DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1, 3-5, 9, 14, 16 and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more. The claims are directed to a composition for repairing cartilage damage, comprising mitochondria and platelet-rich plasma, wherein the platelet-rich plasma comprises platelets, and the mitochondria are located outside of the platelets, and wherein the composition comprises 15 µg of the mitochondria per 10 µl of the platelet- rich plasma to 40 µg of the mitochondria per 10 µl of the platelet-rich plasma. The claim(s) does/do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
See MPEP 2106.07.
Effective January 7, 2019, subject matter eligibility determinations under 35 U.S.C. § 101 follow the procedure explained in the Federal Register notice titled 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance (Federal Register, Vol. 84, No.4, 50-57), which is found at: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-01-07/pdf/2018-28282.pdf. Applicants are kindly asked to review this guidance as well as MPEP 2106.
The statutory categories of invention under 35 U.S.C. 101 are processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter. However, certain members of these categories constitute judicial exceptions, i.e., the courts have determined that these entities are not patentable subject matter. These judicial exceptions include abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomena. The Office released guidance on December 16, 2014 for the examination of claims reciting natural products under 35 U.S.C. 101 in light of the recent Supreme Court decisions in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. (569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116, 106 USPQ2d 1972 (2013)) and Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories (566 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 101 USPQ2d 1961 (2012)), Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)) and Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. - 333 U.S. 127 (1948)). (inter alia). See eg. MPEP 2106.04(b)
The Supreme Court has explained that the judicial exceptions reflect the Court’s view that abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomena are "the basic tools of scientific and technological work", and are thus excluded from patentability because "monopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it." Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354, 110 USPQ2d at 1980 (quoting Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116, 106 USPQ2d at 1978 and Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965 (2012)). The Supreme Court’s concern that drives this "exclusionary principle" is pre-emption. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354, 110 USPQ2d at 1980. The Court has held that a claim may not preempt abstract ideas, laws of nature, or natural phenomena; i.e., one may not patent every "substantial practical application" of an abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon, even if the judicial exception is narrow.
While preemption is the concern underlying the judicial exceptions, it is not a standalone test for determining eligibility. Rapid Litig. Mgmt. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1052, 119 USPQ2d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Instead, questions of preemption are inherent in and resolved by the two-part framework from Alice Corp. and Mayo (the Alice/Mayo test referred to by the Office as Steps 2A and 2B). It is necessary to evaluate eligibility using the Alice/Mayo test, because while a preemptive claim may be ineligible, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate that a claim is eligible.
Products of Nature: When a law of nature or natural phenomenon is claimed as a physical product, the courts have often referred to the exception as a "product of nature". Products of nature are considered to be an exception because they tie up the use of naturally occurring things, but they have been labeled as both laws of nature and natural phenomena. See Myriad 133 S. Ct. at 2116-17, 106 USPQ2d at 1979 (claims to isolated DNA held ineligible because they "claim naturally occurring phenomena" and are "squarely within the law of nature exception"); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130, 76 USPQ 280, 281 (1948) (claims to bacterial mixtures held ineligible as "manifestations of laws of nature" and "phenomena of nature"). Step 2A of the Office’s eligibility analysis uses the terms "law of nature" and "natural phenomenon" as inclusive of "products of nature".
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It is important to keep in mind that product of nature exceptions include both naturally occurring products and non-naturally occurring products that lack markedly different characteristics from any naturally occurring counterpart. Instead, the key to the eligibility of all non-naturally occurring products is whether they possess markedly different characteristics from any naturally occurring counterpart.
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When a claim recites a nature-based product limitation, examiners use the markedly different characteristics analysis discussed in MPEP § 2106.04(c) to evaluate the nature-based product limitation and determine the answer to Step 2A. Nature-based products, as used herein, include both eligible and ineligible products and merely refer to the types of products subject to the markedly different characteristics analysis used to identify product of nature exceptions.
