Prosecution Insights
Last updated: October 22, 2026
Application No. 17/773,393

PROTECTION DEVICE FOR AN AGITATOR SHAFT OF AN AGITATOR

Final Rejection §101§103§112
Filed
Apr 29, 2022
Priority
Nov 05, 2019 — EU 19207110.8 +1 more
Examiner
COOLEY, CHARLES E
Art Unit
1774
Tech Center
1700 — Chemical & Materials Engineering
Assignee
BASF Coatings GmbH
OA Round
6 (Final)
79%
Grant Probability
Favorable
7-8
OA Rounds
0m
Est. Remaining
94%
With Interview

Examiner Intelligence

Grants 79% — above average
79%
Career Allowance Rate
1195 granted / 1513 resolved
+14.0% vs TC avg
Strong +15% interview lift
Without
With
+15.3%
Interview Lift
resolved cases with interview
Typical timeline
2y 10m
Avg Prosecution
51 currently pending
Career history
1573
Total Applications
across all art units

Statute-Specific Performance

§101
0.8%
-39.2% vs TC avg
§103
33.1%
-6.9% vs TC avg
§102
26.7%
-13.3% vs TC avg
§112
29.6%
-10.4% vs TC avg
Black line = Tech Center average estimate • Based on career data from 1513 resolved cases

