DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Continued Examination Under 37 CFR 1.114
A request for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, including the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e), was filed in this application after final rejection. Since this application is eligible for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, and the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e) has been timely paid, the finality of the previous Office action has been withdrawn pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114. Applicant's submission filed on 7/21/2026 has been entered.
Claim Status
Claims 1 and 34-36 are pending. Claim 1 was amended; claims 34-26 were newly added; and claims 3 and 6-13 were canceled in the reply filed 7/21/2026. Claims 35-36 are withdrawn as directed to non-elected species. Claims 1 and 34 are presently considered in view of the elected species.
Election/Restrictions
Applicant's election with traverse of a single subgenus of species of treating Parkinson’s disease by orally administering Prostaglandin B 1 (PGB1) at 0.1 mg/kg to 50 mg/kg, wherein “no additional agent is administered” in the reply filed on 9/09/2025 was previously acknowledged. The traversal was considered but not found persuasive for reasons of record (see, e.g., Action mailed 10/06/2025 at 2-3), and the requirement was deemed proper and made final.
The originally elected species was understood to be a patentably indistinct subgenus of species of treating Parkinson’s disease in patients “in need thereof”, wherein the method comprises the steps of orally administering Prostaglandin B 1 (PGB1) at 0.1 mg/kg to 50 mg/kg, wherein “no additional agent is administered”.
Amended claims 1 and 34 are understood to continue reading upon the originally elected species. However, claims 34-36 do not recite PGB1 alone, and therefore do not read upon the originally elected species.
Following extensive search and examination, the originally elected species has been deemed anticipated and/or obvious in view of the prior art as applied below. Per MPEP § 803.02(III)(A),
Following election, the Markush claim will be examined fully with respect to the elected species and further to the extent necessary to determine patentability. Note that where a claim reads on multiple species, only one species needs to be taught or suggested by the prior art in order for the claim to be anticipated or rendered obvious...
If the Markush claim is not allowable, the provisional election will be given effect and examination will be limited to the Markush claim and claims to the elected species, with claims drawn to species patentably distinct from the elected species held withdrawn from further consideration.
Accordingly, claims 1 and 34 are rejected in view of the originally elected species and claims that do not read upon the originally elected species are withdrawn.
Claims 35-36 are withdrawn from further consideration pursuant to 37 CFR 1.142(b) as being drawn to a nonelected species, there being no allowable generic or linking claim. Applicant timely traversed the restriction (election) requirement in the reply filed on 9/09/2025.
Claims 1 and 34 are presently considered.
Priority
The priority claim to US Provisional Application 62/537,634, filed 7/27/2017 is acknowledged.
Information Disclosure Statement
No IDS was filed in the Reply filed 2/06/2026.
Claim Interpretation
Amended claim 1 is representative of the pending claim scope and applicable claim interpretations are set forth below. The applicable claim interpretation was previously discussed on record, and that discussion is incorporated into the instant action (see, e.g., Action mailed 10/06/2025 at 4-6).
“Treating” is understood to include inhibiting the disease (i.e., “preventing a worsening of symptoms”) and/or relieving the severity of the disease (i.e., “causing regression of symptoms”) (see, e.g., Spec. filed 7/20/2022 at ¶[00109]).
“Subject” is understood to include humans and animals (see, e.g., Spec. filed 7/20/2022 at ¶¶[00124]-[00127]).
“Subject in need thereof” includes subjects that have a condition or are at risk of developing that condition (see, e.g., Spec. filed 7/20/2022 at ¶¶[00126]-[00127]).
“Administering” is understood to include, but not be limited to oral, parenteral, intravenous, intramuscular, subcutaneous, transdermal, aerosol, pulmonary, cutaneous, topical, injections, and local or systemic delivery (see, e.g., Spec. filed 7/20/2022 at ¶¶[0092], [0096]-[0097]).
Prostaglandins are understood as described in the prior art (see, e.g., US 5,151,4441 at col I at line 1 to col II at line 50). Prostaglandin B 1 (PGB1) is understood to be (13E,15S)-15-Hydroxy-9-oxoprosta-8(12),13-dien-1-oic acid, and correspond to CAS Number 13345-51-2, and the compound is understood to have the following structure:
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“Comprising” is an open-ended transitional term (see, e.g., MPEP § 2111.03(I)), wherein additional steps or components are not excluded. However, “‘[c]omprising’ is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential” (see, e.g., id.; see also Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501, 42 USPQ2d 1608, 1613 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
“Consisting of” excludes any elements, step, or ingredient not specified (see, e.g., MPEP § 2111.03(II)). However, when the phrase "consists of" or “consisting of” appears in a clause of the body of a claim, rather than immediately following the preamble, the "consisting of" phrase limits only the element set forth in that clause; other elements are not excluded from the claim as a whole (see, e.g., MPEP § 2111.03(II)). Here, the phrase “comprising administering to the subject a composition consisting of at least one of Prostaglandin B (PGB)1, PGB2, or PGB3 as an active ingredient” recites “consisting of” in a clause of the body of claim 1, and therefore the “consisting of” language applies to the specific “composition” referenced in that clause. However, the claim may “comprise” the step of administering other, separate compositions in view of the open-ended nature of “comprising”.