The Markedly Different Characteristics Analysis
The markedly different characteristics analysis is part of Step 2A, because the courts use this analysis to identify product of nature exceptions. If the claim includes a nature-based product that has markedly different characteristics, then the claim does not recite a product of nature exception and is eligible. If the claim includes a nature-based product that does not exhibit markedly different characteristics from its closest naturally occurring counterpart in its natural state, then the claim is directed to a "product of nature" exception (Step 2A: YES), and requires further analysis in Step 2B to determine whether any additional elements in the claim add significantly more to the exception.
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Nature-based Product Claim Analysis
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Where the claim is to a nature-based product by itself, the markedly different characteristics analysis should be applied to the entire product.
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Where the claim is to a nature-based product produced by combining multiple components, the markedly different characteristics analysis should be applied to the resultant nature-based combination, rather than its component parts. Where the claim is to a nature-based product in combination with non-nature based elements, the markedly different characteristics analysis should be applied only to the nature-based product limitation. For a product-by-process claims, the analysis turns on whether the nature-based product in the claim has markedly different characteristics from its naturally occurring counterpart.
The markedly different characteristics analysis compares the nature-based product limitation to its naturally occurring counterpart in its natural state. Markedly different characteristics can be expressed as the product’s structure, function, and/or other properties, and are evaluated based on what is recited in the claim on a case-by-case basis. If the analysis indicates that a nature-based product limitation does not exhibit markedly different characteristics, then that limitation is a product of nature exception. If the analysis indicates that a nature-based product limitation does have markedly different characteristics, then that limitation is not a product of nature exception.
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Because the markedly different characteristics analysis compares the nature-based product limitation to its naturally occurring counterpart in its natural state, the first step in the analysis is to select the appropriate counterpart(s) to the nature-based product.
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When there are multiple counterparts to the nature-based product, the comparison should be made to the closest naturally occurring counterpart. When the nature-based product is a combination produced from multiple components, the closest counterpart may be the individual nature-based components of the combination. Because there is no counterpart mixture in nature, the closest counterparts to the claimed mixture are the individual components of the mixture, i.e., each naturally occurring species by itself. See, e.g., Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130, 76 USPQ at 281 (comparing claimed mixture of bacterial species to each species as it occurs in nature).
Markedly changed characteristics can include structural, functional, chemical changes. In order to show a marked difference, a characteristic must be changed as compared to nature, and cannot be an inherent or innate characteristic of the naturally occurring counterpart or an incidental change in a characteristic of the naturally occurring counterpart. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2111, 106 USPQ2d at 1974-75. Thus, in order to be markedly different, applicant must have caused the claimed product to possess at least one characteristic that is different from that of the counterpart.
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If there is no change in any characteristic, the claimed product lacks markedly different characteristics, and is a product of nature exception.
The claims are directed to a composition for repairing cartilage damage, comprising mitochondria and platelet-rich plasma, wherein the platelet-rich plasma comprises platelets, and the mitochondria are located outside of the platelets, and wherein the composition comprises 15 µg of the mitochondria per 10 µl of the platelet- rich plasma to 40 µg of the mitochondria per 10 µl of the platelet-rich plasma which is not markedly different from its closest naturally-occurring counterpart because there is no indication that their combination, amounts or preparation has caused the nature-based product to have any characteristics that are markedly different from the closest naturally-occurring product and the claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. The rationale for this determination is explained below:
Step 1: Determine if the claims are directed to one of the four statutory categories of patentable subject matter identified by 35 U.S.C. 101: a process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter. YES, the claims are directed to a composition of matter (i.e., a composition for repairing cartilage damage, comprising mitochondria and platelet-rich plasma, wherein the platelet-rich plasma comprises platelets, and the mitochondria are located outside of the platelets, and wherein the composition comprises 15 µg of the mitochondria per 10 µl of the platelet- rich plasma to 40 µg of the mitochondria per 10 µl of the platelet-rich plasma), which is a statutory category within at least one of the four categories of patent eligible subject matter.
Step 2A: PRONG ONE: Evaluate whether the claim recites a Judicial Exception
(e.g., law of nature, natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea). YES, the claims are product claims reciting something that appears to be a nature-based product (i.e., a composition for repairing cartilage damage, comprising mitochondria and platelet-rich plasma, wherein the platelet-rich plasma comprises platelets, and the mitochondria are located outside of the platelets, and wherein the composition comprises 15 µg of the mitochondria per 10 µl of the platelet- rich plasma to 40 µg of the mitochondria per 10 µl of the platelet-rich plasma) which is not markedly different from the closest naturally-occurring counterpart (i.e., the individual nature-based products).
