DETAILED ACTION
This is a final office action on the merits. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the Office) has received claims 1 – 27 in application 17/668,368.
Claims 2, 6, 8, 20, 22, 24, and 26 are amended.
New claims 18-27 are added.
Claims 1 and 10-17 are canceled.
Claims 2-9 and 18-27 are pending and have been examined on the merits.
Response to Arguments
Claim Objections
Applicant’s amendments filed 2/16/2026, with respect to Claim Objections have been fully considered and are persuasive. The Claim Objections of Claims 26 and 27 has been withdrawn.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
Applicant’s amendments filed 2/16/2026, with respect to 35 USC § 112 have been fully considered and are persuasive. The Claim Rejection of Claim 26 has been withdrawn.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
Applicant’s arguments filed 2/16/2026, with respect to 35 USC § 101 have been fully considered and are persuasive. The amended claims integrate the potentially abstract concepts into a clearly practical, technology based voting workflow that involves tangible components. The Claim Rejections of Claims 2-9 and 18-27 has been withdrawn.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
Applicant’s arguments filed 2/16/2026, with respect to 35 USC § 103 have been fully considered and are persuasive. Regarding Claim 2, Applicant argues that the prior art fails to disclose: (1) a voting-ticket identifier x signed using a private-singing function of an election authority to produce s’(x); and (2) validation of that identifier by a ballot scanner using the corresponding public key. The rejection is based on the combined teachings of Goswami and Mukherjee. Goswami teaches a physical ballot token, with the token present before the voter makes selections, and subsequent scanning of the code from the ballot. Mukherjee teaches generating a barcode containing a message and a digital signature created by signing the message or its digest with the author’s private key. Mukherjee further the teaches that the reading device extracts the message and signature and verifies the signature using the corresponding public key. The rejection has been updated to clearly teach these limitations.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claim(s) 2-5, 8, 9, 18-23, and 25-27. is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Goswami (US20200258338A1), in view of Backert (US8636211B2), and in further view of Mukherjee (US20120308003A1).
Claim 2. Goswami teaches (in BOLD): A voting process comprising: applying to a physical ballot an encrypted voting ticket identifier, where:
Goswami - Voters can then apply to the system to allow them to receive a mailed ballot. The system can verify the identity of the voter and create a pseudo-anonymous token in the form of a unique identifier that represents the voter. In some embodiments, the vote by mail system then generates a paper ballot that is printed with a QR code, barcode, or other computer or machine-readable identifier that represents the token (¶ 0044). Once the ballot has been filled out, the application 1401 transmits the votes or ballot selections to a blockchain abstraction layer or blockchain access layer (BAL) 1402, or to other parts of the system. In some embodiment, the application 1401 transmits the ElectionID, BallotID, VoterID as well as the ballot selections the user made on the ballot to other parts of the system. In some embodiments, the application 1401 can also transmit the digitized version of the user's physical signature. All of this information is transmitted to blockchain access layer 1402 (¶ 0120).
x is a voting ticket ID, and
Goswami - The system can verify the identity of the voter and create a pseudo-anonymous token in the form of a unique identifier that represents the voter. In some embodiments, the vote by mail system then generates a paper ballot that is printed with a QR code, barcode, or other computer or machine readable identifier that represents the token (¶ 0044).
receiving vote selections on the physical ballot, after the voting ticket identifier is applied to the physical ballot; and
Goswami - the voter can receive the paper ballot and use a mobile device or other computer to scan the ballot with a camera. The voter can then use the mobile device to cast digital votes, which are then written to a blockchain. The voter can then mail the blank ballot back to the registrar. In some embodiments, the voter does not vote electronically, but instead fills out the paper ballot and sends it to the registrar. In some embodiments, the QR code, barcode, or other computer or machine readable identifier on the printed out ballot can be used to verify the that the ballot was properly submitted by a registered voter (¶ 0045).
Goswami does not teach, however Backert disclose (in BOLD):
function s'( ) is a private signer function of an election authority;
Claim interpretation – s’() is RSA/DSA signing with the election server’s private key. Only the election authority possesses that key satisfying the “private signer function.”
