DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Continued Examination Under 37 CFR 1.114
A request for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, including the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e), was filed in this application after final rejection. Since this application is eligible for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, and the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e) has been timely paid, the finality of the previous Office action has been withdrawn pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114. Applicant's submission filed on 27 January 2026 has been entered.
Drawings
The drawings were received on 18 July 2025. These drawings are acceptable.
Claim Interpretation
Attention is directed to MPEP 904.01 [R-08.2012].
The breadth of the claims in the application should always be carefully noted; that is, the examiner should be fully aware of what the claims do not call for, as well as what they do require. During patent examination, the claims are given the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 44 USPQ2d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See MPEP § 2111 - § 2116.01 for case law pertinent to claim analysis.
It is noted with particularity that narrowing limitations found in the specification cannot be inferred in the claims where the elements not set forth in the claims are linchpin of patentability. In re Philips Industries v. State Stove & Mfg. Co, Inc., 186 USPQ 458 (CA6 1975). While the claims are to be interpreted in light of the specification, it does not follow that limitations from the specification may be read into the claims. On the contrary, claims must be interpreted as broadly as their terms reasonably allow. See Ex parte Oetiker, 23 USPQ2d 1641 (BPAI, 1992). In added support of this position, attention is directed to MPEP 2111 [R-11.2013], where, citing In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05, 162 USPQ 541, 550-51 (CCPA 1969), is stated:
The court explained that “reading a claim in light of the specification, to thereby interpret limitations explicitly recited in the claim, is a quite different thing from ‘reading limitations of the specification into a claim,’ to thereby narrow the scope of the claim by implicitly adding disclosed limitations which have no express basis in the claim.” The court found that applicant was advocating the latter, i.e., the impermissible importation of subject matter from the specification into the claim.
Additionally, attention is directed to MPEP 2111.01 [R-01.2024], wherein is stated:
II. IT IS IMPROPER TO IMPORT CLAIM LIMITATIONS FROM THE SPECIFICATION
“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not part of the claim. For example, a particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment.” Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875, 69 USPQ2d 1865, 1868 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Attention is also directed to MPEP 2111.02 II [R-07.2022]. As stated herein:
II. PREAMBLE STATEMENTS RECITING PURPOSE OR INTENDED USE
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The claim preamble must be read in the context of the entire claim. The determination of whether preamble recitations are structural limitations or mere statements of purpose or use "can be resolved only on review of the entirety of the [record] to gain an understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to encompass by the claim" as drafted without importing "'extraneous' limitations from the specification." Corning Glass Works, 868 F.2d at 1257, 9 USPQ2d at 1966. If the body of a claim fully and intrinsically sets forth all of the limitations of the claimed invention, and the preamble merely states, for example, the purpose or intended use of the invention, rather than any distinct definition of any of the claimed invention’s limitations, then the preamble is not considered a limitation and is of no significance to claim construction. Shoes by Firebug LLC v. Stride Rite Children’s Grp., LLC, 962 F.3d 1362, 2020 USPQ2d 10701 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (The court found that the preamble in one patent’s claim is limiting but is not in a related patent); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305, 51 USPQ2d 1161, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1999). See also Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478, 42 USPQ2d 1550, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention, the preamble is not a claim limitation")… (Emphasis added)
Attention is directed to MPEP 2111 [R-10.2019]. As stated therein:
During patent examination, the pending claims must be "given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification." The Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316, 75 USPQ2d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) expressly recognized that the USPTO employs the "broadest reasonable interpretation" standard:
The Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") determines the scope of claims in patent applications not solely on the basis of the claim language, but upon giving claims their broadest reasonable construction "in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art." In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364[, 70 USPQ2d 1827, 1830] (Fed. Cir. 2004). Indeed, the rules of the PTO require that application claims must "conform to the invention as set forth in the remainder of the specification and the terms and phrases used in the claims must find clear support or antecedent basis in the description so that the meaning of the terms in the claims may be ascertainable by reference to the description." 37 CFR 1.75(d)(1). (Emphasis added).
Attention is directed to MPEP 2173.04 [R-10.2019]. As stated therein:
Breadth of a claim is not to be equated with indefiniteness. In re Miller, 441 F.2d 689, 169 USPQ 597 (CCPA 1971); In re Gardner, 427 F.2d 786, 788, 166 USPQ 138, 140 (CCPA 1970) ("Breadth is not indefiniteness."). A broad claim is not indefinite merely because it encompasses a wide scope of subject matter provided the scope is clearly defined. But a claim is indefinite when the boundaries of the protected subject matter are not clearly delineated and the scope is unclear. For example, a genus claim that covers multiple species is broad, but is not indefinite because of its breadth, which is otherwise clear. But a genus claim that could be interpreted in such a way that it is not clear which species are covered would be indefinite (e.g., because there is more than one reasonable interpretation of what species are included in the claim). (Emphasis added)
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112, Enablement
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Standard for Enablement
It is well settled that in order to satisfy the enablement requirement, “the specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without ‘undue experimentation.’” Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 [42 USPQ2d 1001] (Fed. Cir. 1997). (Emphasis added)
For purposes of examination, the aspect of just what constitutes the “full scope” of the claims is that which is consistent with the broadest reasonable interpretation. See MPEP 904.01 and In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 44 USPQ2d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See MPEP § 2111 - § 2116.01 for case law pertinent to claim analysis.