Note: with respect to natural products such as mitochondria and platelet rich plasma, the closest naturally-occurring counterpart is always the same compounds found in the mitochondria and platelet rich plasma, present in the non-isolated form in the source. Mitochondria and platelet rich plasma that are made simply by separating the extracted components from the non-extracted components, is a partitioning process that absent any specific chemical modification, merely separates the compounds leaving their activities unchanged (as is evidenced by the instantly claimed invention).
Ingredients recited in the claims are natural products that would occur naturally; thus, the claims involve the use of judicial exceptions. There is no indication in the record of any markedly different characteristics (either structural or functional) of the composition as broadly claimed. For example, there is no evidence of record of a structural difference between the extract(s) in the claimed composition and that of their nature-based counterparts. Consequently, the claimed compositions are structurally the same as their closest naturally- occurring counterparts.
Nor is there any difference in functional characteristics. To show a marked difference, the characteristic(s) must be changed as compared it closest natural-occurring counterpart. Furthermore, inherent or innate characteristics of the naturally occurring counterpart cannot show a marked difference. Likewise, differences in the characteristics that came about or were produced independently of any effort or influence by Applicant cannot show a marked difference.
The recitation of specific amounts of the ingredients does not affect this analysis because it is well known and routine in the art to mix specific amounts of active ingredients with additional ingredients. The same holds true for whether the composition is a cosmetic, pharmaceutical or food composition since there is nothing which imparts a markedly different characteristic on the composition. Therefore, the claim is not meaningfully limited and does not amount to significantly more than each product of nature by itself. Finally, the claimed composition is like the novel bacterial mixture of Funk Brothers, which was held ineligible because each species of bacteria in the mixture continued to have “the same effect it always had”, i.e., it lacked markedly different characteristics. Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948), discussed in Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2117. While not discussed in the opinion, it is noted that several of the claims held ineligible in Funk Brothers recited specific amounts of the bacterial species in the mixture, e.g., claims 6, 7 and 13. Funk Brothers, 333 U.S. at 128 n.1.
Thus, there is no evidence of record to indicate that the claimed product is markedly different, structurally, chemically, functionally, than its closest naturally occurring counterpart.
PRONG TWO: Evaluate whether the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application. The claims are directed to a composition, not its practical use such as a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition.
Thus, the cited claims are directed to a judicial exception to patentable subject matter.
Step 2b: Determine whether the claim directed to a judicial exception provides an inventive concept. For example, the claims may recite additional elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. In the instant case, NO, the claims are directed to an extract composition without any other components that could add significantly more to the exception. No other specific limitations other than what is well-understood, routine and conventional in the field at a high level of generality have been added to the claimed nature-based product (e.g., addition of well-known ingredients).
Thus, the claimed composition is not eligible subject matter under current 35 USC 101 standards. See MPEP 2106.07.
Applicant argues that allegedly the claims have been amended to recite, “a method of repairing cartilage damage”. While this is noted, it is also noted that this does NOT create a markedly different characteristic. This only claims the intended use of the composition.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims 1, 3-5, 9, 14, 16 and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
There is no support in the instant specification for “the mitochondria are located outside of the platelets”.
Without such support, the claims are not supported by the instant specification.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1, 3-5, 9, 14, 16 and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Klement et al. (WO 2014/055949) in light of support by Cole et al. (Sports Health 2010) Boudreau et al. (Blood, 2014) and Glas et al. (J Cell Biol. 1966).
