DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Response to Amendment
The amendment filed 26 January 2026 has been entered.
Applicant’s amendments to the Claims have overcome the previous Claim objection. However, the Applicant’s amendments have provided new grounds for an additional Claim objection.
Applicant’s amendments by reciting a “sensor” instead of a “detector” have voided 35 USC 112(f) interpretation in claim 1. The examiner fully considered the Applicant’s arguments as to why a “controller” should not be interpreted under 35 USC 112(f), but the examiner was not persuaded. Accordingly, 35 USC 112(f) interpretation is still held for the claimed “controller,” and the 35 USC 112(a/b) rejections that are based on the 35 USC 112(f) interpretation for the “controller” still stand.
Applicant’s arguments, filed 26 January 2026 with respect to the rejection of claim 1 under 35 USC § 103 have been fully considered and are persuasive. However, after conducting an updated search, additional references were identified, which teach the amended portions of the claims. Therefore, the grounds of rejection under 35 USC § 103 still stand.
Status of the Claims
In the amendment dated 26 January 2026, the status of the claims is as follows: Claims 1 and 4-5 have been amended. Claim 2 has been cancelled.
Claims 1 and 3-5 are pending.
Claim Objections
Claim 4 is objected to because of the following informalities: recommend amending the claim to recite: “sensor” (last line). Appropriate correction is required.
Claim Interpretation
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(f):
(f) Element in Claim for a Combination. – An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The following is a quotation of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The claims in this application are given their broadest reasonable interpretation using the plain meaning of the claim language in light of the specification as it would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim element (also commonly referred to as a claim limitation) is limited by the description in the specification when 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is invoked.
As explained in MPEP § 2181, subsection I, claim limitations that meet the following three-prong test will be interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
(A) the claim limitation uses the term “means” or “step” or a term used as a substitute for “means” that is a generic placeholder (also called a nonce term or a non-structural term having no specific structural meaning) for performing the claimed function;
(B) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is modified by functional language, typically, but not always linked by the transition word “for” (e.g., “means for”) or another linking word or phrase, such as “configured to” or “so that”; and
(C) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is not modified by sufficient structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function.
Use of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim with functional language creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites sufficient structure, material, or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Absence of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is not to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is not interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites function without reciting sufficient structure, material or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Claim limitations in this application that use the word “means” (or “step”) are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action. Conversely, claim limitations in this application that do not use the word “means” (or “step”) are not being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action.
This application includes one or more claim limitations that do not use the word “means,” but are nonetheless being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, because the claim limitation(s) uses a generic placeholder that is coupled with functional language without reciting sufficient structure to perform the recited function and the generic placeholder is not preceded by a structural modifier. Such claim limitation(s) is/are:
“controller” in claim 4: the generic placeholder is “controller” (understood to be a means for controlling) and the functional limitation is “that controls an output of the laser oscillator based on a detection value detected by the detector.”
“notification unit” in claim 5: the generic placeholder is “unit” and the functional limitations are “notification” and “performs a predetermined notification operation.”
Structure that is used from the Specification to cover the claimed functional limitation are an “alarm buzzer,” “alarm lamp, “alarm message,” or equivalents thereof.
Because this/these claim limitation(s) is/are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, it/they is/are being interpreted to cover the corresponding structure described in the specification as performing the claimed function, and equivalents thereof.
If applicant does not intend to have this/these limitation(s) interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, applicant may: (1) amend the claim limitation(s) to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph (e.g., by reciting sufficient structure to perform the claimed function); or (2) present a sufficient showing that the claim limitation(s) recite(s) sufficient structure to perform the claimed function so as to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims 4-5 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
Claim 4 recites “a controller that controls an output of the laser oscillator based on a detection value detected by the detector,” but the Specification fails to disclose any structure for the “controller.” As a result, there is no structure that can perform the claimed function in sufficient detail such that one of ordinary skill in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor possessed the claimed subject matter at the time of filing (MPEP 2161.01).
Claim 5 is rejected based on their dependency to claim 4.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
In claim 4, the limitation “controller” invokes 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. However, the written description fails to disclose the corresponding structure, material, or acts for performing the entire claimed function and to clearly link the structure, material, or acts to the function. The disclosure is devoid of any structure that performs the functions in the claim. Therefore, the claim is indefinite and is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph.