The phrase “a composition consisting of at least one of Prostaglandin B (PGB)1, PGB2, or PGB3 as an active ingredient” contains qualifiers “at least one” and “as an active ingredient”. Accordingly, the “composition” presumably can contain unlimited non-active ingredients, but can only contain, “as an active ingredient”, (i) PBG1, (ii) PGB2, (iii) PGB3, (iv) PBG1 and PGB2, (v) PBG1 and PGB3, (vi) PBG1, PBG2, and PBG3, and (vi) PBG2 and PBG3. However, this raises the question “what constitutes an active ingredient?”
The term “active ingredient” is not defined on record and lacks an unambiguous meaning in the art (see, e.g., Drugs@FDA Glossary2 at 1 at “Active Ingredient”, explaining that an “active ingredient is any component that provides pharmacological activity or other direct effect in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or animals”). This definition is broad enough to encompass carriers, because even water may be reported and treated as an “active ingredient” (see, e.g., EyeWash3 at 1 and 3). This raises a substantial and material concern, namely what are the metes and bounds of the amended claim scope, since it is unclear what does nor does not constitute an “active ingredient” in the pending claim scope. For purposes of applying prior art, the Examiner has reasonably inferred that the claim scope is equivalent to “consisting of (i) one or more pharmaceutically acceptable carriers or excipients, and (ii) at least one of Prostaglandin B (PGB)1, PGB2, or PGB3”. This interpretation is consistent with the description in the instant Specification (see, e.g., Spec. filed 7/20/2022 at ¶¶[00143]).
Additional claim interpretations are set forth below.
Withdrawn Claim Rejections
The rejection of claims 1 and 4-7 under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US2013/0309330A1 (Mastronardi; Nov. 21, 2013; cited in previous action) in view of US 5,151,444 (Ueno et al; Sep. 29, 1992; cited in previous action) is withdrawn in view of the amendments to claims 1 and the cancellation of claims 4-7. However, the amendments have necessitated a new rejection, which is set forth below.
Claim Rejections
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112(b)
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 1 and 34 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Amended claim 1 recites the phrase “a composition consisting of at least one of Prostaglandin B (PGB)1, PGB2, or PGB3 as an active ingredient”, which renders the claim scope indefinite. The interpretation of this limitation is dependent upon the metes and bounds of the phrase “as an active ingredient” and the term “active ingredient”. The term “active ingredient” is undefined on record, and is functionally defined in the art (see, e.g., Drugs@FDA Glossary4 at 1 at “Active Ingredient”, explaining that an “active ingredient is any component that provides pharmacological activity or other direct effect in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or animals”). Notably, the definition of “active ingredient” does not exclude pharmaceutically acceptable carrier and excipients, because such terms are not mutually exclusive, and common excipients may be utilized as “active ingredients” (e.g., mannitol is a carrier, but also used as an active osmotic diuretic; calcium carbonate is a common binder and diluent, but acts as an active antacid and dietary calcium supplement; glycerin is a common excipient, but used as an active osmotic agent or laxative, etc., etc.). Notably, even water may be reported and treated as an “active ingredient” (see, e.g., EyeWash5 at 1 and 3). Accordingly, it is unclear what the metes and bounds of the claimed “composition consisting of at least one of Prostaglandin B (PGB)1, PGB2, or PGB3 as an active ingredient” may be, since it is unclear what is or is not considered an “active ingredient” for purposes of the instant invention. Notably, the courts have stated that
Regardless whether a compound is claimed per se or a method is claimed that entails the use of the compound, the inventor cannot lay claim to the subject matter unless he can provide a description of the compound sufficient to distinguish infringing compounds from non-infringing compounds, or infringing methods from non-infringing methods.” University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle Co., 69 USPQ2d 1886 1984 (CAFC 2004) (emphasis added).
Here, it is unclear what the metes and bounds of a “composition consisting of at least one of Prostaglandin B (PGB)1, PGB2, or PGB3 as an active ingredient” may be, and close prior art exists (see, e.g., rejection under 35 USC 103, applied below). Accordingly, because it is unclear what components are permitted or excluded from the recited “composition”, the claim scope is rendered indefinite.
Claim 34 depends from claim 1 and fails to clarify the indefiniteness of the base claim. Accordingly, claim 34 is rejected for the reasons applied to claim 1.
Claims 1 and 34 are rejected.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
Claims 1 and 34 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US2013/0309330A1 (Mastronardi; Nov. 21, 2013; cited in previous action) as applied to claims 1 and 6-7 above, and further in view of US 5,151,444 (Ueno et al; Sep. 29, 1992; cited in previous action).
Claim interpretation: The applicable claim interpretation has been set forth in a preceding section above and in a preceding rejection, and those interpretations are incorporated into the instant rejection. The phrase “composition consisting of at least one of Prostaglandin B (PGB)1, PGB2, or PGB3 as an active ingredient” has been rejected as indefinite, above. For purposes of applying prior art, the phrase is reasonably understood to be equivalent to “consisting of (i) one or more pharmaceutically acceptable carriers or excipients, and (ii) at least one of Prostaglandin B (PGB)1, PGB2, or PGB3”. This interpretation is reasonable because it is consistent with the description in the instant Specification (see, e.g., Spec. filed 7/20/2022 at ¶¶[00143]). Additional claim interpretations are set forth below.
