DETAILED ACTION
This office action is in response to the Amendments filed on 06/01/2026.
Claims 33 and 39 are cancelled.
Claims 1, 26-27, and 35 are amended.
Claims 1-32, 34-38, 40-45 are presented for examination.
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Interpretation
Examiner notes that upon review of the provisional application, there is no recitation of the Nitrogen-Vacancy Diamond sensor. Therefore each claim that recites the NVD sensor, Claims 3-5, 7-8, 27-34, and 40, do not have the benefit of the priority date of the provisional application 07/19/2021, and instead have a the priority date of 07/15/2022.
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s arguments, see Remarks pg.14-26, filed 06/01/2026, with respect to 35 USC 103 rejection to claim 1 have been fully considered and are persuasive. The 35 USC 103 rejection to claims 1-26, and 41-45 have been withdrawn.
Applicant’s arguments with respect to the 35 USC 103 rejections of claims filed on 06/01/2026 in Remarks pg.17-24 have been considered but are moot because the new ground of rejection does not rely on any reference applied in the prior rejection of record for any teaching or matter specifically challenged in the argument.
Applicant further argues in essence:
[a] “To the extent Keller may disclose "electromagnetic energy in step 623 that are gathered by the integrated antenna enclosure 500 via the antenna structure 556 in step 639 and is received at the RF receiver 572 characterize the RF emission signature and the device 2 is either found as meeting a predetermined performance criteria or a predetermined emission signature in step 633 or is found as counterfeited or substandard in step 635," or "[e]nhanced modulation techniques briefly applying modulation which briefly exceeds the specified voltage, current or frequency limits of the component under test , electronic devices which have been deliberately modified to pose a security threat and/or intentionally modified for a malicious purpose with the intent to deceive as to the intended function," nothing in Keller teaches, discloses or suggests at least "measuring, by an electromagnetic (EM) probe attached to a three-dimensional computer numerical control (CNC) controller and in response to the applying of the distortion, a two- dimensional grid of EM radiation measurements across the PCB to localize a presence of at least one anomalous element that could be indicative of a presence of the hostile element in the PCB," (emphasis added), as recited in amended claim 35.
Furthermore, although Keller describes detecting "a counterfeit and a substandard condition of the each of the one or more electronic devices," (see, para. [0124]), "to enhance emissions signatures for differentiating authentic/genuine electronic devices 2 from counterfeit or substandard electronic devices 2," (see, para. [0125]), "characterize the RF emission signature and the device 2 is either found as meeting a predetermined performance criteria or a predetermined emission signature in step 633 or is found as counterfeited or substandard," (see, para. [0130]), "discern the authenticity or counterfeit nature of the electronic device 2 on the edge of the criterion boundary calculations between the two," (see, para. [0134]), "finding a specific type of counterfeit for a batch of test electronic devices," (see, para. [0134]), nothing in Keller teaches, discloses or suggests at least "detecting, based on the comparing and by the testing computing device, the presence of the at least one anomalous element in the region of the PCB to identify a location of the hostile element in the PCB," (emphasis added), as recited in amended claim 35.”
In response to [a], examiner respectfully disagrees. Regarding the limitation of "measuring, by an electromagnetic (EM) probe attached to a three-dimensional computer numerical control (CNC) controller” examiner relies upon new reference Goodchild, reflected in the updated rejection below. However, regarding the limitation of “and in response to the applying of the distortion, a two- dimensional grid of EM radiation measurements across the PCB to localize a presence of at least one anomalous element that could be indicative of a presence of the hostile element in the PCB," examiner respectfully disagrees.
In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
As seen below, Bahgat teaches the concept of generating a 2 dimensional grid of EM radiation measurements across a PCB to localize the anomalous element, as seen in Fig. 9 903 and 904. The only difference is that this process is not performed by applying the distortion. Keller applies a distortion to obtain EM readings, and is able to localize where each reading was obtained in para.0097 “The integrated antenna enclosure 510′ functions in a similar manner to the aforementioned embodiment but is capable of a greater discrimination regarding the location origin of specific RF unintended emissions emitted by the device 2 under test”, although this reading is not 2D, locations of each reading is discriminated.
Therefore, while Bahgat-Keller does not explicitly disclose the CNC controller, they together teach the concept of "detecting, based on the comparing and by the testing computing device, the presence of the at least one anomalous element in the region of the PCB to identify a location of the hostile element in the PCB”.
Bahgat: measuring, by an electromagnetic (EM) probe and a two- dimensional grid of EM radiation measurements across the PCB to localize a presence of at least one anomalous element that could be indicative of a presence of the hostile element in the PCB; (Bahgat: para.0053-0055 “For illustrative purposes and without limitation, process 1100 is described below in the context of apparatus 300…At 1120, process 1100 may involve EM emission measurement unit 340 of apparatus 300 measuring electromagnetic emissions of the target device in a test context different from the baseline context. ” the testing computing device, 300 Fig. 3, obtains EM emission measurements from the device being tested, 350 in Fig. 3, using the Electromagnetic Emission Measurement unit, and the photonic emission measurement unit, to detect a hostile element in a portion of an IC. Seen in Fig. 9, and para.0049-0050, 904 and 903, portions of the circuit can be identified for anomalous elements. Para.0049 “A photonic emission image 903 may be a result of applying a different set of electrical stimuli which may involve activities from more than one sub-circuit block. One without the layout knowledge of the integrated circuit may be interested in locating regions in the photonic emission image 903 for the previous sub-circuit event.” Fig. 9 903-904 shows a 2D grid of EM radiation measurements.);
Keller: measuring, by an electromagnetic (EM) probe and in response to the applying of the distortion, EM radiation measurements (Keller: para.0077 electromagnetic emission) across the PCB (Keller: para.0006 printed circuit board) for a presence of at least one anomalous element that could be indicative of a presence of the hostile element in the PCB (Keller: fig. 20 para.0131, para.0134, para.0128-0130 “Step 615 configures the power, ground, clock source and modulation parameters using circuits/boards 564a, 564h and/or 582 that provide means for modulating an input and/or output pin of the electronic device 2…. When powered, the electronic device 2 emits electromagnetic energy in step 623 that are gathered by the integrated antenna enclosure 500 via the antenna structure 556 in step 639 and is received at the RF receiver 572…. The received RF emissions are digitized in step 625 with the digital signal processed in step 627. Further, in step 631, the logic algorithms executed by the processing device 574 characterize the RF emission signature and the device 2 is either found as meeting a predetermined performance criteria or a predetermined emission signature in step 633 or is found as counterfeited or substandard in step 635. ” para.0097 “The integrated antenna enclosure 510′ functions in a similar manner to the aforementioned embodiment but is capable of a greater discrimination regarding the location origin of specific RF unintended emissions emitted by the device 2 under test” The modulations are applied to the device under test, such as device 2 described in Fig. 1, and the output emissions from the device are obtained and compared to emission signatures to identify a counterfeited device. Locations of each RF emission is documented.)
[b] “The Office Action, at p. 50, acknowledges that "Bahgat does not explicitly disclose wherein the applying of the distortion comprises violating a preconfigured functionality of a hostile element to cause the hostile element to potentially reveal its presence when a hostile element is present in a printed circuit board (PCB) of the computing device under test; measuring, by a nitrogen-vacancy diamond (NVD) sensor and in response to the applying of the distortion, a digital signal transmitted by a region of the PCB for a presence of at least one anomalous element that could be indicative of a presence of the hostile element in the PCB." To the extent Bahgat describes "measuring electromagnetic emissions of the target device in a test context different from the baseline context," nothing in Bahgat teaches, discloses or suggests at least "measuring, by a nitrogen-vacancy diamond (NVD) sensor and in response to the applying of the distortion, a digital signal transmitted by a region of the PCB for a presence of at least one anomalous element that could be indicative of a presence of the hostile element in the PCB, wherein the measuring of the heat signature comprises measuring an increased heat signature at a location of the hostile element compared to normal PCB operation, and wherein the increased heat signature is a result of applying the distortion," (emphasis added), as recited in amended claim 27.