Backert - Digital signature component 216 then creates digital signature 709-1 by encrypting the first message digest for electronic ballot 700-1 with an encryption key. In some embodiments, the encryption key used by digital signature component 216 at this step is a private key from a public/private key pair such as are used in RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adelman) or DSA (digital signature algorithm) … then appends digital signature 709-1 to the encrypted electronic ballot 700-1. (Column 11, lines 14-21). the electronic ballots were signed by application server 104 (Column 12, lines 60-61).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skilled in the art before the effective filing date to combine the voter identifier of Goswami with the digital signature of Backert because doing so shows that an election authority can sign each ballot or token with its private key and thereby allow anyone holding the corresponding public key to verify authenticity.
The combination of Goswami and Backert disclose however Mukherjee discloses (in BOLD):
A voting process comprising: first applying to a physical ballot an encrypted voting ticket identifier and then receiving vote selections on the physical ballot, where:
Mukherjee – device…creates a digital signature…using the author’s private key (¶ 0044).
the encrypted voting ticket identifier is s'(x), where:
Mukherjee – device…creates a digital signature…using the author’s private key (¶ 0044). In step 340, device 200 generates a barcode 470 that includes a graphical representation of information comprising the message 410, the digital signature 440 of the message or message digest, and a public key certificate 450. Public key certificate 450 may include a public key 455 corresponding to the author's private key 420 (¶ 0046).
reading by a ballot scanner the encrypted voting ticket identifier from the physical ballot and validating the encrypted voting ticket identifier using a public key corresponding to the private signer function of the election authority.
Mukherjee - In step 820, reading device 700 decodes barcode 910 to translate the graphical patterns of the physical barcode into the information encoded within the barcode according to the standards of the relevant barcode type, for example using a dedicated barcode decoding software or hardware component 920. In step 830, reading device 700 parses the barcode information to extract a message 940, digital signature 930, and public key certificate 950, which includes a public key 955 (¶ 0053). the ballots can be scanned using the camera of a mobile computing device or by a scanner attached to a personal computer. The system can then identify what ballot is being submitted by looking at the scanned ballot barcode or other computer or machine readable identifier, as discussed further below (¶ 0096).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skilled in the art before the effective filing date to combine the voter identifier of Goswami and the digital signature of Backert with the scanner of Mukherjee because doing so verifies that the ballot originated from the election authority and had not been forged or altered before the ballot was accepted.
Claim 3. The combination of Goswami, Backert, and Mukherjee further discloses: The voting process of claim 2 where x is randomly generated.
Backert - In one embodiment, a unique trust token is assigned to each voter, and is not chosen by the voters but rather by application server 104. As shown in FIG. 11A, trust tokens 1101-1 and 1101-2 for the first voter and the second voter can be, for example, a random combination of a shape and a color, along with a randomly generated four-digit number. For example trust token 1100-1 is a white circle with the number “9228,” and trust token 1100-2 is a black diamond with the number “3969” (¶ 0127).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skilled in the art before the effective filing date to combine the voter identifier of Goswami and the EHT of Herskowitz and the digital signature of Backert with the scanner of Mukherjee because doing so shows that an election authority can sign each ballot or token with its private key and thereby allow anyone holding the corresponding public key and scan to verify authenticity.
Claim 4. The combination of Goswami, Backert, and Mukherjee further discloses: The voting process of claim 2 furthermore including: applying to the ballot an error check hash of the vote selections and the encrypted voting ticket identifier where the error check hash = h(y+s'(x)), where y+s'(x) is a concatenation of y and s'(x)
Backert - Digital signature component 216 generates a first cryptographic hash, or message digest, of electronic ballot 700-1, and a second cryptographic hash, or message digest, of electronic ballot 700-2. In particular, the first cryptographic hash is a hash of fields 701-1 and 701-2, and the second cryptographic hash is a hash of fields 701-2 and 702-2. Thus, the cryptographic hashes are performed on the “base” electronic ballots represented by fields 701 and 702. These message digests can be created, for example, using SHA1 or other suitable hashing algorithms known to those skilled in the art (¶ 0087). The message digests serve as unique identifiers for the contents of electronic ballots 700-1 and 700-2, such that it is computationally infeasible to generate a different electronic ballot that will hash to the same message digest. Thus, these message digests can be used to ensure that the contents of electronic ballots 700-1 and 700-2 have not been altered (¶ 0088).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skilled in the art before the effective filing date to combine the voter identifier of Goswami and the EHT of Herskowitz and the digital signature of Backert with the scanner of Mukherjee because doing so shows that an election authority can sign each ballot or token with its private key and thereby allow anyone holding the corresponding public key and scan to verify authenticity. .