Applicant may:
(a) Amend the claim so that the claim limitation will no longer be interpreted as a limitation under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph;
(b) Amend the written description of the specification such that it expressly recites what structure, material, or acts perform the entire claimed function, without introducing any new matter (35 U.S.C. 132(a)); or
(c) Amend the written description of the specification such that it clearly links the structure, material, or acts disclosed therein to the function recited in the claim, without introducing any new matter (35 U.S.C. 132(a)).
If applicant is of the opinion that the written description of the specification already implicitly or inherently discloses the corresponding structure, material, or acts and clearly links them to the function so that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize what structure, material, or acts perform the claimed function, applicant should clarify the record by either:
(a) Amending the written description of the specification such that it expressly recites the corresponding structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function and clearly links or associates the structure, material, or acts to the claimed function, without introducing any new matter (35 U.S.C. 132(a)); or
(b) Stating on the record what the corresponding structure, material, or acts, which are implicitly or inherently set forth in the written description of the specification, perform the claimed function. For more information, see 37 CFR 1.75(d) and MPEP §§ 608.01(o) and 2181.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
Claims 1 and 3-5 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Takigawa et al. (US-20200387131-A1, effective filing date of 7 June 2019) in view of Chida et al. (US-20140224780-A1).
Regarding claim 1, Takigawa teaches a laser processing head (machining head 2, fig. 5) that emits laser light (light emitted from surface 41, fig. 5) including a first laser light having a first wavelength (“the light having a second wavelength,” para 0091; laser beam 12, fig. 5) and a second laser light having a second wavelength (“the light having a first wavelength,” para 0091), the laser processing head comprising:
a transmission fiber (fiber 4, fig. 5) that transmits the laser light (para 0092);
a collimator lens (collimation lens 21, fig. 5) that collimates the laser light transmitted through the transmission fiber (the lens 21 collimates light from fiber 4, fig. 5);
a focusing lens (condenser lens 22, fig. 5) that condenses the laser light collimated by the collimator lens (lens 22 condenses light from collimation lens 21, fig. 5);
a beam splitter (wavelength selective mirror 24C, fig. 5; splitting the beam as shown in fig. 5 is construed such that the mirror 24C is a beam splitter) that reflects a portion of the laser light (reflects laser beam 121, fig. 5) and allows a rest of the laser light to pass through the beam splitter (beam 12 passes through the mirror 24C, fig. 5); and
a sensor (image capturing elements 151, fig. 5; “CCD image sensor or a CMOS image sensor,” para 0093) that detects reflection light (light 121, fig. 5) reflected by the beam splitter, the AR coating has a first reflectance for reflecting the first laser light (“reflects, at high reflectivity, for example, 50% or higher, the light having a different wavelength from the wavelength of the laser beam 12,” para 0091; construed as a reflectance of 50%) and a second reflectance for reflecting the second laser light (“transmits at least 99% of the light having the wavelength of the laser beam 12 and reflects only a minimal part thereof,” para 0091; construed as a reflectance of less than 1%), the first reflectance being higher than the second reflectance (50% is higher than below 1%), and the sensor has a first light receiving sensitivity for receiving the first laser light and a second light receiving sensitivity for receiving the second laser light (“pixels having sensitivity to the visible light or the light in near infrared region having a different wavelength from the wavelength of the laser beam 12,” para 0094; two types of pixels are disclosed in para 0094, one type that is sensitive to the beam 12 and the other that is sensitive to the IR light; the pixels that are disclosed as being sensitive to the IR light are construed having the claimed “sensitivity”), the first light receiving sensitivity being lower than the second light receiving sensitivity (“the pixels having the highest sensitivity to the light in near infrared region having the wavelength of 2.5 μm,” para 0094; construed such that the IR pixels are more sensitive to 2.5 micrometer wavelength than 1.1 micrometer wavelength),
wherein the first laser light has a wavelength (“the laser beam 12 has the wavelength of approx. 1.1 μm,” para 0094) that is smaller than a wavelength of the second laser light (“wavelength of 2.5 μm and the wavelength in its vicinity as the light having the first wavelength,” para 0094; 1.1 micrometers is smaller than 2.5 micrometers).
Takigawa, fig. 5
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Takigawa does not explicitly disclose a beam splitter that reflects a portion of the laser light condensed by the focusing lens; wherein the beam splitter is provided with an anti reflection coating (AR coating).