Regarding instant claims 1, 34, and the general treatment of Parkinson’s disease by administering prostaglandins, US’330 teaches and claims methods of treating neuropsychiatric conditions by administering a therapeutically effective amount of a composition comprising any prostaglandin or prostaglandin derivative (see, e.g., US’330 at claim 50), to a human patient (see, e.g., US’330 at claim 69), wherein administration may include oral administration routes (see, e.g., US’330 at claim 69), and wherein “neuropsychiatric condition” explicitly expressly includes Parkinson’s disease (see, e.g., US’330 at ¶¶[0015], [0021], [0065]). Regarding the concentration administered, US’330 identifies that the concentration of prostaglandin can vary (see, e.g., US’330 at ¶¶[0009]-[0010]), but exemplifies the usage of prostaglandins in animal models at 40 mg/kg (see, e.g., US’330 at ¶¶[0110] and table 1 at [0101]; see also MPEP § 2144.05(I)). Regarding amended claim 1 and compositions comprising a prostaglandin and a pharmaceutically acceptable carrier, US’330 exemplifies prostaglandin formulations comprising only a prostaglandin and a pharmaceutically acceptable carrier (see, e.g., US’330 at Table at ¶[0101], showing a prostaglandin combined with a saline vehicle; see also id. at claim 50, noting that recited elements are only a “therapeutically effective amount of a pharmaceutical composition comprising a prostaglandin, derivative thereof, or pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof”). Accordingly, an artisan would readily appreciate minimally active compositions required only a prostaglandin or prostaglandin derivative, and a pharmaceutically acceptable carrier.
The primary reference differs from the originally elected subgenus as follows: Although US’330 informs artisans of methods of treating Parkinson’s disease (and other neuropsychiatric conditions) by orally administering any prostaglandin or prostaglandin derivative to human patients, wherein such treatment would predictably lead to treatment of the condition, US’330 does not explicitly identify the prostaglandin of PGB1.
PGB1 was a known prostaglandin disclosed within a reference cited by US’330, and therefore would be readily understood to be usable in the methods of US’330: US’330 identifies that the term “prostaglandin” encompasses all prostaglandins, including those classified as Prostaglandin B, and those disclosed by US5151444 (see, e.g., US’330 at ¶[0030]). US’444 describes and defines prostaglandins, including PGBs (see, e.g., US’444 at col I at line 1 to col II at line 50, col. 4 at lines 35-40, col. 17 at lines 24-45), and including PG1s based upon the placement of a double bond in the ω-chain (see id). Accordingly, an artisan would readily appreciate that the teachings of US’330 applied to all prostaglandins and prostaglandin derivatives, including PGB1 (see id).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, either before the effective filing date of the claimed invention (AIA ) or otherwise at the time the invention was made (pre-AIA ), to arrive at the instantly claimed invention in view of the prior art for at least the following reason(s):
First, the invention is the combination of prior art elements (i.e., prostaglandins, including PGB1) according to known methods of treating Parkinson’s disease by orally administering a prostaglandin to human patients as taught by the primary reference, to yield predictable results, namely the treatment of Parkinson’s disease exactly as taught and suggested by the primary reference (see, e.g., MPEP §§ 2143(I)(A), (F), (G)). Furthermore, each prior art element merely performs its art recognized function in combination as it does separately.
Second, the invention is the simple substitution of one known prostaglandin (i.e., PGB1) in place of another prostaglandin (i.e., PGF2α, PGE1, or PGE2), in the prior art method of the primary reference for treating Parkinson’s disease by orally administering a prostaglandin to human patients as taught by the primary reference, wherein such substitution would be expected and predicted to yield predictable results, namely the treatment of Parkinson’s disease exactly as taught and suggested by the primary reference (see, e.g., MPEP §§ 2143(I)(B), (G)).
Accordingly, the claimed invention is obvious in view of the prior art.
Furthermore, there would be a reasonable expectation of success because the prior art is presumed fully enabled (see, e.g., MPEP § 2121(I)) for all that it discloses (see, e.g., MPEP §§ 2123(I)-(II)). Furthermore, it is well-within the ordinary skill in the prior art to administer known compounds to a known patient population via a known route of administration at a known concentration to obtain the results explicitly taught and disclosed by the prior art.
No evidence of unexpected results commensurate in scope with the requirements of MPEP §§ 716, 716.01, or 716.02 have been placed on record to date.
Accordingly, claims 1 and 34 are rejected as obvious.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed 7/21/2026 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Examiner notes that some arguments have been rendered moot in view of the revised rejection (see, e.g., Reply filed 7/21/2026 at 3 at § “Claim Rejections” to page 4 at 2nd ¶, addressing In re Kerkhoven and rationale of MPEP § 2144,06(I)). Remaining applicable arguments are addressed below.
Applicant appears to suggest the prior art reference of US’330 is not enabled in the absence of a demonstration that Parkinson’s disease can be treated by administration of prostaglandins: It is the Examiner’s understanding that Applicant addresses US’330 alone, and alleges that “nowhere does US’330 actually demonstrate treating Parkinson’s disease by administration of prostaglandins” (see, e.g., Reply filed 7/21/2026 at 4-5 at bridging ¶, 9 at 2nd ¶). This is understood to be an allegation that the full scope of the prior art is not enabled in the absence of a reduction to practice. This is not persuasive for at least four reasons.
