Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Applicant’s amendments dated 1/16/26 are hereby entered.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1-7 and 21-36 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more.
Claims 1-7 and 21-36 are directed to an abstract idea without significantly more. The claims recite a mental process that can be performed by a human being.
In regard to Claim 1, the following limitations can be performed as a mental process by a human being in terms of claiming collecting data, analyzing that data, and providing outputs based on that analysis which has been held by the CAFC to be an abstract idea in decisions such as, e.g., Electric Power Group, University of Florida Research Foundation, and Yousician v Ubisoft (non-precedential), in terms of the Applicant claiming:
A [method] comprising:
[…]
[…] receiv[ing] [a] command […] and [providing an output] in response to the […] command, the [outputs] comprising:
[…] eject[ing] a projectile in response to the […] command;
[…] produc[ing] sound in response to the […] command;
[…] produc[ing] light in response to the […] command; and
[…] receiv[ing] inputs to respond to the […] command.
In regard to the dependent claims, they also claim an abstract idea to the extent that they merely claim further limitations that likewise could be performed as a mental process by a human being.
Furthermore, this judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application because to the extent that additional elements are claimed either alone or in combination such as, e.g., a mobile computing devices; bodies defining an interior configured to secure a mobile computing device; communications modules; a projectile launchers; speakers; projectors; input devices; a projectile reservoir; wireless short range data writers; projectiles; processors; non-transitory, computer-readable memories storing instructions that embody Applicant’s abstract idea as computer code; drawing power from a mobile computing device; a motor and a wheel; a display; and/or producing a hologram; these are merely claimed to add insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception (e.g., data gathering), to embody the abstract idea on a general purpose computer, and/or do no more than generally link the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use. In this regard, see MPEP 2106.04(d)(I) in regard to “courts have also identified limitations that did not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application…”
Furthermore, the claims do not include additional elements that taken individually, and also taken as an ordered combination, are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because to the extent that, e.g., a mobile computing devices; bodies defining an interior configured to secure a mobile computing device; communications modules; a projectile launchers; speakers; projectors; input devices; a projectile reservoir; wireless short range data writers; projectiles; processors; non-transitory, computer-readable memories storing instructions that embody Applicant’s abstract idea as computer code; drawing power from a mobile computing device; a motor and a wheel; a display; and/or producing a hologram; these are well-understood, routine, and conventional elements and are claimed for the well-understood, routine, and conventional functions of collecting and processing data and/or providing an analysis/outputs based on that processing. To the extent that an apparatus is claimed as an additional element said apparatus fails to qualify as a “particular machine” to the extent that it is claimed generally, merely implements the steps of Applicant’s claimed method, and is claimed merely for purposes of extra-solution activity or field of use. See MPEP 2106.05(b). As evidence that these additional elements are well-understood, routine, and conventional, Applicant’s specification discloses the support for these elements in a manner that indicates that the additional elements are sufficiently well-known that the specification does not need to describe the particulars of such additional elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). See, e.g., p7 in Applicant’s PGPUB in regard to mobile computing devices; e.g., p9 in regard to bodies defining an interior configured to secure a mobile computing device; e.g., p7 in regard to communications modules; e.g., p10 in regard to a projectile launchers; e.g., p22 in regard to speakers; e.g., p20 in regard to projectors; e.g., p59 in regard to input devices; e.g., p12 in regard to a projectile reservoir; e.g., p17 in regard to wireless short range data writers; e.g., p14 in regard to projectiles; see, e.g., p7 in regard to processors; see, e.g., p7 in regard to non-transitory, computer-readable memories storing instructions that embody Applicant’s abstract idea as computer code; see, e.g., p16 in regard to drawing power from a mobile computing device; see, e.g., p15 in regard to a motor and a wheel; see, e.g., p19 in regard to a display; and/or see, e.g., p33 in regard producing a hologram.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1-6, 26-27, 29-32, and 34-36 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by PGPUB US 20150038048 A1 by Rosenberg (“Rosenberg”); in view of PGPUB US 20130104868 A1 by Sikes (“Sikes”); further in view of Nerf Wiki, “Phoenix LTX Tagger”, Wayback Machine date 11/22/19, retrieved from URL https://web.archive.org/web/20191122080218/https://nerf.fandom.com/wiki/Phoenix_LTX_Tagger on 1/19/26 (“Phoenix”)
In regard to Claim 1, Rosenberg teaches an accessory for a mobile computing device, the accessory comprising:
a body defining an interior configured to secure the mobile computing device;
(see, e.g., p73 regarding “docking station for reception of a user’s smartphone”);
[…]
a projectile launcher, coupled to the body, configured to eject a projectile in response to [a] command;
(see, e.g., p69 and p79);
a speaker, coupled to the body, configured to produce sound in response to the […] command;
(see, e.g., p84);
[…]
an input device, coupled to the body, configured to receive inputs to respond to the […] command
(see, e.g., p88 in regard to the RFID writer receiving user inputs in regard to damage level);
Furthermore, to the extent to which Rosenberg may fail to specifically also teach
and a communications module configured to receive an electronic command from [a] mobile computing device and to control at least one attachment in response to the electronic command
However, in an analogous reference, Sikes teaches a projectile launcher which utilizes a mobile computing device as its electronic control module (see, e.g., p140 and 319) and whereby when a trigger input command is received by said ECM which then transmits that command via a communication module to cause a projectile launch (see, e.g., F3, p70 and p77);
Furthermore, the combination of the cited prior art would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing because the cited prior art includes each element claimed, although not necessarily in a single prior art reference, with the only difference between the claimed invention and the cited prior art being the lack of actual combination of the elements in a single prior art reference; one of ordinary skill in the art could have combined the elements as claimed by known methods, and that in combination, each element merely performs the same function as it does separately; and one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the results of the combination were predictable.