To the extent Keller describes detecting "a counterfeit and a substandard condition of the each of the one or more electronic devices," (see, para. [0124]), "to enhance emissions signatures for differentiating authentic/genuine electronic devices 2 from counterfeit or substandard electronic devices 2," (see, para. [0125]), "characterize the RF emission signature and the device 2 is either found as meeting a predetermined performance criteria or a predetermined emission signature in step 633 or is found as counterfeited or substandard," (see, para. [0130]), "discern the authenticity or counterfeit nature of the electronic device 2 on the edge of the criterion boundary calculations between the two," (see, para. [0134]), "finding a specific type of counterfeit for a batch of test electronic devices," (see, para. [0134]), nothing in Keller teaches, discloses or suggests at least "measuring, by a nitrogen-vacancy diamond (NVD) sensor and in response to the applying of the distortion, a digital signal transmitted by a region of the PCB for a presence of at least one anomalous element that could be indicative of a presence of the hostile element in the PCB, wherein the measuring of the heat signature comprises measuring an increased heat signature at a location of the hostile element compared to normal PCB operation, and wherein the increased heat signature is a result of applying the distortion," (emphasis added), as recited in amended claim 27.”
In response to [b], examiner respectfully disagrees. In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Regarding the NVD concept, this particular type of sensor is taught by Turner as set forth below.
However, regarding the concepts of "measuring, [[by a nitrogen-vacancy diamond (NVD) sensor and]] in response to the applying of the distortion, a digital signal transmitted by a region of the PCB for a presence of at least one anomalous element that could be indicative of a presence of the hostile element in the PCB, wherein the measuring of the heat signature comprises measuring an increased heat signature at a location of the hostile element compared to normal PCB operation, and wherein the increased heat signature is a result of applying the distortion,", this concept is taught by Bahgat-Keller.
As seen below in Bahgat, measurements are record from the PCB of the device under test of EM readings to identify patterns and regions of interest to find hostile elements as in para.0022. As shown in para.0023, photonic emission data includes thermal imaging data. Therefore heat signatures are also considered in the teachings of Bahgat.
Bahgat discloses para.0053-0055 “For illustrative purposes and without limitation, process 1100 is described below in the context of apparatus 300…At 1120, process 1100 may involve EM emission measurement unit 340 of apparatus 300 measuring electromagnetic emissions of the target device in a test context different from the baseline context. ”
Para.0023 “For example, the following is a non-exhaustive list of viable photonic emission data that can be recorded or otherwise utilized for the intended purpose of the present disclosure:… and thermal imaging.”
para.0034 “Moreover, data analysis unit 320 may compare the first PICA emission image and the second PICA emission image to provide a comparison result. Control unit 310 may identify a region of interest associated with one or more circuit blocks of an integrated circuit of DUT 350 based on the comparison result. In some embodiments, in correlating the recorded data of the photonic emissions and the recorded data of the electromagnetic emissions based on the analysis result to establish the one or more electromagnetic emission models for DUT 350, control unit 310 may correlate the one or more circuit blocks performing one or more activities in the region of interest during a first period of time to electromagnetic emission signatures recorded during the first period of time.”
Para.0022 “ A system according to various embodiments of the present disclosure may be able to remotely detect and classify changes in execution of program(s) by a target device and/or activation of malware(s) (e.g., one or more hardware Trojans, viruses, worms, ransomwares, spywares, adwares, scarewares and/or any other types of malicious programs or intrusive software) on the target device based on a comparison of measured EM emissions of one or more circuit blocks of an integrated circuit within the target device to EM emission models developed using photonic emission data.”
Para.0049 “ The high/low states in EM emission waveform 901,”
Para.0055 “measuring electromagnetic emissions of the target device in a test context different from the baseline context.”
Further Keller discloses in para.0134 “ The apparatus 500 or 500′ and, more particularly, the signal output module 564, may be configured to provide selected real-time feedback of RF-emission frequency regions back into the modulation circuitry feeding one or more pins of the electronic device 2. The apparatus 500 or 500′ may further include a temperature sensor 664, preferably mounted within the hollow interior 512, being configured and operable to detect the temperature of the electronic device 2 under test, or the temperature of specific regions of the electronic device 2 under test. The apparatus 500 or 500′ may further include a probe 666 or any other suitable means configured to detect the current drawn in any of the device′ pins at any point during the test procedure or modulation to further discriminate between the characteristics of the electronic devices 2. ”
para.0128-0130 “Step 615 configures the power, ground, clock source and modulation parameters using circuits/boards 564a, 564h and/or 582 that provide means for modulating an input and/or output pin of the electronic device 2…. When powered, the electronic device 2 emits electromagnetic energy in step 623 that are gathered by the integrated antenna enclosure 500 via the antenna structure 556 in step 639 and is received at the RF receiver 572…. The received RF emissions are digitized in step 625 with the digital signal processed in step 627. Further, in step 631, the logic algorithms executed by the processing device 574 characterize the RF emission signature and the device 2 is either found as meeting a predetermined performance criteria or a predetermined emission signature in step 633 or is found as counterfeited or substandard in step 635. ”
During testing for frequency, EM readings etc, temperature of specific regions of the device is also measured after applying the distortion to the PCB.
Therefore, while the NVD sensor is not taught by Bahgat-Keller, in combination they teach the concept of "measuring, [[by a nitrogen-vacancy diamond (NVD) sensor and]] in response to the applying of the distortion, a digital signal transmitted by a region of the PCB for a presence of at least one anomalous element that could be indicative of a presence of the hostile element in the PCB, wherein the measuring of the heat signature comprises measuring an increased heat signature at a location of the hostile element compared to normal PCB operation, and wherein the increased heat signature is a result of applying the distortion,"
[c] “Indeed, at para. [0023], Keller states that an "object of the invention is to provide the modulation in a manner that does not impact the functionality of the device and does not exceed the typical expected electromagnetic interference noise that electronic devices being tested are typically designed to function with in normal standard operating conditions." This teaches away from "wherein the applying of the distortion comprises violating a preconfigured functionality of a hostile element to cause the hostile element to potentially reveal its presence when the hostile element is present in a printed circuit board (PCB) of the computing device under test," as recited in amended claim 27.”
In response to [c], examiner respectfully disagrees. This paragraph describes the safety of the device, such that the testing of the device is still within safe margins, and the normal operating conditions merely keep the device from breaking, as referenced in the very next para.0024, and does not teach away from causing hostile elements to reveal their presence.
Para.0022-0024 “Another object of the present invention is to provide an apparatus for detection and/or identification of counterfeit and/or substandard electronic devices that modulates signal applied to inputs not typically receiving a modulated signal of the modulation form expected by the manufacturer of such electronic devices.
A further object of the invention is to provide the modulation in a manner that does not impact the functionality of the device and does not exceed the typical expected electromagnetic interference noise that electronic devices being tested are typically designed to function with in normal standard operating conditions.
Another object of the invention is that the invention does not degrade the parts being tested.”
[d] “Although Turner is cited to teach a "a nitrogen-vacancy diamond (NVD) sensor," nothing in Turner teaches, discloses or suggests at least "measuring, by a nitrogen-vacancy diamond (NVD) sensor and in response to the applying of the distortion, a digital signal transmitted by a region of the PCB for a presence of at least one anomalous element that could be indicative of a presence of the hostile element in the PCB, wherein the measuring of the heat signature comprises measuring an increased heat signature at a location of the hostile element compared to normal PCB operation, and wherein the increased heat signature is a result of applying the distortion," (emphasis added), as recited in amended claim 27. Applicant submits that amended claim 27 is allowable.”
In response to [d], examiner respectfully disagrees. In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
As explained above, Bahgat-Keller discloses this limitation in view of an ordinary EM probe rather than an NVD sensor. Turner discloses the NVD sensor for measuring regions of a PCB including changes in temperature, to identify malicious components, i.e. for trojan detection in para.0198-0190.
The combination merely applies an NVD sensor to the process of Bahgat-Keller that already performs all of the steps of the claim. Therefore, Examiner maintains rejection in view of the same combination of references.
