DETAILED ACTION
This Office Action is in response to claims filed on 08/20/2025.
Claims 1-25 are pending.
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s arguments, see page 1 of the remarks, filed 08/20/2025, with respect to objections to the specification have been fully considered and are persuasive. The objection of 03/20/2025 has been withdrawn.
Applicant’s arguments, see page 1 of the remarks, filed 08/20/2025, with respect to claim objections have been fully considered and are persuasive. The objections of 03/20/2025 has been withdrawn.
Applicant's arguments, see page 7 of the remarks, filed 08/20/2025, with respect to 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) rejections of claims 1-22, 24, and 25 have been fully considered but they are not fully persuasive. Examiner acknowledges the amendments made and withdraws the 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) rejections of claims 1-12, 14-22, 24, and 25. However, the rejection of claim 13 is maintained for the reasons discussed in the previous office action and set forth below.
Applicant's arguments filed 08/20/2025 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Applicant argues in substance:
The eligibility of the recited claims under §101 is self-evident because they are directed to improvements in computer-related technology and do not seek to tie up any judicial exception. According to the MPEP, a “streamlined eligibility analysis can be used for a claim that may or may not recite a judicial exception but, when viewed as a whole, clearly does not seek to tie up any judicial exception such that others cannot practice it.” MPEP §2106.06(a). “Such claims do not need to proceed through the full analysis herein as their eligibility will be self-evident.” Id. In particular, “claims directed to clear improvements to computer-related technology do not need the full eligibility analysis” since “their eligibility [is] self-evident based on the clear improvement.” MPEP §2106.06(b) (citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
Claim 1, for example, is directed to a distributed system that includes multiple computing nodes and simulates the execution of instructions on a graph processing system. Independent claims 17 and 20 and their corresponding dependent claims are directed to analogous methods and instructions for performing these simulations. The claimed technologies allow for scaling of the simulations to lager graph processing systems as disclosed in the Specification, and are improvements over existing simulations techniques. For example, the Specification describes why the multi-node system claimed by claim 1 is advantageous over other types of simulation systems, such as functional-first systems that run on a single computing node. Accordingly, the claims, when viewed as a whole, are clearly directed to improvements in a computer-related technology, and, like the claims in Enfish, their eligibility under §101 is self-evident and further analysis under Steps 2A/2B is not necessary. The rejections under §101 should accordingly be withdrawn for at least these reasons.
With respect to point (a), Examiner respectfully disagrees. In conducting subject matter eligibility analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 101, examiners may use a streamlined eligibility analysis when the eligibility of the claim is self-evident, e.g., because the claim clearly improves a technology or computer functionality. However, if there is doubt as to whether the applicant is effectively seeking coverage for a judicial exception itself, the full eligibility (the Alice/Mayo test described in MPEP 2106, subsection III) should be conducted to determine whether the claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application or recites significantly more than the judicial exception (see MPEP § 2106.06).
As expressed above and in applicant’s arguments, the streamlined eligibility analysis is applicable only when the claim, when viewed as a whole, demonstrates a self-evident improvement in technology or computer functionality. That is, the improvement must be readily apparent from the claim language itself such that amounts to a clear technological improvement and eliminates any reasonable doubt to whether the applicant is effectively seeking coverage for a judicial exception itself.
Applicant asserts that for at least claims 1, 17, and 20 contain improvements that “allow for scaling of simulations to larger graph processing systems as disclosed the specification.” This improvement is not explicitly evident in the claim language therefore cannot be considered self-evident for purposes of subject-matter eligibility. Moreover, even if the alleged improvement in scalability were explicitly recited in the claims, such an improvement would not be a self-evident improvement in technology or computer functionality. The purported improvement of “scaling of simulations to larger graph processing systems” is a result, solution, or outcome from applying the judicial exception as instructions onto generic computing node(s), such that the computing node(s) are being used in their ordinary intended capacity (receiving, manipulating, and outputting data) and would require full subject matter eligibility analysis to ascertain whether the claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application or recites significantly more than the judicial exception.
In the instant application, when the claims are viewed as a whole, the Examiner finds that claims recite abstract ideas and further finds no improvement in technology or computer functionality that is readily apparent from the claim language itself. As such, Examiner contains doubts as to whether the applicant is effectively seeking coverage for a judicial exception itself and applies the full subject matter eligibility analysis to the claims.
