Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Detailed Action
The Amendments and Remarks filed 4/10/26 in response to the Office Action of 11/10/25 are acknowledged and have been entered.
Claims 1-4, 8-10, and 12-18 are pending.
Claims 3 and 15-18 remain withdrawn.
Claims 1, 4, 8, 12, and 14 have been amended by Applicant.
Claims 1, 4, 8-10, and 12-14 are currently under examination.
The text of those sections of Title 35, U.S. Code not included in this action can be found in a prior Office action.
The following Office Action contains NEW GROUNDS of rejections Necessitated by Amendments.
Objections Withdrawn
Objection to claim 14 is withdrawn.
Rejections Withdrawn
The rejections under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, are withdrawn.
The rejection of claims 12-14 under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, because the specification does not reasonably provide enablement for methods of measuring the expression level of circPCMTD1 in a cancerous cell comprising p53 mutation or BCR/ABL fusion from a subject wherein increased expression of circPCMTD1 relative to a cancerous nondividing control indicates the cancer is more severe is withdrawn.
The rejection of claim 8-10 under 35 U.S.C. 101 is withdrawn.
Rejections Maintained
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
Claims 1, 2, 4 and 10 remain rejected and claims 8-10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for pre-AIA the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention. In the instant case, the claims are inclusive of a genus of antibodies that specifically bind circPCMTD1 or a peptide encoded by circPCMTD1. The specification does not disclose, and the art does not teach, the genus of antibodies as broadly encompassed in the claims.
The specification does not adequately describe any antibody that binds circPCMTD1 or a protein encoded by circPCMTD1. A description of a genus may be achieved by means of a recitation of a representative number of species falling within the scope of the genus or by describing structural features common to that genus that “constitute a substantial portion of the genus.” See University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568, 43 USPQ2d 1398, 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1997): “A description of a genus of cDNAs may be achieved by means of a recitation of a representative number of cDNA, defined by nucleotide sequence, falling within the scope of the genus or of a recitation of structural features common to the members of the genus, which features constitute a substantial portion of the genus.”
The inventions at issue in Lilly were DNA constructs per se, the holdings of that case is also applicable to claims such as those at issue here. Further, disclosure that does not adequately describe a product itself logically cannot adequately describe a method of using that product. See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1354-55 (“Regardless whether the asserted claims recite a compound, Ariad still must describe some way of performing the claimed methods... the specification must demonstrate that Ariad possessed the claimed methods by sufficiently disclosing molecules capable of reducing NF-kB activity so as to ‘satisfy the inventor’s obligation to disclose the technologic knowledge upon which the patent is based, and to demonstrate that the patentee was in possession of the invention that is claimed.’”) (internal citation omitted); see also Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle& Co., Inc., 358 F.3d916,918 (Fed.Cir.2004) (applying the same analysis to assess written description for claims to a “method for selectively inhibiting” a particular enzyme by administering a functionally defined compound, i.e., a “non-steroidal compound that selectively inhibits activity” of the gene product for that enzyme).
In regards to claims to a product defined by function, without a correlation between structure and function, the claim does little more than define the claimed invention by function. That is not sufficient to satisfy the written description requirement. See Eli Lilly, 119 at1568 USPQ2d at 1406 (“definition by function…does not suffice to define the genus because it is only an indication of what the gene does, rather than what it is”).
The instant specification fails to provide sufficient descriptive information, such as definitive structural features that are common to the genus. That is, the specification provides neither a representative number of antibodies that encompass the genus nor does it provide a description of structural features that are common to the genus so that one of skill in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the genus. “[A] sufficient description of a genus . . . requires the disclosure of either a representative number of species falling within the scope of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus so that one of skill in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the genus.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350 (quoting Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568-69). A “representative number of species” means that those species that are adequately described are representative of the entire genus. AbbVie Deutschland GMBH v. Janssen Biotech, 111 USPQ2d 1780, 1790 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The ’128 and ’485 patents, however, only describe species of structurally similar antibodies that were derived from Joe-9. Although the number of the described species appears high quantitatively, the described species are all of the similar type and do not qualitatively represent other types of antibodies encompassed by the genus.”). Thus, when there is substantial variation within the genus, one must describe a sufficient variety of species to reflect the variation within the genus to provide a “representative number” of species. Further, in view of Amgen v. Sanofi, 872 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017) and the Office’s February 2018 memo clarifying written description guidance for claims drawn to antibodies, the 2008 Written Description Training Materials are outdated and should not be relied upon as reflecting the current state of law regarding 35 U.S.C. 112. Further, a “newly characterized antigen” test flouts basic legal principles of the written description requirement (Amgen v. Sanofi, 872 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). Adequate written description of a newly characterized antigen alone is not considered adequate written description of a claimed antibody to that newly characterized antigen. Where an antibody binds to an antigen tells one nothing about the structure of any other antibody. Also, see the Board’s decision in Appeal 2017-010877 (claims to “A monoclonal antibody that binds a conformational epitope formed by amino acids 42-66 of SEQ ID NO:1”).