Turner discloses measuring, by a nitrogen-vacancy diamond (NVD) sensor, a digital signal transmitted by a region of a printed circuit board (PCB) of a computing device under test for a presence of at least one anomalous element that could be indicative of a hostile element in the PCB (Turner: para.0120 “In various embodiments, a magnetometer apparatus employs an ensemble of nitrogen vacancy (NV) centers in a diamond chip to achieve wide-field magnetic field measurement and mapping. NV centers in diamond are a modality for sensitive, high-spatial resolution, wide field of view imaging of microscopic magnetic fields, and may be employed to measure magnetic fields of magnetotactic bacteria, paleomagnetism in rocks, and magnetic fields emanated by propagating action potentials in neurons. The apparatus for measuring magnetic fields from integrated circuits (ICs) consists of an optical microscope and a photodetector (such as a photo-diode or a camera) to measure the fluorescence emitted by a thin ensemble NV layer at the surface of the diamond sensor chip, with the IC placed near to or in contact with the diamond.” para.0186 “the classifier algorithm may accept as input additional data pertaining to how the article and the crystal diamond interact, such as temperature data (e.g., a local temperature map)” para.0206 “The desired FPGA state-dependent magnetic field projection on each NV axis, ΔBz,i, and the change in local temperature, ΔT, are given by…” para.0243-0244 “Temperature changes in the diamond are determined from common mode shifts of NV resonance line centers….Ultimately, the multimodal information from the magnetic field maps, linewidth, contrast, and temperature may be used to create a more detailed fingerprint of IC activity. These physical parameters provide a rich data set of features that afford further dimensionality for characterization and classification.” One of the factors for finger printing the IC circuits state for classification of the state, e.g. for trojan detection in para.0198-0190, is central temperature changes of the NV diamond while reading the circuit board. The delta T being the change from some state, i.e a baseline, to the current temperature.)
Claim Objections
Claim 27 is objected to because of the following informalities:
Claim 27 recites in part “wherein the measuring of the heat signature”, however there is no previous recitation of “measuring of the heat signature” or “a heat signature” in the claim. This should be corrected by either incorporating a previous recitation of “measuring of a heat signature” in the claim , or removing “the” in both instances as to avoid antecedent basis issues.
Appropriate correction is required.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 1-32, 34-38, 40-45 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Regarding Claims 1, 27, 35, and 43-45, they recite in part “violating a preconfigured functionality of a hostile element”, however it is unclear as to what a “preconfigured functionality” of a hostile element is, thereby rendering the claims indefinite as to when or how this violation would occur.
A review of specification did not result in a description of this process. The specification is silent as to what a preconfigured functionality is, and at best only describes violating in para.36 “As described herein, unanticipated logic states of a combined Trojan and a target computing system may be leveraged to violate Trojan author assumptions and expectations about resources and host system behavior.” And para.37 “Accordingly, methods and systems are disclosed that weaken or violate assumptions that an attacker may make when placing anomalies or Trojans into systems”
However, these are not the same things as the specification describes essentially confusing or providing false information to the hostile elements rather than violating a preconfigured functionality. If these paragraphs are the source of this limitation, this language should be corrected to better align with the specification as to avoid 35 USC 112(b) issues.
Regarding Claims 2-32, 34, 36-38, and 40-42, they are dependent on claims 1, 27 and 35, but do not cure their deficiencies, therefore these claims are rejected under the same rationale as that of claims 1, 27, and 35.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claim(s) 27-28, 31-32, 34, is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Bahgat Shehata et al. (hereinafter Bahgat, US 2018/0027003 A1) in view of Keller, III et al. (hereinafter Keller, US 2015/0137830 A1) in view of Turner et al. (hereinafter Turner, US 2021/0239779 A1).
Regarding Claim 27, Bahgat discloses A computer-implemented method, comprising: applying, by a testing computing device (Bahgat: Fig. 3, Fig. 4, apparatus 300), a distortion to a computing device under test (Bahgat: para.0038 “At 401, one or more sets of electrical stimuli, as test signals, may be selected by control unit 310 of apparatus 300 for inducing or otherwise causing a variety of electrical activities and/or activate one of more circuit blocks of an integrated circuit of a target device or DUT 410 to perform various operations. At 402, each set of the one or more sets of electrical stimuli may be applied to DUT 410 by control unit 310. As various activities and/or operations in DUT 410 are induced by each set of electrical stimuli, photonic emissions as well as EM emissions by DUT 410 may result. At 403, photonic emissions from DUT 410 may be measured and recorded as photonic emission data by photonic emission measurement unit 330 of apparatus 300.” A set of stimuli, a set of distortions, are applied by the testing device to the device under test. Fig. 3 shows system 300 applying test signals to the device under test 350.),
measuring, by a sensor a digital signal transmitted by a region of the PCB for a presence of at least one anomalous element that could be indicative of a presence of the hostile element in the PCB (Bahgat: para.0053-0055 “For illustrative purposes and without limitation, process 1100 is described below in the context of apparatus 300…At 1120, process 1100 may involve EM emission measurement unit 340 of apparatus 300 measuring electromagnetic emissions of the target device in a test context different from the baseline context. ” the testing computing device, 300 Fig. 3, obtains EM emission measurements from the device being tested, 350 in Fig. 3, using the Electromagnetic Emission Measurement unit, and the photonic emission measurement unit, to detect a hostile element in a portion of an IC. Seen in Fig. 9, and para.0049-0050, 904 and 903, portions of the circuit can be identified for anomalous elements.)
wherein the measuring of the heat signature comprises measuring an increased heat signature at a location of the hostile element compared to normal PCB operation, (Bahgat: Para.0023 “For example, the following is a non-exhaustive list of viable photonic emission data that can be recorded or otherwise utilized for the intended purpose of the present disclosure:… and thermal imaging.” para.0034 “Moreover, data analysis unit 320 may compare the first PICA emission image and the second PICA emission image to provide a comparison result. Control unit 310 may identify a region of interest associated with one or more circuit blocks of an integrated circuit of DUT 350 based on the comparison result. In some embodiments, in correlating the recorded data of the photonic emissions and the recorded data of the electromagnetic emissions based on the analysis result to establish the one or more electromagnetic emission models for DUT 350, control unit 310 may correlate the one or more circuit blocks performing one or more activities in the region of interest during a first period of time to electromagnetic emission signatures recorded during the first period of time.” The measurements of the photonic emission data include thermal imaging. Therefore, the signatures may be that of a change in heat, i.e. an increase in heat, in some regions. Para.0022 “… to remotely detect and classify changes in execution of program(s) by a target device and/or activation of malware(s) … on the target device based on a comparison of measured EM emissions of one or more circuit blocks of an integrated circuit within the target device to EM emission models developed using photonic emission data.” Para.0049 “ The high/low states in EM emission waveform 901,” fig. 9, showing high and low areas in emission data on the circuit. Para.0055 “measuring electromagnetic emissions of the target device in a test context different from the baseline context.”);
comparing, by the testing computing device, the digital signal to a device fingerprint associated with the computing device under test (Bahgat: para.0056 “At 1130, process 1100 may involve control unit 310 identifying an anomaly condition associated with the target device by comparing a result of the measuring to the one or more electromagnetic emission models.” The obtained signal is compared to known fingerprints of the circuit para.0057-0059. For example, Fig. 10 shows the steps to generate the fingerprint by measuring em and photon emissions based on stimuli and generating EM models used to detect anomalies and Trojans.); and
detecting, based on the comparing and by the testing computing device, the presence of the at least one anomalous element in the region of the PCB that could be indicative of the presence of the hostile element in the PCB (Bahgat: para.0056 “At 1130, process 1100 may involve control unit 310 identifying an anomaly condition associated with the target device by comparing a result of the measuring to the one or more electromagnetic emission models.” para.0034 “Moreover, data analysis unit 320 may compare the first PICA emission image and the second PICA emission image to provide a comparison result. Control unit 310 may identify a region of interest associated with one or more circuit blocks of an integrated circuit of DUT 350 based on the comparison result. In some embodiments, in correlating the recorded data of the photonic emissions and the recorded data of the electromagnetic emissions based on the analysis result to establish the one or more electromagnetic emission models for DUT 350, control unit 310 may correlate the one or more circuit blocks performing one or more activities in the region of interest during a first period of time to electromagnetic emission signatures recorded during the first period of time.” Para.0022, Using the models, anomalies, trojans and malware can be detected on the circuit. Seen in para.0034, the models contain region specific signatures learned during the training phase for the emission models in step 1110 Fig. 11. Para.0022 “detect and classify changes in execution of program(s) by a target device and/or activation of malware(s) (e.g., one or more hardware Trojans, viruses, worms, ransomwares, spywares, adwares, scarewares and/or any other types of malicious programs or intrusive software) on the target device “).