As set forth in the unanimous U.S. Supreme Court decision in Amgen Inc., et al. v. Sanofi et al. 598 U.S. ___ (2023):
Our decisions in Morse, Incandescent Lamp, and Holland Furniture reinforce the simple
statutory command. If a patent claims an entire class of processes, machines,
manufactures, or compositions of matter, the patent’s specification must enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the entire class. In other words, the specification must enable the full scope of the invention as defined by its claims. The more one claims, the more one must enable. See §112(a); see also Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405, 419 (1908) (“[T]he claims measure the invention.”). (Emphasis added)
***
To be fair, Amgen does not dispute this much. It freely admits that it seeks to claim for
itself an entire universe of antibodies. Still, it says, its broad claims are enabled because scientists can make and use every undisclosed but functional antibody if they simply follow the company’s “roadmap” or its proposal for “conservative substitution.” We cannot agree. These two approaches amount to little more than two research assignments… Whether methods like a “roadmap” or “conservative substitution” might suffice to enable other claims in other patents—perhaps because, as this Court suggested in Incandescent Lamp, the inventor identifies a quality common to every functional embodiment, supra, at 13—they do not here. They leave a scientist about where Sawyer and Man left Edison: forced to engage in “painstaking experimentation” to see what works. 159 U. S., at 475. That is not enablement. More nearly, it is “a hunting license.” Brenner v. Manson, 383 U. S. 519, 536 (1966). (Emphasis added)
It is further noted that “routine experimentation is ‘not without bounds.’” Wyeth v. Abbott Laboratories 107 USPQ2d 1273, 1275, 1276 (Fed. Cir. June 2013), citing Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 707 F.3d 1330, 1339 [105 USPQ2d 1817] (Fed. Cir. 2013), and that what constitutes "undue experimentation" can be evaluated from the perspective of the amount of time required to enable the full scope of the invention. In support of this position, attention is directed to Cephalon at 1823, citing White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc., 218 USPQ 961 (Fed. Cir. 1983), that work that would require 18 months to 2 years so to enable the full scope of an invention, even if routine, would constitute undue experimentation. As stated therein:
Permissible experimentation is, nevertheless, not without bounds. This court has held that experimentation was unreasonable, for example, where it was found that eighteen months to two years’ work was required to practice the patented invention. See, e.g., White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc., 713 F.2d 788, 791 [218 USPQ 961] Fed. Cir.1983). (Emphasis added)
Holding and Rationale
Claims 1-9, 11-12, 14, 16-17, 19-23, and 27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to enable one skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and/or use the invention.
Claims 1, 17, and 21, the only independent claims pending, are reproduced below.
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As evidenced above, the claimed method, kit and reporter oligonucleotide are to comprise oligonucleotides that can hybridize to a target nucleic acid that is found in a sample. Applicant, at page 28, lines 22-24, defines sample thusly:
The sample may comprise cells comprising said nucleic acids. The cells may for example be prokaryotic cells or eukaryotic cells, such as plant cells or mammalian cells. (Emphasis added)
Attention is directed to the following publications which teach of the enormity of the genera of virus, plants, insects, bacteria, mammals, and species encompassed by the subfamily Murinae as the detection of any and all genes from all members of the various genera are encompassed by the instant claims.
“Viruses” (Wikipedia.com, accessed 08 September 2023), teaches:
An enormous variety of genomic structures can be seen among viral species; as a group, they contain more structural genomic diversity than plants, animals, archaea, or bacteria. There are millions of different types of viruses, although fewer than 7,000 types have been described in detail. (Emphasis added)
“How many species of bacteria are there” (wisegeek.com; accessed 21 January 2014) teaches:
Currently, estimates of the total number of species of bacteria range from about 10 million to a billion, but these estimates are tentative, and may be off by many orders of magnitude. By comparison, there are probably between 10 and 30 million species of animals, the vast majority of them insects. The number of scientifically recognized species of animals is about 1,250,000. There are almost 300,000 recognized species of plants.
“Fungi,” (Wikipedia.com; accessed 08 September 2023), teaches:
As of 2020, around 148,000 species of fungi have been described by taxonomists,[6] but the global biodiversity of the fungus kingdom is not fully understood.[48] A 2017 estimate suggests there may be between 2.2 and 3.8 million species.[5]
“Insect”, (Wikipedia.com; accessed 09/10/2020) teaches:
Insects are the most diverse group of animals; they include more than a million described species and represent more than half of all known living organisms. The total number of extant species is estimated at between six and ten million; potentially over 90% of the animal life forms on Earth are insects.
“Plant,” (Wikipedia.com; accessed 08 September 2023) teaches:
There are about 380,000 known species of plants, of which the majority, some 260,000, produce seeds.
“Mammal,” (Wikipedia.com; accessed 08 September 2023) teaches:
According to Mammal Species of the World, which is updated through periodic editions, 5,416 species were identified in 2006. These were grouped into 1,229 genera, 153 families and 29 orders.[5]
“Murinae,” (Wikipedia.com, accessed 10 June 2024) teaches:
The Old World rats and mice, part of the subfamily Murinae in the family Muridae, comprise at least 519 species. Members of this subfamily are called murines. In terms of species richness, this subfamily is larger than all mammal families except the Cricetidae and Muridae, and is larger than all mammal orders except the bats and the remainder of the rodents.
“Fish,” (Wikipedia.com, accessed 08 September 2023) teaches:
Fish are abundant in most bodies of water. They can be found in nearly all aquatic environments, from high mountain streams (e.g., char and gudgeon) to the abyssal and even hadal depths of the deepest oceans (e.g., cush-eels and snailfish), although no species has yet been documented in the deepest 25% of the ocean.[4] At 34,300 described species, fish exhibit greater species diversity than any other group of vertebrates.[5]
“Archaea,” Wikipedia.com (accessed 08 September 2023), teaches:
The classification of archaea into species is also controversial. Ernst Mayr defined a species as a group of interbreeding organisms which are reproductively isolated, but this is of no help since archaea only reproduce asexually.[37]
Archaea show high levels of horizontal gene transfer between lineages. Some researchers suggest that individuals can be grouped into species-like populations given highly similar genomes and infrequent gene transfer to/from cells with less-related genomes, as in the genus Ferroplasma.[38] On the other hand, studies in Halorubrum found significant genetic transfer to/from less-related populations, limiting the criterion's applicability. Some researchers question whether such species designations have practical meaning.[40]
Current knowledge on genetic diversity is fragmentary, so the total number of species cannot be estimated with any accuracy.[22] (Emphasis added)
“Algae,” Wikipedia.com (accessed 03-04-2016) teaches:
The most recent estimate suggests 72,500 algal species worldwide.
“Protozoa,” Wikipedia.com (accessed 05-11-2016), teaches:
The classification of protozoa has been and remains a problematic area of taxonomy. Where they are available, DNA sequences are used as the basis for classification; however, for the majority of described protozoa, such material is not available. (Emphasis added)
A review of the disclosure does identify a Sequence Listing. The sequence listing has been found to comprise but 8 DNA sequences, of which 6 are to Homo sapiens (SEQ ID NO. 1-6) and two are identified as being an “Artificial Sequence” (SEQ ID NO. 7 & 8).