Argument has not been found to be persuasive.
“Step 2A is a two-prong inquiry, in which examiners determine in Prong One whether a claim recites a judicial exception, and if so, then determine in Prong Two if the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception.” MPEP §2106.04(II)(A). “In Prong One examiners evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial exception, i.e. whether a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea is set forth or described in the claim.” Id. (emphasis in original). “Examiners should determine whether a claim recites an abstract idea by (1) identifying the specific limitation(s) in the claim under examination that the examiner believes recites an abstract idea, and (2) determining whether the identified limitations(s) fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas [i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity, and mental processes].” MPEP §2106.04(a).
Here, the Examiner contends that the claims recite limitations that can be performed in the mind, e.g., by a person without a pen or paper. However, the Examiner’s contentions are erroneous and improper under the guidelines set forth in the MPEP. For instance, the MPEP states that claims “recite a mental process when they contain limitations that can practically be performed in the human mind, including for example, observations, evaluations, judgments, and opinions.” MPEP §2106.04(a)(2)(III). However, “[c]laims do not recite a mental process when they do not contain limitations that can practically be performed in the human mind, for instance when the human mind is not equipped to perform the claim limitations.” Id.
In particular, claim 1 is directed to a system that includes multiple computing nodes, so claim 1 at the very least cannot be said to be directed to a mental process. Furthermore, claim 1 and the other independent claims recite limitations that cannot be practically performed in the human mind. For example, the claims recite functional simulators that “simulate[s] execution of instructions on [a] graph processing system”, which is not something the human mind can practically perform. The claims also recite a timing simulator that “determines timing information associated with execution of the instructions by the functional simulators [and] send[s] the timing information to the functional simulators over [a] network”. These limitations similarly cannot be practically performed by the human mind. That is, they are not merely observations, evaluations, or judgements, as the human mind is not equipped to perform these limitations.
For at least these reasons, the claims do not recite a mental process as alleged by the Examiner and are thus not directed to an abstract idea. The rejections under §101 should accordingly be withdrawn.
With respect to point (b), Examiner respectfully disagrees. Step 2A is a two-prong inquiry, in which examiners determine in Prong One whether a claim recites a judicial exception, and if so, then determine in Prong Two if the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception. Together, these prongs represent the first part of the Alice/Mayo test, which determines whether a claim is directed to a judicial exception (See MPEP § 2106.04(II)(A)). As an example, the step 2A inquiry will be applied to claim 1. Prong One poses: Does the claim recite an abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon?
Claim 1 recites “a distributed simulation system comprising: a first computing node to execute a timing simulator of a graph processing system; and one or more second computing nodes coupled to the first compute node over a network, the second computing nodes to execute functional simulators of a graph processing system wherein: the functional simulators are to simulate execution of instructions on the graph processing system and send information associated with the simulated instructions to the timing simulator over the network; and the timing simulator is to determine timing information associated with the execution of the instructions sent by the functional simulators, and send the timing information to the functional simulators over the network.”
In the previous Office Action, filed 03/20/2025, Examiner has identified the limitations of “functional simulators are to simulate execution of instructions on the graph processing system” and “the timing simulator is to determine timing information associated with execution of the instructions” as processes that, but for the recitation of generic computing components, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, cover performance of the limitation of the mind (Pg. 7). For example, “simulat[ing] [the] execution of instructions” can reasonably incorporate a person mentally observing and evaluating an instruction and approximating or predicting the behavior of such system, with or without the use of a physical aid such as pen and paper. Similarly, “determin[ing] timing information associated with [the] execution of the instructions” can reasonably incorporate a person mentally observing start and end times of an event, and mentally evaluating a duration, with or without the use of physical aids such as pen and paper. Thus, Yes, Claim 1 recites judicial exceptions.