However Bahgat does not explicitly disclose wherein the applying of the distortion comprises violating a preconfigured functionality of a hostile element to cause the hostile element to potentially reveal its presence when a hostile element is present in a printed circuit board (PCB) of the computing device under test; measuring, by a nitrogen-vacancy diamond (NVD) sensor and in response to the applying of the distortion, a digital signal transmitted by a region of the PCB for a presence of at least one anomalous element that could be indicative of a presence of the hostile element in the PCB; and wherein the increased heat signature is a result of applying the distortion
Keller discloses wherein the applying of the distortion comprises violating a preconfigured functionality of a hostile element to cause the hostile element to potentially reveal its presence (Keller: para.0119 “Enhanced modulation techniques envisioned herein include but are not limited to modulating multiple inputs or outputs substantially simultaneously with the same or different signal, modulating multiple such pins with a phase shifted signal relative to each other, using the results of the modulation to change modulation in a multi-step approach, applying a series of different modulation patterns to the device under test, applying a randomized modulation pattern to seek new useful discriminating emission results, briefly applying modulation which briefly exceeds the specified voltage, current or frequency limits of the component under test,” para.0073 “It is to be understood that the definition of a counterfeit or substandard electronic device applies to but is not limited to … electronic devices which have been deliberately or unintentionally modified, electronic devices which have been deliberately modified to pose a security threat, and electronic devices which have been deliberately and/or intentionally modified for a malicious purpose with the intent to deceive as to the intended function.” modulations are applied to the device under test, such as device 2 in fig. 1, causing the device to operate outside of the normal range of operation, i.e. violating a preconfigured functionality, by exceeding maximum performance capacity such as voltage current or frequency limits of the device. Testing a device that may be counterfeited, that includes devices that have been deliberately modified to be malicious or a security threat, therefore this process reveals the presence of hostile elements by violating its preconfigured functionality)
when a hostile element is present in a printed circuit board (PCB) (Keller: para.0006 printed circuit board) of the computing device under test (Keller: para.0073 “It is to be understood that the definition of a counterfeit or substandard electronic device applies to but is not limited to … electronic devices which have been deliberately or unintentionally modified, electronic devices which have been deliberately modified to pose a security threat, and electronic devices which have been deliberately and/or intentionally modified for a malicious purpose with the intent to deceive as to the intended function.” Testing device that may be counterfeited, that includes devices that have been deliberately modified to be malicious or a security threat.);
measuring, by a sensor and in response to the applying of the distortion, a digital signal transmitted by a region of the PCB (Keller: para.0006 printed circuit board) for a presence of at least one anomalous element that could be indicative of a presence of the hostile element in the PCB (Keller: fig. 20 para.0131, para.0134, para.0128-0130 “Step 615 configures the power, ground, clock source and modulation parameters using circuits/boards 564a, 564h and/or 582 that provide means for modulating an input and/or output pin of the electronic device 2…. When powered, the electronic device 2 emits electromagnetic energy in step 623 that are gathered by the integrated antenna enclosure 500 via the antenna structure 556 in step 639 and is received at the RF receiver 572…. The received RF emissions are digitized in step 625 with the digital signal processed in step 627. Further, in step 631, the logic algorithms executed by the processing device 574 characterize the RF emission signature and the device 2 is either found as meeting a predetermined performance criteria or a predetermined emission signature in step 633 or is found as counterfeited or substandard in step 635. ” The modulations are applied to the device under test, such as device 2 described in Fig. 1, and the output emissions from the device are obtained and compared to emission signatures to identify a counterfeited device)
and wherein the increased heat signature is a result of applying the distortion (Keller: para.0134 “The apparatus 500 or 500′ may further include a temperature sensor 664, preferably mounted within the hollow interior 512, being configured and operable to detect the temperature of the electronic device 2 under test, or the temperature of specific regions of the electronic device 2 under test.” Changes of temperature of the device under test is measured, i.e. increased heat.).
Therefore it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine Bahgat in order to incorporate wherein the applying of the distortion comprises violating a preconfigured functionality of a hostile element to cause the hostile element to potentially reveal its presence when a hostile element is present in a printed circuit board (PCB) of the computing device under test; measuring, by a sensor and in response to the applying of the distortion, a digital signal transmitted by a region of the PCB for a presence of at least one anomalous element that could be indicative of a presence of the hostile element in the PCB and wherein the increased heat signature is a result of applying the distortion
One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine because of the expected benefit of identification of security threats from devices that may cause issues (Keller: para.0073).
However Bahgat-Keller does not explicitly disclose measuring, by a nitrogen-vacancy diamond (NVD) sensor.
Turner discloses measuring, by a nitrogen-vacancy diamond (NVD) sensor, a digital signal transmitted by a region of a printed circuit board (PCB) of a computing device under test for a presence of at least one anomalous element that could be indicative of a hostile element in the PCB (Turner: para.0120 “In various embodiments, a magnetometer apparatus employs an ensemble of nitrogen vacancy (NV) centers in a diamond chip to achieve wide-field magnetic field measurement and mapping. NV centers in diamond are a modality for sensitive, high-spatial resolution, wide field of view imaging of microscopic magnetic fields, and may be employed to measure magnetic fields of magnetotactic bacteria, paleomagnetism in rocks, and magnetic fields emanated by propagating action potentials in neurons. The apparatus for measuring magnetic fields from integrated circuits (ICs) consists of an optical microscope and a photodetector (such as a photo-diode or a camera) to measure the fluorescence emitted by a thin ensemble NV layer at the surface of the diamond sensor chip, with the IC placed near to or in contact with the diamond.” para.0186 “the classifier algorithm may accept as input additional data pertaining to how the article and the crystal diamond interact, such as temperature data (e.g., a local temperature map)” para.0206 “The desired FPGA state-dependent magnetic field projection on each NV axis, ΔBz,i, and the change in local temperature, ΔT, are given by…” para.0243-0244 “Temperature changes in the diamond are determined from common mode shifts of NV resonance line centers….Ultimately, the multimodal information from the magnetic field maps, linewidth, contrast, and temperature may be used to create a more detailed fingerprint of IC activity. These physical parameters provide a rich data set of features that afford further dimensionality for characterization and classification.” One of the factors for finger printing the IC circuits state for classification of the state, e.g. for trojan detection in para.01988-0190, is central temperature changes of the NV diamond while reading the circuit board. The delta T being the change from some state, i.e a baseline, to the current temperature.)
Therefore it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine Bahgat-Keller with Turner in order to incorporate measuring, by a nitrogen-vacancy diamond (NVD) sensor, a digital signal transmitted by a region of a printed circuit board (PCB) of a computing device under test for a presence of at least one anomalous element that could be indicative of a hostile element in the PCB.
One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine because of the expected benefit of improved detection of malicious circuitry (Turner: para.0188-0189, para.0232).
Regarding Claim 28, Bahgat-Keller-Turner discloses claim 27 as set forth above.
However Bahgat-Keller does not explicitly disclose wherein the comparing of the digital signal to the device fingerprint associated with the computing device under test comprises detecting a change in one or more of a resistance, a capacitance, an integrated circuit (IC) design, a trace impedance, or a thermal measurement.