First, US’330 has not been applied alone, and one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Second, if Applicant is suggesting that in the Parkinson’s disease arts, that a disclosure is non-enabling in view of a description of a problem to be solved presented without a working “exemplified” demonstration (see, e.g., Reply filed 7/21/2026 at 4 at final ¶, alleging that US’330 does not “demonstrate treating Parkinson’s disease”; see also Reply filed 2/06/2026 at 7-8 at bridging ¶, 9 at 2nd ¶). Examiner notes that if such Applicant’s own position is correct, then the instant disclosure would be deemed non-enabling, since zero exemplified methods of treating Parkinson’s disease in a patient were reduced to practice. Applicants provide no explanation for this apparent incongruity with their position.
Third, the prior art is presumed fully enabled (see, e.g., MPEP § 2121(I)) for all that it discloses (see, e.g., MPEP §§ 2123(I)-(II)), including “all that it would have reasonably suggested to one having ordinary skill in the art, including nonpreferred embodiments” (see, e.g., MPEP § 2123(I)). Therefore, the prior art of US’330 is presumed fully enabled for all that it discloses, including treatment of Parkinson’s disease, absent objective evidence to the contrary rebutting such presumption.
Fourth, if Applicant is attempting to rebut the presumption of operability and enablement (see, e.g., MPEP § 2121(I)), the burden is on the Applicant to rebut the presumption of operability (see, e.g., MPEP § 2121(I); MPEP § 716.07). However, to date, no evidence of inoperability commensurate in scope with the requirements of MPEP § 716.07 have been placed on record at this time. Critically, arguments of counsel cannot take the place of evidence in the record (see, e.g., In re Schulze, 346 F.2d 600, 602, 145 USPQ 716, 718 (CCPA 1965), and evidence is required to rebut the presumption of operability.
Accordingly, arguments suggesting that the prior is held to a higher standard than the instant disclosure, and suggesting US’330 is not fully enabled for treating Parkinson’s disease in the absence of a working exemplification, have been fully considered, but not found persuasive for the reasons discussed above.
It is the Examiner’s understanding that an Applicant would not have been motivated to treat Parkinson’s disease by administering known prostaglandins to such patients, based on the teachings of US’330: It is the Examiner’s understanding that Applicant is alleging that an artisan would not have been motivated, in view of US’330, to treat Parkinson’s disease by administering a known prostaglandin to Parkinson’s disease patients in view of US’330 alone (see, e.g., Reply filed 7/21/2026 at 4-5 at bridging ¶). This line of reasoning is not persuasive for at least the following reasons:
First, US’330 has not been applied alone, and one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Second, US’330 is presumed fully enabled (see, e.g., MPEP § 2121(I)) for all that it discloses, including nonpreferred and alternative embodiments (see, e.g., MPEP §§ 2123(I)-(II)), which includes the treatment of enumerated neuropsychiatric conditions, including Parkinson’s disease, by administering a therapeutically effective amount of a composition comprising a prostaglandin or prostaglandin derivative (see, e.g., US’330 at claim 50, 69, ¶¶[0015], [0021], [0065]).
Third, in response to applicant’s argument that there is no teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references, the examiner recognizes that obviousness may be established by combining or modifying the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention where there is some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to do so found either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 USPQ2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988), In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 21 USPQ2d 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1992), and KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). In this case, the Examiner has set forth multiple, clear rationales supporting a determination of prima facie obviousness in the rejection, namely the exemplary rationales discussed at MPEP §§ 2143(I)(A), (B), (F), and (G)). Furthermore, each prior art element merely performs its art recognized function in combination as it does separately. Critically, Applicant does not identify how the elements of each one of MPEP §§ 2143(I)(A), (B), (F), and (G) has not been met.
Accordingly, allegations regarding a lack of motivation have been fully considered, but not found persuasive because the prior art clearly teaches the treatment of Parkinson’s disease in patients by administering any prostaglandin, and therefore clear motivation exists to achieve the exact predicted and expected result presently claimed by administering a member of the same class of compounds to such patients.
It is the Examiner’s understanding that an Applicant would not have been motivated to treat Parkinson’s disease by specifically administering the known prostaglandin of PGB1 to such patients, based on the teachings of US’330: It is the Examiner’s understanding that Applicant is alleging that an artisan would not have been motivated, in view of US’330, to treat Parkinson’s disease by administering the specific prostaglandin of PGB1 to Parkinson’s disease patients in view of US’330 alone, because PGB1 is “not even mentioned in US’330” and allegedly only “certain prostaglandins can activate Nurr1 and/or PPARγ” (see, e.g., Reply filed 7/21/2026 at 4-5 at bridging ¶ to page 6 at 1st partial ¶, 6 at final ¶). This line of reasoning is not persuasive for at least the following reasons:
First, US’330 has not been applied alone, and one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Second, US’330 is presumed fully enabled (see, e.g., MPEP § 2121(I)) for all that it discloses, including nonpreferred and alternative embodiments (see, e.g., MPEP §§ 2123(I)-(II)), which includes the treatment of enumerated neuropsychiatric conditions, including Parkinson’s disease, by administering a therapeutically effective amount of a composition comprising any prostaglandin or prostaglandin derivative (see, e.g., US’330 at claim 50, 69, ¶¶[0015], [0021], [0065]). It is presently undisputed that PGB1 is a prior art “prostaglandin”, and therefore US’330 expressly identifies (and informs artisans) that it may be utilized to successfully treat neuropsychiatric conditions, including Parkinson’s disease (see, e.g., US’330 at claims 50, 63-64, 69, and ¶¶[0015], [0021], [0026]-[0027], [0055], [0065]).