Applicant argues that the claims are not directed to a mental process because the recited operations cannot practically be performed in the human mind. In particular, Applicant sets forth that the claims explicitly necessitate the use of computing components (e.g., the functional simulators and the timing simulator) to perform the alleged judicial exception, and therefore the claims do not recite a mental process. However, MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III) states “Nor do the courts distinguish between claims that recite mental processes performed by humans and claims that recite mental processes performed on a computer. As the Federal Circuit has explained “[c]ourts have examined claims that required the use of a computer and still found that the underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper or in a person’s mind." Versata Dev. Group v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335, 115 USPQ2d 1681, 1702 (Fed. Cir. 2015). See also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318, 120 USPQ2d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (‘‘[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.’’); Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324, 117 USPQ2d 1693, 1699 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that computer-implemented method for "anonymous loan shopping" was an abstract idea because it could be "performed by humans without a computer")”. That is, even though the instant claims recite limitations as being performed by “a first computing node” or “one or more second computing nodes coupled to the first computing node over a network”, if the underlying limitation can be performed mentally or with pen and paper, the use of generic computing components does not limit the claims from being performed by a human, mentally or with a physical aid.
Please see the detailed analysis in the rejection below regarding full subject matter eligibility of the remaining independent and dependent claims. Argument has not been found to be persuasive.
Assuming arguendo (again) that the claims did recite a mental process as alleged by the Examiner, the claims as a whole integrate any alleged mental process into a practical application. “In Prong Two, examiners evaluate whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a practical application of that exception.” MPEP §2106.04(II)(A) (emphasis added). “One way to demonstrate such integration is when the claimed invention improves the functioning of a computer or improves another technology or technical field. The application or use of the judicial exception in this manner meaningfully limits the claim by going beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, and thus transforms a claim into patent-eligible subject matter.” MPEP §2106.04(d)(1).
Here, the Examiner states that the only additional elements recited by the claims beyond the alleged mental processes are the computing nodes or computer-readable media comprising instructions, and then relegates other additional limitations to the Step 2B analysis. See Office Action, pp. 8-9. However, this analysis is improper as the MPEP requires that the Examiner consider the claim as a whole in the Step 2A, Prong 2 analysis. When considered as a whole, the claim clearly recites limitations that go beyond alleged mental processes (which as shown above, are not really mental processes). More particularly, they recite meaningful limitations that go beyond merely linking the alleged mental processes to a computer and provide improved systems or techniques for performing computational simulations. Furthermore, as shown above, the claims are directed to a technological improvement, which is one example way of showing that the claims are integrated into a practical application. Accordingly, the claims recite eligible subject matter under §101, and the rejections under §101 should be withdrawn.
With regard to point (c), Examiner respectfully disagrees.
Continuing upon the analysis set forth in point (b), Prong Two of the Step 2A analysis poses: Does the claim recite additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application? Claim 1 recites additional elements of “a first computing node to execute a timing simulator of a graph processing system” and “one or more second computing nodes coupled to the first computing node over a network, the second computing nodes to execute functional simulators of the graph processing system” which are recitations that timing and functional simulators are mere generic computing components. As recited above, the timing and functional simulators are configured to perform the identified abstract idea such that the claim invokes these computing components merely as tools to apply the judicial exception (see MPEP § 2106.05(f)) such that the application of the generic computing components are merely used in their ordinary intended capacity. Further the claim recites “send[ing] information associated with the simulated instructions to the timing simulator over the network” and “send[ing] the timing information to the functional simulators over the network” which indicates insignificant extra-solution activity amounting to data outputting (see MPEP § 2106.05(g)) which requires further analysis under Step 2B.
Applicant alleges that the Examiner performed an incomplete assessment of the additional elements under Step 2A Prong 2 in the previous Office Action. With respect to the analysis of Step 2A Prong 2, the Examiner notes that every limitation recited in the independent and dependent claims were thoroughly analyzed in accordance with the procedures set forth by the MPEP (see MPEP § 2106). In the previous Office Action, using the independent claims analysis for example, the Examiner had analyzed and identified each claim limitations either under generic computing components or other machinery merely as tools to apply the abstract idea (see MPEP § 2106.05(f)), insignificant extra-solution activity amounting to mere data gathering (see MPEP § 2106.05(g)), and recitation of field of use / technological environment (see MPEP § 2106.05(h)) (see Office Action, pp. 8-9). With regard to Step 2B, the MPEP sets forth the guidelines disclosing “Although the conclusions of whether a claim is eligible at Step 2B requires that all relevant considerations be evaluated, most of these considerations were already evaluated in Step 2A Prong Two. Thus, in Step 2B, examiners should: Carry over their identification of the additional element(s) in the claim from Step 2A Prong Two; Carry over their conclusions from Step 2A Prong Two on the considerations discussed in MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)-(c), (e), (f) and (h): Re-evaluate any additional element or combination of elements that was considered to be insignificant extra-solution activity per MPEP § 2106.05(g), because if such re-evaluation finds that the element is unconventional or otherwise more than what is well-understood, routine, and conventional activity in the field, this finding may indicate that the additional element is no longer considered to be insignificant; and Evaluate whether any additional element or combination of elements are other than what is well-understood, routine, and conventional activity in the field, or simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception, per MPEP § 2106.05(d)” (see MPEP § 2106.05(II), emphasis added). Thus, the Examiner maintains that a complete Step 2A analysis of all claims has been performed and that the Step 2B analysis was conducted in accordance with the procedures and guidance set forth in the MPEP.