The functional requirements of the claimed antibodies is the sort of wish list of properties which fails to satisfy the written description requirement because “antibodies with those properties have not been adequately described.” Centocor, 636 F.3d at 1352. The “claims merely recite a description of the problem to be solved while claiming all solutions to it and . . . cover any compound later actually invented and determined to fall within the claim’s functional boundaries— leaving it to the pharmaceutical industry to complete an unfinished invention.”Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. EliLilly and Co.,598 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Since the disclosure fails to describe common attributes or characteristics that adequately identify members of the genus, and because the genus is highly variant, the disclosure is insufficient to describe the genus. Thus, one of skill in the art would reasonably conclude that the disclosure fails to provide a representative number of species to describe the genus as broadly claimed.
Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 19USPQ2d 1111, clearly states “applicant must convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention. The invention is, for purposes of the ‘written description’ inquiry, whatever is now claimed.” (See page 1117.) The specification does not “clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [he or she] invented what is claimed.” (See Vas-Cath at page 1116). As discussed above, even though Applicant may propose methods of screening for possible members of the genus, the skilled artisan cannot envision the detailed chemical structure of the encompassed genus, and therefore conception is not achieved until reduction to practice has occurred, regardless of the complexity or simplicity of the method of isolation. Adequate written description requires more than a mere statement that it is part of the invention and reference to a potential method of isolation. The compound itself is required. See Fiers v. Revel, 25 USPQ2d 1601 at 1606 (CAFC 1993) and Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 18 USPQ2d 1016. See Ariad, 94 USPQ2d at 1161; Centocor at 1876 (“The fact that a fully-human antibody could be made does not suffice to show that the inventors of the ‘775 patent possessed such an antibody.”)
One cannot describe what one has not conceived. See Fiddes v. Baird, 30 USPQ2d 1481 at 1483. In Fiddes, claims directed to mammalian FGF’s were found to be unpatentable due to lack of written description for that broad class. The specification provided only the bovine sequence. Applicant is reminded that Vas-Cath makes clear that the written description provision of 35 U.S.C. §112 is severable from its enablement provision (see page 1115).
Response to Arguments
In the Reply of 4/10/26, Applicant argues Applicant possesses an antibody meeting all features of claim 1. Applicant further argues that it is well within routine skill of the person of skill in the art to recognize every possible antibody sequence that will bind a target.
The amendments to the claims and the arguments found in the Reply of 4/10/26 have been carefully considered, but are not deemed persuasive. In regards to the argument Applicant possesses an antibody meeting all features of claim 1, the antibody used in figures of the specification is not adequately described and is not representative of the genus.
In regards to the argument that it is well within routine skill of the person of skill in the art to recognize every possible antibody sequence that will bind a target, the examiner disagrees. Where an antibody binds to an antigen tells one nothing about the structure of any other antibody. Further, description of a target does not adequately describe any antibody. Further, a “newly characterized antigen” test flouts basic legal principles of the written description requirement (Amgen v. Sanofi, 872 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). No person can visualize every possible antibody sequence that binds circPCMTD1 or a peptide encoded by circPCMTD1.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
Claim 4 remains rejected and claims 8-10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to enable one skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and/or use the invention.
Factors to be considered in determining whether undue experimentation is required, are summarized in In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8 USPQ2d 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988). There are many factors to be considered when determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a determination that a disclosure does not satisfy the enablement requirement and whether any necessary experimentation is "undue." These factors include, but are not limited to: the breadth of the claims, the nature of the invention, the state of the prior art, the level of one of ordinary skill, the level of predictability in the art, the amount of direction provided by the inventor, the existence of working examples, and the quantity of experimentation needed to make or use the invention based on the content of the disclosure. See also Ex parte Forman, 230 USPQ 546 (BPAI 1986).
