Prosecution Insights
Last updated: April 19, 2026
Application No. 17/753,638

METHOD FOR CONTROLLING ELECTRONIC CIGARETTE AND ELECTRONIC CIGARETTE

Final Rejection §103§112
Filed
Mar 10, 2022
Examiner
SPARKS, RUSSELL E
Art Unit
1755
Tech Center
1700 — Chemical & Materials Engineering
Assignee
Shenzhen First Union Technology Co. Ltd.
OA Round
5 (Final)
63%
Grant Probability
Moderate
6-7
OA Rounds
3y 9m
To Grant
79%
With Interview

Examiner Intelligence

Grants 63% of resolved cases
63%
Career Allow Rate
240 granted / 380 resolved
-1.8% vs TC avg
Strong +16% interview lift
Without
With
+16.2%
Interview Lift
resolved cases with interview
Typical timeline
3y 9m
Avg Prosecution
73 currently pending
Career history
453
Total Applications
across all art units

Statute-Specific Performance

§101
0.5%
-39.5% vs TC avg
§103
48.5%
+8.5% vs TC avg
§102
13.5%
-26.5% vs TC avg
§112
24.8%
-15.2% vs TC avg
Black line = Tech Center average estimate • Based on career data from 380 resolved cases

Office Action

§103 §112
DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Response to Amendment Claims 1, 4 and 6-7 are amended. Claims 2 and 16-22 are cancelled. Claim 15 is withdrawn. Claims 1 and 3-14 are presently examined. Claim Interpretation Regarding claim 1, the claim recites limitations “determining if the time interval is greater than a first preset time interval, controlling the electrical heating element to work at a first power based on determining that the time interval is greater than the first present time interval, and determining if a duration of the first power is greater than a first preset duration, turning off the electronic cigarette based on determining if the duration of the first power is greater than the first preset duration; or determining if the time interval is greater than a second preset time interval but less than or equal to the first preset time interval, controlling the electrical heating element to work at a second power based on determining that the time interval is greater than the second preset time interval but less than or equal to the first preset time interval, and determining is a duration of the second power is greater than a second preset duration, turning off the electronic cigarette based on determining that the duration of the second power is greater than the second preset duration; wherein, the first power is greater than the second power, and wherein the first preset duration is less than the second preset duration,” which are limitations that are contingent on certain conditions being met. A contingent limitation in a process claim does not restrict the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim since the performance recited by the step need not be carried out in order for the claimed method to be performed if the condition for performing a contingent step is not satisfied. See MPEP § 2111.04. Therefore, for the purposes of this Office action, the limitations will be interpreted as if they do not further limit the claim. Regarding claim 3, the claim is directed solely to a parameter that is only conditionally present. A contingent limitation in a process claim does not restrict the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim since the performance recited by the step need not be carried out in order for the claimed method to be performed if the condition for performing a contingent step is not satisfied. See MPEP § 2111.04. Therefore, for the purposes of this Office action, the claim will not be considered to have any limitations that are required to be specifically taught in the prior art. Regarding claim 4, the claim recites the limitations “determining if the time interval is less than or equal to the second preset time interval, controlling the electronic cigarette to work at a third power based on determining that the time interval is less than or equal to the second preset time interval, and determining if a duration of the third power is greater than a third preset duration, turning off the electronic cigarette based on determining that the duration of the third power is greater than the third preset duration; wherein, the second power is greater than the third power,” which are contingent upon certain conditions being met. A contingent limitation in a process claim does not restrict the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim since the performance recited by the step need not be carried out in order for the claimed method to be performed if the condition for performing a contingent step is not satisfied. See MPEP § 2111.04. Therefore, for the purposes of this Office action, the limitations will be interpreted as if they do not further limit the claim. Regarding claim 5, the claim is directed solely to parameters that are only conditionally present. A contingent limitation in a process claim does not restrict the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim since the performance recited by the step need not be carried out in order for the claimed method to be performed if the condition for performing a contingent step is not satisfied. See MPEP § 2111.04. Therefore, for the purposes of this Office action, the claim will not be considered to have any limitations that are required to be specifically taught in the prior art. Regarding claim 6, the claim recites the limitation “determining if the e-liquid remaining amount is less than the first preset remaining amount, controlling the electronic cigarette to keep a turnoff state based on determining that the e-liquid remaining amount is less than the first preset remaining amount,” which is a contingent limitation that is only required to be performed when certain conditions are satisfied. the claim is directed solely to a parameter that is only conditionally present. A contingent limitation in a process claim does not restrict the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim since the performance recited by the step need not be carried out in order for the claimed method to be performed if the condition for performing a contingent step is not satisfied. See MPEP § 2111.04. Therefore, for the purposes of this Office action, the claim will not be considered to have any limitations that need to be specifically taught in the prior art. Therefore, for the purposes