Third, if Applicant is attempting to rebut the presumption of operability and enablement for the treatment of Parkinson’s disease using “certain prostaglandins” but not others (see, e.g., Reply filed 7/21/2026 at 4-5 at bridging ¶ to page 6 at 1st partial ¶; see, e.g., MPEP § 2121(I)), the burden is on the Applicant to rebut the presumption of operability (see, e.g., MPEP § 2121(I); MPEP § 716.07). However, to date, no evidence of inoperability commensurate in scope with the requirements of MPEP § 716.07 have been placed on record at this time. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that Applicant could show that some prostaglandins within the scope of US’330 were not as effective as others, per MPEP § 716.07, “Where the affidavit or declaration presented asserts inoperability in features of the reference which are not relied upon, the reference is still effective as to other features which are operative. In re Shepherd, 172 F.2d 560, 80 USPQ 495 (CCPA 1949)”.
Fourth, if Applicant means to allege that although US’330 does teach the treatment of Parkinson’s disease by administering a prostaglandin, but that US’330 would not specifically direct an artisan to select the specific prostaglandin of PGB1 (see, e.g., Reply filed 7/21/2026 at 4 at final ¶), this is not persuasive because PGB1 was a prior art element and known prostaglandin, was not excluded by US’330, and therefore would have been readily identified and understood to be a functional equivalent for purposes of US’330 methods. This is pertinent because the courts have previously noted that
"[r]eading a list and selecting a known compound to meet known requirements is no more ingenious than selecting the last piece to put in the last opening in a jig-saw puzzle."
(see, e.g., Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327 (1945), at 335)
Accordingly, selection of a known, prior art element (e.g., the prostaglandin PGB1) from a list of known prostaglandins is obvious, and would merely yield the expected and predicted results identified by US’330, namely the successful treatment of Parkinson’s disease.
Accordingly, allegations of lack of motivation to select PGB1 for use in the methods of US’330 have been fully considered, but not found persuasive as explained above. Selecting a known prostaglandin for use in a method of treating Parkinson’s disease by administering a prostaglandin, to predictably and expectedly achieve the exact result taught by the prior art (i.e., treatment of Parkinson’s disease) is neither surprising nor unexpected.
Allegations of unexpected results, criticality of specific structures, and potential lack of enablement for all prostaglandins: It is the Examiner’s understanding that Applicant is alleging that the presently claimed invention “is based in part on the discovery “that certain prostaglandins can activate Nurr1 and/or PPARγ” but others do not (see, e.g., Reply filed 7/21/2026 at 4-5 at bridging ¶ to 6 at 1st partial ¶, 6 at final ¶, 7 at 1st full ¶; see also Reply filed 2/06/2026 at 10-11 at bridging ¶). Applicant’s position is not persuasive because it is not directly germane to the invention as actually claimed, or to the prior art methodology:
First, US’330 is presumed fully enabled (see, e.g., MPEP § 2121(I)) for all that it discloses, including nonpreferred and alternative embodiments (see, e.g., MPEP §§ 2123(I)-(II)), which includes the treatment of enumerated neuropsychiatric conditions, including Parkinson’s disease, by administering a therapeutically effective amount of a composition comprising any prostaglandin or prostaglandin derivative (see, e.g., US’330 at claim 50, 69, ¶¶[0015], [0021], [0065]).
Second, if Applicant is attempting to rebut the presumption of operability and enablement for the treatment of Parkinson’s disease using “certain prostaglandins” but not others (see, e.g., Reply filed 7/21/2026 at 4-5 at bridging ¶ to page 6 at 1st partial ¶; see, e.g., MPEP § 2121(I)), the burden is on the Applicant to rebut the presumption of operability (see, e.g., MPEP § 2121(I); MPEP § 716.07). However, to date, no evidence of inoperability commensurate in scope with the requirements of MPEP § 716.07 have been placed on record at this time. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that Applicant could show that some prostaglandins within the scope of US’330 were not as effective as others, per MPEP § 716.07, “Where the affidavit or declaration presented asserts inoperability in features of the reference which are not relied upon, the reference is still effective as to other features which are operative. In re Shepherd, 172 F.2d 560, 80 USPQ 495 (CCPA 1949)”.
Third, the arguments asserting that “that certain prostaglandins can activate Nurr1 and/or PPARγ” but others do not (see, e.g., Reply filed 7/21/2026 at 4-5 at bridging ¶ to 6 at 1st partial ¶) is of unknown relevance to the claimed invention because activation of Nurr1 and/or PPARγ is not actually recited in the pending claims. Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Furthermore, activation of Nurr1 and/or PPARγ is not shown to be a required mechanism for treating Parkinson’s disease in vivo, because US’330 is presumed to be fully enabled for all that it discloses.