The claims are broadly drawn to methods of treating cancer in a subject comprising administering the subject an antibody that specifically binds circPCMTD1 or a peptide encoded by circPCMTD1.
This invention is in a class of invention which the CAFC has characterized as "the unpredictable arts such as chemistry and biology". Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 243 F.3d 1316, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
The specification discloses an antibody specific for circPCMTD1 has been generated (lines 14-15 on page 35, in particular). However, neither the specification nor the prior art adequately describes an antibody that specifically binds circPCMTD1 or a peptide encoded by circPCMTD1. The specification provides no working examples demonstrating the claimed method. Further, there is no indication that an antibody that specifically binds circPCMTD1 or a peptide encoded by circPCMTD1 would provide therapeutic upon administration of the antibody to a subject with cancer.
In order to perform the method, as broadly claimed, it would require undue experimentation to (i) generate antibodies that specifically bind circPCMTD1 or a peptide encoded by circPCMTD1 and (ii) determine which, if any, of those antibodies would provide therapeutic benefit to subjects with each cancer encompassed by the claims.
Further, similar to claims at issue in Amgen Inc. v Sanofi, the instant specification does not enable the full scope of the claims. In view of the teachings above and the lack of guidance, workable examples and or exemplification in the specification, it would require undue experimentation by one of skill in the art to determine with any predictability, that the method would function as claimed.
Response to Arguments
In the Reply of 4/10/26, Applicant argues an antibody encompassed by the claims has been described. Applicant asserts the claims are enabled, argues enablement does not require a working example, and argues the Office has not provided reason for lack of enablement.
The amendments to the claims and the arguments found in the Reply of 4/10/26 have been carefully considered, but are not deemed persuasive. In regards to the argument an antibody encompassed by the claims has been described, the specification discloses an antibody specific for circPCMTD1 has been generated (lines 14-15 on page 35, in particular). However, neither the specification nor the prior art adequately describes an antibody that specifically binds circPCMTD1 or a peptide encoded by circPCMTD1. Where an antibody binds to an antigen tells one nothing about the structure of any other antibody. Further, description of a target does not adequately describe any antibody. Further, a “newly characterized antigen” test flouts basic legal principles of the written description requirement (Amgen v. Sanofi, 872 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
In regards to the arguments enablement does not require a working example and that the Office has not provided reason for lack of enablement, the examiner agrees enablement does not require a working example. However, existence of working examples is one factor used to determine enablement. There are many factors to be considered when determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a determination that a disclosure does not satisfy the enablement requirement and whether any necessary experimentation is "undue." These factors include, but are not limited to: the breadth of the claims, the nature of the invention, the state of the prior art, the level of one of ordinary skill, the level of predictability in the art, the amount of direction provided by the inventor, the existence of working examples, and the quantity of experimentation needed to make or use the invention based on the content of the disclosure. See also Ex parte Forman, 230 USPQ 546 (BPAI 1986). The breadth of the instant claims is: methods of treating cancer in a subject comprising administering the subject any antibody that specifically binds circPCMTD1 or a peptide encoded by circPCMTD1. The nature of the invention is: an invention in a class of invention which the CAFC has characterized as "the unpredictable arts such as chemistry and biology". Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 243 F.3d 1316, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The state of the prior art is: antibodies that specifically bind circPCMTD1 or a peptide encoded by circPCMTD1 are not know to treat cancer. The level of one of ordinary skill is: inability to treat a cancer with a reagent that has not been shown to treat a cancer. The existence of working examples is: there are none. The quantity of experimentation needed to make or use the invention based on the content of the disclosure is: undue experimentation would be required to (i) generate antibodies that specifically bind circPCMTD1 or a peptide encoded by circPCMTD1 and (ii) determine which, if any, of those antibodies would provide therapeutic benefit to subjects with each cancer encompassed by the claims.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
Claims 8-10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, because the specification, while being enabling for methods of detecting the presence of circPCMTD1 RNA in a sample from a subject, does not reasonably provide enablement for methods of detecting the presence of circPCMTD1 RNA in a subject wherein the presence or increased expression of circPCMTD1 relative to a control indicates the presence of a p53 mutation and a BCR/ABL fusion. The specification does not enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to perform the invention commensurate in scope with these claims.