Turner discloses wherein the comparing of the digital signal to the device fingerprint associated with the computing device under test comprises detecting a change in one or more of a resistance, a capacitance, an integrated circuit (IC) design, a trace impedance, or a thermal measurement (Turner: para.0015 “In some embodiments, determining the state of the integrated circuit further comprises providing linewidth, contrast, and/or temperature of the integrated circuit to the trained classifier.” Para.0061 “In some embodiments of the first device, the computing node is further configured to provide temperature data pertaining to the magnetic field-generating article to the algorithm.” Para.0244 “Temperature changes in the diamond are determined from common mode shifts of NV resonance line centers. The common mode shift for each pixel is calculated and then all the pixels are averaged together to give a single value for the bulk crystal temperature. …Ultimately, the multimodal information from the magnetic field maps, linewidth, contrast, and temperature may be used to create a more detailed fingerprint of IC activity. These physical parameters provide a rich data set of features that afford further dimensionality for characterization and classification.” The temperature changes of the circuit being analyzed is considered for classification.)
Therefore it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine Bahgat-Keller with Turner in order to incorporate wherein the comparing of the digital signal to the device fingerprint associated with the computing device under test comprises detecting a change in one or more of a resistance, a capacitance, an integrated circuit (IC) design, a trace impedance, or a thermal measurement.
One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine because of the expected benefit of improved detection of malicious circuitry (Turner: para.0188-0189).
Regarding Claim 31, Bahgat-Keller -Turner discloses claim 27 as set forth above.
However Bahgat-Keller does not explicitly disclose wherein the detecting of the presence of the at least one anomalous element is performed by a neural network.
Turner disclose wherein the detecting of the presence of the at least one anomalous element is performed by a neural network (Turner: para.0189 “In general, the resulting IC magnetic fields pass largely unaltered through standard IC materials, and will vary spatially and temporally in ways that correlate with both IC architecture and operational state. Thus, high-resolution mapping of magnetic fields may yield simultaneous structural and functional information, and may be suitable for identification of malicious circuitry or Trojans, counterfeit detection, and fault detection.” Para.0085 “ the classifier algorithm may include one or more of the following: a convolutional neural network, a principal component analysis algorithm, and a support vector machine model. In some embodiments, the classifier algorithm may be trained using a corpus of labeled and/or unlabeled data pertaining to various magnetic field-generating articles (e.g., various integrated circuits) in various states, and the algorithm may thus be configured to determine a state of an article based on information regarding its magnetic vector field and/or other input data regarding the article.” Anomalous elements detected from the circuits can be done via a neural network.).
Therefore it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine Bahgat-Keller with Turner in order to incorporate wherein the detecting of the presence of the at least one anomalous element is performed by a neural network.
One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine because of the expected benefit of improved detection of malicious circuitry (Turner: para.0188-0189).
Regarding Claim 32, Bahgat-Keller -Turner discloses claim 31 as set forth above.
However Bahgat-Keller does not explicitly disclose determining the device fingerprint by the neural network.
Turner discloses determining the device fingerprint by the neural network (Turner: para.0241 “ Fitting also extracts the Lorentzian linewidth and contrast, which can contain useful information about the properties of magnetic fields emanating from the circuit, and can be used as additional inputs to machine learning models to fingerprint IC activity.” Para.0085 “ the classifier algorithm may include one or more of the following: a convolutional neural network, a principal component analysis algorithm, and a support vector machine model. In some embodiments, the classifier algorithm may be trained using a corpus of labeled and/or unlabeled data pertaining to various magnetic field-generating articles (e.g., various integrated circuits) in various states, and the algorithm may thus be configured to determine a state of an article based on information regarding its magnetic vector field and/or other input data regarding the article.” The devices are fingerprinted and ).
Therefore it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine Bahgat-Keller with Turner in order to incorporate determining the device fingerprint by the neural network.
One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine because of the expected benefit of improved detection of malicious circuitry (Turner: para.0188-0189).
Regarding Claim 34, Bahgat-Keller -Turner discloses claim 27 as set forth above.
Bahgat further discloses measuring, by an electromagnetic (EM) probe, an EM radiation transmitted by the PCB, and wherein the detecting of the presence of the at least one anomalous element is based on the measured EM radiation (Bahgat: para.0022 “The present disclosure generally relates to EM emission of integrated circuits, and more particularly, to the correlation of EM emission measurements with photonic emission data for developing predictive EM emission models. A system according to various embodiments of the present disclosure may be able to remotely detect and classify changes in execution of program(s) by a target device and/or activation of malware(s) (e.g., one or more hardware Trojans, viruses, worms, ransomwares, spywares, adwares, scarewares and/or any other types of malicious programs or intrusive software) on the target device based on a comparison of measured EM emissions of one or more circuit blocks of an integrated circuit within the target device to EM emission models developed using photonic emission data.” para.0028 “FIG. 2 is a block diagram of an example system 200 that can measure EM emission from a device under test, consistent with an exemplary embodiment. Referring to FIG. 2, a test unit 201 (possibly the same as 109) may apply electrical stimuli or signals to an integrated circuit 210 of a target device, which is under test, to induce a variety of electrical activities and/or activate one of more circuit blocks of the integrated circuit of integrated circuit 210 to perform various operations. Integrated circuit 210 may be connected to a radio frequency (RF) probe 202 with a predetermined load (not shown). The output of RF probe 202 may be amplified by a pre-amplifier 203 and fed to an EM emission receiver 204, which may be a spectrum analyzer. Time-resolved EM emission waveforms 108 may be derived from the output of EM emission receiver 204.” The elements 202-204 of the RF probe, pre amplifier and EM receiver together are the EM probe, and receive the digital signal emitting from the circuit 210. This is then used to identify malicious components of the IC.).
Claim(s) 29 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Bahgat Shehata et al. (hereinafter Bahgat, US 2018/0027003 A1) in view of Keller, III et al. (hereinafter Keller, US 2015/0137830 A1) in view of Turner et al. (hereinafter Turner, US 2021/0239779 A1) further in view of Nowroz et al. (hereinafter Nowroz, “Novel Techniques for High-Sensitivity Hardware Trojan Detection Using Thermal and Power Maps” NPL 2014 attached.).
Regarding Claim 29, Bahgat-Keller-Turner discloses claim 28 as set forth above.
However Bahgat-Keller does not explicitly disclose wherein the detecting of the change in the thermal measurement comprises detecting, by the NVD sensor and in response to the distortion, a shift in a photoluminescence central frequency toward a lower frequency, wherein the shift is indicative of a change in the thermal measurement to a higher temperature.
Turner discloses wherein the detecting of the change in the thermal measurement comprises detecting, by the NVD sensor, a shift in a photoluminescence central temperature (Turner: para.0120 “In various embodiments, a magnetometer apparatus employs an ensemble of nitrogen vacancy (NV) centers in a diamond chip to achieve wide-field magnetic field measurement and mapping. NV centers in diamond are a modality for sensitive, high-spatial resolution, wide field of view imaging of microscopic magnetic fields, and may be employed to measure magnetic fields of magnetotactic bacteria, paleomagnetism in rocks, and magnetic fields emanated by propagating action potentials in neurons. The apparatus for measuring magnetic fields from integrated circuits (ICs) consists of an optical microscope and a photodetector (such as a photo-diode or a camera) to measure the fluorescence emitted by a thin ensemble NV layer at the surface of the diamond sensor chip, with the IC placed near to or in contact with the diamond.” para.0186 “the classifier algorithm may accept as input additional data pertaining to how the article and the crystal diamond interact, such as temperature data (e.g., a local temperature map)” para.0206 “The desired FPGA state-dependent magnetic field projection on each NV axis, ΔBz,i, and the change in local temperature, ΔT, are given by…” para.0243-0244 “Temperature changes in the diamond are determined from common mode shifts of NV resonance line centers….Ultimately, the multimodal information from the magnetic field maps, linewidth, contrast, and temperature may be used to create a more detailed fingerprint of IC activity. These physical parameters provide a rich data set of features that afford further dimensionality for characterization and classification.” One of the factors for finger printing the IC circuits state for classification of the state, e.g. for trojan detection in para.01988-0190, is central temperature changes of the NV diamond while reading the circuit board. The delta T being the change from some state, i.e a baseline, to the current temperature.)