Fourth, if such arguments asserting that “that certain prostaglandins can activate Nurr1 and/or PPARγ” but others do not (see, e.g., Reply filed 7/21/2026 at 4-5 at bridging ¶ to 6 at 1st partial ¶) is intended to be an assertion of unexpected results, then this is not persuasive because the proffered evidence is not commensurate in scope with the requirements of MPEP §§ 716, 716.01, and 716.02. Rather the instant claims appear to only achieve the predicted and expected results taught and suggested by the prior art, and therefore evidence confirming the expectations of the prior art actually weigh in favor of a determination of obviousness (see, e.g., MPEP § 716.02(c)(II)).
Accordingly, allegations that only some prostaglandins may not work to treat Parkinson’s disease, but not others, in the absence of supporting objective supporting evidence, is insufficient to rebut prima facie obviousness; insufficient to establish lack of operability of the prior art (see, e.g., MPEP § 2121(I); MPEP § 716.07); and insufficient to establish unexpected results commensurate in scope with the requirements of MPEP §§ 716, 716.01, and 716.02.
Allegations suggesting “lack of predictability” or “lack of reasonable expectation of success”: It is the Examiner’s understanding that Applicant is alleging a lack of predictability or otherwise a lack of reasonable expectation of success (see, e.g., Reply filed 7/21/2026 at 6 at 1st full ¶, 6 at final ¶; see also Reply filed 2/06/2026 at 8 at 1st full ¶, 9 at 2nd ¶, 10 at 2nd full ¶). This is not persuasive because the Applicant’s assertions do not reflect the proper legal standards for evaluating predictability. MPEP § 2143.02(II) explains that “[o]bviousness does not require absolute predictability”, but instead clarifies that only “at least some degree of predictability is required” (see, e.g., MPEP § 2143.02(II)). Here, the rejection explicitly addresses predictability and reasonable expectation of success, but Applicant fails to address the explicitly identified predicted and expected results set forth in the rejection. Here, the Examiner’s basis for “predictability” is merely based upon the presumption that the prior art is fully enabled (see, e.g., MPEP § 2121(I)) for all that it discloses (see, e.g., MPEP §§ 2123(I)-(II)). As explained at MPEP § 2143.02, predictability and reasonable expectation of success are satisfied when “all the claimed elements were known in the prior art and one skilled in the art could have combined the elements as claimed by known methods with no change in their respective functions, and the combination would have yielded nothing more than predictable results to one of ordinary skill in the art”. Here zero evidence of unexpected results commensurate in scope with the requirements of MPEP 716.02 have been set forth on record, all elements of the claimed invention were known in the prior art, one of ordinary skill was fully enabled to combined each component using routine methods in the biochemical arts per the guidance of the primary reference, and the elements would have merely performed their art-recognized, respective functions (see Rejection, above). Accordingly, such arguments are not persuasive.
Allegations addressing less than all references relied upon by the Examiner: It is the Examiner’s understanding that Applicant alleges that US’330, considered alone, does not teach PGB1 (see, e.g., Reply filed 7/21/2026 at 4-5 at bridging ¶; see also Reply filed 2/06/2026 at 7-8 at bridging ¶, 10 at 2nd full ¶), and that US’444, considered alone, does not teach the treatment of Parkinson’s disease (see, e.g., Reply filed 7/21/2026 at 6 at final ¶; see also Reply filed 2/06/2026 at 9 at 1st ¶). In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Allegations that obviousness is not established when diseases are only mentioned five times: It is the Examiner’s understanding that Applicant is suggesting that US’330 does not render treatment of Parkinson’s disease obvious because “In the entire disclosure of US’330, Parkinson’s disease is only mentioned five times” (see, e.g., Reply filed 2/06/2026 at 7 at 1st full ¶, 7-8 at bridging ¶; see also Reply filed 7/21/2026 at 4-5). The underlying legal rationale for Applicant’s argument is unknown because a determination of obviousness is not rebutted if a disease is mentioned five or fewer times in a disclosure. Rather, prior art is presumed fully enabled (see, e.g., MPEP § 2121(I)) for all that it discloses, including nonpreferred and alternative embodiments (see, e.g., MPEP §§ 2123(I)-(II)). Accordingly, such arguments are not persuasive because US’330 literally teaches the treatment of neuropsychiatric conditions, including Parkinson’s disease, by administering a therapeutically effective amount of a composition comprising a prostaglandin or prostaglandin derivative (see, e.g., US’330 at claim 50, 69, ¶¶[0015], [0021], [0065]).
Applicant alleges that US’330 does not teach PBG1: It is the Examiner’s understanding that Applicant is alleging that PBG1 is “not even mentioned in US’330” (see, e.g., Reply filed 7/21/2026 at 4-5 at bridging ¶). Examiner notes that US’330 literally recites and directs artisans to US5151444 (see, e.g., US’330 at ¶[0030]) for matters that were well-known in the prior art, including chemical structures of prostaglandins, including PGBs (see, e.g., US’444 at col I at line 1 to col II at line 50, col. 4 at lines 35-40, col. 17 at lines 24-45). Furthermore, in response to applicant's arguments against the references individually, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Allegations regarding unclaimed limitations: It is the Examiner’s understanding that Applicant alleges that only “certain prostaglandins can activate Nurr1 and/or PPARγ” (see, e.g., Reply filed 7/21/2026 at 4-5 at bridging ¶ to 6 at 1st partial ¶). Activation of Nurr1 and/or PPARγ is not a claimed limitation. Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, such arguments do not distinguish the invention, as claimed, over the prior art.