As set forth in the claimed method, one needs to have prior knowledge of the target sequence and the “nucleotide(s) of interest (NOI)” as well as the “reporter oligonucleotides” and “set[s] of primers”.
As noted above, the disclosure has been found to disclose but 6 DNA fragments of the human genome. Such nondisclosure of such essential materials (target sequences, nucleotide sequences for reporter oligonucleotides and primers) has not been found to constitute enablement of the full scope of the claimed invention. Amgen.
Assuming arguendo that if one could determine the nucleotide sequence of the genome of a bacteria in one day and to also identify in the same day those “nucleotide(s) of interest”; all repetitive sequences, all “reporter oligonucleotides”, and all first and second primers and did so 365 days a year, it would take on the order of 2,739 years to identify such sequences for just 1 million different bacteria. Clearly, such effort constitutes undue experimentation.
In view of the above analysis and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, claims 1-9, 11-12, 14, 16-17, 19-23, and 27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement.
Response to argument
Applicant’s representative, at pages 10-15 of the response of 27 January 2026, hereinafter the response, traverses the rejection of claims under 35 USC 112 for not satisfying the enablement requirement.
At page 11 of the response said representative asserts:
The Applicant maintains that the specification fully satisfies the requirements for enablement under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). "[T]he law does not require a specification to be a blueprint in order to satisfy the requirement for enablement under 35 USC 112, first paragraph." Staehelin v. Secher, 24 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1513, 1516 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1992). A specification need not describe-and best omits-that which is well known in the art. See In re Buchner, 929 F.2d 660, 661, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1331, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Furthermore, "[t]he first paragraph of § 112 requires nothing more than objective enablement." In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220,223,169 U.S.P.Q. 367,369 (CCPA 1971). "How such a teaching is set forth, either by the use of illustrative examples or by broad terminology, is of no importance." Id.
It is also well-settled in the law that "a considerable amount of experimentation is permissible, if it is merely routine, or if the specification in question provides a reasonable amount of guidance with respect to the direction in which the experimentation should proceed " Ex parte Jackson, 217 U.S.P.Q. 804, 807 (Bd. App. 1982).
The above arguments have been considered and have not been found persuasive towards the withdrawal of the rejection. It is noted that the unanimous decision of the US Supreme Court controls. As set forth in the unanimous U.S. Supreme Court decision in Amgen Inc., et al. v. Sanofi et al. 598 U.S. ___ (2023):
Our decisions in Morse, Incandescent Lamp, and Holland Furniture reinforce the simple
statutory command. If a patent claims an entire class of processes, machines,
manufactures, or compositions of matter, the patent’s specification must enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the entire class. In other words, the specification must enable the full scope of the invention as defined by its claims. The more one claims, the more one must enable. See §112(a); see also Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405, 419 (1908) (“[T]he claims measure the invention.”). (Emphasis added)
Given this decision the aspect of enabling an embodiment versus enabling the full scope of that claimed has not been found persuasive.
The aspect that there is no limit to routine experimentation does not stand with the decision in that “routine experimentation is ‘not without bounds.’” Wyeth v. Abbott Laboratories 107 USPQ2d 1273, 1275, 1276 (Fed. Cir. June 2013), citing Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 707 F.3d 1330, 1339 [105 USPQ2d 1817] (Fed. Cir. 2013), and that what constitutes "undue experimentation" can be evaluated from the perspective of the amount of time required to enable the full scope of the invention. In support of this position, attention is directed to Cephalon at 1823, citing White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc., 218 USPQ 961 (Fed. Cir. 1983), that work that would require 18 months to 2 years so to enable the full scope of an invention, even if routine, would constitute undue experimentation. As stated therein:
Permissible experimentation is, nevertheless, not without bounds. This court has held that experimentation was unreasonable, for example, where it was found that eighteen months to two years’ work was required to practice the patented invention. See, e.g., White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc., 713 F.2d 788, 791 [218 USPQ 961] Fed. Cir.1983). (Emphasis added)
It is noted that the decision of the Board does not over rule the decision of the Fed. Cir.
It is noted that no evidentiary showing has been made that the full scope of the claimed invention could be enabled in less than 18 months to two years. Indeed, it is noted that the subject application claims benefit of priority to 13 May 2019. By contrast, the last part of the human Y chromosome was not determined until December 2022 and was not published online until 23 August 20231, which is over four years after applicant’s priority date and two years after this application was filed.
At page 12 of the response said representative asserts:
A person having ordinary skilled in the art can readily determine suitable primers for hybridization to a target nucleic acid using the teachings in the specification and routine methods well known in the art. A person skilled in the art would certainly not require many years to do so as alleged in the Office Action. Rather, a person having ordinary skill in the art using the claimed methods would merely need to apply known methods to known sequences to design primers to a reference sequence in order to practice the method as claimed. Furthermore, a person skilled in the art would readily understand that numerous resources of known sequences are available. As a merely illustrative example, billions of known sequences are available in sequence databases such as GenBank (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/geubank) DNA DataBank of Japan (DDBJ) (https://www.ddbi.nig.ac.jp/index-e.htm) and the European Nucleotide Archive (ENA) (https://www.ebi.ac.uk/ena/browser/).
The above argument has been considered and has not been found persuasive towards the withdrawal of the rejection. While the claimed method may require one to use a “reference sequence”, the specification has not been found to provide the genus of such sequences. It is further noted that the claimed method is not limited to that which was known at the time of filing the instant application.
Further, no showing has been made that in order to practice same, one could identify the genus of such essential material2 in a time line that would not constitute undue experimentation.
At page 13 of the response said representative asserts:
Furthermore, as noted above, enablement of the claimed methods of detecting a variation of a target nucleic acid relative to a reference sequence based on the melting analysis does not require that the entire genome of every living organism in the world be sequenced in order to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention as claimed.