Klement (WO) teaches a composition of 200 μL of human platelet rich plasma (PRP). PRP contains 5.5 x 1010 platelets per 50 mL as supported by Cole et al. (see pg. 205, col 1, 2nd full paragraph). This converts to 1.1 x 106 platelets per μL. This means the 200 μL PRP of Klement et al. has 2.2 x 108 platelets. Platelets contain ~4 mitochondria each as supported by Boudreau et al. (see pg. 2174, col 2, last 3 lines). Using that value, the 200 μL PRP of Klement et al. has ~8.8 x 108 mitochondria. Glas et al. teach that the wet weight of mitochondria is 51.8 x 10-14g (see Abstract). This converts the mass of ~8.8 x 108 mitochondria to ~460 μg which is more than 5 or 40μg. The claimed intended use of the composition is noted, but it does not affect the patentability of the claims and are thus inherently met. To use 40μg/ml would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art since ml is the common unit of measurement for such amounts. Note PDGF on page 3 of WO. It is noted that Platelet-derived growth factor (PDGF) is a dimeric glycoprotein that can be composed of two A subunits (PDGF-AA), two B subunits (PDGF-BB), or one of each (PDGF-AB).
MPEP 2144.05, subsection II.
II. ROUTINE OPTIMIZATION
A. Optimization Within Prior Art Conditions or Through Routine Experimentation
Generally, differences in concentration or temperature will not support the patentability of subject matter encompassed by the prior art unless there is evidence indicating such concentration or temperature is critical. "[W]here the general conditions of a claim are disclosed in the prior art, it is not inventive to discover the optimum or workable ranges by routine experimentation." In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456, 105 USPQ 233, 235 (CCPA 1955) (Claimed process which was performed at a temperature between 40°C and 80°C and an acid concentration between 25% and 70% was held to be prima facie obvious over a reference process which differed from the claims only in that the reference process was performed at a temperature of 100°C and an acid concentration of 10%.); see also Peterson, 315 F.3d at 1330, 65 USPQ2d at 1382 ("The normal desire of scientists or artisans to improve upon what is already generally known provides the motivation to determine where in a disclosed set of percentage ranges is the optimum combination of percentages."); In re Hoeschele, 406 F.2d 1403, 160 USPQ 809 (CCPA 1969) (Claimed elastomeric polyurethanes which fell within the broad scope of the references were held to be unpatentable thereover because, among other reasons, there was no evidence of the criticality of the claimed ranges of molecular weight or molar proportions.). For more recent cases applying this principle, see Merck & Co. Inc. v. Biocraft Lab. Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 10 USPQ2d 1843 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 975 (1989); In re Kulling, 897 F.2d 1147, 14 USPQ2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1990); and In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 43 USPQ2d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Smith v. Nichols, 88 U.S. 112, 118-19 (1874) (a change in form, proportions, or degree "will not sustain a patent"); In re Williams, 36 F.2d 436, 438 (CCPA 1929) ("It is a settled principle of law that a mere carrying forward of an original patented conception involving only change of form, proportions, or degree, or the substitution of equivalents doing the same thing as the original invention, by substantially the same means, is not such an invention as will sustain a patent, even though the changes of the kind may produce better results than prior inventions."). See also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007) (identifying "the need for caution in granting a patent based on the combination of elements found in the prior art.").
B. There Must Be an Articulated Rationale Supporting the Rejection
In order to properly support a rejection on the basis that an invention is the result of "routine optimization", the examiner must make findings of relevant facts, and present the underpinning reasoning in sufficient detail. The articulated rationale must include an explanation of why it would have been routine optimization to arrive at the claimed invention and why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success to formulate the claimed range. See In re Stepan, 868 F.3d 1342, 1346, 123 USPQ2d 1838, 1841 (Fed. Cir. 2017). See also In re Van Os, 844 F.3d 1359,1361,121 USPQ2d 1209, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2017 ("Absent some articulated rationale, a finding that a combination of prior art would have been ‘common sense’ or ‘intuitive’ is no different than merely stating the combination ‘would have been obvious.’"); Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 832 F.3d 1355, 1362, 119 USPQ2d 1822 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("[R]eferences to ‘common sense’ … cannot be used as a wholesale substitute for reasoned analysis and evidentiary support … .").
