 0062, 0094), and each stage is displayed on the display device independently (i.e. feedback of performing each movement is provided to the user on a display device) (see Ramos, par 0092).
With respect to claim 25, Ramos in view of Lee teaches the method of neurorehabilitation according to claim 1. Ramos in view of Lee further teaches the registered signals further comprise a motor imagination signal (i.e., a brain-computer interface paradigm, such as motor imagery potential, is used to extract brain signals corresponding to motor imagery potential for recognizing a user intention) (see Lee, par 0011-0013, 0021, 0023, 0071).
Conclusion
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Destiny J Cruickshank whose telephone number is (571)270-0187. The examiner can normally be reached M-F, 9am-6pm.
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If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Charles Marmor II can be reached at (571) 272-4730. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/CHARLES A MARMOR II/Supervisory Patent Examiner
Art Unit 3791
/D.J.C./Examiner, Art Unit 3791