The above argument has been considered and has not been found persuasive towards the withdrawal of the rejection. While one may be able to practice an embodiment of the claimed invention using sequences in a database, such does not speak to the amount of time and effort required to enable the full scope of that which is claimed. As set forth in Amgen,
If a patent claims an entire class of processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, the patent’s specification must enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the entire class. In other words, the specification must enable the full scope of the invention as defined by its claims. The more one claims, the more one must enable. (Emphasis added)
In the present case the subject application has been found to comprise a Sequence Listing that comprises a total of 8 sequences, of which the first 6 are the only sequences found in an organism (Homo sapiens). Sch a limited disclosure has not been found to enable the full scope of the claimed method, kit and oligonucleotide.
At page 14 of the response said representative asserts:
As further stated on page 49, lines 4-5: "Herein is also provided a reporter oligonucleotide which can hybridise to one strand of a target nucleic acid." Designing a reporter oligonucleotide hybridising to a known sequence is routine practice for a person skilled in the art. The method therefore does not require knowledge of every possible sequence across all species, but instead uses a known target sequence-such as an MSI locus-to detect whether variation is present in the sample.
The above argument has been considered and has not been found persuasive. While one may not need prior knowledge of all sequences in all organisms in order to practice a single embodiment, such does not enable the full scope of that which is claimed. As presently worded the “target nucleic acid sequence” is not limited to any set of organisms. As is asserted by applicant at page 28, lines 22-24, of the disclosure:
The sample may comprise cells comprising said nucleic acids. The cells may for
example be prokaryotic cells or eukaryotic cells, such as plant cells or mammalian
cells. (Emphasis added)
A review of the disclosure fails to find where applicant has provided any sequence, be it repetitive or not, as found in any prokaryotic cell, or non-human eukaryotic cell, which includes any and all plants.
At page 14 of the response said representative asserts:
Furthermore, the Office's concern regarding the need for prior knowledge of suitable primers is also misplaced. Designing primers to amplify a known sequence-such as the target microsatellite region described in the claims-is a routine task well within the capabilities of a person skilled in the art. Given that the reference sequence is known, as recited in the claims, a skilled practitioner would have no difficulty selecting appropriate primers to carry out the amplification step described in the method.
The above argument has been considered and has not been found persuasive. While the claimed method does require “providing a second sample comprising nucleic acids comprising said reference sequence, wherein the second sample is a reference sample”, the disclosure has not been found to provide the repetitive sequences found in any “sample” derived from any and all manner of prokaryotes or eukaryotes. Additionally, no showing has been made that the full scope of the claimed invention could be enabled in less than the 18 months to 2 years which has been held to be unreasonable.
In view of the above analysis and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, claims 1-9, 11-12, 14, 16-17, 19-23, and 27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112, Written Description
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Standard for Written Description.
Attention is directed to MPEP 2163.02 Standard for Determining Compliance With the Written Description Requirement [R-07-2022]:
An objective standard for determining compliance with the written description requirement is, "does the description clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that he or she invented what is claimed." In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012, 10 USPQ2d 1614, 1618 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Under Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64, 19 USPQ2d 1111, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1991), to satisfy the written description requirement, an applicant must convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention, and that the invention, in that context, is whatever is now claimed. (Emphasis added)
Attention is also set directed to MPEP 2161.01 I [R-07-2022], wherein is stated:
For instance, generic claim language in the original disclosure does not satisfy the written description requirement if it fails to support the scope of the genus claimed. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1349-50, 94 USPQ2d at 1171 ("[A]n adequate written description of a claimed genus requires more than a generic statement of an invention’s boundaries.") (citing Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568, 43 USPQ2d at 1405-06); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 968, 63 USPQ2d 1609, 1616 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that generic claim language appearing in ipsis verbis in the original specification did not satisfy the written description requirement because it failed to support the scope of the genus claimed); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170, 25 USPQ2d 1601, 1606 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (rejecting the argument that "only similar language in the specification or original claims is necessary to satisfy the written description requirement").
As set forth in Fiers v. Revel 25 USPQ2d 1601, 1604-5 (CAFC, January 1993):
We thus determined that, irrespective of the complexity or simplicity of the method of isolation employed, conception of a DNA, like conception of any chemical substance, requires a definition of that substance other than by its functional utility.
Fiers' attempt to distinguish Amgen therefore is incorrect. We also reject Fiers' argument that the existence of a workable method for preparing a DNA establishes conception of that material. (Emphasis added)
Conception of a substance claimed per se without reference to a process requires conception of its structure, name, formula, or definitive chemical or physical properties...
The difficulty that would arise if we were to hold that a conception occurs when one has only an idea of a compound, defining it by its hoped-for function, is that would-be inventors would file patent applications before they had made their inventions and before they could describe them. That is not consistent with the statute or the policy behind the statute, which is to promote disclosure of inventions.
Attention is also directed to MPEP 2163 Guidelines for the Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, “Written Description” Requirement [R-01-2024], at part II ii):
The written description requirement for a claimed genus may be satisfied through sufficient description of a representative number of species by actual reduction to practice (see i)(A) above), reduction to drawings (see i)(B) above), or by disclosure of relevant, identifying characteristics, i.e., structure or other physical and/or chemical properties, by functional characteristics coupled with a known or disclosed correlation between function and structure, or by a combination of such identifying characteristics, sufficient to show the inventor was in possession of the claimed genus (see i)(C) above). See Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568, 43 USPQ2d at 1406. See Juno Therapeutics, Inc. v. Kite Pharma, Inc., 10 F.4th 1330, 1337, 2021 USPQ2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ( "[T]he written description must lead a person of ordinary skill in the art to understand that the inventor possessed the entire scope of the claimed invention. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353–54 ('[T]he purpose of the written description requirement is to ensure that the scope of the right to exclude, as set forth in the claims, does not overreach the scope of the inventor's contribution to the field of art as described in the patent specification.' (internal quotation marks omitted).") (Emphasis added)
Acknowledgement is made of the fact that the claims 1-9, 11-12, 14, and 16 are to a method and not to a product. However, it is well settled that in order to satisfy the written description for a method, one must also disclose the molecules required to perform the method. In support of this position attention is directed to University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co. 68 USPQ2D 1424 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) at 1433 (affirmed; University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co. 69 USPQ2d 1886 (Fed. Cir. 2004)):
Plaintiff also argues that the requirements for written descriptions of claims to chemical compounds are irrelevant to this case because the '850 patent does not claim a compound, but a method of treatment by targeting PGHS-2 activity over PGHS-1 activity. Virtually any compound claim could be transformed into a method claim, however, simply by means of wording the claim in terms of a method of using the compound. With respect to the issue before the Court, then, this is little more than a semantic distinction without a difference. The claimed method depends upon finding a compound that selectively inhibits PGHS-2 activity. Without such a compound, it is impossible to practice the claimed method of treatment. It means little to “invent” a method if one does not have possession of a substance that is essential to practicing that method. Without that substance, the claimed invention is more theoretical than real; it is, as defendants argue, akin to “inventing” a cure for cancer by utilizing a substance that attacks and destroys cancer cells while leaving healthy cells alone. Without possession of such a substance, such a “cure” is illusory, and there is no meaningful possession of the method.