Office Action

§101 §103 §112
FINAL OFFICE ACTION after RCE This application has been assigned or remains assigned to Technology Center 1700, Art Unit 1774 and the following will apply for this application: Please direct all written correspondence with the correct application serial number for this application to Art Unit 1774. Telephone inquiries regarding this application should be directed to the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at http://www.uspto.gov/ebc/index.html or 1-866-217-9197 or to the Examiner at (571) 272-1139. All official facsimiles should be transmitted to the centralized fax receiving number (571)-273-8300. Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Priority Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d). All of the CERTIFIED copies of the priority documents have been received in this national stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)). Specification The substitute specification filed 15 APR 2025 is approved for entry. The amended Abstract of the Disclosure is approved. The title is acceptable. Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b): (b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph: The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention. The inquiry during examination is patentability of the invention as the inventor or a joint inventor regards such invention. If the claims do not particularly point out and distinctly claim that which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as his or her invention, the appropriate action by the examiner is to reject the claims under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph. In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 13 USPQ2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Claims 2-5, 8, 9, and 11-13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor, or for pre-AIA the applicant regards as the invention. NOTE: Per 37 CFR 1.75(c), dependent claims shall be construed to include all the limitations of the claim incorporated by reference into the dependent claim. Accordingly, by definition, any claims that depend from a claim that is deemed indefinite under 35 USC 112(b) will also be considered indefinite and identified in the list of rejected claims above, even if such claims are themselves free of indefiniteness under § 112(b). Claim 3: do the “magnetic closures” have any relationship to the magnetic closures recited in claim 11? The recitation of the closures being in the form of “push-button closures” appears mutually exclusive to the magnetic closures now recited in claim 11. Claim 11, line 14: “the two manually releasable closures” lacks antecedent basis – change to –the two or more manually releasable closures--. In line 4, “a part” should be –the part-- to agree with line 2. The use of a confusing variety of terms for the same thing should not be permitted - MPEP 608.01(o). Also see 37 CFR 1.121(e) Disclosure consistency. The disclosure must be amended, when required by the Office, to correct inaccuracies of description and definition, and to secure substantial correspondence between the claims, the remainder of the specification, and the drawings. Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 112(d) The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(d): (d) REFERENCE IN DEPENDENT FORMS.—Subject to subsection (e), a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), fourth paragraph: Subject to the [fifth paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA )], a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers. Claims 3, 5, 8, and 9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(d) as being of improper dependent form for failing to further limit the subject matter of the claim upon which it depends, or for failing to include all the limitations of the claim upon which it depends. Applicant may cancel the claim(s), amend the claim(s) to place the claim(s) in proper dependent form, rewrite the claim(s) in independent form, or present a sufficient showing that the dependent claim(s) complies with the statutory requirements. Claim 3 repeats subject matter of claim 11 related to the magnetic closures and impermissibly broadens the scope of claim 11 related to the push-button closures. Claim 5 duplicates subject matter found in amended claim 11. Claim 8 duplicates subject matter found in amended claim 11 with regard to the closures being magnetic closures. Claim 9 duplicates subject matter found in amended claim 11. § 1.75 Claim(s) (c) One or more claims may be presented in dependent form, referring back to and further limiting another claim or claims in the same application. Any dependent claim which refers to more than one other claim ("multiple dependent claim") shall refer to such other claims in the alternative only. A multiple dependent claim shall not serve as a basis for any other multiple dependent claim. For fee calculation purposes under § 1.16, a multiple dependent claim will be considered to be that number of claims to which direct reference is made therein. For fee calculation purposes also, any claim depending from a multiple dependent claim will be considered to be that number of claims to which direct reference is made in that multiple dependent claim. In addition to the other filing fees, any original application which is filed with, or is amended to include, multiple dependent claims must have paid therein the fee set forth in § 1.16(j). Claims in dependent form shall be construed to include all the limitations of the claim incorporated by reference into the dependent claim. A multiple dependent claim shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of each of the particular claims in relation to which it is being considered. See Supplementary Examination Guidelines for Determining Compliance With 35 U.S.C. 112 and for Treatment of Related Issues in Patent Applications. 