Moreover, Applicant asserts the claims recite “meaningful limitations that go beyond merely linking the alleged mental processes to a computer and provide improved systems or techniques for performing computational simulations”. However, Applicant fails identify, where, in the claim language itself, the alleged improvements to the system or techniques for performing computational simulations are explicitly recited.
Please see the detailed analysis in the rejection below regarding full subject matter eligibility of the remaining independent and dependent claims. Argument has not been found to be persuasive.
Assuming further arguendo that the claims recite a judicial exception under the Step 2A analysis, the claims recite elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. Under Step 2B, it is to be determined whether the claims recite “an inventive concept”. See MPEP §2106.05. “[A]n ‘inventive concept’ is furnished by an element or combination of elements that is recited in the claim in addition to (beyond) the judicial exception, and is sufficient to ensure that the claim as a whole amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception itself.” Id. (citing Alice Corp.). “Examiners should answer this question by first identifying whether there are any additional elements (features/limitations/steps) recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s), and then evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether they contribute an inventive concept (i.e., amount to significantly more than the judicial exception(s)).” MPEP §2106.05(II) (emphasis in original).
Here, the Examiner argues that the claims merely amount to applying an exception using a generic computer component. See Office Action, pg. 10. The Examiner also argues that the claims only recite data gathering and outputting activity that is well-understood, routine, and conventional. However, this is incorrect for many of the same reasons discussed above. For instance, the claims limitations that inherently cannot be mentally performed (e.g., simulating execution of instructions on a graph processing system) and involve the use of a computing node. Further, the simulation of these instructions is not merely data gathering or data outputting as alleged by the Examiner, nor is the passing of information between the recited timing simulator and functional simulators. This information passing is a feature of the inventive concept as described above and in the Specification. Accordingly, the recited limitations when evaluated in combination, amount to significantly more than the mere application of a mental process in a computer environment as the Examiner alleges.
Accordingly, the rejections under §101 should accordingly be withdrawn.
With regard to point (d), Examiner respectfully disagrees.
With respect to Applicant’s arguments pertaining to Step 2B, the Examiner directs Applicant’s attention to the cited portion in point (c) above for the applicable procedures and guidance on conducting Step 2B analysis for subject matter eligibility (see MPEP § 2106.05(II)).
With respect to Applicant’s arguments that the claims limitations cannot be performed mentally, the Examiner directs Applicant’s attention to the response set forth in point (b) above, which addresses the evaluation of mental processes performed on a computer (see MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III)).
Finalizing the analysis set forth in point (b) and point (c), Claim 1 was identified to have recitations of additional elements amounting to no more than generic computing components or other machinery as tools to apply the abstract idea and field of use/technological environment which do not amount more than the abstract idea. Further, the claim was identified to have insignificant extra-solution activity amounting to mere data outputting invoked by reciting “send[ing] information associated with the simulated instructions to the timing simulator over the network” and “send[ing] the timing information to the functional simulators over the network”. Under Step 2B analysis, these recitations of insignificant post-solution data outputting activity are also Well-Understood, Routine, and Conventional. This assertion is supported by MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) reciting “The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well-understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data”. That is, in the instant claims these limitations merely receive or transmit/send data which is Well-Understood, Routine, and Conventional.
As such, this concludes the Examiner’s analysis of claim 1 with respect to subject-matter eligibility, demonstrating that claim 1 is ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The framework set forth above was applied in the previous Office Action, and will be applied to all remaining claims in determining subject-matter eligibility in the current Office Action. As currently presented, the features of both the independent and dependent claims do not overcome the 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejections set forth in the previous office action and, as such, the rejection will remain.