***
What the inventors did not do, however, is succeed in taking the last, critical step of actually isolating such a compound, or at least of developing a process through which one skilled in the art would be directly led to such a compound. Absent that step, their discoveries, valuable though they might have been, did not blossom into a full-fledged, complete invention. Scientific discoveries, and theories based on those discoveries, frequently lay the groundwork for later inventions, but that does not make the discoverer the inventor as well.
Attention is also directed to the decision in Ariad Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.
(Fed. Cir. 2010) 94 USPQ2d 1161, 1175, which teaches:
In accordance with Rochester, the ?516 patent must adequately describe the claimed methods for reducing NF-?B activity, including adequate description of the molecules that Ariad admits are necessary to perform the methods. (Emphasis added)
Holding and Rationale
Claims 1-9, 11-12, 14, 16-17, 19-23 and 27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
As evidenced above, the claimed method, kit and reporter oligonucleotide are to comprise oligonucleotides that can hybridize to a target nucleic acid that is found in a sample. Applicant, at page 28, lines 22-24, defines sample thusly:
The sample may comprise cells comprising said nucleic acids. The cells may for example be prokaryotic cells or eukaryotic cells, such as plant cells or mammalian cells. (Emphasis added)
Attention is directed to the following publications which teach of the enormity of the genera of virus, plants, insects, bacteria, mammals, and species encompassed by the subfamily Murinae as the detection of any and all genes from all members of the various genera are encompassed by the instant claims.
“Viruses” (Wikipedia.com, accessed 08 September 2023), teaches:
An enormous variety of genomic structures can be seen among viral species; as a group, they contain more structural genomic diversity than plants, animals, archaea, or bacteria. There are millions of different types of viruses, although fewer than 7,000 types have been described in detail. (Emphasis added)
“How many species of bacteria are there” (wisegeek.com; accessed 21 January 2014) teaches:
Currently, estimates of the total number of species of bacteria range from about 10 million to a billion, but these estimates are tentative, and may be off by many orders of magnitude. By comparison, there are probably between 10 and 30 million species of animals, the vast majority of them insects. The number of scientifically recognized species of animals is about 1,250,000. There are almost 300,000 recognized species of plants.
“Fungi,” (Wikipedia.com; accessed 08 September 2023), teaches:
As of 2020, around 148,000 species of fungi have been described by taxonomists,[6] but the global biodiversity of the fungus kingdom is not fully understood.[48] A 2017 estimate suggests there may be between 2.2 and 3.8 million species.[5]
“Insect”, (Wikipedia.com; accessed 09/10/2020) teaches:
Insects are the most diverse group of animals; they include more than a million described species and represent more than half of all known living organisms. The total number of extant species is estimated at between six and ten million; potentially over 90% of the animal life forms on Earth are insects.
“Plant,” (Wikipedia.com; accessed 08 September 2023) teaches:
There are about 380,000 known species of plants, of which the majority, some 260,000, produce seeds.
“Mammal,” (Wikipedia.com; accessed 08 September 2023) teaches:
According to Mammal Species of the World, which is updated through periodic editions, 5,416 species were identified in 2006. These were grouped into 1,229 genera, 153 families and 29 orders.[5]
“Murinae,” (Wikipedia.com, accessed 10 June 2024) teaches:
The Old World rats and mice, part of the subfamily Murinae in the family Muridae, comprise at least 519 species. Members of this subfamily are called murines. In terms of species richness, this subfamily is larger than all mammal families except the Cricetidae and Muridae, and is larger than all mammal orders except the bats and the remainder of the rodents.
“Fish,” (Wikipedia.com, accessed 08 September 2023) teaches:
Fish are abundant in most bodies of water. They can be found in nearly all aquatic environments, from high mountain streams (e.g., char and gudgeon) to the abyssal and even hadal depths of the deepest oceans (e.g., cush-eels and snailfish), although no species has yet been documented in the deepest 25% of the ocean.[4] At 34,300 described species, fish exhibit greater species diversity than any other group of vertebrates.[5]
“Archaea,” Wikipedia.com (accessed 08 September 2023), teaches:
The classification of archaea into species is also controversial. Ernst Mayr defined a species as a group of interbreeding organisms which are reproductively isolated, but this is of no help since archaea only reproduce asexually.[37]
Archaea show high levels of horizontal gene transfer between lineages. Some researchers suggest that individuals can be grouped into species-like populations given highly similar genomes and infrequent gene transfer to/from cells with less-related genomes, as in the genus Ferroplasma.[38] On the other hand, studies in Halorubrum found significant genetic transfer to/from less-related populations, limiting the criterion's applicability. Some researchers question whether such species designations have practical meaning.[40]
Current knowledge on genetic diversity is fragmentary, so the total number of species cannot be estimated with any accuracy.[22] (Emphasis added)
“Algae,” Wikipedia.com (accessed 03-04-2016) teaches:
The most recent estimate suggests 72,500 algal species worldwide.
“Protozoa,” Wikipedia.com (accessed 05-11-2016), teaches:
The classification of protozoa has been and remains a problematic area of taxonomy. Where they are available, DNA sequences are used as the basis for classification; however, for the majority of described protozoa, such material is not available. (Emphasis added)
A review of the disclosure does identify a Sequence Listing. The sequence listing has been found to comprise but 8 DNA sequences, of which 7 are to Homo sapiens and one is identified as being an “Artificial Sequence”.
As set forth in the claimed method, one needs to have prior knowledge of the target sequence and the “nucleotide(s) of interest (NOI)” as well as the “reporter oligonucleotides” and “set[s] of primers”.