Allegations addressing the teachings of US’444 alone: It is the Examiner’s understanding that Applicant is alleging that US’444 does not teach a method of treating Parkinson’s disease by administering prostaglandins such as PGB1 (see, e.g., Reply filed 7/21/2026 at 6 at final ¶). This is neither disputed nor dispositive of obviousness because the instant rejection is not based upon US’444 alone. In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Applicant alleges that the “present inventors . . . showed for the first time the therapeutic effectiveness of the specific prostaglandins required by the present claims”: It is the Examiner’s understanding that Applicant is alleging that the “present inventors . . . showed for the first time the therapeutic effectiveness of the specific prostaglandins required by the present claims” (see, e.g., Reply filed 7/21/2026 at 7 at 1st full ¶). This assertion is insufficient to overcome obviousness because (i) the present inventors did not actually reduce to practice the claimed invention, which is an in vivo method of treating Parkinson’s disease, (ii) even assuming arguendo that the proffered evidence supported a conclusion of efficacy of in vivo treatment of Parkinson’s disease upon administration of prostaglandins, such results confirm the expectations of the prior art, and therefore such results would support a conclusion of obviousness (see, e.g., MPEP § 716.02(c)(II), explaining that evidence confirming the expectations of the prior art actually weigh in favor of a determination of obviousness).
Applicant addresses a rationale for supporting obviousness that was not relied upon by the Examiner: It is the Examiner’s understanding that Applicant is alleging that the instant rejection does not support a determination of obviousness under the rationale of MPEP § 2143(I)(E) (i.e., finite number of solutions) (see, e.g., Reply filed 2/06/2026 at 8 at 2nd full ¶ tp 3rd full ¶, 9-10 at bridging ¶). This is neither disputed nor dispositive because the rejection is not premised upon this rationale. Rather, the explicitly recited rationales supporting a determination of obviousness are set forth in the rejection and are MPEP §§ 2143(I)(A), (B), (F), (G) and MPEP § 2144.06(I). Accordingly, arguments directed towards a rationale not relied upon by the Examiner are insufficient to rebut the merits of the rejection based upon different, distinct rationales.
Allegations that a disclosed disease is not obvious because other diseases are also disclosed: It is the Examiner’s understanding that Applicant is suggesting that the disclosure of methods of treating other neuropsychiatric conditions besides just Parkinson’s disease renders the invention less obvious because “it would not have been obvious to select Parkinson’s disease from the long list of neuropsychiatric conditions and cognitive disorders taught by US’330” (see, e.g., Reply filed 2/06/2026 at 7 at 1st full ¶, 7-8 at bridging ¶, 8 at final ¶, 9-10 at bridging ¶, 10 at 1st full ¶). This is not persuasive because the prior art is presumed fully enabled (see, e.g., MPEP § 2121(I)) for all that it discloses (see, e.g., MPEP §§ 2123(I)-(II)), including “all that it would have reasonably suggested to one having ordinary skill in the art, including nonpreferred embodiments” (see, e.g., MPEP § 2123(I)). Furthermore, the courts have previously noted that
"[r]eading a list and selecting a known compound to meet known requirements is no more ingenious than selecting the last piece to put in the last opening in a jig-saw puzzle."
(see, e.g., Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327 (1945), at 335)
and the court did not recite an exception if the “list” was “long” (see id.). This is reasonable because if each of the alternatives merely perform an art-recognized function in the absence of any unexpected results, then the outcome remains predictable and expected, regardless of the total number of alternatives. Furthermore, the Court has stated that
"[W]hen a patent 'simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform' and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement, the combination is obvious."
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 , 417 , 127 S. Ct. 1727 , 167 L. Ed. 2d 705 (2007) (quoting Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 , 282, 96 S. Ct. 1532 , 47 L. Ed. 2d 784 (1976)).
Likewise, the Supreme Court has rejected rigid tests for obviousness and has emphasized that
[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”
KSR Int'l v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007), at 416.
And has also emphasized that
“If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.”
KSR Int'l v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007), at 417.
Here, all aspects of the claimed method were already known in the art, all compounds recited were prior art elements, used in prior art methods exactly as taught by the prior art, wherein the expected and predicted results are the explicitly taught and disclosed results identified in the prior art. Finally, given modern search engine techniques, it is well-within the ordinary skill in the Parkinson’s disease treatment arts to simply perform a text search for documents pertaining to the treatment of Parkinson’s disease, which would yield US’330. Accordingly, such arguments are not persuasive.
Recited caselaw is not explained and does not appear applicable to the instant facts: It is the Examiner’s understanding that Applicant recites and refers to multiple cases (see, e.g., Reply filed 7/21/2026 at 1st full ¶; see also Reply filed 2/06/2026 at 10 at 1st full ¶). The holdings of these cases are neither disputed nor dispositive of obviousness in the instant case, because the Applicant has failed to identify why the facts of each case are germane to the instant rejection and facts at issue.