Claim 5. The combination of Goswami, Backert, and Mukherjee further discloses: The voting process of claim 4 where the error checking hash is provided by a voter app executing on a user device operated by a voter.
Claim interpretation – The mobile voting app running on the voter’s phone receives and transmits the hashed identifier when it scans the ballot and submits selections, so the error checking hash is literally provided by a voter app executing on a user device.
Goswami - send the hash of the ballot selections and the electronic signature to the user operated mobile computing device or to the election official system (¶ 0012). In some embodiments, the voter can receive the paper ballot and use a mobile device or other computer to scan the ballot with a camera. The voter can then use the mobile device to cast digital votes, which are then written to a blockchain (¶ 0045). the barcode or other computer or machine readable identifier is based on a hash of the election ID and user ID (¶ 0106).
Claim 8. The combination of Goswami, Backert, and Mukherjee further discloses: The voting process of claim 2 where the applying is printing the encrypted voting ticket identifier on the physical paper ballot as QR codes.
Goswami - Then, a ballot is generated for the voter with an attached identifier like a QR code, barcode, or other computer or machine readable identifier that obscures the identification information of the voter (¶ 0099).
Claim 9. The combination of Goswami, Backert, and Mukherjee further discloses: The voting process of claim 2 where the ballot is recorded on Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) and the applying is adding the encrypted voting ticket identifier to the DRE record.
Claim interpretation – The machine captures the voter’s selections and writes the finished ballot directly into electronic storage that is later posted to the blockchain, it operates as a DRE.
Goswami - The voter-ballot database 154 stores the electronic completed ballots submitted by the voters. The voter-ballot database 154 can also contain ballots submitted by voters, either via electronic voting through a mobile app or website as described further below, through a mailed ballot, or from a voting machine at a polling place (¶ 0066).
Claim 18. The combination of Goswami, Backert, and Mukherjee further discloses: The voting process of claim 2 where the encrypted voting ticket identifier is a blinded encrypted voting ticket identifier that prevents the election authority from associating the voting ticket ID with an identity credential of a voter.
Claim interpretation – The obfuscation token is generated specifically to hide (blind) the voter’s identity and is secured through cryptographic key-vault storage.
Goswami - create a pseudo-anonymous token (¶ 0044). the tokenizer vault 133 can issue separate ballot and obfuscation tokens (¶ 0058).
Claim 19. The combination of Goswami, Backert, and Mukherjee further discloses: The voting process of claim 18 where the blinded encrypted voting ticket identifier is generated using a commuting function c(x) applied to the voting ticket ID x before signing by the election authority, and where the voter applies a reverse commuting function c'() to the signed blinded voting ticket ID to obtain the encrypted voting ticket identifier s'(x).
Goswami - In some embodiments, the blockchain access layer 101 is in communication with a tokenizer vault 133. Tokenizer vault 133 tokenizes an individual ballot cast by a voter. In order to cast a vote in the digital system the voter must be assigned a token corresponding to the election by the tokenizer vault 133. In some embodiments, the token can also correspond to a particular EPM® associated with a voter. This enables the submission of a physical ballot by mail in an anonymous manner and the simultaneous creation of a digitized version using blockchain technology for added security (¶0057).
Claim 20. The combination of Goswami, Backert, and Mukherjee further discloses: The voting process of claim 2 where the encrypted voting ticket identifier is printed on the physical ballot in a machine-readable format.
Goswami - In some embodiments, the vote by mail system then generates a paper ballot that is printed with a QR code, barcode, or other computer or machine readable identifier that represents the token. In some embodiments, the machine-readable identifier is a United States Postal Service Electronic Postmark (EPM®), or is a code or identifier associated with an EPM®. The paper ballot having the identifier thereon can then be mailed to the voter that corresponds to that token (¶ 0044).
Claim 21. The combination of Goswami, Backert, and Mukherjee further discloses: The voting process of claim 20 where the machine-readable format is selected from the group consisting of: a QR code, a barcode, a data matrix code, and an optical character recognition (OCR) compatible format.