Argument has not been found to be persuasive.
The Office Action relies on Eeckhout as allegedly disclosing these limitations. However, Eeckhout fails to disclose a timing simulator executing on a first computing node and communicating with multiple functional simulators executing on other computing nodes as claim 1 recites. For instance, Eeckhout explicitly discloses that the “functional simulator 720 is equipped with a timing estimator 740”; i.e., the timing estimator of Eeckhout is within its disclosed functional simulator. Indeed, Eeckhout discloses a single node performing the simulation (see, e.g., Fig 4 of Eeckhout). Further, Eeckhout does not disclose a timing simulator that is central to multiple functional simulators for a graph processing system as claim 1 recites
For at least these reasons, Applicant asserts that independent claim 1 is allowable over each of the references of record, both individually and combinations thereof. The other independent claims recite limitations similar, but not identical, to those recited in independent claim 1. Therefore, these claims are also allowable, for example, for the same reasons as identified above. Additionally, the corresponding dependent claims from these independent claims are also patentably distinct for analogous reasons. Notice to this effect is respectfully requested in the form of a full allowance of these claims.
With regard to point (e), Applicant argues that Eeckhout fails to teach or disclose the limitations presented in claim 1 reciting (inter alia): “a first computing node to execute a timing simulator of a graph processing system; and one or more second computing nodes coupled to the first computing node over a network, the second computing nodes to execute functional simulators of the graph processing system”. Specifically, Applicant asserts that Eeckhout is limited to a single computing node due to the functional simulators and timing simulator being located under a single physical housing.
However, Examiner respectfully disagrees. The claims do not explicitly define a “computing node” in a manner that would exclude multi-core processing components within a single device housing, nor do the claims recite any requirement that computing nodes be limited to distinct physical machines or housings. Under the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification, a “computing node” reasonably encompasses any computational unit or entity capable of executing instructions and communicating with other such entities. Accordingly, Eeckhout teaches the limitations of claim 1. Illustrated in Figure 4 and recited in paragraph [0091], Eeckhout discloses a “multi-core interval simulator of the present example model[ing] the timing for the individual cores.” Furthermore, Eeckhout discloses in paragraph [0070] that “when reference is made to a multi-core system, reference is made to a processor comprising a plurality of executing processing parts (processors cores) that can operate simultaneously.” Eeckhout further suggests in [0082] that “the simulation method can be used for single-core processors, but also for multi-core processors and multiprocessors.” Applicant’s attention is further directed to Figure 7 of Eeckhout, as cited in the Office Action, which explicitly illustrates the timing simulator computing node (i.e., Timing Estimator 740) coupled to the plurality of functional simulator computing nodes (i.e., Miss Event Predictor 750, Interval Determinator 760), consistent with the interpretation and mapping previously provided by the Examiner. Accordingly, the Examiner maintains that the reference teaches the claimed limitation of multiple computing nodes as reasonably interpreted.
Argument has not been found to be persuasive.
The Office Action concedes that Eeckhout fails to disclose these limitation and relies instead on Chen. However, Chen merely discloses a simulation manager thread (not a timing simulator that generates timing information associated with the execution of instructions by functional simulators) that sets a “max local time of each core thread”. That is, Chen does not disclose determining a global synchronization point for multiple functional simulators as recited by claim 20. Chen also does not disclose sending timing information to respective functional simulators at the determined global synchronization point.
For at least these reasons, Applicant asserts that independent claim 20 is allowable over each of the references of record, both individually and combinations thereof. Other claims recite limitations similar, but not identical, to those recited in independent claim 20. Therefore, these claims are also allowable, for example, for the same reasons as identified above. Additionally, the corresponding dependent claims from these claims are also patentably distinct for analogous reasons. Notice to this effect is respectfully requested in the form of a full allowance of these claims.
With regard to point (f), Examiner recognizes that Eeckhout fails to disclose the limitations of claims 9 and 20. Applicant argues that Chen fails to teach or disclose the limitations presented in claims 9 and 20 reciting (inter alia): “determine a global synchronization point for the functional simulators; and send the timing information to the functional simulators at the global synchronization point”. Specifically, Applicant asserts that Chen fails to teach or perform the cited limitations entirely.