As noted above, the disclosure has been found to disclose but 7 DNA fragments of the human genome. Such nondisclosure of such essential materials (target sequences, nucleotide sequences for reporter oligonucleotides, helper sequences, and primers) has not been found to constitute satisfaction of the written description requirement of the claimed invention.
In view of the above analysis and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, claims 1-9, 11-12, 14, 16-17, 19-23 and 27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement.
Response to argument
Applicant’s representative, at pages 15-19 of the response traverses the rejection of claims under 35 USC 112 for not satisfying the written description requirement.
A page 17 of the response said representative asserts:
Applicant submits that the Office's requirement that the specification disclose a "representative number of species" of target nucleic acid sequences and primers in this case is misplaced. The claims are drawn to a method of detecting a variant by comparing the melting analysis of an unknown sample with a known reference. However, the reference sequence is not unknown or poorly understood class of compounds.
The above argument has been considered and has not been found persuasive. Acknowledgement is made of the fact that the claims 1-9, 11-12, 14, and 16 are to a method and not to a product. However, it is well settled that in order to satisfy the written description for a method, one must also disclose the molecules required to perform the method. In support of this position attention is directed to University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co. 68 USPQ2D 1424 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) at 1433 (affirmed; University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co. 69 USPQ2d 1886 (Fed. Cir. 2004)):
Plaintiff also argues that the requirements for written descriptions of claims to chemical compounds are irrelevant to this case because the '850 patent does not claim a compound, but a method of treatment by targeting PGHS-2 activity over PGHS-1 activity. Virtually any compound claim could be transformed into a method claim, however, simply by means of wording the claim in terms of a method of using the compound. With respect to the issue before the Court, then, this is little more than a semantic distinction without a difference. The claimed method depends upon finding a compound that selectively inhibits PGHS-2 activity. Without such a compound, it is impossible to practice the claimed method of treatment. It means little to “invent” a method if one does not have possession of a substance that is essential to practicing that method. Without that substance, the claimed invention is more theoretical than real; it is, as defendants argue, akin to “inventing” a cure for cancer by utilizing a substance that attacks and destroys cancer cells while leaving healthy cells alone. Without possession of such a substance, such a “cure” is illusory, and there is no meaningful possession of the method.
***
What the inventors did not do, however, is succeed in taking the last, critical step of actually isolating such a compound, or at least of developing a process through which one skilled in the art would be directly led to such a compound. Absent that step, their discoveries, valuable though they might have been, did not blossom into a full-fledged, complete invention. Scientific discoveries, and theories based on those discoveries, frequently lay the groundwork for later inventions, but that does not make the discoverer the inventor as well.
Attention is also directed to the decision in Ariad Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.
(Fed. Cir. 2010) 94 USPQ2d 1161, 1175, which teaches:
In accordance with Rochester, the ?516 patent must adequately describe the claimed methods for reducing NF-?B activity, including adequate description of the molecules that Ariad admits are necessary to perform the methods. (Emphasis added)
Applicant’s assertion that “the reference sequence is not unknown or poorly understood class of compounds” has not been found persuasive. As is asserted by applicant at page 28, lines 22-24, of the disclosure:
The sample may comprise cells comprising said nucleic acids. The cells may for
example be prokaryotic cells or eukaryotic cells, such as plant cells or mammalian
cells. (Emphasis added)
While the sequences of the cells, and in particular any “variant sequence or of a reference sequence” (claim 1) may be required of claim 1, the disclosure has been found to provide a total of 8 sequences, of which only 6 are labeled as providing and then they are of Homo sapiens. The disclosure has not been found to provide any variant sequence, or any form of “a reference sequence” as found in any “prokaryotic cells or eukaryotic cells, such as plant cells or [non-human] mammalian cells.” While sequences of some organisms are known, such essential material has neither been disclosed nor incorporated by reference. Such non-disclosure by applicant has not been found to satisfy the written description requirement.
At page 19 of the response said representative asserts:
The present case is analogous to Hoechst and Falko-Gunter, in that, to the extent that the pending claims require a genus of primers that comprise a sequence that can hybridize with a target nucleic acid, that genus is only part of the overall invention, and the sequences "are not new or unknown biological materials that ordinarily skilled artisans would easily miscomprehend." Hoechst, 314 F.3d at 1332 (emphasis added). As described above, a person skilled in the art would readily understand that numerous resources of known sequences are available, such as the billions of known sequences available in GenBank, DNA DataBank of Japan, and the European Nucleotide Archive. (Emphasis in the original)
The above argument has been considered and has not been found persuasive. It is noted with particularity that the claimed method, kit and “reporter oligonucleotide” are not limited to that which was known as of the effective priority date (13 May 2019), but rather, encompass not only that which was known, but also that which has subsequently become known and also that which will become known at some point in the future. In the present case, the claimed method and related kit and “reporter oligonucleotide… can hybridize to one strand of a target nucleic acid consisting of two strands and comprising nucleotide(s) of interest” (claim 21). Such target sequences fairly encompass that portion of the human Y chromosome that was not determined until years after applicant having filed the instant application. Such non-disclosure of such essential materials has not been found to support the position that applicant was in possession of the claimed inventions.
In view of the above analysis and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, claims 1-9, 11-12, 14, 16-17, 19-23 and 27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101 (Utility) & 112 (Enablement)
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Standard for Utility
Attention is directed to the decision in In re Langer (CCPA, 1974) 183 USPQ 288, at 297:
As a matter of Patent Office practice, a specification which contains a disclosure of utility which corresponds in scope to the subject matter sought to be patented must be taken as sufficient to satisfy the utility requirement of § 101 for the entire claimed subject matter unless there is reason for one skilled in the art to question the objective truth of the statement of utility or its scope. Assuming that sufficient reason to question the statement of utility and its scope does exist, a rejection for lack of utility under § 101 will be proper on that basis; such a rejection can be overcome by suitable proofs indicating that the statement of utility and its scope as found in the specification are true. Cf. In re Marzocchi, 58 CCPA 1069, 1073, 439 F.2d 220, 223, 169 USPQ 367, 369 (1971) (involving the enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph). (Emphasis added)
Attention is also directed to MPEP 2107.02 I [R-07.2022], which states in part:
The claimed invention is the focus of the assessment of whether an applicant has satisfied the utility requirement. Each claim (i.e., each “invention”), therefore, must be evaluated on its own merits for compliance with all statutory requirements… Only where it can be established that other species clearly encompassed by the claim do not have utility should a rejection be imposed on the generic claim. In such cases, the applicant should be encouraged to amend the generic claim so as to exclude the species that lack utility. (Emphasis added)
Attention is also directed to MPEP 2106 II [R-10.2019], which states in part:
A claim whose BRI covers both statutory and non-statutory embodiments embraces subject matter that is not eligible for patent protection and therefore is directed to non-statutory subject matter. Such claims fail the first step (Step 1: NO) and should be rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101, for at least this reason.
