Prosecution Insights
Last updated: April 19, 2026
Application No. 17/449,116

DYNAMICALLY GENERATED KNOWLEDGE GRAPHS

Non-Final OA §101
Filed
Sep 28, 2021
Examiner
STARKS, WILBERT L
Art Unit
2122
Tech Center
2100 — Computer Architecture & Software
Assignee
International Business Machines Corporation
OA Round
3 (Non-Final)
76%
Grant Probability
Favorable
3-4
OA Rounds
3y 6m
To Grant
80%
With Interview

Examiner Intelligence

Grants 76% — above average
76%
Career Allow Rate
493 granted / 653 resolved
+20.5% vs TC avg
Minimal +4% lift
Without
With
+4.4%
Interview Lift
resolved cases with interview
Typical timeline
3y 6m
Avg Prosecution
47 currently pending
Career history
700
Total Applications
across all art units

Statute-Specific Performance

§101
40.3%
+0.3% vs TC avg
§103
13.1%
-26.9% vs TC avg
§102
35.7%
-4.3% vs TC avg
§112
6.0%
-34.0% vs TC avg
Black line = Tech Center average estimate • Based on career data from 653 resolved cases

Office Action

§101
DETAILED ACTION Claims 1-6, 8-15, and 17-22 have been examined. Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 101 35 U.S.C. § 101 reads as follows: Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. The invention, as taught in Claims 1-6, 8-15, and 17-22, is directed to “mental steps” and “mathematical steps” without significantly more. The claims recite: • cluster data of search results of a topic of interest into a hierarchical knowledge tree format (i.e., mental steps) • monitor computer user behavior regarding the search results (i.e., mental steps) • process a determined result of the monitored computer user behavior and the clustered data of the search results to generate a knowledge graph based on the topic of interest (i.e., mental steps) • generate an answer corresponding to an initial inquiry based on the new version of the knowledge graph (i.e., mental steps) • a modified weight factor that is generated based at least in part on detecting a repeated occurrence of a computer user behavior (i.e., a mental step) • applying a weight factor to the clustered data (i.e., mathematical steps) Claim 1 Step 1 inquiry: Does this claim fall within a statutory category? The preamble of the claim recites “1. A computer system comprising…” Therefore, it is a “system” (or “apparatus”), which is a statutory category of invention. Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: “YES”. Step 2A (Prong One) inquiry: Are there limitations in Claim 1 that recite abstract ideas? YES. The following limitations in Claim 1 recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the 2019 PEG. Specifically, they are “mental steps” and “mathematical steps”: • cluster data of search results of a topic of interest into a hierarchical knowledge tree format (i.e., mental steps) • monitor computer user behavior regarding the search results (i.e., mental steps) • process a determined result of the monitored computer user behavior and the clustered data of the search results to generate a knowledge graph based on the topic of interest (i.e., mental steps) • generate an answer corresponding to an initial inquiry based on the new version of the knowledge graph (i.e., mental steps) • a modified weight factor that is generated based at least in part on detecting a repeated occurrence of a computer user behavior (i.e., a mental step) • applying a weight factor to the clustered data (i.e., mathematical steps) Step 2A (Prong Two) inquiry: Are there additional elements or a combination of elements in the claim that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception? Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”: (1) A processor (2) A memory device\computer readable storage device (3) input information corresponding to reprocessed documents (4) “a computer mouse motion, a copy and paste operation, or highlighting text of an article of the search results” A “processor” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites: 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”). This “processor” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). A “memory device” or “computer readable storage device” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites: The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. *** iv. Storing and retrieving information in memory, Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1681, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 2015); OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363, 115 USPQ2d at 1092-93; This “memory device” or “computer readable storage device” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). A “input information corresponding to reprocessed documents” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part: 2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art."). Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites: The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); … Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception. This “input information corresponding to reprocessed documents” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). A “a computer mouse motion, a copy and paste operation, or highlighting text of an article of the search results” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.04(d)(I) recites: The courts have also identified limitations that did not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application: • Merely reciting the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or merely including instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely using a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea, as discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(f); • Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception, as discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(g); and • Generally linking the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use, as discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(h). This “a computer mouse motion, a copy and paste operation, or highlighting text of an article of the search results” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). The answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements integrate the claimed abstract idea into a practical application. Step 2B inquiry: Does the claim provide an inventive concept, i.e., does the claim recite additional element(s) or a combination of elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in the claim? Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”: (1) A processor (2) A memory device\computer readable storage device (3) input information corresponding to reprocessed documents (4) “a computer mouse motion, a copy and paste operation, or highlighting text of an article of the search results” A “processor” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites: 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”). Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). A “memory device” or “computer readable storage device” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites: The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. *** iv. Storing and retrieving information in memory, Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1681, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 2015); OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363, 115 USPQ2d at 1092-93; Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). A “input information corresponding to reprocessed documents” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part: 2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art."). Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites: The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); … Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception. Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). A “a computer mouse motion, a copy and paste operation, or highlighting text of an article of the search results” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (I)(A)(i-ii) recites: Limitations that the courts have found not to be enough to qualify as “significantly more” when recited in a claim with a judicial exception include: i. Adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, e.g., a limitation indicating that a particular function such as creating and maintaining electronic records is performed by a computer, as discussed in Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 225-26, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (see MPEP § 2106.05(f)); ii. Simply appending well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception, e.g., a claim to an abstract idea requiring no more than a generic computer to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional activities previously known to the industry, as discussed in Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 225, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); Further, M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites: 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”). Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. Further, the clamed input is well-understood, routine, and conventional. Applicant's Specification, paragraph [0061] recites: [0061] The computer system 500 illustrated in FIG. 7 includes a processor 591, an input device 592 coupled to the processor 591, an output device 593 coupled to the processor 591, and memory devices 594 and 595 each coupled to the processor 591. The input device 592 may be, inter alia, a keyboard, a mouse, a camera, a touchscreen, etc. Regarding the computer system of which the input device is a part, Applicant's Specification, paragraph [0064] recites: [0064] While FIG. 7 shows the computer system 500 as a particular configuration of hardware and software, any configuration of hardware and software, as would be known to a person of ordinary skill in the art, may be utilized for the purposes stated supra in conjunction with the particular computer system 500 of FIG. 7. For example, the memory devices 594 and 595 may be portions of a single memory device rather than separate memory devices. Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements provide an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed abstract ideas the claimed abstract idea into a practical application. Claim 1 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 2 Claim 2 recites: 2. The computer system of claim 1, wherein the one or more processors are configured to: Calculate a weight factor from the monitored computer user behavior. Applicant’s Claim 2 merely teaches calculating…, a weight factor (mathematical step). It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 2 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 3 Claim 3 recites: 3. The computer system of claim 2, wherein the generated knowledge graph includes an individual topic tree and a related subtree of at least one children node closest to a root node of the individual topic tree. Applicant’s Claim 3 merely teaches mental steps. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 3 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 4 Claim 4 recites: 4. The computer system of claim 1, wherein the computer user behavior further includes at least one of bookmarking an article of the search results or forwarding an article of the search results. Applicant’s Claim 4 merely teaches “bookmarking an article” or “forwarding an article”. Further, since these computer operations are well understood, routine and conventional, simply using these computer operations to produce a result is not eligible. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites: For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two… Therefore, simply using these computer operations to produce a result is not eligible. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 4 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 5 Claim 5 recites: 5. The computer system of claim 1, wherein the one or more processors are configured to: in response to analyzing the computer user behavior regarding the search results, extract the search results from entities and relationships; and combine interactive behavior permissions established by recording the clustered data search results of the topic of interest into the hierarchical knowledge tree format to form the knowledge graph, wherein the knowledge graph is of a specific topic tree and a result from sub-topics branched from the knowledge tree. Applicant’s Claim 5 merely teaches the mental steps of “extracting” data and relationships and combining permissions. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 5 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 6 Claim 6 recites: 6. The computer system of claim 1, wherein the one or more processors are configured to: generate the new version of the knowledge graph by outputting additional information from reprocessed documents of the search results. Applicant’s Claim 6 merely teaches the mental step of “generating,…, a new version of the knowledge graph”. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 6 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 8 Claim 8 recites: 8. The computer system of claim 6, wherein the new version of the knowledge graph is generated in response to user-entered information as part of adding or modifying, by the one or more processors, data regarding an initial inquiry. Applicant’s Claim 8 merely teaches the mental step of generating a new version of the knowledge graph. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 8 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 9 Claim 9 recites: 9. The computer system of claim 6, wherein the one or more processors are configured to: Receive an additional search condition or criteria; generate a new or modified knowledge graph. Applicant’s Claim 9 merely teaches receiving data and the mental step of generating a new or modified knowledge graph. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 9 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 10 Step 1 inquiry: Does this claim fall within a statutory category? The preamble of the claim recites “10. A knowledge graph formation method, comprising…” Therefore, it is a “method” (or “process”), which is a statutory category of invention. Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: “YES”. Step 2A (Prong One) inquiry: Are there limitations in Claim 10 that recite abstract ideas? YES. The following limitations in Claim 10 recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the 2019 PEG. Specifically, they are “mental steps” and “mathematical steps”: • cluster data of search results of a topic of interest into a hierarchical knowledge tree format (i.e., mental steps) • monitor computer user behavior regarding the search results (i.e., mental steps) • process a determined result of the monitored computer user behavior and the clustered data of the search results to generate a knowledge graph based on the topic of interest (i.e., mental steps) • generate an answer corresponding to an initial inquiry based on the new version of the knowledge graph (i.e., mental steps) • a modified weight factor that is generated based at least in part on detecting a repeated occurrence of a computer user behavior (i.e., a mental step) • applying a weight factor to the clustered data (i.e., mathematical steps) Step 2A (Prong Two) inquiry: Are there additional elements or a combination of elements in the claim that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception? Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”: (1) A processor (2) A memory device\computer readable storage device (3) input information corresponding to reprocessed documents (4) “a computer mouse motion, a copy and paste operation, or highlighting text of an article of the search results” A “processor” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites: 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”). This “processor” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). A “memory device” or “computer readable storage device” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites: The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. *** iv. Storing and retrieving information in memory, Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1681, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 2015); OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363, 115 USPQ2d at 1092-93; This “memory device” or “computer readable storage device” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). A “input information corresponding to reprocessed documents” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part: 2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art."). Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites: The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); … Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception. This “input information corresponding to reprocessed documents” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). A “a computer mouse motion, a copy and paste operation, or highlighting text of an article of the search results” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.04(d)(I) recites: The courts have also identified limitations that did not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application: • Merely reciting the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or merely including instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely using a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea, as discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(f); • Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception, as discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(g); and • Generally linking the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use, as discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(h). This “a computer mouse motion, a copy and paste operation, or highlighting text of an article of the search results” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements provide an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed abstract ideas the claimed abstract idea into a practical application. Step 2B inquiry: Does the claim provide an inventive concept, i.e., does the claim recite additional element(s) or a combination of elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in the claim? Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”: (1) A processor (2) A memory device\computer readable storage device (3) input information corresponding to reprocessed documents (4) “a computer mouse motion, a copy and paste operation, or highlighting text of an article of the search results” A “processor” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites: 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”). Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). A “memory device” or “computer readable storage device” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites: The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. *** iv. Storing and retrieving information in memory, Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1681, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 2015); OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363, 115 USPQ2d at 1092-93; Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). A “input information corresponding to reprocessed documents” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part: 2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art."). Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites: The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); … Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception. Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). A “a computer mouse motion, a copy and paste operation, or highlighting text of an article of the search results” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (I)(A)(i-ii) recites: Limitations that the courts have found not to be enough to qualify as “significantly more” when recited in a claim with a judicial exception include: i. Adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, e.g., a limitation indicating that a particular function such as creating and maintaining electronic records is performed by a computer, as discussed in Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 225-26, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (see MPEP § 2106.05(f)); ii. Simply appending well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception, e.g., a claim to an abstract idea requiring no more than a generic computer to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional activities previously known to the industry, as discussed in Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 225, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); Further, M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites: 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”). Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. Further, the clamed input is well-understood, routine, and conventional. Applicant's Specification, paragraph [0061] recites: [0061] The computer system 500 illustrated in FIG. 7 includes a processor 591, an input device 592 coupled to the processor 591, an output device 593 coupled to the processor 591, and memory devices 594 and 595 each coupled to the processor 591. The input device 592 may be, inter alia, a keyboard, a mouse, a camera, a touchscreen, etc. Regarding the computer system of which the input device is a part, Applicant's Specification, paragraph [0064] recites: [0064] While FIG. 7 shows the computer system 500 as a particular configuration of hardware and software, any configuration of hardware and software, as would be known to a person of ordinary skill in the art, may be utilized for the purposes stated supra in conjunction with the particular computer system 500 of FIG. 7. For example, the memory devices 594 and 595 may be portions of a single memory device rather than separate memory devices. Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements provide an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed abstract ideas the claimed abstract idea into a practical application. Claim 10 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 11 Claim 1 recites: 11. The knowledge graph formation method of claim 10, further comprising: calculating, by the by one or more processors of the computer system, a weight factor from the monitored computer user behavior. Applicant’s Claim 11 merely teaches calculating…, a weight factor (mathematical step). It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 11 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 12 Claim 12 recites: 12. The knowledge graph formation method of claim 11, wherein the generated knowledge graph includes an individual topic tree and a related subtree of at least one children node closest to a root node of the individual topic tree. Applicant’s Claim 12 merely teaches mental steps. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 12 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 13 Claim 13 recites: 13. The knowledge graph formation method of claim 11, wherein the computer user behavior further includes at least one of bookmarking an article of the search results or forwarding an article of the search results. Applicant’s Claim 13 merely teaches “bookmarking an article”, or “forwarding an article”. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 13 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 14 Claim 14 recites: 14. The knowledge graph formation method of claim 10, further comprising: in response to analyzing the computer user behavior regarding the search results, extracting, by the one or more processors of the computer system, the search results from entities and relationships and combining interactive behavior permissions established by recording the topic of interest and search results clustered into the hierarchical knowledge tree format to form the knowledge graph of a specific topic tree and a result from sub-topics branched from the knowledge tree. Applicant’s Claim 14 merely teaches the mental steps of “extracting” data and relationships and combining permissions. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 14 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 15 Claim 15 recites: 15. The knowledge graph formation method of claim 10, further comprising: generating, by the one or more processors of the computer system, a new version of the knowledge graph by outputting additional information from reprocessed documents of the search results. Applicant’s Claim 15 merely teaches the mental step of “generating,…, a new version of the knowledge graph”. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 15 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 17 Claim 17 recites: 17. The knowledge graph formation method of claim 15, further comprising, Adding or modifying, by the one or more processors, data regarding an initial inquiry; and generating the new version of the knowledge graph in response to user-entered information as part of adding or modifying. Applicant’s Claim 17 merely teaches the mental step of generating a new version of the knowledge graph. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 17 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 18 Claim 18 recites: 18. The knowledge graph formation method of claim 10, further comprising: receiving, by the one or more processors, an additional search condition or criteria; and generating, by the one or more processors, a new or modified knowledge graph. Applicant’s Claim 18 merely teaches receiving data and the mental step of generating a new or modified knowledge graph. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 18 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 19 Step 1 inquiry: Does this claim fall within a statutory category? The preamble of the claim recites “19. A computer program product for optimizing a knowledge graph formation process, the computer program product comprising:…” Therefore, it is a “program product” (i.e., software per se that is possibly transitory, rather than a “product of manufacture”). Applicant fails to properly claim a non-transitory computer readable medium, which is a product of manufacture. Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: “NO”. Step 2A (Prong One) inquiry: Are there limitations in Claim 19 that recite abstract ideas? YES. The following limitations in Claim 19 recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the 2019 PEG. Specifically, they are “mental steps” and “mathematical steps”: • cluster data of search results of a topic of interest into a hierarchical knowledge tree format (i.e., mental steps) • monitor computer user behavior regarding the search results (i.e., mental steps) • process a determined result of the monitored computer user behavior and the clustered data of the search results to generate a knowledge graph based on the topic of interest (i.e., mental steps) • generate an answer corresponding to an initial inquiry based on the new version of the knowledge graph (i.e., mental steps) • a modified weight factor that is generated based at least in part on detecting a repeated occurrence of a computer user behavior (i.e., a mental step) • applying a weight factor to the clustered data (i.e., mathematical steps) Step 2A (Prong Two) inquiry: Are there additional elements or a combination of elements in the claim that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception? Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”: (1) A processor (2) A memory device\computer readable storage device (3) input information corresponding to reprocessed documents (4) “a computer mouse motion, a copy and paste operation, or highlighting text of an article of the search results” A “processor” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites: 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”). This “processor” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). A “memory device” or “computer readable storage device” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites: The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. *** iv. Storing and retrieving information in memory, Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1681, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 2015); OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363, 115 USPQ2d at 1092-93; This “memory device” or “computer readable storage device” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). A “input information corresponding to reprocessed documents” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part: 2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art."). Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites: The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); … Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception. This “input information corresponding to reprocessed documents” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). A “a computer mouse motion, a copy and paste operation, or highlighting text of an article of the search results” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.04(d)(I) recites: The courts have also identified limitations that did not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application: • Merely reciting the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or merely including instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely using a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea, as discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(f); • Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception, as discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(g); and • Generally linking the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use, as discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(h). This “a computer mouse motion, a copy and paste operation, or highlighting text of an article of the search results” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)). The answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements integrate the claimed abstract idea into a practical application. Step 2B inquiry: Does the claim provide an inventive concept, i.e., does the claim recite additional element(s) or a combination of elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in the claim? Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”: (1) A processor (2) A memory device\computer readable storage device (3) input information corresponding to reprocessed documents (4) “a computer mouse motion, a copy and paste operation, or highlighting text of an article of the search results” A “processor” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites: 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”). Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). A “memory device” or “computer readable storage device” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites: The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. *** iv. Storing and retrieving information in memory, Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1681, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 2015); OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363, 115 USPQ2d at 1092-93; Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). A “input information corresponding to reprocessed documents” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part: 2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art."). Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites: The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); … Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception. Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). A “a computer mouse motion, a copy and paste operation, or highlighting text of an article of the search results” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (I)(A)(i-ii) recites: Limitations that the courts have found not to be enough to qualify as “significantly more” when recited in a claim with a judicial exception include: i. Adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, e.g., a limitation indicating that a particular function such as creating and maintaining electronic records is performed by a computer, as discussed in Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 225-26, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (see MPEP § 2106.05(f)); ii. Simply appending well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception, e.g., a claim to an abstract idea requiring no more than a generic computer to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional activities previously known to the industry, as discussed in Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 225, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); Further, M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites: 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019] Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”). Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites: (2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. Further, the clamed input is well-understood, routine, and conventional. Applicant's Specification, paragraph [0061] recites: [0061] The computer system 500 illustrated in FIG. 7 includes a processor 591, an input device 592 coupled to the processor 591, an output device 593 coupled to the processor 591, and memory devices 594 and 595 each coupled to the processor 591. The input device 592 may be, inter alia, a keyboard, a mouse, a camera, a touchscreen, etc. Regarding the computer system of which the input device is a part, Applicant's Specification, paragraph [0064] recites: [0064] While FIG. 7 shows the computer system 500 as a particular configuration of hardware and software, any configuration of hardware and software, as would be known to a person of ordinary skill in the art, may be utilized for the purposes stated supra in conjunction with the particular computer system 500 of FIG. 7. For example, the memory devices 594 and 595 may be portions of a single memory device rather than separate memory devices. Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)). Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements provide an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed abstract ideas the claimed abstract idea into a practical application. Claim 19 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 20 Claim 20 recites: 20. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 19, wherein the one or more instructions cause the device to: in response to analyzing the computer user behavior regarding the search results, extract the search results from entities and relationships; and combine interactive behavior permissions established by recording the topic of interest and search results clustered into the hierarchical knowledge tree format to form the knowledge graph of a specific topic tree and a result from sub-topics branched from the knowledge tree. Applicant’s Claim 20 merely teaches the mental steps of “extracting” data and relationships and combining permissions. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 20 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 21 Claim 21 recites: 21. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 19, wherein the one or more instructions cause the device to: calculate a weight factor from the monitored computer user behavior. Applicant’s Claim 21 merely teaches calculation of a dimensionless number. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 21 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 22 Claim 22 recites: 22. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 21, wherein the generated knowledge graph includes an individual topic tree and a related subtree of at least one children node closest to a root node of the individual topic tree. Applicant’s Claim 22 merely teaches a “tree” of topics (i.e., mental steps). It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).) Claim 22 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Response to Arguments Applicant's arguments filed 19 DEC 2025 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Specifically, Applicant argues: Argument 1 Thus, paragraphs [0002] and [0003] identify a technical problem that arises during collaborative project work involving electronic data searching: different project teams may develop different knowledge structures, leading to a disorganized knowledge system and inaccurate results. As amended, Claim 1 is directed to a technical solution that leverages an optimized knowledge graph generated based on different knowledge structures, rather than duplicating search efforts. Specifically, the claimed solution detects "a repeated occurrence of a computer user behavior" corresponding to various users of a team, and uses the "information corresponding to reprocessed documents of the search results and a modified weight factor for generating a new version of the knowledge graph" to "generate an answer corresponding to an initial inquiry based on the new version of the knowledge graph," resulting in more efficient electronic data search and retrieval. Thus, even if a judicial exception were properly deemed to be recited in claim 1, at least the above- identified features of the claim further integrate the alleged abstract idea into a practical application and are patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Independent claims 10 and 19, as amended, recite similar features. For at least the reasons presented in the interview and without acquiescing in the Examiner's rejection, independent claims 1, 10, and 19, as amended, and the claims that depend thereon, are patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Accordingly, Applicant respectfully requests that the Examiner reconsider and withdraw the rejection of claims 1-6, 8-15, and 17-22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The new limitations add new "weight factors," "modified weight factors," computer peripherals, and computer functions for an unspecified machine learning model which present a new structure for the invention that would require further consideration on the merits. Arguments based on the new structure are unpersuasive. The rejections stand. Conclusion Any inquiries concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Wilbert L. Starks, Jr., who may be reached Monday through Friday, between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. EST. or via telephone at (571) 272-3691 or email: Wilbert.Starks@uspto.gov. If you need to send an Official facsimile transmission, please send it to (571) 273-8300. If attempts to reach the examiner are unsuccessful the Examiner’s Supervisor (SPE), Kakali Chaki, may be reached at (571) 272-3719. Hand-delivered responses should be delivered to the Receptionist @ (Customer Service Window Randolph Building 401 Dulany Street, Alexandria, VA 22313), located on the first floor of the south side of the Randolph Building. Finally, information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Moreover, status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see http://pair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have any questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) toll-free @ 1-866-217-9197. /WILBERT L STARKS/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2122 WLS 21 MAR 2026
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Prosecution Timeline

Sep 28, 2021
Application Filed
Mar 10, 2025
Non-Final Rejection — §101
May 23, 2025
Interview Requested
Jun 11, 2025
Applicant Interview (Telephonic)
Jun 11, 2025
Examiner Interview Summary
Jun 17, 2025
Response Filed
Sep 19, 2025
Final Rejection — §101
Nov 12, 2025
Interview Requested
Nov 21, 2025
Applicant Interview (Telephonic)
Nov 24, 2025
Response after Non-Final Action
Nov 25, 2025
Examiner Interview Summary
Dec 19, 2025
Request for Continued Examination
Jan 15, 2026
Response after Non-Final Action
Mar 21, 2026
Non-Final Rejection — §101 (current)

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Study what changed to get past this examiner. Based on 5 most recent grants.

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Prosecution Projections

3-4
Expected OA Rounds
76%
Grant Probability
80%
With Interview (+4.4%)
3y 6m
Median Time to Grant
High
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