However, Examiner respectfully disagrees. Chen is a reference in a similar field of endeavor, directed to “revisiting the problem of parallel architecture simulation in the context of CMPs (chip multiprocessors), namely the simulation of a CMP on multiple threads” (p. 20). In particular, Chen describes a simulation manager thread that “orchestrates and paces the progress of the entire simulation” (p. 21) of a plurality CPU core threads, as demonstrated in Figure 2, thereby addressing coordination and synchronization within a distributed simulation environment. Chen discloses the simulation manager thread “maintain[ing] the global time, which is equal to the smallest local time of all core threads” and that the “max local time of each core is set by the simulation manager thread in accordance with the slack simulation scheme” (p. 22). Chen further discloses that the “simulation manager thread synchronizes the progress of the simulation by setting the max local time of each core thread” (p. 22). Collectively, these disclosures demonstrate that Chen’s simulation manager performs the recited limitation of “determin[ing] a global synchronization point for the functional simulators”.
Further, Chen discloses the architecture in Figure 3, illustrating “each core thread [having] two queues: an outgoing event queue (OutQ) and an incoming event queue (InQ). The simulation manager thread has a global event queue (GQ)” (p. 22). These queues are a means for the simulation manager thread and core threads to communicate with each other such that “the simulation manager thread figures out both latency and data associated with the access on behalf of the core thread. Next, it generates an InQ entry filled with the returned value from the L2 cache and a timestamp indicating when the InQ event should be simulated by the core thread” (p. 22).
Moreover, it is implicitly known that such message exchange occurs during the global synchronization point. Chen describes synchronization through the use of barriers wherein “within a time interval, all simulation threads can independently advance until they reach the barrier. Before the simulation moves into the next interval, all global events triggered during the current interval must become visible to all simulated cores so that their effect will be simulated n the following interval” (pg. 21). As depicted in the architecture of the simulator in Figure 3, the simulation manager maintains the global time which allows the mechanism to set the interval of each core thread, and communicates with each core thread such that events are propagated upon reaching a global barrier and distributed to all simulated cores before the next interval. This description demonstrates Chen’s system sending timing information through InQ data structures hosted in core thread simulators dictating a timestamp at a global synchronization point that is managed and provided by the simulation manager. Accordingly, the Examiner maintains that the reference teaches the claimed limitation of determining a global synchronization point and providing timing information to the functional simulators at such point as reasonably interpreted.
Examiner refers Applicant to the detailed claim mapping and motivation to combine rationales in the rejection maintained below.
Argument has not been found to be persuasive.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claim 13 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Claim 13 recites the limitation "the instruction information" in line 1. There is insufficient antecedent basis for this limitation in the claim. For examination purposes claim 13 will be read as if dependent on claim 2, which recites “instruction information”.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1-25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention recites a judicial exception, is directed to that judicial exception, an abstract idea, as it has not been integrated into practical application and the claims further do not recite significantly more than the judicial exception. Examiner has evaluated the claims under the framework provided in the 2019 Patent Eligibility guidance published in the Federal Register 01/07/2019 and has provided such analysis below.
Step 1: Claims 1-16 are directed to systems and fall within the statutory category of machines; Claims 17-19 are directed to methods and fall within the statutory category of processes. Claims 20-22 are directed to a non-transitory computer-readable medium and falls within the statutory category of articles of manufacture. Claims 23-25 are directed to an additional non-transitory computer-readable medium and falls within the statutory category of articles of manufacture. Therefore, “Are the claims to a process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter?” Yes.
In order to evaluate the Step 2A inquiry “Is the claim directed to a law of nature, a natural phenomenon or an abstract idea?” we must determine, at Step 2A Prong 1, whether the claim recites a law of nature, a natural phenomenon or an abstract idea and further whether the claim recites additional elements that ingrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
Step 2A Prong 1:
Claim 1, 17, 20, and 23: The limitations of “simulate execution of instructions”, as drafted, is a process that, but for the recitation of generic computing components, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance of the limitation of the mind. For example, a person can mentally evaluate, with or without the use of pen and paper, how an instruction would behave, simply approximating an outcome or result, thereby simulating the instruction.