Factors to be considered in determining whether undue experimentation is required are summarized in Ex parte Forman, 230 USPQ 546 (BPAI 1986). They include the nature of the invention, the state of the prior art, the relative skill of those in the art, the amount of direction or guidance disclosed in the specification, the presence or absence of working examples, the predictability or unpredictability of the art, the breadth of the claims, and the quantity of experimentation which would be required in order to practice the invention as claimed.
The instant claims are drawn to methods of detecting the presence of circPCMTD1 RNA in a subject wherein the presence or increased expression of circPCMTD1 relative to a control indicates the presence of a p53 mutation and BCR/ABL fusion. This includes methods of detecting circPCMTD1 RNA with oligonucleotides known in the prior art to bind circPCMTD1 RNA (see probe used in Figure 5F of Zheng et al (Frontiers in Oncology, 2019, 398: 1-13; 5/6/22 IDS), for example) or antibodies that are not adequately described.
This invention is in a class of invention which the CAFC has characterized as "the unpredictable arts such as chemistry and biology". Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 243 F.3d 1316, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
The specification discloses detecting circPCMTD1 RNA (Fig. 12, in particular). The specification further discloses leukemic cell lines used in disclosed experiments have a BCR/ABL fusion protein and p53 mutations (sentence spanning pages 35-36). However, neither the specification nor the prior art demonstrates the presence or increased expression of circPCMTD1 relative to a control predictably indicates the presence of a p53 mutation and BCR/ABL fusion. It has not been shown presence or increased expression of circPCMTD1 relative to a control is more likely to be found in cells with a p53 mutation and BCR/ABL fusion, as compared to cells lacking a p53 mutation or lacking BCR/ABL. Undue, and inventive, experimentation would be required to determine whether such an association exists.
In view of the teachings above and the lack of guidance, workable examples and or exemplification in the specification, it would require undue experimentation by one of skill in the art to determine with any predictability, that the method would function as claimed.
Response to Arguments
In the Reply of 4/10/26, Applicant cites line 30 on page 35 to line 3 on page 36 of the specification and states the examples show that the presence (and thus, by definition, an increase) of cirPCMTD1 only occurs in leukemias with p53 and BCR/ABL fusion.
The amendments to the claims and the arguments found in the Reply of 4/10/26 have been carefully considered, but are not deemed persuasive. In regards to the argument the citation of line 30 on page 35 to line 3 on page 36 of the specification and statement the examples show that the presence (and thus, by definition, an increase) of cirPCMTD1 only occurs in leukemias with p53 and BCR/ABL fusion, the examiner disagrees. Example 1 appears to show function of cirPCMTD1 is dependent upon the presence of a p53 mutation, but the examples do not show that the presence (and thus, by definition, an increase) of cirPCMTD1 only occurs in leukemias with p53 and BCR/ABL fusion. Further, the claims are not limited to leukemias.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
Claims 12-14 remain rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to judicial exception(s) (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, and/or an abstract idea) without significantly more. The rationale for this determination is explained below:
Claims 12-14 are directed to natural phenomenon because the claims recite natural phenomenon (“Step 2A prong one”) and the judicial exception(s) is/are not integrated into a practical application (“Step 2A prong two”). The “natural phenomenon” is: expression of circPCMTD1 RNA correlates with cancer severity. The claim(s) does/do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception(s). A claim that focuses on judicial exception(s) can be shown to recite something “significantly more” than the judicial exception(s) by reciting a meaningful limitation beyond the judicial exceptions. However, in the instant case, the claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the additional elements (when considered both individually and as an ordered combination) are limited to well-understood, routine and conventional limitations of measuring/detecting circular RNA, using reagents such as oligonucleotides known in the prior art to bind circular RNA (see probe used in Figure 5F of Zheng et al (Frontiers in Oncology, 2019, 398: 1-13; 5/6/22 IDS), for example), in cells from subjects (“Step 2B”). Zheng et al and Okholm et al (npj Genomic Medicine, 2017, 36: 1-14) both teach measuring/detecting circPCMTD1 RNA in cancer cells (Fig. 5F of Zheng et al, Fig. 4E of Okholm et al, in particular). Further, the prior art teachings of Zeng et al (PLOS, 2017, e1005420, 1-21) is a review article focused on detecting circular RNA. Well-understood, routine and conventional limitations are not meaningful limitations and are not enough to qualify the claimed method as reciting something “significantly more” than the judicial exception(s) (see Part I.B.1 of the interim Guidance).