Attention is also directed to MPEP 2107.01 I [R-07.2022], which states in part:
Specific Utility
A "specific utility" is specific to the subject matter claimed and can "provide a well-defined and particular benefit to the public." In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371, 76 USPQ2d 1225, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2005). This contrasts with a general utility that would be applicable to the broad class of the invention. Office personnel should distinguish between situations where an applicant has disclosed a specific use for or application of the invention and situations where the applicant merely indicates that the invention may prove useful without identifying with specificity why it is considered useful. For example, indicating that a compound may be useful in treating unspecified disorders, or that the compound has "useful biological" properties, would not be sufficient to define a specific utility for the compound. See, e.g., In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 153 USPQ 48 (CCPA 1967); In re Joly, 376 F.2d 906, 153 USPQ 45 (CCPA 1967). Similarly, a claim to a polynucleotide whose use is disclosed simply as a "gene probe" or "chromosome marker" would not be considered to be specific in the absence of a disclosure of a specific DNA target. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1374, 76 USPQ2d at 1232 ("Any EST [expressed sequence tag] transcribed from any gene in the maize genome has the potential to perform any one of the alleged uses…. Nothing about [applicant’s] seven alleged uses set the five claimed ESTs apart from the more than 32,000 ESTs disclosed in the [ ] application or indeed from any EST derived from any organism. Accordingly, we conclude that [applicant] has only disclosed general uses for its claimed ESTs, not specific ones that satisfy § 101."). A general statement of diagnostic utility, such as diagnosing an unspecified disease, would ordinarily be insufficient absent a disclosure of what condition can be diagnosed. Contrast the situation where an applicant discloses a specific biological activity and reasonably correlates that activity to a disease condition. Assertions falling within the latter category are sufficient to identify a specific utility for the invention. Assertions that fall in the former category are insufficient to define a specific utility for the invention, especially if the assertion takes the form of a general statement that makes it clear that a "useful" invention may arise from what has been disclosed by the applicant. Knapp v. Anderson, 477 F.2d 588, 177 USPQ 688 (CCPA 1973).
B. Substantial Utility
"[A]n application must show that an invention is useful to the public as disclosed in its current form, not that it may prove useful at some future date after further research. Simply put, to satisfy the ‘substantial’ utility requirement, an asserted use must show that the claimed invention has a significant and presently available benefit to the public." Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371, 76 USPQ2d at 1230. The claims at issue in Fisher were directed to expressed sequence tags (ESTs), which are short nucleotide sequences that can be used to discover what genes and downstream proteins are expressed in a cell. The court held that "the claimed ESTs can be used only to gain further information about the underlying genes and the proteins encoded for by those genes. The claimed ESTs themselves are not an end of [the inventor’s] research effort, but only tools to be used along the way in the search for a practical utility…. [Applicant] does not identify the function for the underlying protein-encoding genes. Absent such identification, we hold that the claimed ESTs have not been researched and understood to the point of providing an immediate, well-defined, real world benefit to the public meriting the grant of a patent." Id. at 1376, 76 USPQ2d at 1233-34). Thus a "substantial utility" defines a "real world" use. Utilities that require or constitute carrying out further research to identify or reasonably confirm a "real world" context of use are not substantial utilities. For example, both a therapeutic method of treating a known or newly discovered disease and an assay method for identifying compounds that themselves have a "substantial utility" define a "real world" context of use. An assay that measures the presence of a material which has a stated correlation to a predisposition to the onset of a particular disease condition would also define a "real world" context of use in identifying potential candidates for preventive measures or further monitoring. On the other hand, the following are examples of situations that require or constitute carrying out further research to identify or reasonably confirm a "real world" context of use and, therefore, do not define "substantial utilities":
(A) Basic research such as studying the properties of the claimed product itself or the mechanisms in which the material is involved;
(B) A method of treating an unspecified disease or condition;
(C) A method of assaying for or identifying a material that itself has no specific and/or substantial utility;
(D) A method of making a material that itself has no specific, substantial, and credible utility; and
(E) A claim to an intermediate product for use in making a final product that has no specific, substantial and credible utility.
Office personnel must be careful not to interpret the phrase "immediate benefit to the public" or similar formulations in other cases to mean that products or services based on the claimed invention must be "currently available" to the public in order to satisfy the utility requirement. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35, 148 USPQ 689, 695 (1966). Rather, any reasonable use that an applicant has identified for the invention that can be viewed as providing a public benefit should be accepted as sufficient, at least with regard to defining a "substantial" utility. (Emphasis added)
Holding & Rationale.
Claims 1-9, 11-12, 14, 16-17, 19-23 and 27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is not supported by either a specific, substantial, and credible asserted utility or a well-established utility.
As presently worded, claims 1-12, 14, and 16 are drawn to drawn to “a method for detecting the presence of a variant sequence in a target nucleic acid sequence consisting of two strands and comprising nucleotide(s) of interest (NOI) preferably comprising repeats”. Claims 17, 19, 20 and 27 are drawn to a kit comprising “a reporter oligonucleotide”; and claims 21-23 are drawn to “a reporter oligonucleotide which can hybridise to one strand of a target nucleic acid consisting of two strands and comprising nucleotide(s) of interest (NOI)”.