Therefore it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine Bahgat-Keller with Turner in order to incorporate wherein the comparing of the one or more digital signals to the one or more baseline digital signals comprises detecting a change in a thermal measurement by detecting, by the NVD sensor, a shift in a photoluminescence central temperature.
One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine because of the expected benefit of improved detection of malicious circuitry (Turner: para.0188-0189).
However, Bahgat-Keller -Turner does not explicitly disclose detecting in response to the distortion a shift in a photoluminescence central frequency toward a lower frequency, wherein the shift is indicative of a change in the thermal measurement to a higher temperature.
Nowroz discloses detecting in response to the distortion a shift in a photoluminescence central frequency toward a lower frequency, wherein the shift is indicative of a change in the thermal measurement to a higher temperature. (Nowroz: pg. 3 “For the purpose of this paper, we first apply random vectors to the ICs and get the estimated power trace of each block by Primetime-PX. We then use HotSpot [27] thermal simulation tools to create the steady state thermal maps of various test bench circuits as described in Section VI-A1. We denote the steady-state thermal maps obtained using design-time simulations of the original authentic chip by A1, A2,... for each benchmark. We perform Monte Carlo simulations of the original chip at various PV corners to get power consumption under various PV scenarios. The thermal maps from chips under test by using infrared imaging is represented by T1,T2,... for each benchmark. It is possible to use the thermal maps for Trojan detection, but the sensitivity is less than the Trojan detection using power maps. If power mapping of the thermal maps is not available, these thermal maps can be used for Trojan detection as described in Section III-C. We use authentic thermal maps A1, A2,... as the training set and perform our Trojan detection methods of 2DPCA on the thermal maps under tests T1,T2,... for Trojan detection as described in Section III-C.” thermal maps are used for trojan detection. Seen in pg. 6 Fig. 3 a “(a) Thermal map with Trojan”, it can be seen that the maps (a) and (b) are both showing thermal shifts and patterns, with higher temperatures depicted with lower frequency, i.e. red, in response to the distortion, i.e. random vectors applied to the IC).
Therefore it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine Bahgat-Keller -Turner with Nowroz in order to incorporate detecting in response to the distortion a shift in a photoluminescence central frequency toward a lower frequency, wherein the shift is indicative of a change in the thermal measurement to a higher temperature.
One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine because of the expected benefit of improved trojan detection (Nowroz: pg. 1 abstract.).
Claim(s) 30 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Bahgat Shehata et al. (hereinafter Bahgat, US 2018/0027003 A1) in view of Keller, III et al. (hereinafter Keller, US 2015/0137830 A1) in view of Turner et al. (hereinafter Turner, US 2021/0239779 A1) further in view of Nowroz et al. (hereinafter Nowroz, “Novel Techniques for High-Sensitivity Hardware Trojan Detection Using Thermal and Power Maps” NPL 2014 attached.) in view of Jacob et al. (hereinafter Jacob, US 2023/0176111 A1).
Regarding Claim 30, Bahgat-Keller -Turner-Nowroz discloses claim 29 as set forth above.
However Bahgat-Keller does not explicitly disclose generating, by the NVD sensor, a temperature map of the PCB, and wherein the detecting of the presence of the at least one anomalous element comprises comparing the generated map with a density map for a flow of current in the PCB.
Turner discloses generating, by the NVD sensor, a temperature map of a printed circuit board (PCB) (Turner: para.0216 “The state-dependent temperature of the FPGA was measured and determined using Equation 6. The dependence of current on the RO cluster size leads to state dependent temperature changes. Due to the high thermal conductivity of the monolithic crystal substrate, there is no spatial structure in the resultant temperature maps. However, from temperature measurements over the entire FOV, we are able to determine a scaling of ˜0.0075° C. per active ring oscillator (discussed further below) and for the 200 RO state we saw a temperature increase of ˜1.5° C.”, para.0186 local temperature map, para.0243 thermal signature. The sensor further obtains temperature data and generates a temperature map of the pcb.).
Therefore it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine Bahgat-Keller with Turner in order to incorporate generating, by the NVD sensor, a temperature map of a printed circuit board (PCB).
One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine because of the expected benefit of improved detection of malicious circuitry (Turner: para.0188-0189).
While Nowroz discloses the general usage of a current density map and temperature map to identify trojans, such as in pg. 5-6 III, Bahgat-Keller-Turner-Nowroz does not explicitly disclose wherein the detecting of the presence of the at least one anomalous element comprises comparing the generated map with a density map for a flow of current in the PCB.
Jacob discloses generating, by the sensor, a temperature map of a printed circuit board (PCB) (Jacob: para.0075 “Referring to FIG. 8, a schematic of a detection system for detecting hardware trojans in a target integrated circuit is provided. …In general, sensing circuit 54 includes an array of magnetic tunnel junction circuits MTJCij where i an j are integer labels. Each magnetic tunnel junction circuit MTJCij includes one or more magnetic tunnel junctions. Moreover, each magnetic tunnel junction circuit MTJCij is configured to provide data for and/or determine a temperature map or a current map of the target integrated circuit….Computer processor 56 executes instructions for producing the current and/or the temperature maps. In a refinement, computer processor 56 executes the machine learning algorithms (e.g., a trained neural network) for identifying hardware Trojans from the current and/or the temperature maps or data thereof.” The sensing circuit generates a temperature map and a current map, i.e. a current density map for the circuit.),
and wherein the detecting of the presence of the at least one anomalous element comprises comparing the generated map with a density map for a flow of current in the PCB (Jacob: para.0067 “Specifically, a multi-modal ML trojan detection algorithm that exploits uncorrelated and correlated data between thermal and current maps as well as the relative pixel intensity within each map with respect to other pixels can be employed for high accuracy trojan detection.” Thermal maps and current maps are correlated for high accuracy trojan detection.).
Therefore it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date to combine Bahgat-Keller-Turner-Nowroz to incorporate Jacob in order to incorporate generating, by the sensor, a temperature map of a printed circuit board (PCB) and wherein the detecting of the presence of the at least one anomalous element comprises comparing the generated map with a density map for a flow of current in the PCB.
One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine because of the expected benefit of improved accuracy of trojan detection on circuits (Jacob: para.0067).
Claim(s) 35 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Bahgat Shehata et al. (hereinafter Bahgat, US 2018/0027003 A1) in view of Keller, III et al. (hereinafter Keller, US 2015/0137830 A1) further in view of Goodchild et al. (hereinafter Goodchild, US 2021/0226480 A1).