Goswami - In some embodiments, the vote by mail system then generates a paper ballot that is printed with a QR code, barcode, or other computer or machine readable identifier that represents the token. In some embodiments, the machine-readable identifier is a United States Postal Service Electronic Postmark (EPM®), or is a code or identifier associated with an EPM®. The paper ballot having the identifier thereon can then be mailed to the voter that corresponds to that token (¶ 0044).
Claim 22. The combination of Goswami, Backert, and Mukherjee further discloses: The voting process of claim 4 further comprising the ballot scanner that reads both the vote selections y and the encrypted voting ticket identifier s'(x) and computing the error check hash h(y+s’(x)) from the scanned data.
Goswami - The system can then identify what ballot is being submitted by looking at the scanned ballot barcode or other computer or machine readable identifier, as discussed further below (¶ 0096).
Claim 23. The combination of Goswami, Backert, and Mukherjee further discloses: The voting process of claim 22 further comprising verifying the error check hash during scanning to detect tampering with the ballot.
Goswami - The system can then identify what ballot is being submitted by looking at the scanned ballot barcode or other computer or machine readable identifier, as discussed further below (¶ 0096).
Claim 25. The combination of Goswami, Backert, and Mukherjee further discloses: The voting process of claim 24 where the physical mail-in ballot with the voting ticket and ballot integrity code is submitted via postal mail or a ballot drop box.
Goswami - In some embodiments, the distribution network resources, such as carriers, can scan codes on the ballots as they are delivered in order to provide a positive delivery scan for the ballots or other election or voting documents to the system 100 (¶ 0061).
Claim 26. The combination of Goswami, Backert, and Mukherjee further discloses: The voting process of claim 5 where the voter app is configured to allow the voter to verify that their vote was counted using a voter receipt.
Goswami - scan a ballot that has been cast with virtual button 513, show the votes that have been cast with virtual button 514, and check the status of a voters votes with virtual button 515 (¶ 0093).
Claim 27. The combination of Goswami, Backert, and Mukherjee further discloses: The voting process of claim 18 where the blinded encrypted voting ticket identifier is generated using a blind signature scheme selected from the group consisting of: RSA blind signature scheme, Elliptic Curve (EC) digital signature scheme, and Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)/Lucre.
Goswami - The next hierarchical level is a participant 302 software object. Participant 302 is a software object that interacts with interface 301 to allow users to perform functions common to all users. In some embodiments, participants can use the interface 301 to create an account on the blockchain access layer 101, create a user on the blockchain access layer 101, generate a public and private key pair for the user that is used for signing transactions entered onto the blockchain, login to the system, and sign specific transactions. Participants can also come in three categories: voters, registrars, and notaries. Each category can perform additional specific functions for that particular category of participants (¶ 0080).
Claim(s) 6, 7, and 24 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Goswami, in view of Backert, and in further view of Mukherjee, and in further view of Cohen (US20080110985A1).
Claim 6. Goswami teaches: A voting process comprising:
applying a voting ticket, and a ballot integrity code, to a ballot,
Goswami - Voters can then apply to the system to allow them to receive a mailed ballot. The system can verify the identity of the voter and create a pseudo-anonymous token in the form of a unique identifier that represents the voter. In some embodiments, the vote by mail system then generates a paper ballot that is printed with a QR code, barcode, or other computer or machine-readable identifier that represents the token (¶ 0044). Once the ballot has been filled out, the application 1401 transmits the votes or ballot selections to a blockchain abstraction layer or blockchain access layer (BAL) 1402, or to other parts of the system. In some embodiment, the application 1401 transmits the ElectionID, BallotID, VoterID as well as the ballot selections the user made on the ballot to other parts of the system. In some embodiments, the application 1401 can also transmit the digitized version of the user's physical signature. All of this information is transmitted to blockchain access layer 1402 (¶ 0120).
where: x is a voting ticket ID and
Goswami - a ballot token is a unique identifier that is generated for a specific user who signs up for voting in absentia in a specific election and is printed on the mailed ballot. This token authorizes the voter to one ballot submission for that election (¶ 0058).
receiving vote selections on the physical ballot; and
Goswami - the voter can receive the paper ballot and use a mobile device or other computer to scan the ballot with a camera. The voter can then use the mobile device to cast digital votes, which are then written to a blockchain. The voter can then mail the blank ballot back to the registrar. In some embodiments, the voter does not vote electronically, but instead fills out the paper ballot and sends it to the registrar. In some embodiments, the QR code, barcode, or other computer or machine readable identifier on the printed out ballot can be used to verify the that the ballot was properly submitted by a registered voter (¶ 0045).