However, in the same field of endeavor of laser processing, Chida teaches a beam splitter (dichroic mirror 14, fig. 1) that reflects a portion of the laser light condensed by the focusing lens (the mirror 14 reflects light from adjustment unit 13, fig. 1; adjustment unit 13 uses lenses, which are “focused onto the point to be processed,” para 0040; construed as including a focusing lens); wherein the beam splitter is provided with an anti reflection coating (AR coating) (“a film by coating, it cannot reflect 100% of the visible light,” para 0045; construed as a coating that is “anti reflection” because not all of the light is reflected).
Chida, fig. 1
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Therefore, it would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date to modify the invention of Takigawa, in view of the teachings of Chida, by using a filter and a film with a coating, as taught by Chida, for the mirror 24C, as taught by Takigawa, and by placing the condenser lens 22 upstream of the mirror 24C, as taught by Takigawa, because dichroic mirrors are formed by using films, such that it is not possible to reflect 100% of the light that is reflected by the mirror, but this effect which can be mitigated by using a filter, and because placing the dichroic mirror downstream of the focusing lens, the reflected light that is measured can be used to determine whether the processing beam is focused onto the point to be processed (Chida, paras 0040 and 0045; Takigawa teaches that only 50% of the light is reflected, para 0091).
Regarding claim 3, Takigawa teaches wherein an output of the second laser light (“reflects, at high reflectivity, for example, 50% or higher,” para 0091; construed as an output of 50%) is higher than an output of the first laser light (“transmits at least 99% of the light having the wavelength of the laser beam 12 and reflects only a minimal part thereof,” para 0091; construed as an output of less than 1%).
Regarding claim 4, Takigawa teaches A laser processing device comprising:
the laser processing head (machining head 2, fig. 1) according to claim 1;
a laser oscillator (laser oscillator 31, fig. 1) that is connected to an inlet end of the transmission fiber (inlet end of fiber 4, fig. 1) and oscillates laser light (“outputs the laser beam 12,” para 0066) including the first wavelength and the second wavelength (para 0091); and
a controller (control circuit 33, fig. 1; “CPU,” para 0068) configured to control an output of the laser oscillator (para 0066) based on a detection value detected by the detector (para 0100).
Regarding claim 5, Takigawa teaches further comprising a notification unit (determination circuit 36, fig. 1) that performs a predetermined notification operation based on the detection value detected by the sensor (“In response to the determination result by the image determination circuit 36, the control circuit 33 issues, for example, the command to stop laser oscillation to the laser oscillator 31.,” para 0100; issuing a command to stop is construed as being a notification operation or an alarm message)
Response to Argument
Applicant's arguments filed 26 January 2026 have been fully considered.
Claim Interpretations and Rejections under 35 USC §§§ 112(f), 112(a), and 112(b)
Applicant’s amendments, removing “detector” and replacing with “sensor,” have voided 112(f) interpretation for the claimed “detector.”
The examiner fully considered the Applicant’s rationale as to why “controller” should not invoke 112(f), but the examiner was not persuaded.
Pages 6-7 of the arguments suggest that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand what is meant is claiming a “controller configured to control an output of the laser oscillator based on a detection value.” This argument was not found to be persuasive because the Applicant does not state what one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the meaning to be a for a “controller.” In other words, the arguments hint at a supposed understanding that the Applicant knows and those of ordinary skill in the art know. However, the arguments do not actually disclose what exactly that understanding is, which is being shared by the Applicant and those of ordinary skill in the art.
Page 7 suggests that there is a structural modifier for the term “controller.” However, the examiner is interpreting “controller” as a replacement for a “means for controlling.” The term “controlling” is a functional modifier and not a structural modifier.
Page 7 suggests that because the claim requires a structural interrelationship between the “controller” and the “laser oscillator,” then this structural interrelationship is sufficient structure to cover the claimed “controller.” However, respectfully submit that the “laser oscillator” cannot be used as structure to cover the claimed “controller,” because the claim requires a “controller configured to control an output of the laser oscillator.” Without more structure, a laser oscillator cannot be configured to control itself. Moreover, the claim 4 identifies two separate structures—a controller and a laser oscillator. There is no mention in claim 4 of a controller comprising a laser oscillator.
The top of page 8 references multiple terms from MPEP 2181 that have been found not to invoke 112(f). However, none of those terms include a “controller.” This section of the MPEP does describe a “distributed learning control module,” which was determined to invoke 112(f). Respectfully submit that if a “distributed learning control module” would invoke 112(f), then a “controller” should invoke 112(f), because a “control module” has a narrower meaning than a “controller.” For example, a “controller” could be an operator or a user. In contrast, neither an operator or a user could be a “control module.”