Regarding Claim 35, Bahgat discloses A computer-implemented method, comprising: applying, by a testing computing device, a distortion to a computing device under test (Bahgat: Fig. 3, Fig. 4, apparatus 300), a distortion to a computing device under test (Bahgat: para.0038 “At 401, one or more sets of electrical stimuli, as test signals, may be selected by control unit 310 of apparatus 300 for inducing or otherwise causing a variety of electrical activities and/or activate one of more circuit blocks of an integrated circuit of a target device or DUT 410 to perform various operations. At 402, each set of the one or more sets of electrical stimuli may be applied to DUT 410 by control unit 310. As various activities and/or operations in DUT 410 are induced by each set of electrical stimuli, photonic emissions as well as EM emissions by DUT 410 may result. At 403, photonic emissions from DUT 410 may be measured and recorded as photonic emission data by photonic emission measurement unit 330 of apparatus 300.” A set of stimuli, a set of distortions, are applied by the testing device to the device under test. Fig. 3 shows system 300 applying test signals to the device under test 350.),
measuring, by an electromagnetic (EM) probe and a two- dimensional grid of EM radiation measurements across the PCB to localize a presence of at least one anomalous element that could be indicative of a presence of the hostile element in the PCB; (Bahgat: para.0053-0055 “For illustrative purposes and without limitation, process 1100 is described below in the context of apparatus 300…At 1120, process 1100 may involve EM emission measurement unit 340 of apparatus 300 measuring electromagnetic emissions of the target device in a test context different from the baseline context. ” the testing computing device, 300 Fig. 3, obtains EM emission measurements from the device being tested, 350 in Fig. 3, using the Electromagnetic Emission Measurement unit, and the photonic emission measurement unit, to detect a hostile element in a portion of an IC. Seen in Fig. 9, and para.0049-0050, 904 and 903, portions of the circuit can be identified for anomalous elements. Para.0049 “A photonic emission image 903 may be a result of applying a different set of electrical stimuli which may involve activities from more than one sub-circuit block. One without the layout knowledge of the integrated circuit may be interested in locating regions in the photonic emission image 903 for the previous sub-circuit event.” Fig. 9 903-904 shows a 2D grid of EM radiation measurements.);
comparing, by the testing computing device, the EM radiation to a device fingerprint associated with the computing device under test (Bahgat: para.0056 “At 1130, process 1100 may involve control unit 310 identifying an anomaly condition associated with the target device by comparing a result of the measuring to the one or more electromagnetic emission models.” The obtained signal is compared to known fingerprints of the circuit para.0057-0059. For example, Fig. 10 shows the steps to generate the fingerprint by measuring em and photon emissions based on stimuli and generating EM models used to detect anomalies and Trojans.); and
detecting, based on the comparing and by the testing computing device, the presence of the at least one anomalous element in the region of the PCB to identify a location of the hostile element in the PCB (Bahgat: para.0056 “At 1130, process 1100 may involve control unit 310 identifying an anomaly condition associated with the target device by comparing a result of the measuring to the one or more electromagnetic emission models.” para.0034 “Moreover, data analysis unit 320 may compare the first PICA emission image and the second PICA emission image to provide a comparison result. Control unit 310 may identify a region of interest associated with one or more circuit blocks of an integrated circuit of DUT 350 based on the comparison result. In some embodiments, in correlating the recorded data of the photonic emissions and the recorded data of the electromagnetic emissions based on the analysis result to establish the one or more electromagnetic emission models for DUT 350, control unit 310 may correlate the one or more circuit blocks performing one or more activities in the region of interest during a first period of time to electromagnetic emission signatures recorded during the first period of time.” Para.0022, Using the models, anomalies, trojans and malware can be detected on the circuit. Para.0034 “Control unit 310 may identify a region of interest associated with one or more circuit blocks of an integrated circuit of DUT 350 based on the comparison result.” Seen in para.0034, the models contain region specific signatures learned during the training phase for the emission models in step 1110 Fig. 11. Via comparison, malicious entities are identified, as well as regions of interest on the circuit board.).
However Bahgat does not explicitly disclose wherein the applying of the distortion comprises violating a preconfigured functionality of a hostile element to cause the hostile element to potentially reveal its presence when a hostile element is present in a printed circuit board (PCB) of the computing device under test; measuring, by an by an electromagnetic (EM) probe attached to a three-dimensional computer numerical control (CNC) controller; measuring, by an electromagnetic (EM) probe and in response to the applying of the distortion, an-a two- dimensional grid of EM radiation measurements across the PCB for a presence of at least one anomalous element that could be indicative of a presence of the hostile element in the PCB.
Keller discloses wherein the applying of the distortion comprises violating a preconfigured functionality of a hostile element to cause the hostile element to potentially reveal its presence (Keller: para.0119 “Enhanced modulation techniques envisioned herein include but are not limited to modulating multiple inputs or outputs substantially simultaneously with the same or different signal, modulating multiple such pins with a phase shifted signal relative to each other, using the results of the modulation to change modulation in a multi-step approach, applying a series of different modulation patterns to the device under test, applying a randomized modulation pattern to seek new useful discriminating emission results, briefly applying modulation which briefly exceeds the specified voltage, current or frequency limits of the component under test,” para.0073 “It is to be understood that the definition of a counterfeit or substandard electronic device applies to but is not limited to … electronic devices which have been deliberately or unintentionally modified, electronic devices which have been deliberately modified to pose a security threat, and electronic devices which have been deliberately and/or intentionally modified for a malicious purpose with the intent to deceive as to the intended function.” modulations are applied to the device under test, such as device 2 in fig. 1, causing the device to operate outside of the normal range of operation, i.e. violating a preconfigured functionality, by exceeding maximum performance capacity such as voltage current or frequency limits of the device. Testing a device that may be counterfeited, that includes devices that have been deliberately modified to be malicious or a security threat, therefore this process reveals the presence of hostile elements by violating its preconfigured functionality)
when a hostile element is present in a printed circuit board (PCB) of the computing device (Keller: para.0006 printed circuit board) under test (Keller: para.0073 “It is to be understood that the definition of a counterfeit or substandard electronic device applies to but is not limited to … electronic devices which have been deliberately or unintentionally modified, electronic devices which have been deliberately modified to pose a security threat, and electronic devices which have been deliberately and/or intentionally modified for a malicious purpose with the intent to deceive as to the intended function.” Testing device that may be counterfeited, that includes devices that have been deliberately modified to be malicious or a security threat.);
measuring, by an electromagnetic (EM) probe and in response to the applying of the distortion, EM radiation measurements (Keller: para.0077 electromagnetic emission) across the PCB (Keller: para.0006 printed circuit board) for a presence of at least one anomalous element that could be indicative of a presence of the hostile element in the PCB (Keller: fig. 20 para.0131, para.0134, para.0128-0130 “Step 615 configures the power, ground, clock source and modulation parameters using circuits/boards 564a, 564h and/or 582 that provide means for modulating an input and/or output pin of the electronic device 2…. When powered, the electronic device 2 emits electromagnetic energy in step 623 that are gathered by the integrated antenna enclosure 500 via the antenna structure 556 in step 639 and is received at the RF receiver 572…. The received RF emissions are digitized in step 625 with the digital signal processed in step 627. Further, in step 631, the logic algorithms executed by the processing device 574 characterize the RF emission signature and the device 2 is either found as meeting a predetermined performance criteria or a predetermined emission signature in step 633 or is found as counterfeited or substandard in step 635. ” para.0097 “The integrated antenna enclosure 510′ functions in a similar manner to the aforementioned embodiment but is capable of a greater discrimination regarding the location origin of specific RF unintended emissions emitted by the device 2 under test” The modulations are applied to the device under test, such as device 2 described in Fig. 1, and the output emissions from the device are obtained and compared to emission signatures to identify a counterfeited device. Locations of each RF emission is documented.).
Therefore it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine Bahgat with Keller in order to incorporate wherein the applying of the distortion comprises violating a preconfigured functionality of a hostile element to cause the hostile element to potentially reveal its presence when a hostile element is present in a printed circuit board (PCB) of the computing device under test; measuring, by an electromagnetic (EM) probe and in response to the applying of the distortion, EM radiation measurements across the PCB for a presence of at least one anomalous element that could be indicative of a presence of the hostile element in the PCB, and apply this concept to the a two- dimensional grid of EM radiation measurements of Bahgat.
One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine because of the expected benefit of identification of security threats from devices that may cause issues (Keller: para.0073).
However Bahgat-Keller does not explicitly disclose an electromagnetic (EM) probe attached to a three-dimensional computer numerical control (CNC) controller.
Goodchild discloses an electromagnetic (EM) probe attached to a three-dimensional computer numerical control (CNC) controller (Goodchild: para.0054 “FIG. 12 illustrates certain aspects of an apparatus 1200 that may be used as testbed or test rig for the multi-coil free-position wireless charger 1100 illustrated in FIG. 11. The apparatus 1200 may include a computer numerical control (CNC) processor or other controller that can control movement of a receiving head 1202 that includes a receiving coil or other sensors that can measure electromagnetic field, flux or wireless signals used during object detection and device charging operations in a wireless charging device.” A receiving head 1202 is a probe that can read EM field information on a device under test. Seen in Fig. 13, the test head receiver is connected to the CNC controller.).
Therefore it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine Bahgat-Keller with that of Goodchild in order to incorporate an electromagnetic (EM) probe attached to a three-dimensional computer numerical control (CNC) controller.