Goswami does not teach, however Backert discloses:
function s'( ) is a private signer function of an election authority.
Claim interpretation – s’() is RSA/DSA signing with the election server’s private key. Only the election authority possesses that key satisfying the “private signer function.”
Backert - Digital signature component 216 then creates digital signature 709-1 by encrypting the first message digest for electronic ballot 700-1 with an encryption key. In some embodiments, the encryption key used by digital signature component 216 at this step is a private key from a public/private key pair such as are used in RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adelman) or DSA (digital signature algorithm) … then appends digital signature 709-1 to the encrypted electronic ballot 700-1. (Column 11, lines 14-21). the electronic ballots were signed by application server 104 (Column 12, lines 60-61).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skilled in the art before the effective filing date to combine the voter identifier of Goswami and the digital signature of Backert because doing so shows that an election authority can sign each ballot or token with its private key and thereby allow anyone holding the corresponding public key and scan to verify authenticity.
The combination of Goswami and Backert does not disclose however Mukherjee discloses:
where the voting ticket is s'(x),
Mukherjee - generates a digital signature of the message using a private key associated with the author of the message (¶ 0043).
providing to a voter a voter receipt, where the voter receipt includes cryptographic details that enables the voter to confirm the vote selections y in the ballot integrity code.
Mukherjee - In step 820, reading device 700 decodes barcode 910 to translate the graphical patterns of the physical barcode into the information encoded within the barcode according to the standards of the relevant barcode type, for example using a dedicated barcode decoding software or hardware component 920. In step 830, reading device 700 parses the barcode information to extract a message 940, digital signature 930, and public key certificate 950, which includes a public key 955 (¶ 0053). the blockchain abstraction layer 1402 can also create an entry on the submitted vote blockchain 1407 as it creates the entries in the voting databases 140 (shown as 1 b on FIG. 14). The blockchain abstraction layer 1402 records, on the submitted vote blockchain 1407 to stores information about the voting. In some embodiments, for each ballot submitted, the blockchain abstraction layer 1402 creates a voteID, a unique entry on the submitted vote blockchain 1407 that contains a unique number that corresponds to the cast ballot or an instance of the vote or of a receipt of ballot selections, and a pointer that points to the vote record stored in the votes database 1405, a pointer that points to the data in the signature database 1406, a hash of the digitized signature of the voter, and a count of all of the votes currently submitted (¶ 0123).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skilled in the art before the effective filing date to combine the voter identifier of Goswami and the digital signature of Backert with the scanner of Mukherjee because doing so verifies that the ballot originated from the election authority and had not been forged or altered before the ballot was accepted.
The combination of Goswami, Backert, and Mukherjee does not disclose, however Cohen discloses:
the ballot integrity code is vs'(h(y + s'(x))) where: y is the vote selections of the voter, where y+s'(x) is a concatenation of y and s'(x) [where] s'(x) is the voting ticket, function h() is a hash function [and] function vs'() is voter private signing key function,
Cohen - electronically signing said vote and said identifier with said private key to create a digital signature (Claim 1). A method is described that involves creating a private key and a public key cryptographic key pair, generating a unique and random identifier for a voter's vote and accepting an election vote from said voter. The vote and identifier are electronically signed with the private key to create a digital signature. The vote and identifier are provided in a human readable format to the voter. The digital signature is provided to the voter. The method further involves generating a second unique and random identifier for a second voter's vote and accepting a second election vote from the second voter. The second vote and identifier are electronically signed with the private key to create a second digital signature. The second vote and second identifier are provided in a human readable format to the second voter. The second digital signature is provided to the second voter. The public key is published on an internet. Information is publicly provided on the internet that associates together: (i) the voter's vote in a human readable format, (ii) the identifier in a human readable format, and (iii) the digital signature. The voter's vote is verifiable with the digital signature and the public key. Information is publicly provided on the internet that associates together: (iv) the second voter's vote in a human readable format, (v) the second identifier in a human readable format, and (vi) the second digital signature. The second voter's vote is verifiable with the second digital signature and the public key. The method includes, in response to receiving a request from the internet containing the identifier, providing (i), (ii) and (iii) above through an internet communication. The method also includes in response to receiving a second request from the internet containing the second identifier, providing (iv), (v) and (vi) above through a second internet communication (Abstract).
the voter receipt includes cryptographic details that enables the voter to confirm the vote selections y in the ballot integrity code.