The Supreme Court has clarified that an "obvious to try" line of reasoning may properly support an obviousness rejection. In In re Antonie, 559 F.2d 618, 195 USPQ 6 (CCPA 1977), the CCPA held that a particular parameter must first be recognized as a result-effective variable, i.e., a variable which achieves a recognized result, before the determination of the optimum or workable ranges of said variable might be characterized as routine experimentation, because "obvious to try" is not a valid rationale for an obviousness finding. However, in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), the Supreme Court held that "obvious to try" was a valid rationale for an obviousness finding, for example, when there is a "design need" or "market demand" and there are a "finite number" of solutions. 550 U.S. at 421 ("The same constricted analysis led the Court of Appeals to conclude, in error, that a patent claim cannot be proved obvious merely by showing that the combination of elements was ‘[o]bvious to try.’ ... When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under §103."). Thus, after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process.
Applicant argues that allegedly the mitochondria are located outside of the platelets. This is not understood because platelets by definition contain mitochondria, see Boudreau et al. (see pg. 2174, col 2, last 3 lines).
Further, applicants argue that allegedly embodiment 6 (the claimed composition comprising 15 μg of mitochondria per 10 μl of platelet-rich plasma to 40 μg of mitochondria per 10 μg of platelet-rich plasma) is significantly increased. While this is noted, it is also noted that in Table 4 (embodiment 6) in the instant specification, only 15 μg of mitochondria per 10 μl of platelet rich plasma is taught as being present in the table. Therefore, whether the results are increased or not, the other end of the range claimed is not supported by Table 4 (embodiment 6).
It would have been obvious to use the claimed amounts of the claimed components since clearly the claimed components are result effective variables.
Double Patenting
The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).
A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b).
The filing of a terminal disclaimer by itself is not a complete reply to a nonstatutory double patenting (NSDP) rejection. A complete reply requires that the terminal disclaimer be accompanied by a reply requesting reconsideration of the prior Office action. Even where the NSDP rejection is provisional the reply must be complete. See MPEP § 804, subsection I.B.1. For a reply to a non-final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.111(a). For a reply to final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.113(c). A request for reconsideration while not provided for in 37 CFR 1.113(c) may be filed after final for consideration. See MPEP §§ 706.07(e) and 714.13.
The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The actual filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA /25, or PTO/AIA /26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/applying-online/eterminal-disclaimer.
Claims 1, 3-5, 9, 14, 16 and 17 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-12 of U.S. Patent No. 12,616,782. Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because both sets of claims are drawn to a composition comprising mitochondria and platelets.
Applicant argues that allegedly the instant claims no longer read on the claims of the patent, but this is clearly NOT the case.
Claims 1, 3-5, 9, 14, 16, 17 are provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claim 1- 9 of copending Application No. 17/912,336. Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because both sets of claims are drawn to a composition comprising mitochondria and platelets.
This is a provisional nonstatutory double patenting rejection because the patentably indistinct claims have not in fact been patented.
Applicant argues that allegedly the instant claims no longer read on the claims of the application but this is clearly NOT the case.
Claims 1, 3-5, 9, 14, 16 and 17 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-11 of U.S. Patent No. 12,629,460. Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because both sets of claims are drawn to a composition comprising mitochondria and platelets.
Applicant argues that allegedly the instant claims no longer read on the claims of the patent but this is clearly NOT the case.
Claims 1, 3-5, 9, 14, 16, 17 are provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-9 of copending Application No. 17/912,394. Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because both sets of claims are drawn to a composition comprising mitochondria and platelets.
This is a provisional nonstatutory double patenting rejection because the patentably indistinct claims have not in fact been patented.
Applicant argues that allegedly the instant claims no longer read on the claims of the application but this is clearly NOT the case.
Claims 1, 3-5, 9, 14, 16, 17 are provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-15 of copending Application No. 17/948,764. Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because both sets of claims are drawn to a composition comprising mitochondria and platelets.
This is a provisional nonstatutory double patenting rejection because the patentably indistinct claims have not in fact been patented.
Applicant argues that allegedly the instant claims no longer read on the claims of the application but this is clearly NOT the case.
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to MICHAEL V MELLER whose telephone number is (571)272-0967. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 9 am-5:30 pm.
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If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Anand Desai can be reached at 571-272-0947. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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MICHAEL V. MELLER
Primary Examiner
Art Unit 1655
/MICHAEL V MELLER/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1655
Prosecution Insights