As evidenced above, the claimed method, kit and reporter oligonucleotide are to comprise oligonucleotides that can hybridize to a target nucleic acid that is found in a sample. Applicant, at page 28, lines 22-24, defines sample thusly:
The sample may comprise cells comprising said nucleic acids. The cells may for example be prokaryotic cells or eukaryotic cells, such as plant cells or mammalian cells. (Emphasis added)
The claims do not require that the nucleic acid to ultimately be detected and quantified even be known at the time of filing, much less require that it be useful under 35 USC 101. Likewise, the claims do not require that the reporter oligonucleotide be directed to any target nucleic acid that was known at the time of filing, much less require that it satisfy the utility requirements of 35 USC 101. Brenner, Comr. Pats. v. Manson, 148 USPQ 689 (U.S. 1966). The case at hand is deemed to be analogous to that set forth in MPEP 2107.01 I B (C) and (E), supra, which teaches that “[a] method of assaying for or identifying a material that itself has no specific and/or substantial utility” and “[a] claim to an intermediate product for use in making a final product that has no specific, substantial and credible utility” are not considered to have a substantial utility.
For "specific utility", the invention must have a utility specific to the subject matter claimed in contrast with a general utility that would be applicable to the broad class of the invention. According to 35 U.S.C. 101, a specific utility is not a list of potential applications for which the broad class of the invention would also have utility.
While nucleic acids, which satisfy the utility requirements of 35 USC 101, were known at the time of filing, such narrowing limitations have not been read into the claims. See MPEP 2111.01 and Superguide.
Applicant is urged to consider amending the claims such that the claims are drawn to those nucleic acids that unquestionably do have utility under 35 USC 101 and which are adequately supported by the original disclosure.
Claims 1-9, 11-12, 14, 16-17, 19-23 and 27 are also rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement. Specifically, since the claimed invention is not supported by either a specific, substantial, and credible asserted utility or a well-established utility for the reasons set forth above, one skilled in the art clearly would not know how to use the claimed invention.
Response to argument
At pages 19-20 of the response applicant’s representative traverses the rejection of claims under 35 USC 101 and 35 USC 112, enablement. At page 20 of the response said representative asserts:
Specifically, the claimed method enables the detection of variant microsatellite sequences, such as changes in the number of repetitive units or nucleotides per unit within a known target sequence, using a defined comparison to a reference sequence. This type of sequence variation-particularly in the context of microsatellite instability (MSI)-is relevant for disease diagnostics, cancer genomics, and genetic screening. The application explicitly describes how the method can be used to compare a sample to a known reference.
Furthermore, the application provides sufficient detail to show that the method produces a reproducible and meaningful output-i.e., a difference in melting curves-based on whether a variant sequence is present. A person skilled in the art would readily recognize that such a result has practical utility in distinguishing between normal and variant forms of a given repeat region and would immediately recognise the utility of the claimed method, which lies in its general applicability to any known target microsatellite locus where variation is of interest.
The above arguments have been considered and have not been found persuasive towards the withdrawal of the rejection. While agreement is reached in that “disease diagnostics, cancer genomics, and genetic screening” do have a significant utility, the claimed method, kit and “reporter oligonucleotide” are not so limited. Attention is directed to MPEP 2107.01 I A [R-07.2022]. As asserted to therein:
A general statement of diagnostic utility, such as diagnosing an unspecified disease, would ordinarily be insufficient absent a disclosure of what condition can be diagnosed. Contrast the situation where an applicant discloses a specific biological activity and reasonably correlates that activity to a disease condition. Assertions falling within the latter category are sufficient to identify a specific utility for the invention. Assertions that fall in the former category are insufficient to define a specific utility for the invention, especially if the assertion takes the form of a general statement that makes it clear that a "useful" invention may arise from what has been disclosed by the applicant. Knapp v. Anderson, 477 F.2d 588, 177 USPQ 688 (CCPA 1973). (Emphasis added)
As noted above, applicant, at page 28, lines 22-24, defines sample thusly:
The sample may comprise cells comprising said nucleic acids. The cells may for example be prokaryotic cells or eukaryotic cells, such as plant cells or mammalian cells. (Emphasis added)
A review of the disclosure and response fails to find where applicant has identified a specific utility that is currently available, with the variable repeat sequence occurring in all forms of life identified which has a specific and substantial utility.
In view of the above analysis and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, claims 1-9, 11-12, 14, 16-17, 19-23 and 27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is not supported by either a specific, substantial, and credible asserted utility or a well-established utility; and claims 1-9, 11-12, 14, 16-17, 19-23 and 27 are also rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement.
Conclusion
Objections and/or rejections which appeared in the prior Office action and which have not been repeated hereinabove have been withdrawn.
All claims are identical to or patentably indistinct from, or have unity of invention with claims in the application prior to the entry of the submission under 37 CFR 1.114 (that is, restriction (including a lack of unity of invention) would not be proper) and all claims could have been finally rejected on the grounds and art of record in the next Office action if they had been entered in the application prior to entry under 37 CFR 1.114. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL even though it is a first action after the filing of a request for continued examination and the submission under 37 CFR 1.114. See MPEP § 706.07(b). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Bradley L. Sisson whose telephone number is (571)272-0751. The examiner can normally be reached Monday to Thursday, from 6:30 AM to 5 PM.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Wu-Cheng Shen can be reached at 571-272-3157. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/Bradley L. Sisson/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1682
1 “The complete sequence of a human Y chromosome”, Rhie et al., Nature, Vol. 621, 14 September 2023, pages 344-353.
2 Attention is directed to 37 CFR 1.57(d), which sates in part:
(d) "Essential material" may be incorporated by reference, but only by way of an incorporation by reference to a U.S. patent or U.S. patent application publication, which patent or patent application publication does not itself incorporate such essential material by reference. "Essential material" is material that is necessary to:
(1) Provide a written description of the claimed invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out the invention as required by 35 U.S.C. 112(a);
(2) Describe the claimed invention in terms that particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention as required by 35 U.S.C. 112(b); or
(3) Describe the structure, material, or acts that correspond to a claimed means or step for performing a specified function as required by 35 U.S.C. 112(f). (Emphasis added)
(e) Other material ("Nonessential material") may be incorporated by reference to U.S. patents, U.S. patent application publications, foreign patents, foreign published applications, prior and concurrently filed commonly owned U.S. applications, or non-patent publications. An incorporation by reference by hyperlink or other form of browser executable code is not permitted.