76 FR 7166 (Feb. 9, 2011): 5. Dependent Claims: When examining a dependent claim, the examiner should also determine whether the claim complies with § 112, ¶4, which requires that dependent claims contain a reference to a previous claim in the same application, specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed, and necessarily include all the limitations of the previous claim. If the dependent claim does not comply with the requirements of § 112, ¶4, the examiner should reject the dependent claim under § 112, ¶4 as unpatentable rather than objecting to the claim. Although the requirements of § 112, ¶4 are related to matters of form, noncompliance with § 112, ¶4 renders the claim unpatentable just as noncompliance with other paragraphs of § 112 would. For example, a dependent claim must be rejected under § 112, ¶4 if it omits an element from the claim upon which it depends or it fails to add a limitation to the claim upon which it depends. (footnotes omitted). Double Patenting A rejection based on double patenting of the “same invention” type finds its support in the language of 35 U.S.C. 101 which states that “whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process... may obtain a patent therefor...” (Emphasis added). Thus, the term “same invention,” in this context, means an invention drawn to identical subject matter. See Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186 (1894); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Ockert, 245 F.2d 467, 114 USPQ 330 (CCPA 1957). A statutory type (35 U.S.C. 101) double patenting rejection can be overcome by canceling or amending the claims that are directed to the same invention so they are no longer coextensive in scope. The filing of a terminal disclaimer cannot overcome a double patenting rejection based upon 35 U.S.C. 101. Claims 4 and 12 of the instant application are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 as claiming the same subject matter. This is a statutory double patenting rejection. Claim 13 duplicates subject matter found in claim 2. Claims 2 and 13 are thus objected to under 37 CFR 1.75 as being substantial duplicates of each other. When two claims in an application are duplicates or else are so close in content that they both cover the same thing, despite a slight difference in wording, it is proper after allowing one claim to object to the other as being a substantial duplicate of the allowed claim. See MPEP § 608.01(m). Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 The terms used in this respect are given their broadest reasonable interpretation in their ordinary usage in context as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, in light of the written description in the specification, including the drawings, without reading into the claim any disclosed limitation or particular embodiment. See, e.g., In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054-55 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321-22 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The Examiner interprets claims as broadly as reasonable in view of the specification, but does not read limitations from the specification into a claim. Elekta Instr. S.A.v.O.U.R. Sci. Int'l, Inc., 214 F.3d 1302, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2000). To determine whether subject matter would have been obvious, "the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved .... Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented." Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). The Supreme Court has noted: Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the design community or present in the marketplace; and the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art, all in order to determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1727, 1740-41 (2007). "Under the correct analysis, any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed." (Id. at 1742). In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made. This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention. The instant office action conforms to the policies articulated in the Federal Register notice titled “Updated Guidance for Making a Proper Determination of Obviousness” at 89 Fed. Reg. 14449, February 27, 2024, wherein the Supreme Court’s directive to employ a flexible approach to understanding the scope of prior art is reflected in the frequently quoted sentence, ‘‘A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.’’ Id. at 421, 127 S. Ct. at 1742. In this section of the KSR decision, the Supreme Court instructed the Federal Circuit that persons having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITAs) also have common sense, which may be used to glean suggestions from the prior art that go beyond the primary purpose for which that prior art was produced. Id. at 421–22, 127 S. Ct. at 1742. Thus, the Supreme Court taught that a proper understanding of the prior art extends to all that the art reasonably suggests, and is not limited to its articulated teachings regarding how to solve the particular technological problem with which the art was primarily concerned. Id. at 418, 127 S. Ct. at 1741 (‘‘As our precedents make clear, however, the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.’’). ‘‘The obviousness analysis cannot be confined . . . by overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents.’’ Id. at 419, 127 S. Ct. at 1741. Federal Circuit case law since KSR follows the mandate of the Supreme Court to understand the prior art— including combinations of the prior art—in a flexible manner that credits the common sense and common knowledge of a PHOSITA. The Federal Circuit has made it clear that a narrow or rigid reading of prior art that does not recognize reasonable inferences that a PHOSITA would have drawn is inappropriate. An argument that the prior art lacks a specific teaching will not be sufficient to overcome an obviousness rejection when the allegedly missing teaching would have been understood by a PHOSITA—by way of common sense, common knowledge generally, or common knowledge in the relevant art. For example, in Randall Mfg. v. Rea, 733 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2013), the Federal Circuit vacated a determination of nonobviousness by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB or Board) because it had not properly considered a PHOSITA’s perspective on the prior art. Id. at 1364. The Randall court recalled KSR’s criticism of an overly rigid approach to obviousness that has ‘‘little recourse to the knowledge, creativity, and common sense that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have brought to bear when considering combinations or modifications.’’ Id. at 1362, citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 415–22, 127 S. Ct. at 1727. In reaching its decision to vacate, the Federal Circuit stated that by ignoring evidence showing ‘‘the knowledge and perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art, the Board failed to account for critical background information that could easily explain why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine or modify the cited references to arrive at the claimed inventions.’’ Id. From Norgren Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 699 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (‘‘A flexible teaching, suggestion, or motivation test can be useful to prevent hindsight when determining whether a combination of elements known in the art would have been obvious.’’); Outdry Techs. Corp. v. Geox S.p.A., 859 F.3d 1364, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (‘‘Any motivation to combine references, whether articulated in the references themselves or supported by evidence of the knowledge of a skilled artisan, is sufficient to combine those references to arrive at the claimed process.’’). In keeping with this flexible approach to providing a rationale for obviousness, the Federal Circuit has echoed KSR in identifying numerous possible sources that may, either implicitly or explicitly, provide reasons to combine or modify the prior art to determine that a claimed invention would have been obvious. These include ‘‘market forces; design incentives; the ‘interrelated teachings of multiple patents’; ‘any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent’; and the background knowledge, creativity, and common sense of the person of ordinary skill.’’ Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc., 724 F.3d 1343, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2013), quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 418–21, 127 S. Ct. at 1741–42. The Federal Circuit has also clarified that a proposed reason to combine the teachings of prior art disclosures may be proper, even when the problem addressed by the combination might have been more advantageously addressed in another way. PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharms., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1197–98 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (‘‘Our precedent, however, does not require that the motivation be the best option, only that it be a suitable option from which the prior art did not teach away.’’) (emphasis in original). One aspect of the flexible approach to explaining a reason to modify the prior art is demonstrated in the Federal Circuit’s decision in Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 796 (Fed. Cir. 2021), which confirms that a proposed reason is not insufficient simply because it has broad applicability. Patent challenger Intel had argued in an inter partes review before the Board that some of Qualcomm’s claims were unpatentable because a PHOSITA would have been able to modify the prior art, with a reasonable expectation of success, for the purpose of increasing energy efficiency. Id. at 796–97. The Federal Circuit explained that ‘‘[s]uch a rationale is not inherently suspect merely because it’s generic in the sense of having broad applicability or appeal.’’ Id. The Federal Circuit further pointed out its pre-KSR holding ‘‘that because such improvements are ‘technology independent,’ ‘universal,’ and ‘even common-sensical,’ ‘there exists in these situations a motivation to combine prior art references even absent any hint of suggestion in the references themselves.’ ’’ Id., quoting DyStar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (emphasis added by the Federal Circuit in Intel). When formulating an obviousness rejection, the PTO may use any clearly articulated line of reasoning that would have allowed a PHOSITA to draw the conclusion that a claimed invention would have been obvious in view of the facts. MPEP 2143, subsection I, and MPEP 2144. Acknowledging that, in view of KSR, there are ‘‘many potential rationales that could make a modification or combination of prior art references obvious to a skilled artisan,’’ the Federal Circuit has also pointed to MPEP 2143, which provides several examples of rationales gleaned from KSR. Unwired Planet, 841 F.3d at 1003. In view of the 103 guidance above, claims 2-5, 8, 9, and 11-13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over FRIEDLAND (US 6389701 B1) in view of HOFFMAN (US 2017/0016557 A1). FRIEDLAND discloses an agitator 10 with an agitator tool 24 (such as a blade 24, such blade being capable of agitating substances – col. 1, lines 11-23) comprising an agitator shaft 20 attached thereon, a part of an agitator head 16 which does not rotate during operation of the agitator 10, and a protection device 30 for the agitator shaft 20 of the agitator 10 or for use with “other tools from other manufacturers” (col. 3, lines 1-3), the protection device 30 comprising an upper part (about 28), which serves for fastening of the protection device to the part 28 of an agitator head of the agitator, which does not rotate during operation of the agitator; and a lower part 66, 126, 40, 102 which serves for contactless covering of the agitator shaft 20; and an inward facing collar 68 or 132 at an upper edge of the protection device, wherein the protection device 30 comprises two or more shell parts 34 and 36 wherein the protection device 30 protects operating personnel from getting into contact with a rotating agitator shaft 20 of the agitator 10 (col. 1, lines 5-41); wherein the upper part and the lower part of the protection device form a tube with open ends at 44, 106 and 80, 134 (Figures 1-10) when fastening the two or more shell parts 34, 36 to each other (col. 1, lines 58-60 that describes “a hollow tubular shroud” having a pair of opposed shroud portions/shell parts); wherein the part of the agitator head 16 which does not rotate during operation of the agitator is a coupling protection of the agitator for supporting and coupling the drive shaft 18 to the drive motor within 12, 15 (col. 3, lines 7-11); wherein the protection device 30 is formed from a dimensionally stable plastic material (col. 3, lines 29-35); wherein the protection device 30 consists of two or more shell parts 34 and 36, each comprising an upper part and a lower part; wherein the part of the agitator head 16 which does not rotate during operation of the agitator is a coupling protector for supporting and coupling the drive shaft 18 to the drive motor within 12, 15; wherein the upper part and the lower part of the protection device form a tube with open ends (Figures 1-10) when fastening the two or more shell parts 34, 36 to each other (col. 1, lines 58-60); and wherein the two or more shell parts 34, 36 are two half-shell parts (Figures 1-10). FRIEDLAND does not disclose the recited magnetic closures for releasably fastening the shell parts to each other added to claim 11 via amendment. HOFFMAN discloses a protection device intended to cover a pipe that “may protect pipes” or “may be used for many different purposes” ¶ [0002] comprising an upper part (e.g., the top half portion of mirror-imaged