of this Office action, the limitation will be interpreted as if it did not further limit the claim. Regarding claim 7, the claim recites the limitation “determining if the e-liquid remaining amount is greater than or equal to the first preset remaining amount but less than a second preset remaining amount, controlling the electronic cigarette to work at a fourth power based on determining that the e-liquid remaining amount is greater than or equal to the first preset element remaining amount but less than the second preset remaining amount; wherein, the fourth power is less than the first power,” which is a contingent limitation since it is only performed when a certain condition is satisfied. the claim is directed solely to a parameter that is only conditionally present. A contingent limitation in a process claim does not restrict the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim since the performance recited by the step need not be carried out in order for the claimed method to be performed if the condition for performing a contingent step is not satisfied. See MPEP § 2111.04. Therefore, for the purposes of this Office action, the claim will not be considered to have any limitations that need to be specifically taught in the prior art. Therefore, for the purposes of this Office action, the limitation will be interpreted as if it did not further limit the claim. Regarding claim 8, the claim is directed solely to parameters that are only conditionally present. A contingent limitation in a process claim does not restrict the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim since the performance recited by the step need not be carried out in order for the claimed method to be performed if the condition for performing a contingent step is not satisfied. See MPEP § 2111.04. Therefore, for the purposes of this Office action, the claim will not be considered to have any limitations that are required to be specifically taught in the prior art. Regarding claim 9, the claim is directed solely to parameters that are only conditionally present. A contingent limitation in a process claim does not restrict the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim since the performance recited by the step need not be carried out in order for the claimed method to be performed if the condition for performing a contingent step is not satisfied. See MPEP § 2111.04. Therefore, for the purposes of this Office action, the claim will not be considered to have any limitations that are required to be specifically taught in the prior art. Regarding claim 10, the claim is directed solely to parameters that are only conditionally present. A contingent limitation in a process claim does not restrict the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim since the performance recited by the step need not be carried out in order for the claimed method to be performed if the condition for performing a contingent step is not satisfied. See MPEP § 2111.04. Therefore, for the purposes of this Office action, the claim will not be considered to have any limitations that are required to be specifically taught in the prior art. Regarding claim 11, the claim is directed solely to parameters that are only conditionally present. A contingent limitation in a process claim does not restrict the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim since the performance recited by the step need not be carried out in order for the claimed method to be performed if the condition for performing a contingent step is not satisfied. See MPEP § 2111.04. Therefore, for the purposes of this Office action, the claim will not be considered to have any limitations that are required to be specifically taught in the prior art. Regarding claim 12, the claim is directed solely to parameters that are only conditionally present. A contingent limitation in a process claim does not restrict the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim since the performance recited by the step need not be carried out in order for the claimed method to be performed if the condition for performing a contingent step is not satisfied. See MPEP § 2111.04. Therefore, for the purposes of this Office action, the claim will not be considered to have any limitations that are required to be specifically taught in the prior art. Regarding claim 13, the claim is directed solely to parameters that are only conditionally present. A contingent limitation in a process claim does not restrict the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim since the performance recited by the step need not be carried out in order for the claimed method to be performed if the condition for performing a contingent step is not satisfied. See MPEP § 2111.04. Therefore, for the purposes of this Office action, the claim will not be considered to have any limitations that are required to be specifically taught in the prior art. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112 The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b): (b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph: The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention. Claims 1 and 3-13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention. Regarding claim 1, there is insufficient antecedent basis for the limitation “the first present time interval” (line 21) in the claim, rendering the claim indefinite. For the purposes of this Office action, the limitation will be interpreted as if it recited the first preset time interval. Claims 3-13 are indefinite by dependence. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made. The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows: 1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art. 2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue. 3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. 