Allegations suggesting “skepticism of experts”: It is the Examiner’s understanding that Applicant’s statements amount to a suggestion that the Examiner’s position would be met with skepticism of experts (see, e.g., Reply filed 7/21/2026 at 4-5 at bridging ¶ to 6 at 1st partial ¶, 6 at final ¶, 7 at 1st full ¶; see also Reply filed 2/06/2026 at 7 at 1st full ¶, 7-8 at bridging ¶, 8 at final ¶, 9-10 at bridging ¶, 10 at 1st full ¶). If Applicant means to suggest the existence of skepticism of experts, such evidence should be filed per MPEP § 716.05 as evidence is required to establish skepticism of experts. In the absence of such evidence, such statements are understood to be unsupported conjecture of counsel. The prior art is presumed fully enabled (see, e.g., MPEP § 2121(I)) for all that it discloses (see, e.g., MPEP §§ 2123(I)-(II)), including “all that it would have reasonably suggested to one having ordinary skill in the art, including nonpreferred embodiments” (see, e.g., MPEP § 2123(I)), and no objective evidence rebutting this presumption has been placed on record to date.
Examiner’s prior responses of record remain applicable and were not addressed by the Applicant: Examiner notes that the prior response to arguments remains applicable (see, e.g., Action mailed 3/25/2026 at 10-20), and therefore that prior response is incorporated into the instant response. Examiner notes that the Reply filed 7/21/2026 reiterated multiple arguments, previously addressed by the Examiner, but failed to acknowledge or address the Examiner’s prior response of record. Accordingly, the Examiner’s position on such issues has not been disputed with specificity on record.
Accordingly, all arguments have been fully considered but not found persuasive for reasons of record. Accordingly, the rejection is maintained as revised above, and all revisions were necessitated by Applicant amendment.
Pertinent Prior Art
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure.
US2013/0225643A1 (Sakai et al; Aug. 29, 2013; cited in previous action) claims a method of treating Parkinson’s disease (see, e.g., US’643 at claim 41) using a method that includes administering a therapeutically effective amount of any prostaglandin derivative (see, e.g., US’643 at claim 50), wherein “prostaglandin derivative” is defined to explicitly include PGE1 and/or PGE2 (see, e.g., US’643 at ¶[0157]). Accordingly, an artisan would at once envisage methods of US’643 for treating Parkinson’s disease by administering PGE1, PGE2, or a combination of both PGE1 and PGE2.
US20200038352A1 (Yoon et al; Feb. 6, 2020; Filing date Sep. 20, 2016; cited in previous action) discloses a method of treating subjects for Parkinson’s disease (see, e.g., Yoon at claims 11-13, ¶[0099]) by administering “an effective amount” of PGA1 or PGA2 (see, e.g., Yoon at claim 14, ¶[0103]), wherein “administration” would be readily envisaged and understood to include oral administration (see, e.g., Yoon at claims 11-14, ¶[0107]). In addition, Yoon discloses a method of treating subjects for Parkinson’s disease (see, e.g., Yoon at claims 11-13, ¶[0099]) by administering “an effective amount” of a “cyclopentenone prostaglandin” (see, e.g., Yoon at claim 11]), wherein “administration” would be readily envisaged and understood to include oral administration (see, e.g., Yoon at claims 11-14, ¶[0107]). The term “cyclopentenone prostaglandin” is explicitly defined as a narrow subgenus of compounds, including PGJ2 (see, e.g., Yoon at ¶[0046]), and therefore an artisan would readily envisage and understand that the method could be practiced utilizing PGJ2.
Conclusion
No claims are allowed.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to RANDALL L BEANE whose telephone number is (571)270-3457. The examiner can normally be reached Mon.-Fri., 7 AM to 2 PM ET.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Lianko G. Garyu can be reached at (571) 270-7367. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/RANDALL L BEANE/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1654
1 Cited in previous action.
2 "Active ingredient", Drugs@FDA Glossary of Terms, FDA.gov, attached as 8 page pdf, published Nov. 14, 2017, also available at https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-approvals-and-databeses/drugsfda-glossary-terms (last visited 10/26/2026); hereafter "Glossary". (Year: 2017)
3 "Eye Wash", dailymed.nlm.nih.gov, NDC Code: 67510-0662-4, (Feb. 22, 2013), attached as a pdf, 5 pages, also available at https://dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed/drugInfo.cfm?setid=0bccbba8-091c-4d31-9f11-43e20d01977a (last visited 10/23/2026). (Year: 2013)
4 "Active ingredient", Drugs@FDA Glossary of Terms, FDA.gov, attached as 8 page pdf, published Nov. 14, 2017, also available at https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-approvals-and-databeses/drugsfda-glossary-terms (last visited 10/26/2026); hereafter "Glossary". (Year: 2017)
5 "Eye Wash", dailymed.nlm.nih.gov, NDC Code: 67510-0662-4, (Feb. 22, 2013), attached as a pdf, 5 pages, also available at https://dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed/drugInfo.cfm?setid=0bccbba8-091c-4d31-9f11-43e20d01977a (last visited 10/23/2026). (Year: 2013)