Page 8 of the arguments states “capable of” has a narrower meaning than “configured to.” The examiner agrees. However, the examiner respectfully submits that regardless of whether “capable of” or “configured to” is used, either construction invokes 35 USC 112(f). The second prong of the 3-prong analysis for 35 USC 112(f) in MPEP 2181.I states that “configured to” is a phrase that invokes claim interpretation under 35 USC 112(f).
Page 9 of the arguments suggests that the prosecution of application 17/529,911 has bearing on the current application. However, the examiner disagrees and submits that the determination in another application should have no bearing on the current application, because each application will have a different claim interpretation or construction that is required by the examiner. It is common for examiner to spend multiple hours understanding claim limitations in view of the specification. At face value, claim limitations should not be imputed back and forth across applications without first understanding how these limitations are being understood in view of their respective specifications.
Although the Applicant’s arguments acknowledge this difficulty of comparing applications on page 9 and only suggest that the examiner “consider” application 17/529,911, the examiner respectfully submits that just to “consider” this application would take a significant amount of time. The examiner submits that it would be better for the prosecution of the current application that the Applicant take the time to explain the specific why a “controller” should not be interpreted under 35 USC 112(f), based on the Applicant’s experience in prosecuting application 17/529,911, so that these reasons can be captured and documented as part of the prosecution history of the Instant Application that is under review.
Page 9 of the arguments states that “notification unit” should not be interpreted under 35 USC 112(f) for the same reason that “controller” should not be interpreted under 35 USC 112(f). The examiner respectfully disagrees for the same reasons that are provided above.
Page 10 of the arguments suggests adding a “determination unit” to claim 4 in order to overcome the 112(f) interpretation for the claimed “controller.” However, adding a “determination unit” would also invoke 112(f) that result in 35 USC 112(a/b) rejections because “unit” is a generic placeholder, “determination” is a functional limitation, and there would not be sufficient structure in the claim or in the Specification to cover the “determination unit.”
Page 12 of the arguments references MPEP 2161.01 and states that those of ordinary skill in the art would infer from the Specification that the Applicant is in possession of a “controller.” However, the arguments do not state what parts of the Specification provide evidence that the Applicant is in possession of a “controller.”
This section of the MPEP specifically directs examiners to do the following:
“When examining computer-implemented functional claims, examiners should determine whether the specification discloses the computer and the algorithm (e.g., the necessary steps and/or flowcharts) that perform the claimed function in sufficient detail such that one of ordinary skill in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor possessed the claimed subject matter at the time of filing. An algorithm is defined, for example, as “a finite sequence of steps for solving a logical or mathematical problem or performing a task.” Microsoft Computer Dictionary (5th ed., 2002). Applicant may “express that algorithm in any understandable terms including as a mathematical formula, in prose, or as a flow chart, or in any other manner that provides sufficient structure.” Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340, 86 USPQ2d 1609, 1623 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted). It is not enough that one skilled in the art could write a program to achieve the claimed function because the specification must explain how the inventor intends to achieve the claimed function to satisfy the written description requirement. See, e.g., Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. MicroStrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 681-683, 114 USPQ2d 1349, 1356, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (reversing and remanding the district court’s grant of summary judgment of invalidity for lack of adequate written description where there were genuine issues of material fact regarding “whether the specification show[ed] possession by the inventor of how accessing disparate databases is achieved”). If the specification does not provide a disclosure of the computer and algorithm in sufficient detail to demonstrate to one of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor possessed the invention a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, for lack of written description must be made (emphasis, examiner’s).”
The examiner reviewed the Specification again to see if there was disclosure of a computer or an algorithm for the claimed “controller,” but the examiner could not find any evidence to support a possession determination. Although page 12 of the arguments encourages the examiner to contact the Applicant if a “controller” continues to be an issue, respectfully submit that in these types of situations, no leeway is provided to examiners. Instead, the MPEP clearly requires that a 35 USC 112(a) rejection “must be made.”
Applicant’s arguments filed 26 January 2026 have been fully considered but are moot because the arguments do not apply to the new rejections of Takigawa combined with Chida.
For the above reasons, rejections to the pending claims are respectfully sustained by the examiner.
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to ERWIN J WUNDERLICH whose telephone number is (571)272-6995. The examiner can normally be reached Mon-Fri 7:30-5:30.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Edward Landrum can be reached at 571-272-5567. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
/ERWIN J WUNDERLICH/Examiner, Art Unit 3761 4/7/2026
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