DETAILED ACTION
Notice of AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Response to Amendment
Applicant’s Amendment and remarks dated 4/28/2026 have been considered. Claims 6, 8, 17, 19, and 24 are cancelled. Claims 1-5, 7, 9-16, 18, and 20-23 are pending.
Response to Arguments
On page 8 of Applicant’s 4/28/2026 Amendment and remarks, Applicant identifies portions of the instant specification and asserts that such portions provide sufficient written description support for the claim amendments.
The examiner agrees that the portions of the specification identified by Applicant provide sufficient written description support for the claim amendments.
On pages 8-9 of Applicant’s 4/28/2026 Amendment and remarks, with respect to the rejections of claims 1 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. 101, with respect to Step 2A, Prong 2, Applicant argues that the claims “provide a technical solution to a technical problem and improve the functioning of a computer.” In particular, Applicant argues that “claims 1 and 12 recite a method and an apparatus, respectively, for modifying results produced by an NLP ML algorithm without retraining the NLP ML algorithm.”
The examiner respectfully disagrees. MPEP 2106.04(d)(1) explains:
In short, first the specification should be evaluated to determine if the disclosure provides sufficient details such that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize the claimed invention as providing an improvement. The specification need not explicitly set forth the improvement, but it must describe the invention such that the improvement would be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art. Conversely, if the specification explicitly sets forth an improvement but in a conclusory manner (i.e., a bare assertion of an improvement without the detail necessary to be apparent to a person of ordinary skill in the art), the examiner should not determine the claim improves technology. Second, if the specification sets forth an improvement in technology, the claim must be evaluated to ensure that the claim itself reflects the disclosed improvement. That is, the claim includes the components or steps of the invention that provide the improvement described in the specification. The claim itself does not need to explicitly recite the improvement described in the specification.
First, the examiner finds that one of ordinary skill would not find the portions of the specification identified in Applicants argument to provide details sufficient for one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize the claimed invention as providing any improvement. The claimed invention merely pertains to the mental steps of scoring phrases, and using rules to perform post-processing on the results of an NLP ML algorithm, with no actual improvements to NLP or other computer technologies. Second, the examiner finds that the claims do not even reflect the improvement argued by Applicant. There are no improvements to computer technologies at all, and as admitted by Applicant, the NLP ML algorithm is not retrained or improved in any way, so there is no improvement to natural language processing techniques either. Any improvement is to the mental processes identified in the office action, and not to any computer or natural language processing technologies.
With respect to Applicant’s argument that claim 1 (and 12) recites a “mechanism for modifying initial scores recited in claim 1 is designed to fix an inherent flaw (lack of domain-specific context) in the operation of an NLP ML algorithm making the NLP ML algorithm functionally useful without specialized programming environments such as gaming or FAQs without incurring the technical cost of retraining,” the claimed mechanism encompasses post-processing data steps (i.e., post-processing of NLP ML algorithm outputs) that can be performed mentally and that do not provide a technical solution to the alleged “flaw” of the NLP ML algorithm. As explained in the detailed rejections, a human could perform such post-processing mentally to improve the outputs of the NLP ML algorithm as claimed in claims 1 and 12.
On page 9 of Applicant’s 4/28/2026 Amendment and remarks, with respect to the rejections of claims 1 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. 101, with respect to Step 2A, Prong 2, Applicant argues:
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The examiner respectfully disagrees. The claims do not recite any improvements to software technologies or to any “semantic natural language processing (NLP) machine learning (ML) algorithm.” As explained above, the features claimed in claims 1 and 12 are mental steps and there is no improvement to the functioning of a computer at all.
On page 10 of Applicant’s 4/28/2026 Amendment and remarks, with respect to the rejections of claims 1 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. 101, with respect to Step 2A, Prong 1, Applicant argues:
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The examiner respectfully disagrees with Applicant’s arguments that the “wherein the wherein the at least one rule indicates an input threshold for the first phrase, a response threshold for the second phrase, and a bias,” “converting the at least one of the initial scores to an input weight based on the input threshold and converting the second scores to response weights based on the response threshold”, and “adding a total bias comprising a product of the input weight, a corresponding response weight, and the bias specified by the at least one rule to each of the initial scores for the set of candidate responses to generate final scores for the set of candidate responses” limitations are structural limitations that cannot be performed mentally. As explained in the detailed rejections, these limitations can be performed mentally by a human applying the mathematical relationships recited on page 9 of the instant specification, and calculating the biases mentally (or using pencil and paper) as claimed.