Further, the limitations of “determine timing information”, as drafted, is a process that, but for the recitation of generic computing components, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance of the limitation of the mind. For example, a person can observe a start and end time of an event and mentally evaluate, with or without the use of pen and paper, the duration of the event to determine timing information.
Further still, the limitations of “determine a global synchronization point” as drafted, is a process that, but for the recitation of generic computing components, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance of the limitation in the mind. For example, a person can think and observe, judge and evaluate a discrete value in time or iteration where tasks align and mentally associate the value of time as a global synchronization point.
Moreover, the limitations of “after a predetermined quantity of instructions have been simulated” as drafted, is a process that, but for the recitation of generic computing components, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, covers a performance of the limitation in the mind. For example, a person can trivially tally, with or without a pen and paper, each instruction simulated and mentally judge and evaluate, through comparison, if a threshold has been reached at a predetermined quantity.
Additionally, the limitations of “stall simulation of further instructions” as drafted, is a process that, but for the recitation of generic computing components, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance of the limitation in the mind. For example, a person can mentally judge and pause, stop, or merely not proceed with simulating any additional instructions.
Therefore, Yes, claims 1, 17, 20, and 23 recite judicial exceptions.
The claims have been identified to recite judicial exceptions, Step 2A Prong 2 will evaluate whether the claims are directed to the judicial exception.
Step 2A Prong 2:
Claims 1, 17, 20, and 23: The judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application. In particular, the claim recited the following additional elements – “a first computing node to execute a timing simulator”, “the second computing nodes to execute functional simulators”, “One or more non-transitory computer-readable media comprising instructions that, when executed by processors of a distributed simulation system, cause the processors to”, “the functional simulators are to”, “the timing simulator is to”, “at a plurality of functional simulators”, and “at a timing simulator” which are recitations of generic computing components or other machinery merely as tools to apply the abstract idea (see MPEP § 2106.05(f)) which does not integrate a judicial exception into practical application. Further, the claims recite the following additional elements – “associated with execution of the instructions sent by the functional simulators”, “receive … information associated with the simulated execution of instructions”, and “until timing information is received from the timing simulator for the quantity of instructions” which is merely a recitation of insignificant extra-solution activity amounting to mere data gathering (see MPEP § 2106.05(g)). This element will be further analyzed below at step 2B with regard to being Well-Understood, Routine, and Conventional. Further still, claims 1, 17, 20, and 23 recite the following additional elements – “one or more second computing nodes coupled to the first computing node over a network”, “of a graph processing system”, “on the graph processing system”, “on components of a graph processing system”, “for the functional simulator”, and “for the component” which is merely a recitation of field of use/technological environment (see MPEP § 2106.05(h)). Moreover, claims 1, 17, 20, and 23 recite the following additional elements – “send information associated with the simulated instructions to the timing simulator over the network”, “send the timing information to the functional simulators over the network”, “cause information associated with the simulated instructions to be sent to a timing simulator over a network”, and “send the timing information for the sets of instructions to respective functional simulators at the global synchronization point” which is merely a recitation of insignificant extra-solution activity amounting to mere data outputting (see MPEP § 2106.05(g)). This element will be further analyzed below at step 2B with regard to being Well-Understood, Routine, and Conventional.
Therefore, “Do the claims recite additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into practical application?” No, these additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into practical application and they do not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. The claim is directed to an abstract idea.
After having evaluating the inquires set forth in Steps 2A Prong 1 and 2, it has concluded that claims 1, 17, 20 and 23 not only recite a judicial exception but that the claim is directed to the judicial exception has not been integrated into practical application.
Step 2B:
Claims 1, 17, 20, and 23: The claims do not include additional elements, alone or in combination, that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. As discussed above with respect to integration of the abstract idea into a practical application, the additional elements amount to no more than generic computing components or other machinery as tools to apply the abstract idea and field of use/technological environment which do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. Moreover, the recitations of insignificant pre-solution data gathering activity and insignificant post-solution data outputting activity as also Well-Understood, Routine, and Conventional. See MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) “The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well-understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data”. That is, in the instant claims these limitations merely receive or transmit/send data which is Well-Understood, Routine, and Conventional.