half-shell 102 or half-shell 104 seen in Figure 1); a lower part (e.g., the bottom half portion of mirror-imaged half-shell 102 or half-shell 104 seen in Figure 1); two mirror-image half-shell parts 102 and 104 [0024] which are fastened to each other by manually releasable magnetic closures 108, 110, 114, 116 that are present at least at the upper part of the protection device [0028]; wherein one of the manually releasable magnetic closures 108 or 110 is present on a first half-shell part 102 and one of the manually releasable magnetic closures 114 or 116 is present on a second half-shell part 104 as seen in Figure 1; wherein the upper part and the lower part of the protection device form a tube with open ends by fastening the two or more shell parts to each other by the manually releasable magnetic closures (Figure 1); wherein the protection device consists of two or more shell parts 102 and 104 with each comprising an upper part and a lower part as defined above, which are fastened to each other by the manually releasable magnetic closures 108, 110, 114, 116; wherein the upper part and the lower part of the protection device form a tube with open ends by fastening the two or more shell parts 102, 104 to each other by the manually releasable magnetic closures 108, 110, 114, 116; wherein the two or more shell parts 102, 104 3, 3 are two half- shell parts (Figure 1); the protection device is formed of plastic material [0014]; the magnetic closures 108, 110, 114, 116 being embedded into or attached to the plastic material forming the shell parts 102, 104 [0027]; and the magnetic closures may include neodymium type magnets [0013]. HOFFMAN thus discloses a protection device that is intended to cover another element or certainly capable of covering another element and including half-shell parts 102, 104 which are fastened to each other by manually releasable magnetic closures 108, 110, 114, 116 that are embedded into or attached to the plastic material forming the shell parts 102, 104. As noted above HOFFMAN explicitly discloses a protection device intended to cover a pipe that “may protect pipes” or “may be used for many different purposes” per ¶ [0002]. Accordingly, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to have provided the half shell parts of the protection device of FRIEDLAND with manually releasable magnetic closures on portions of the half shells of the FRIEDLAND protection device, such closures being taught by HOFFMAN for the desirable purpose of releasably securing the two shell parts of the protection device together such that the protection device is disposed around and at least partially encloses the protected component, such as the agitator and rotating tool/blade of FRIEDLAND [0018], [0019], [0021]. Conclusion Applicant’s remarks are moot in view of the new grounds of rejection mandated by amendment and a renewed prior art search in response thereto. Applicant's amendment necessitated the new grounds of rejection. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See M.P.E.P. § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). Per Rule 1.116(b)(3): “An amendment touching the merits of the application or patent under reexamination may be admitted upon a showing of good and sufficient reasons why the amendment is necessary and was not earlier presented.” Thus, an amendment after final lacking such showing will be denied entry. A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR RESPONSE TO THIS FINAL ACTION IS SET TO EXPIRE THREE MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THIS ACTION. IN THE EVENT A FIRST RESPONSE IS FILED WITHIN TWO MONTHS OF THE MAILING DATE OF THIS FINAL ACTION AND THE ADVISORY ACTION IS NOT MAILED UNTIL AFTER THE END OF THE THREE-MONTH SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD, THEN THE SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD WILL EXPIRE ON THE DATE THE ADVISORY ACTION IS MAILED, AND ANY EXTENSION FEE PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) WILL BE CALCULATED FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THE ADVISORY ACTION. IN NO EVENT WILL THE STATUTORY PERIOD FOR RESPONSE EXPIRE LATER THAN SIX MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THIS FINAL ACTION. ANY RESPONSE FILED AFTER THE MAILING DATE OF THIS FINAL REJECTION WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF MPEP 714.12 AND 714.13 - NO EXCEPTIONS. NOTE: The examiner of record follows the interview after-final policy set forth in MPEP 713.09: Normally, one interview after final rejection is permitted. However, prior to the interview, the intended purpose and content of the interview [agenda] should be presented briefly, preferably in writing. Such an interview may be granted if the examiner is convinced that disposal or clarification for appeal may be accomplished with only nominal further consideration. Interviews merely to restate arguments of record or to discuss new limitations which would require more than nominal reconsideration or new search should be denied. (emphasis added) The agenda will be made of record per PTO policy. New USPTO policy limits time for interviews to one per new application or RCE (utility), when during prosecution, the examiner conducts an interview. More than one interview and additional time will only be granted if it is ensured “that the interviews are being used to advance prosecution”. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to CHARLES COOLEY whose telephone number is (571)272-1139. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 9:30 AM - 6:00 PM. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, CLAIRE X. WANG can be reached at 571-272-1700. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /CHARLES COOLEY/ Examiner, Art Unit 1774 11 SEP 2026
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Prosecution Timeline

Show 7 earlier events
Sep 23, 2025
Non-Final Rejection mailed — §101, §103, §112
Dec 08, 2025
Response Filed
Dec 29, 2025
Final Rejection mailed — §101, §103, §112
Mar 26, 2026
Request for Continued Examination
Mar 28, 2026
Response after Non-Final Action
Apr 10, 2026
Non-Final Rejection mailed — §101, §103, §112
Jul 09, 2026
Response Filed
Sep 15, 2026
Final Rejection mailed — §101, §103, §112 (current)

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Prosecution Projections

7-8
Expected OA Rounds
79%
Grant Probability
94%
With Interview (+15.3%)
2y 10m (~0m remaining)
Median Time to Grant
High
PTA Risk
Based on 1513 resolved cases by this examiner. Grant probability derived from career allowance rate.

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