One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine because of the expected benefit of validating devices during assembly or service (Goodchild: para.0048).
Claim(s) 36 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Bahgat Shehata et al. (hereinafter Bahgat, US 2018/0027003 A1) in view of Keller, III et al. (hereinafter Keller, US 2015/0137830 A1) further in view of Goodchild et al. (hereinafter Goodchild, US 2021/0226480 A1) in view of Pathak et al. (hereinafter Pathak, US 2016/0124041 A1).
Regarding Claim 36, Bahgat-Keller discloses claim 35 as set forth above.
However Bahgat-Keller does not explicitly disclose wherein the comparing of the EM radiation to the device fingerprint associated with the computing device under test comprises detecting a change in one or more of a resistance, a capacitance, an integrated circuit (IC) design, or a trace impedance.
Pathak discloses wherein the comparing of the EM radiation to the device fingerprint associated with the computing device under test comprises detecting a change in one or more of a resistance, a capacitance, an integrated circuit (IC) design, or a trace impedance (Pathak: para.0090 “The design of the total die size of the sensor 10 can be based on included components and the necessary manufacturing process stages. Detection and analysis of the ultra-low power RF fields emitted from electronic devices (characteristic EMI signatures) can be performed for identification, differentiation, diagnostics, and prediction. IC tamper detection capability necessarily involves detection of changing of the internal circuitry of the target IC; even exposing circuits 20 using de-encapsulation techniques changes local trace impedances. These changes manifest as subtle changes to the unintended RF emission signature of the device. Detection of malicious tampering events is accelerated based on signature changes to provide constant protection of critical ICs utilizing a combination of advanced antenna 24, receiver, and signal processing technology driven by signal characterization algorithms for the detection and identification of malicious tampering that could occur in small electronic devices.” Changes to IC design as well as trace impedance changes are detected for malicious tampering).
Therefore it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine Bahgat-Keller with Yang in order to incorporate wherein the comparing of the EM radiation to the device fingerprint associated with the computing device under test comprises detecting a change in one or more of a resistance, a capacitance, an integrated circuit (IC) design, or a trace impedance.
One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine because of the expected benefit of improved detection of malware and malicious changes to ICs (Pathak: para.0090, para.0118).
Claim(s) 37-38, 40 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Bahgat Shehata et al. (hereinafter Bahgat, US 2018/0027003 A1) in view of Keller, III et al. (hereinafter Keller, US 2015/0137830 A1) further in view of Goodchild et al. (hereinafter Goodchild, US 2021/0226480 A1) in view of Turner et al. (hereinafter Turner, US 2021/0239779 A1).
Regarding Claim 37, Bahgat-Keller -Goodchild discloses claim 35 as set forth above.
However Bahgat-Keller -Goodchild does not explicitly disclose wherein the detecting of the presence of the at least one anomalous element is performed by a neural network.
Turner disclose wherein the detecting of the presence of the at least one anomalous element is performed by a neural network (Turner: para.0189 “In general, the resulting IC magnetic fields pass largely unaltered through standard IC materials, and will vary spatially and temporally in ways that correlate with both IC architecture and operational state. Thus, high-resolution mapping of magnetic fields may yield simultaneous structural and functional information, and may be suitable for identification of malicious circuitry or Trojans, counterfeit detection, and fault detection.” Para.0085 “ the classifier algorithm may include one or more of the following: a convolutional neural network, a principal component analysis algorithm, and a support vector machine model. In some embodiments, the classifier algorithm may be trained using a corpus of labeled and/or unlabeled data pertaining to various magnetic field-generating articles (e.g., various integrated circuits) in various states, and the algorithm may thus be configured to determine a state of an article based on information regarding its magnetic vector field and/or other input data regarding the article.” Anomalous elements detected from the circuits can be done via a neural network.).
Therefore it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine Bahgat-Keller -Goodchild with Turner in order to incorporate wherein the detecting of the presence of the at least one anomalous element is performed by a neural network.
One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine because of the expected benefit of improved detection of malicious circuitry (Turner: para.0188-0189).
Regarding Claim 38, Bahgat-Keller -Goodchild discloses claim 37 as set forth above.
However Bahgat-Keller -Goodchild does not explicitly disclose determining the device fingerprint by the neural network.
Turner discloses determining the device fingerprint by the neural network (Turner: para.0241 “ Fitting also extracts the Lorentzian linewidth and contrast, which can contain useful information about the properties of magnetic fields emanating from the circuit, and can be used as additional inputs to machine learning models to fingerprint IC activity.” Para.0085 “ the classifier algorithm may include one or more of the following: a convolutional neural network, a principal component analysis algorithm, and a support vector machine model. In some embodiments, the classifier algorithm may be trained using a corpus of labeled and/or unlabeled data pertaining to various magnetic field-generating articles (e.g., various integrated circuits) in various states, and the algorithm may thus be configured to determine a state of an article based on information regarding its magnetic vector field and/or other input data regarding the article.” The devices are fingerprinted and ).
Therefore it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine Bahgat-Keller -Goodchild with Turner in order to incorporate determining the device fingerprint by the neural network.
One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine because of the expected benefit of improved detection of malicious circuitry (Turner: para.0188-0189).
Regarding Claim 40, Bahgat-Keller -Goodchild discloses claim 35 as set forth above.
However Bahgat-Keller -Goodchild does not explicitly disclose measuring, by a nitrogen-vacancy diamond (NVD) sensor, a digital signal transmitted by the PCB, and wherein the detecting of the presence of the at least one anomalous element is based on the measured digital signal.
Turner discloses measuring, by a nitrogen-vacancy diamond (NVD) sensor, a digital signal transmitted by the PCB, and wherein the detecting of the presence of the at least one anomalous element is based on the measured digital signal (Turner: para.0120 “In various embodiments, a magnetometer apparatus employs an ensemble of nitrogen vacancy (NV) centers in a diamond chip to achieve wide-field magnetic field measurement and mapping. NV centers in diamond are a modality for sensitive, high-spatial resolution, wide field of view imaging of microscopic magnetic fields, and may be employed to measure magnetic fields of magnetotactic bacteria, paleomagnetism in rocks, and magnetic fields emanated by propagating action potentials in neurons. The apparatus for measuring magnetic fields from integrated circuits (ICs) consists of an optical microscope and a photodetector (such as a photo-diode or a camera) to measure the fluorescence emitted by a thin ensemble NV layer at the surface of the diamond sensor chip, with the IC placed near to or in contact with the diamond.” para.0186 “the classifier algorithm may accept as input additional data pertaining to how the article and the crystal diamond interact, such as temperature data (e.g., a local temperature map)” para.0206 “The desired FPGA state-dependent magnetic field projection on each NV axis, ΔBz,i, and the change in local temperature, ΔT, are given by…” para.0243-0244 “Temperature changes in the diamond are determined from common mode shifts of NV resonance line centers….Ultimately, the multimodal information from the magnetic field maps, linewidth, contrast, and temperature may be used to create a more detailed fingerprint of IC activity. These physical parameters provide a rich data set of features that afford further dimensionality for characterization and classification.” One of the factors for finger printing the IC circuits state for classification of the state, e.g. for trojan detection in para.01988-0190, is central temperature changes of the NV diamond while reading the circuit board. The delta T being the change from some state, i.e a baseline, to the current temperature.)
Therefore it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine Bahgat-Keller -Goodchild with Turner in order to incorporate measuring, by a nitrogen-vacancy diamond (NVD) sensor, a digital signal transmitted by the PCB, and wherein the detecting of the presence of the at least one anomalous element is based on the measured digital signal.
One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine because of the expected benefit of improved detection of malicious circuitry (Turner: para.0188-0189, para.0232).
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure. Margalit US 2021/0240823 A1, para.0208 and Fig. 3 shows fault injection into IC
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to EUI H KIM whose telephone number is (571)272-8133. The examiner can normally be reached 7:30-5 M-R, M-F alternating.
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/EUI H KIM/ Examiner, Art Unit 2453
/KAMAL B DIVECHA/ Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2453
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