Cohen – providing said vote and said identifier in a human readable format to said voter and providing said digital signature to said voter (Abstract).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skilled in the art before the effective filing date to combine the voter identifier of Goswami and the digital signature of Backert and the scanner of Mukherjee with the cryptographic proof of Cohen because doing so verifies that the ballot originated from the election authority and had not been forged or altered before the ballot was accepted and improves end-to-end ballot verification.
Claim 7. The combination of Goswami, Backert, Mukherjee, and Cohen further discloses: The voting process of claim 6 where: the voter receipt includes a public key corresponding to a private key used in the function vs'( ).
Cohen - electronically signing said vote and said identifier with said private key to create a digital signature (Claim 1). A method is described that involves creating a private key and a public key cryptographic key pair, generating a unique and random identifier for a voter's vote and accepting an election vote from said voter. The vote and identifier are electronically signed with the private key to create a digital signature. The vote and identifier are provided in a human readable format to the voter. The digital signature is provided to the voter. The method further involves generating a second unique and random identifier for a second voter's vote and accepting a second election vote from the second voter. The second vote and identifier are electronically signed with the private key to create a second digital signature. The second vote and second identifier are provided in a human readable format to the second voter. The second digital signature is provided to the second voter. The public key is published on an internet. Information is publicly provided on the internet that associates together: (i) the voter's vote in a human readable format, (ii) the identifier in a human readable format, and (iii) the digital signature. The voter's vote is verifiable with the digital signature and the public key. Information is publicly provided on the internet that associates together: (iv) the second voter's vote in a human readable format, (v) the second identifier in a human readable format, and (vi) the second digital signature. The second voter's vote is verifiable with the second digital signature and the public key. The method includes, in response to receiving a request from the internet containing the identifier, providing (i), (ii) and (iii) above through an internet communication. The method also includes in response to receiving a second request from the internet containing the second identifier, providing (iv), (v) and (vi) above through a second internet communication (Abstract).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skilled in the art before the effective filing date to combine the voter identifier of Goswami and the digital signature of Backert and the scanner of Mukherjee with the cryptographic proof of Cohen because doing so verifies that the ballot originated from the election authority and had not been forged or altered before the ballot was accepted and improves end-to-end ballot verification.
Claim 24. The combination of Goswami, Backert, Mukherjee, and Cohen further discloses: The voting process of claim 7 where the ballot is a physical mail-in ballot that is distributed to the voter.
Goswami - The ballot is then mailed to the voter, who casts his or her votes, records the votes onto the blockchain via the app or website and optionally mails the ballot back. The election officials can tally the vote using the electronic or paper ballot received from the voter (¶ 0099).
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant’s disclosure.
Kondou (US20040041023A1)
An electronic voting system includes a ballot card, accepting apparatus, and at least one voting apparatus. The accepting apparatus issues a ballot card in accordance with a vote acceptance request. The voting apparatus performs voting processing in accordance with a vote request using the ballot card. The accepting apparatus includes an acceptance time recording section which records the acceptance time on the ballot card when issuing the ballot card. The voting apparatus includes a timeout detecting section and unauthorized use warning display section. Before performing voting processing upon reception of a vote request, the timeout detecting section determines whether or not a preset timeout time has elapsed from the acceptance time recorded on the ballot card to the time of voting. The unauthorized use warning display section outputs a warning message when the timeout detecting section determines that the timeout time has elapsed. A method of preventing the unauthorized use of a ballot card and a medium recording a program for preventing the unauthorized use of a ballot card are also disclosed.
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to CHRISTINA C STEVENSON whose telephone number is (571)270-7280 and whose email is christina.mention@uspto.gov. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 8am-5pm.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Patrick McAtee can be reached on (571) 272-7575. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
/C.C.S./Examiner, Art Unit 3698
/PATRICK MCATEE/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3698
Prosecution Insights