Therefore “Do the claims recite additional elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception?” No, these additional elements, alone or in combination, do not amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Having concluded analysis within the provided framework, Claims 1, 17, 20, and 23 do not recite patent eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
With regard to claims 2, 4, 6, and 24 recite additional abstract idea recitations of “after a predetermined number of instructions have been simulated” and “after a predetermined quantity of sub-instructions” as drafted, is a process that, but for the recitation of generic computing components, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, covers a performance of the limitation in the mind. For example, a person can trivially tally, with or without a pen and paper, each instruction simulated and mentally judge and evaluate, through comparison, if a threshold has been reached at a predetermined quantity. Further, claims 2, 4, 6, and 24 recite “wherein at least one functional simulator is to execute a simulation”, “by the functional simulator”, and “of an accelerator instruction have been executed” which are recitations of generic computing components or other machinery merely as tools to apply the abstract idea (see MPEP § 2106.05(f)) which does not integrate a judicial exception into practical application. Further still, claims 2, 4, 6, and 24 recite “of a component of the graph processing system”, “for the component”, “wherein the component is a multi-threaded core of the graph processing system”, “wherein simulating execution of instructions comprises simulating a multi-threaded core of the graph processing system”, “wherein the component is an accelerator of the graph processing system” and “for all of the threads of the multi-threaded core in aggregate” which is merely a recitation of the field of use/technological environment (see MPEP § 2106.05(h)) which does not integrate a judicial exception into practical application. Moreover, claims 2, 4, 6, and 24 recite “send instruction information to the timing simulator” which is insignificant extra-solution activity amounting to mere data outputting (see MPEP § 2106.05(g)) which does not integrate a judicial exception into practical application and is also Well-Understood, Routine, and Conventional. See MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) “The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well-understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data”. That is, in the instant claims these limitations merely transmit data which is Well-Understood, Routine, and Conventional. For the same reasons above with regard to integration into practical application and whether additional elements amount to significantly more, claims 2, 4, 6, and 24 also fail both Step 2A prong 2, thus the claims are directed to judicial exception as it has not been integrated into practical application, and fail Step 2B as not amounting to significantly more. Therefore, Claims 2, 4, 6, and 24 do not recite patent eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
With regard to claim 3, it recites an additional element of “wherein the component is a single threaded core of the graph processing system” which is merely a recitation of the field of use/technological environment (see MPEP § 2106.05(h)) which does not integrate a judicial exception into practical application. Claim 3 does not recite any further additional elements and for the same reasons as above with regard to integration into practical application and whether additional elements amount to significantly more, claim 3 also fails both Step 2A prong 2 thus the claims are directed to judicial exception as it has not been integrated into practical application, and fails Step 2B as not amounting to significantly more. Therefore, Claim 3 does not recite patent eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
With regard to claims 5 and 21, they recite additional abstract idea recitations of “determine a thread interleaving factor” as drafted, is a process that, but for the recitation of generic computing components, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance of the limitation in the mind. For example, a person can think about and observe, judge and evaluate a quantity of instructions to assign to each thread, and mentally associate, with or without using a pencil or paper, the quantity to each thread. Further, claims 5 and 21 recite “for the multi-threaded core” which is merely a field of use/technological environment (see MPEP § 2106.05(h)) which does not integrate a judicial exception into practical application. Further still, claims 5 and 21 recite “the thread interleaving factor indicating a quantity of instructions to simulate for each thread of the multi-threaded core per cycle” and “being simulated by a functional simulator” which are recitations of mere instructions to apply the abstract idea amounting to recitation only of a solution or outcome and generic computing components or other machinery merely as tools to apply the abstract idea, respectively, (see MPEP § 2106.05(f)) which does not integrate a judicial exception into practical application. Moreover, claims 5 and 21 recite “send the interleaving factor to the functional simulator” which is insignificant extra-solution activity amounting to mere data outputting (see MPEP § 2106.05(g)) which does not integrate a judicial exception into practical application and is also Well-Understood, Routine, and Conventional. See MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) “The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well-understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data”. That is, in the instant claims these limitations merely transmit data which is Well-Understood, Routine, and Conventional. For the same reasons above with regard to integration into practical application and whether additional elements amount to significantly more, claims 5 and 21 also fail both Step 2A prong 2, thus the claims are directed to judicial exception as it has not been integrated into practical application, and fail Step 2B as not amounting to significantly more. Therefore, Claims 5 and 21 do not recite patent eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
With regard to claim 7, it recites additional abstract idea recitations of “without waiting for the pr