The examiner agrees that the “modifying execution of the program code based on the final scores” is not a mental process, and therefore such limitation was analyzed under Step 2A, Prong 2 and Step 2B, and would not found to be sufficient to render the claims eligible.
On page 10 of Applicant’s 4/28/2026 Amendment and remarks, with respect to the rejections of claims 1 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. 101, with respect to Step 2A, Prong 2, Applicant argues:
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The examiner respectfully disagrees. The independent claims do not recite any improvement to any video game technologies or any enhancements with respect to player experience or non-player character response logic. As explained with respect to claim 10 (see 1/28/2026 office action at page 18), the examiner notes that at p. 2, lines 14-30 of the instant disclosure, Applicant provides a particular example explaining how the invention is used to “enhance player experience” with respect to video games where the video game world redefines concepts that contrasts with real-world interpretations (using a raccoon suit to endow a character with the ability to fly). The examiner respectfully suggests that amending each claim so that the “claim itself reflects the disclosed improvement” to video game technology would progress the claims towards subject matter eligibility. See MPEP 2106.04(d).
On pages 10-12 of Applicant’s 4/28/2026 Amendment and remarks, with respect to the rejections 35 U.S.C. 103, Applicant argues that the amendments to the independent claims overcome the previous rejections over the prior art of record.
The examiner agrees. All of the previous rejections under 35 U.S.C. 103 are hereby withdrawn.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1-5, 7, 9-16, 18, and 20-23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more.
Regarding Step 1 of the Alice/Mayo framework, Claims 1-5, 7, and 9-11 are directed to a method (a process), Claims 12-16, 18, and 20-22 are directed to an apparatus (a machine), and Claim 23 is directed to a non-transitory computer readable medium (an article of manufacture), which each fall within one of the four statutory categories of inventions.
Regarding Claim 1
Step 2A, prong 1 (Is the claim directed to a law of nature, a natural phenomenon or an abstract idea).
Claim 1 recites the following mental processes, that in each case under the broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance of the limitation in the mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion) or with the aid of pencil and paper but for the recitation of generic computer components (e.g., “semantic natural language processing (NLP) machine learning (ML) algorithm”, “program code”).
generating, ... initial scores that represent a degree of matching between a set of candidate responses and an input phrase provided by a user ...; (under the broadest reasonable interpretation, a human can mentally perform this limitation, for example, a human can mentally review an input phrase provided by a user and then mentally assign scores to each candidate response based on the human’s perception of how well the candidate response matches the input phrase)
modifying at least one of the initial scores using at least one rule that associates a first phrase with a second phrase, (under the broadest reasonable interpretation, a human can mentally perform this limitation, for example, a human can mentally review and modify the initial scores, e.g., mentally applying a rule modifying the scores, such as a rule that associates a sample input with a sample output response)
wherein the at least one rule is selected to modify the at least one of the initial scores based on semantic similarity of the input phrase and the first phrase determined ... and second scores that represent the semantic similarity of the second phrase with a corresponding candidate response, wherein the wherein the at least one rule indicates an input threshold for the first phrase, a response threshold for the second phrase, and a bias, and wherein modifying the at least one of the initial scores comprises: converting the at least one of the initial scores to an input weight based on the input threshold and converting the second scores to response weights based on the response threshold; and adding a total bias comprising a product of the input weight, a corresponding response weight, and the bias specified by the at least one rule to each of the initial scores for the set of candidate responses to generate final scores for the set of candidate responses (under the broadest reasonable interpretation, a human can mentally perform this limitation, for example, a human can mentally modify scores based on semantic similarity, e.g., based on the human’s understanding of the meaning of the input phrase and first phrase, using certain rules (such as the formulas on page 9 of the instant specification) and biases (such as biases set forth in table 1 on page 10 of the instant specification)
Step 2A, prong 2 (Does the claim recite additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application?).
The judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application. In particular, the claim recites the additional elements (e.g., “semantic natural language processing (NLP) machine learning (ML) algorithm”, “program code”) which are recited at a high-level of generality such that they amount to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component (See MPEP 2106.05(f)).
Regarding the “using a semantic natural language processing (NLP) machine learning (ML) algorithm ... during execution of program code” limitation, such limitation is recited at a high-level of generality and amounts to no more than adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, because the limitation merely provides instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea. Accordingly, this additional element does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. (See MPEP 2106.05(f)). In particular, the recited “semantic natural language processing (NLP) machine learning (ML) algorithm” is recited at a high-level, and is a generic computer component because it is merely recited to perform the mental processes explained above with respect to step 2a, prong 1, and the claims do not recite any particular structure for how such “semantic natural language processing (NLP) machine learning (ML) algorithm” is implemented.
Regarding the “by the semantic NLP ML algorithm” limitation, such limitation is recited at a high-level of generality and amounts to no more than adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, because the limitation merely provides instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea. Accordingly, this additional element does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. (See MPEP 2106.05(f)).
Regarding the “modifying execution of the program code based on the final scores” limitation, such limitation is recited at a high-level of generality and amounts to no more than adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, because the limitation merely provides instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea. Accordingly, this additional element does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. (See MPEP 2106.05(f)).
Step 2B (Does the claim recite additional elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception?)
In accordance with Step 2B, the claim does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more that the judicial exception. As discussed above, the additional elements (e.g., “semantic natural language processing (NLP) machine learning (ML) algorithm”, “program code”) are recited at a high-level of generality such that they amount to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component (See MPEP 2106.05(f)).
Regarding the “using a semantic natural language processing (NLP) machine learning (ML) algorithm ... during execution of program code” limitation, such limitation is recited at a high-level of generality and amounts to no more than adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, because the limitation merely provides instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea. Accordingly, this additional element does not add significantly more than the judicial exception. (See MPEP 2106.05(f)).
Regarding the “by the semantic NLP ML algorithm” limitation, such limitation is recited at a high-level of generality and amounts to no more than adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, because the limitation merely provides instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea. Accordingly, this additional element does not add significantly more than the judicial exception. (See MPEP 2106.05(f)).
Regarding the “modifying execution of the program code based on the final scores” limitation, such limitation is recited at a high-level of generality and amounts to no more than adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, because the limitation merely provides instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea. Accordingly, this additional element does not add significantly more than the judicial exception. (See MPEP 2106.05(f)).
Regarding Claim 2
Step 2A, Prong 1
wherein modifying the at least one of the initial scores comprises generating, ... a first score that represents semantic similarity of the first phrase and the input phrase (under the broadest reasonable interpretation, a human can mentally perform this limitation, for example, a human can mentally generate a score based on semantic similarity, e.g., based on the human’s understanding of the meaning of the input phrase and first phrase)
Step 2A, Prong 2
Regarding the “using the semantic NLP ML algorithm” limitation, such limitation is recited at a high-level of generality and amounts to no more than adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, because the limitation merely provides instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea. Accordingly, this additional element does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. (See MPEP 2106.05(f)).
Step 2B
Regarding the “using the semantic NLP ML algorithm” limitation, such limitation is recited at a high-level of generality and amounts to no more than adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, because the limitation merely provides instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea. Accordingly, this additional element does not add significantly more than the judicial exception. (See MPEP 2106.05(f)).
Regarding Claim 3
Step 2A, Prong 1
wherein modifying the at least one of the initial scores comprises generating, ... the second scores that represent semantic similarities of the set of candidate responses and the second phrase. (under the broadest reasonable interpretation, a human can mentally perform this limitation, for example, a human can mentally generate a score based on semantic similarity, e.g., based on the human’s understanding of the meaning of each of the set of candidate responses and second phrase)
Step 2A, Prong 2
Regarding the “using the semantic NLP ML algorithm” limitation, such limitation is recited at a high-level of generality and amounts to no more than adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, because the limitation merely provides instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea. Accordingly, this additional element does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. (See MPEP 2106.05(f)).