Specifically, it would have been obvious to have added the functionality taught by Sikes to the apparatus otherwise taught by Rosenberg, in order to more precisely control the attachments by triggering them electronically;
Furthermore, in an analogous reference, Phoenix teaches a projector being employed with a toy gun (see, e.g., p31, “emits a green laser sight”);
Furthermore, the combination of the cited prior art would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing because the cited prior art includes each element claimed, although not necessarily in a single prior art reference, with the only difference between the claimed invention and the cited prior art being the lack of actual combination of the elements in a single prior art reference; one of ordinary skill in the art could have combined the elements as claimed by known methods, and that in combination, each element merely performs the same function as it does separately; and one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the results of the combination were predictable.
Specifically, it would have been obvious to have added the functionality taught by Phoenix to the apparatus otherwise taught by Rosenberg, in order to allow the user to aim their gun more precisely;
In regard to Claim 2, Rosenberg teaches limitations. See, e.g., F5, 206.
In regard to Claims 3-4, see rejection of Claim 1.
In regard to Claim 5, Rosenberg teaches limitations. See, e.g., p67.
In regard to Claim 6, Rosenberg teaches employing a processor in addition to that of the mobile computing device to, e.g., process data read by the RFID reader (see, e.g., p79);
Furthermore, the combination of the cited prior art would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing because the cited prior art includes each element claimed, although not necessarily in a single prior art reference, with the only difference between the claimed invention and the cited prior art being the lack of actual combination of the elements in a single prior art reference; one of ordinary skill in the art could have combined the elements as claimed by known methods, and that in combination, each element merely performs the same function as it does separately; and one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the results of the combination were predictable.
Specifically, it would have been obvious to have combined the teachings of Rosenberg and to have added an additional processor dedicated to controlling the projectile launcher in order to increase reliability by adding redundancy.
In regard to Claim 26, Rosenberg teaches limitations. See, e.g., p79.
In regard to Claim 27, Rosenberg teaches limitations. See, e.g., p36 and 79.
In regard to Claims 29-30, Rosenberg teaches limitations. See rejection of Claim 1.
In regard to Claim 31, Rosenberg teaches limitations. See, e.g., see rejection of Claim 1 and p43.
In regard to Claim 32, Rosenberg teaches limitations. See rejection of Claim 1.
In regard to Claim 34, Rosenberg teaches limitations. See rejection of Claim 6.
In regard to Claims 35-36, Rosenberg teaches limitations. See, e.g., p43.
Claim 7 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Rosenberg, in view of Sikes, further in view of Phoenix, further in view of admitted prior art.
In regard to Claim 7, to the extent that the otherwise cited prior art may fail to specifically teach the claimed limitations, however,
the Examiner takes OFFICIAL NOTICE that such functionality was old and well-known at the time of Applicant’s filing its invention. Such functionality allows for the accessory to be more easily charged by relying on the power supply of the mobile device. As such it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing to implement the claimed functionality within the invention of the cited prior art so as to allow for the accessory to be more easily charged by relying on the power supply of the mobile device;
Furthermore, the Applicant failed to adequately traverse the Examiner’s taking of official notice in a prior Office action and, therefore, these claimed limitations are now admitted prior art. See MPEP 2144.03.
Claim 22 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Rosenberg, in view of Sikes, further in view of Phoenix, further in view of by PATENT US 8469824 B1 to Farley et al (“Farley”).
In regard to Claim 22, Farley teaches these limitations (see, e.g., F12B and 13; C35-36);
Furthermore, the combination of the cited prior art would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing because the cited prior art includes each element claimed, although not necessarily in a single prior art reference, with the only difference between the claimed invention and the cited prior art being the lack of actual combination of the elements in a single prior art reference; one of ordinary skill in the art could have combined the elements as claimed by known methods, and that in combination, each element merely performs the same function as it does separately; and one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the results of the combination were predictable.