MPEP 2106.05(d)(II) provides a non-limiting list of laboratory techniques recognized by courts as well-understood, routine, conventional activity. These techniques include:
i. Determining the level of a biomarker in blood by any means, Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 101 USPQ2d at 1968; Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics, LLC, 859 F.3d 1352, 1362, 123 USPQ2d 1081, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 2017);
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vii. Amplifying and sequencing nucleic acid sequences, University of Utah Research Foundation v. Ambry Genetics, 774 F.3d 755, 764, 113 USPQ2d 1241, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2014); and
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viii. Hybridizing a gene probe, Ambry Genetics, 774 F.3d at 764, 113 USPQ2d at 1247.
Here, the claims do not contain any significant additional elements or steps beyond the observation of judicial exception(s) present when performing routine and conventional methods. Further, the active method steps are conventional and routine in the art for the reasons stated above and the claims do not amount to significantly more than the judicial exception(s). Further, just as methods comprising detecting paternal DNA sequences in particular samples by PCR was identified in Ariosa v. Sequenom as "well-known, routine, and conventional" (see first paragraph on page 13 of Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2015)) even though the prior art did not demonstrate detecting said paternal DNA sequences in said particular samples by PCR, the methods encompassed by the instant claims are well-known, routine, and conventional. The claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the additional elements (common methods of detecting expression) are routinely performed in the art to obtain data regarding expression. Moreover, “[w]hile preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility…." Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, No. 15-1182, 2016 WL 1117246 (U.S. June 27, 2016). Further, “Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117 (2013). The claims do not recite something “significantly more” than the judicial exception(s); rather, the claims “simply inform” the natural phenomenon to one performing routine active method steps and do not amount to significantly more than the judicial exception(s).
Response to Arguments
In the Reply of 4/10/26, Applicant amended claim 8 and indicates the claims are patent eligible due to the amendment of claim 8.
The amendments to the claims and the arguments found in the Reply of 4/10/26 have been carefully considered, but are not deemed persuasive. In regards to the amendment of claim 8 and indication the claims are patent eligible due to the amendment of claim 8, the examiner disagrees. Claim 8 and claims dependent thereof are not part of this rejection. Claims 10-14 remain rejected for the reasons stated above.
Claim Objections
Claim 8 is objected to because of an apparent typographical error. A term (“that” or “which”) appears to be missing between the wors “antibody” and “specifically” at the fourth-to-last line of the claim. Proper correction is required.
New Rejections Necessitated by Amendments
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
Claims 8-10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to enable one skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and/or use the invention.
Factors to be considered in determining whether undue experimentation is required, are summarized in In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8 USPQ2d 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988). There are many factors to be considered when determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a determination that a disclosure does not satisfy the enablement requirement and whether any necessary experimentation is "undue." These factors include, but are not limited to: the breadth of the claims, the nature of the invention, the state of the prior art, the level of one of ordinary skill, the level of predictability in the art, the amount of direction provided by the inventor, the existence of working examples, and the quantity of experimentation needed to make or use the invention based on the content of the disclosure. See also Ex parte Forman, 230 USPQ 546 (BPAI 1986).
The claims are broadly drawn to methods of treating cancer in a subject comprising administering the subject a peptide encoded by circPCMTD1.
This invention is in a class of invention which the CAFC has characterized as "the unpredictable arts such as chemistry and biology". Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 243 F.3d 1316, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
The specification provides no working examples demonstrating treating cancer in a subject comprising administering the subject a peptide encoded by circPCMTD1. Further, there is no indication that a peptide encoded by circPCMTD1 would provide therapeutic upon administration of the antibody to a subject with cancer.
In order to perform the method, as broadly claimed, it would require undue experimentation to (i) generate peptides encoded by circPCMTD1 and (ii) determine which, if any, of those peptides would provide therapeutic benefit to subjects with each cancer encompassed by the claims.
Further, similar to claims at issue in Amgen Inc. v Sanofi, the instant specification does not enable the full scope of the claims. In view of the teachings above and the lack of guidance, workable examples and or exemplification in the specification, it would require undue experimentation by one of skill in the art to determine with any predictability, that the method would function as claimed.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
Claims 8-10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for pre-AIA the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention. This is a NEW MATTER rejection.
Claims 8-10 recite methods of treating cancer in a subject comprising administering the subject a peptide encoded by circPCMTD1. Descriptions of methods of treating cancer in a subject comprising administering the subject a peptide encoded by circPCMTD1 are not found in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventors, at the time the invention was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
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/SEAN E AEDER/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1642