Step 2B
Regarding the “using the semantic NLP ML algorithm” limitation, such limitation is recited at a high-level of generality and amounts to no more than adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, because the limitation merely provides instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea. Accordingly, this additional element does not add significantly more than the judicial exception. (See MPEP 2106.05(f)).
Regarding Claim 4
Step 2A, Prong 1
wherein modifying the at least one of the initial scores comprises converting the first score to the input weight using a first functional relationship between the first score and the input threshold (under the broadest reasonable interpretation, a human can mentally perform this limitation, for example, a human can mentally convert the first score to an input weight by subtracting the input threshold from the first score)
wherein modifying the at least one of the initial scores comprises converting the second scores to the response weights using a second functional relationship between the second scores and the response threshold (under the broadest reasonable interpretation, a human can mentally perform this limitation, for example, a human can mentally convert the second score to each of the response weights by subtracting the response threshold from the second score)
Regarding Step 2A, Prong 2, the claim does not include any additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application and regarding Step 2B, there are no additional elements recited that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Regarding Claim 5
Step 2A, Prong 1
wherein the first functional relationship sets the input weight to zero in response to the first score being below the input threshold and increases the input weight linearly from zero to one in response to the first score being above the input threshold and below a maximum score (under the broadest reasonable interpretation, this is a mathematical relationship, where anything below the threshold is a zero-score, and linearly scaling the range between the input threshold and maximum possible first score from 0 to 1, merely determines weights according to a particular function depicted in Fig. 5 to the instant disclosure, which is a mathematical relationship; the examiner further notes that a human can mentally chart this functional relationship)
wherein the second functional relationship sets each of the response weights to zero in response to the corresponding second score being below the response threshold and increases each of the response weights linearly from zero to one in response to the corresponding second score being above the response threshold and below a maximum score (under the broadest reasonable interpretation, this is a mathematical relationship, where anything below the threshold is a zero-score, and linearly scaling the range between the response threshold and maximum possible second score from 0 to 1, merely determines weights according to a particular function depicted in Fig. 6 to the instant disclosure, which is a mathematical relationship; the examiner further notes that a human can mentally chart this functional relationship)
Regarding Step 2A, Prong 2, the claim does not include any additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application and regarding Step 2B, there are no additional elements recited that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Regarding Claim 7
Step 2A, Prong 1
wherein the at least one rule is not used to modify each of the candidate responses that have a total bias of zero due to at least one of the first score being below the input threshold and the corresponding second score being below the response threshold (under the broadest reasonable interpretation, a human can mentally perform this limitation, for example, a human can mentally determine not to reply a rule in the circumstances claimed)
Regarding Step 2A, Prong 2, the claim does not include any additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application and regarding Step 2B, there are no additional elements recited that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Regarding Claim 9
Step 2A, Prong 1
ranking the set of candidate responses based on the final scores (under the broadest reasonable interpretation, a human can mentally perform this limitation, for example, a human can mentally rank the set of candidate responses in ascending or descending order based on the final scores)
Regarding Step 2A, Prong 2, the claim does not include any additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application and regarding Step 2B, there are no additional elements recited that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Regarding Claim 10
Step 2A, Prong 2
Regarding the “applying the ranked set of candidate responses to influence player experience during execution of a video game” limitation, such limitation amounts to no more than generally linking the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use (video games). As explained by the Supreme Court, a claim directed to a judicial exception cannot be made eligible "simply by having the applicant acquiesce to limiting the reach of the patent for the formula to a particular technological use." Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 n.14, 209 USPQ 1, 10 n. 14 (1981). Thus, limitations that amount to merely indicating a field of use or technological environment in which to apply a judicial exception do not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application.
The examiner notes that at p. 2, lines 14-30 of the instant disclosure, Applicant provides a particular example explaining how the invention is used to “enhance player experience” with respect to video games where the video game world redefines concepts that contrasts with real-world interpretations (using a raccoon suit to endow a character with the ability to fly). The examiner respectfully suggests that amending each claim so that the “claim itself reflects the disclosed improvement” to video game technology would progress the claims towards subject matter eligibility. See MPEP 2106.04(d).