4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness. This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention. Claims 1, 3-5 and 9-14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being obvious over Ding (CN 109907379, machine translation relied upon) in view of Pan (US 8,205,622). Regarding claim 1, Ding discloses an output control method of an atomization device [0002] that is maintained in a low energy state until it is triggered to enter a working state [0044], which is considered to meet the claim limitation of a acquiring a work start signal. A time interval between the device starting to work and the last time work was stopped is read [0045] and compared to a first predetermined time [0046]. The device is controlled by a microprocessor that is connected to a timer that detects the starting and stopping of device use [0015] and controls the heating module accordingly through a controllable switch [0016]. Different powers are applied to the heating element based on different determined times [0015], which is considered to meet the claim limitation of controlling the heating element to work at one of several preset powers depending on a result of the comparing. The processor has a memory to store predetermined thresholds [0068]. The remaining limitations do not further limit the claim as set forth above. Ding does not explicitly disclose detecting the starting and stopping of device use through an airflow sensor. Pan teaches an electronic cigarette having an airflow sensor that generates a signal indicating that a user is puffing on the cigarette. The signal is used to instruct the power supply to supply power to an atomizer (abstract). The sensor also triggers the processor to stop supplying power to the atomizer when a user stops puffing (column 3, lines 21-33). It would therefore have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the cigarette of Ding with the airflow sensor of Pan. One would have been motivated to do so since Ding discloses an airflow sensor that controls a heating module based on cigarette use and Pan teaches an airflow sensor that uses an airflow sensor to determine when an electronic cigarette is being used. Regarding claims 3-5 and 9-13, the claims do not have any limitations that are given patentable weight under the interpretations as set forth above. Regarding claim 14, Ding discloses that the time interval is set based on time it takes the device to cool from an operating temperature at the last shutdown of the device [0037], which is considered to meet the claim limitation of a time interval. Claims 6-8 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Ding (CN 109907379, machine translation relied upon) in view of Pan (US 8,205,622) as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of Xiang (US 2017/0360097). Regarding claim 6, modified Ding teaches all the claim limitations as set forth above. Modified Ding does not explicitly teach determining the amount of e-liquid remaining. Xiang teaches an electronic cigarette control method (abstract) in which the device detects that a user has begun a smoking action and reads an available smoking time [0076] and then determines whether the available smoking time is less than a preset value [0077] so that appropriate action can be taken based on the result ([0078], [0079], [0080]). The action can include keeping the device off [0080]. The preset value and current available smoking time are updated based on the current amount of e-liquid remaining and the calculation is based on these e-liquid values [0055]. Xiang additionally teaches that this method ensures that a user will not smoke a scorched smell [0006]. It would therefore have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the method of modified Ding with the e-liquid level comparison of Xiang before the device of modified Ding is operated. One would have been motivated to do so since Xiang teaches a method that keeps a device in the off state when insufficient e-liquid remains to avoid a scorched smell. Regarding claims 7 and 8, the claims do not have any limitations that are given patentable weight under the interpretations as set forth above. Response to Arguments Regarding the claim interpretation and the claim rejections under 35 USC 103, applicant’s arguments have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Applicant argues that the claims have been amended to require that the claimed steps be performed, however, the claims recite the conditional limitation “determining if,” which has been substituted for the prior language “in response to.” However, the word “if” is by definition a conditional term. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “if” as “on condition that” and “in the event that,” which are themselves conditional phrases. Therefore, the plain meaning of the limitation “determining if” is that it is a conditional limitation since the definition of “if” is that it is a conditional term. See MPEP § 2111.01. Applicant also argues that the dependent claims are allowable due to dependence on an allowable claim, however, all examined claims are rejected as set forth above. Conclusion THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a). A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to RUSSELL E SPARKS whose telephone number is (571)270-1426. The examiner can normally be reached Monday-Friday, 9:00 am-5 pm. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Philip Louie can be reached at 571-270-1241. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /RUSSELL E SPARKS/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1755
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Prosecution Timeline

Mar 10, 2022
Application Filed
Oct 15, 2024
Non-Final Rejection — §103, §112
Jan 19, 2025
Response Filed
Apr 18, 2025
Non-Final Rejection — §103, §112
Jun 30, 2025
Response Filed
Jul 25, 2025
Final Rejection — §103, §112
Sep 01, 2025
Interview Requested
Sep 15, 2025
Examiner Interview Summary
Sep 15, 2025
Applicant Interview (Telephonic)
Oct 09, 2025
Request for Continued Examination
Oct 14, 2025
Response after Non-Final Action
Nov 26, 2025
Non-Final Rejection — §103, §112
Feb 05, 2026
Response Filed
Mar 13, 2026
Final Rejection — §103, §112 (current)

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Study what changed to get past this examiner. Based on 5 most recent grants.

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Prosecution Projections

6-7
Expected OA Rounds
63%
Grant Probability
79%
With Interview (+16.2%)
3y 9m
Median Time to Grant
High
PTA Risk
Based on 380 resolved cases by this examiner. Grant probability derived from career allow rate.

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