Specifically, it would have been obvious to have added the structure and functionality taught by Farley to the apparatus taught by the otherwise cited prior art, in order to provide an additional gaming modality to the player.
Claim 23 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Rosenberg, in view of Sikes, further in view of Phoenix, further in view of Farley.
In regard to Claim 23, Farley teaches these limitations (see, e.g., F14, 712);
Furthermore, the combination of the cited prior art would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing because the cited prior art includes each element claimed, although not necessarily in a single prior art reference, with the only difference between the claimed invention and the cited prior art being the lack of actual combination of the elements in a single prior art reference; one of ordinary skill in the art could have combined the elements as claimed by known methods, and that in combination, each element merely performs the same function as it does separately; and one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the results of the combination were predictable;
Specifically, it would have been obvious to have added the structure taught by Farley to the apparatus taught by the otherwise cited prior art, in order to provide an secure way to allow the camera on the mobile device to operate.
Claims 24-25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Rosenberg, in view of Sikes, further in view of Phoenix, further in view of Farley, further in view of admitted prior art.
In regard to Claims 24-25, to the extent that the otherwise cited prior art may fail to specifically teach the claimed limitations, however,
the Examiner takes OFFICIAL NOTICE that such functionalities were old and well-known at the time of Applicant’s filing its invention. Such functionalities allow for the mobile device to be accessed to, e.g., plug in a power cord and/or adjust settings on the phone. As such it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing to implement the claimed functionality within the invention of the cited prior art so as to allow for the mobile device to be accessed to, e.g., plug in a power cord and/or adjust settings on the phone;
Furthermore, the Applicant failed to adequately traverse the Examiner’s taking of official notice in a prior Office action and, therefore, these claimed limitations are now admitted prior art. See MPEP 2144.03.
Claim 33 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Rosenberg, in view of Sikes, further in view of Phoenix, further in view of admitted prior art.
In regard to Claim 33, to the extent that the otherwise cited prior art may fail to specifically teach the claimed limitations, however,
the Examiner takes OFFICIAL NOTICE that employing multi-channel sound in a gaming device was old and well-known at the time of Applicant’s filing its invention. Such functionality allows for greater realism. As such it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing to implement the claimed functionality within the invention of the cited prior art so as to allow for greater realism;
Furthermore, the Applicant failed to adequately traverse the Examiner’s taking of official notice in a prior Office action and, therefore, these claimed limitations are now admitted prior art. See MPEP 2144.03.
Response to Arguments
Applicant argues on page 8 of its Remarks in regard to the rejections made under 35 USC 101:
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Applicant’s arguments are not persuasive because any “electronic-to-mechanical transformation that converts an electronic command into a physical actuation” is not identified as being part of the alleged abstract idea.
Applicant further argues on page 8 of its Remarks in regard to the rejections made under 35 USC 101:
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Applicant’s arguments are not persuasive because all of Applicant’s claimed “attachments” are disclosed with so little detail as to how to make and/or use them that they must have been well-known, routine, and conventional at the time of filing and, thereby, do not add “significantly more” to Applicant’s abstract idea. Merely claiming a generic physical device that performs some action without providing any improvement to that device does not necessarily claim patent eligible subject matter. See, e.g., the fish hooks claimed in In re Rudy, the copy machine of Content Extraction, the digital camera of Yu vs Apple, the CAD printer of Ficep v. Peddinghaus (non-precedential), and/or the garage door controller of Chamberlain.
Applicant further argues on page 9 of its Remarks in regard to the rejections made under 35 USC 101:
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Applicant’s arguments are not persuasive. It is unclear how to apply the 101 Examples provided by the Office given that the Mayo test is a legal test and the Office cannot make law as being part of the executive branch; the Examples themselves to not cite to relevant legal authority; some of the Examples are inapposite of precedential legal authority; and, as well, because the Examples are not provided with specifications that would allow the BRI of the limitations in question to be determined. What is more, Applicant does not claim (nor disclose) any detail in regard to which the “physical action” is performed and, instead, it is merely a transitory output and, thereby, indistinguishable from the transitory outputs that the CAFC held to not be “significantly more” in, e.g., Electric Power Group, University of Florida Research Foundation, and/or Yousician (non-precedential).
Applicant further argues on page 9 of its Remarks in regard to the rejections made under 35 USC 101:
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Applicant’s arguments are not persuasive as 101 is a separate statutory burden from 102/103.
Applicant’s arguments regarding the art rejections are addressed by the updated statements of those rejections made supra, which were necessitated by Applicant’s amendments.
Conclusion
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the Examiner should be directed to Mike Grant whose telephone number is 571-270-1545. The Examiner can normally be reached on Monday through Friday between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., except on the first Friday of each bi-week.
If attempts to reach the Examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the Examiner's Supervisory Primary Examiner, Peter Vasat can be reached at 571-270-7625. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/MICHAEL C GRANT/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3715