Step 2B
Regarding the “applying the ranked set of candidate responses to influence player experience during execution of a video game” limitation, such limitation amounts to no more than generally linking the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use as explained above, which does not amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. MPEP 2106.05(h).
Regarding Claim 11
Step 2A, Prong 1
adding an additional rule (under the broadest reasonable interpretation, a human can mentally perform this limitation, for example, a human can mentally add an additional rule to a set of rules)
modifying the at least one rule or the additional rule (under the broadest reasonable interpretation, a human can mentally perform this limitation, for example, a human can mentally modify one of the rules)
removing the at least one rule or the additional rule (under the broadest reasonable interpretation, a human can mentally perform this limitation, for example, a human can mentally remove one of the rules)
Step 2A, Prong 2
Regarding the “to the video game at runtime; ... in the video game at runtime; and ... from the video game at runtime” limitations, such limitations amount to no more than generally linking the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use (video games). As explained by the Supreme Court, a claim directed to a judicial exception cannot be made eligible "simply by having the applicant acquiesce to limiting the reach of the patent for the formula to a particular technological use." Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 n.14, 209 USPQ 1, 10 n. 14 (1981). Thus, limitations that amount to merely indicating a field of use or technological environment in which to apply a judicial exception do not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application.
Step 2B
Regarding the “to the video game at runtime; ... in the video game at runtime; and ... from the video game at runtime” limitations, such limitations amount to no more than generally linking the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use as explained above, which does not amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. MPEP 2106.05(h).
Regarding Claim 12
Step 2A, prong 1 (Is the claim directed to a law of nature, a natural phenomenon or an abstract idea).
Claim 12 corresponds to the method of claim 1, and the analysis under Step 2A, prong 1 explained with respect to claim 1 also applies to this claim 12.
Step 2A, prong 2 (Does the claim recite additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application?).
Claim 12 corresponds to the method of claim 1, and the analysis under Step 2A, prong 2 explained with respect to claim 1 also applies to this claim 12.
The additional computer components recited in claim 12 (“memory” and “processor”) are recited at a high-level of generality such that they amount to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component (See MPEP 2106.05(f)).
Regarding the “modify execution of the program code based on the at least one modified initial score” limitation (which slightly differs from claim 1 in that the modification is based on “at least one modified initial score” instead of “the final scores”), such limitation is recited at a high-level of generality and amounts to no more than adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, because the limitation merely provides instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea. Accordingly, this additional element does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. (See MPEP 2106.05(f)).
Step 2B (Does the claim recite additional elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception?)
Claim 12 corresponds to the method of claim 1, and the analysis under Step 2B explained with respect to claim 1 also applies to this claim 12.
The additional computer components recited in claim 12 (“memory” and “processor”) are recited at a high-level of generality such that they amount to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component (See MPEP 2106.05(f)).
Regarding the “modify execution of the program code based on the at least one modified initial score” limitation (which slightly differs from claim 1 in that the modification is based on “at least one modified initial score” instead of “the final scores”), such limitation is recited at a high-level of generality and amounts to no more than adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, because the limitation merely provides instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea. Accordingly, this additional element does not add significantly more than the judicial exception. (See MPEP 2106.05(f)).
Claims 13-16, 18, and 20 depend from claim 12 and correspond to the methods claimed in claims 2-9, respectively, and therefore claims 13-20 are rejected for the same reasons explained above with respect to claim 12 and claims 2-9, respectively.
Regarding Claim 21
Step 2A, Prong 1
apply the ranked set of candidate responses to influence player experience in a game, .... (under the broadest reasonable interpretation, a human can mentally perform this limitation, for example, a human can take the highest ranked candidate response and use it in a game (the broadest reasonable interpretation of “game” includes mental games and is not limited to video games))
Step 2A, Prong 2
Regarding the “or to choose non-player character responses to character statements or actions in the game” limitation, such limitation amounts to no more than generally linking the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use (video games – the examiner notes that “non-player character” is a known term of art with respect to video games). As explained by the Supreme Court, a claim directed to a judicial exception cannot be made eligible "simply by having the applicant acquiesce to limiting the reach of the patent for the formula to a particular technological use." Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 n.14, 209 USPQ 1, 10 n. 14 (1981). Thus, limitations that amount to merely indicating a field of use or technological environment in which to apply a judicial exception do not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application.
Step 2B
Regarding the “or to choose non-player character responses to character statements or actions in the game” limitation, such limitation amounts to no more than generally linking the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use as explained above, which does not amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. MPEP 2106.05(h).
Claim 22 depends from claim 21 and corresponds to the method claimed in claim 11 and therefore claim 22 is rejected for the same reasons explained above with respect to claims 11 and 21.
Claim 23 depends from claim 1 and recites a “non-transitory computer readable medium embodying a set of executable instructions.” The analyses under Step 2A, prong 1, Step 2A, prong 2, and Step 2B with respect to claim 1 are also applicable to claim 23. Moreover, a “non-transitory computer readable medium embodying a set of executable instructions” is recited at a high-level of generality such that it amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component (See MPEP 2106.05(f)).
Allowable Subject Matter
Claims 1-5, 7, 9-16, 18, and 20-23 would be allowed over the prior art if the rejections under 35 U.S.C. 101 are overcome.
The following is a statement of reasons for the indication of allowable subject matter:
Independent claims 1 and 12 would be allowable, provided that the rejections under 35 U.S.C. 101 are overcome, because none of the references of record either alone or in combination fairly disclose or suggest the combination of limitations specified in independent claims 1 and 12, including at least:
wherein the wherein the at least one rule indicates an input threshold for the first phrase, a response threshold for the second phrase, and a bias, and
wherein modifying the at least one of the initial scores comprises:
converting the at least one of the initial scores to an input weight based on the input threshold and converting the second scores to response weights based on the response threshold; and
adding a total bias comprising a product of the input weight, a corresponding response weight, and the bias specified by the at least one rule to each of the initial scores for the set of candidate responses to generate final scores for the set of candidate responses
The closest prior art of record discloses:
Urbanek, Jack, et al. "Learning to speak and act in a fantasy text adventure game." arXiv preprint arXiv:1903.03094 (2019), hereinafter referenced as URBANEK, discloses using the BERT pretrained language model to score responses to utterances. (p. 1, section 1, pp. 4-5, section 4).
US 20190392066 A1, hereinafter referenced as KIM, discloses using paraphrasing rules to score queries based on semantic similarity. (paras. 0048, 0053, 0055).
Sabir, Ahmed, et al. "Semantic relatedness based re-ranker for text spotting." arXiv preprint arXiv:1909.07950 (2019), hereinafter referenced as SABIR, discloses a shallow deep-network that performs postprocessing operations to rank candidate texts. (p. 1, section 1).
US 20130262465 A1, hereinafter referenced as GALLE, discloses scoring using a clustering method and subtracting a threshold value. (para. 0071).
US 20210056113 A1, hereinafter referenced as MAC AN TSAOIR, discloses determining a relevance score in view of thresholds and/or weights for relevant features. (para. 0052).
However, the examiner has found that the distinct feature of the Applicant's claimed invention over the prior art is the explicit claiming of the aforementioned limitations in combination with all the other limitations as specified in independent claims 1 and 12. The examiner further finds that one of ordinary skill would not have been motivated to specifically design a rule in the precise manner claimed without the hindsight aid of Applicant’s disclosure. Therefore, independent claims 1 and 12 would be allowed if the rejections under 35 U.S.C. 101 are overcome.
Claims 2-5, 7, and 9-11 depend from claim 1, and would be allowed for depending from an allowed independent base claim, provided that the rejections under 35 U.S.C. 101 are overcome.
Claims 12-16, 18, and 20-22 depend from claim 12, and would be allowed for depending from an allowed independent base claim, provided that the rejections under 35 U.S.C. 101 are overcome.
Claim 23 recites a non-transitory computer readable medium that includes instructions to perform the method of claim 1, and would be allowed for the same reasons explained with respect to claim 1, provided that the rejections under 35 U.S.C. 101 are overcome.
Conclusion
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to MICHAEL C LEE whose telephone number is (571)272-4933. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 12:00 pm - 8:00 pm ET.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Omar Fernandez Rivas can be reached at 571-272-2589. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/MICHAEL C. LEE/Examiner, Art Unit 2128
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