DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application is being examined under the pre-AIA first to invent provisions.
Status of Application
This Communication is a Final Office Action in response to the Amendments, Remarks, and Arguments filed on the 17th day of December, 2025. Currently Claims 2-22 are pending. Claim 22 is new. Claim 1 has been cancelled. No claims are allowed.
Double Patenting
The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).
A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b).
The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA /25, or PTO/AIA /26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/process/file/efs/guidance/eTD-info-I.jsp.
Claims 2-22 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims of U.S. Patent No. 11468529. Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because Claims 2-22 would be obvious over claims 1-20 of U.S. Patent No. 11468529.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 2-22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101 because the claimed invention is directed to judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) with no practical application and without significantly more. Claims 2-21 describe a system, method, and non-transitory computer readable medium. Hence, the claimed invention is initially directed towards one of the four statutory categories under 35 U.S.C. §101.
Under the 2019 PEG, when considering subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, it must be determined whether the claim is directed to one of the four statutory categories of invention, i.e., process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter (step 1). If the claim does fall within one of the statutory categories, it must then be determined whether the claim is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., law of nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract idea) (step 2A prong 1), and if so, it must additionally be determined whether the claim is integrated into a practical application (step 2A prong 2). If an abstract idea is present in the claim without integration into a practical application, any element or combination of elements in the claim must be sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself (step 2B).
In the instant case, claims 2-22 are directed to a system, method, and non-transitory computer-readable media. Thus, each of the claims falls within one of the four statutory categories (step 1). However, the claims also fall within the judicial exception of an abstract idea (step 2). While claims 2, 9, and 16, are directed to different categories, the language and scope are substantially the same and have been addressed together below.
Under Step 2A Prong 1, the test is to identify whether the claims are “directed to” a judicial exception. Examiner notes that the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea in that the instant application is directed to certain methods of organizing human activity specifically commercial interactions and behaviors and managing personal behavior and/or interactions between people (see MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(II)) and mental processes (see MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(III).
Examiner notes that claims 2-22 recite a system comprising a memory device storing instructions that, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform operations comprising: storing, in a database at a domain registry, a consent record associated with a first consent identifier, wherein the consent record is associated with a first object and a second object, wherein a first entity is a consent holder associated with the consent record; receiving, by a server of the domain registry, over a network, a request from a second entity for a domain service, the request comprising a second consent identifier and a command related to the second object; in response to determining that the first consent identifier corresponds to the second consent identifier, performing, by the domain registry, the command on the second object; and transmitting, to the second entity over the network, a result of the request. This is common practice when protecting or enforcing protection a domain name or anything domain associated with a business. Because the limitations above closely follow the steps of receiving identifier information related to consent of using namespace, comparing if the identifier matches stored data and outputting the result of that comparison, and the steps involved human judgments, observations and evaluations that can be practically or reasonably performed in the human mind, the claim recites an abstract idea consistent with the “mental process” grouping set forth in the see MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(III).
Alternatively, Examiner notes that claims 2-22 recite a system comprising a memory device storing instructions that, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform operations comprising: storing, in a database at a domain registry, a consent record associated with a first consent identifier, wherein the consent record is associated with a first object and a second object, wherein a first entity is a consent holder associated with the consent record; receiving, by a server of the domain registry, over a network, a request from a second entity for a domain service, the request comprising a second consent identifier and a command related to the second object; in response to determining that the first consent identifier corresponds to the second consent identifier, performing, by the domain registry, the command on the second object; and transmitting, to the second entity over the network, a result of the request, and is similar to the abstract idea identified in MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(II) in grouping “II” in that the claims recite certain methods of organizing human activity such as managing business interactions and managing risk. This is merely further embellishments of the abstract idea and does not further limit the claimed invention to render the claims patentable subject matter. The limitations, substantially comprising the body of the claim, recite standard processes found in standard practice in namespace owners controlling the access and use of protected information. This is common practice when protecting or enforcing a domain name or anything domain associated with a business. Because the limitations above closely follow the steps standard in interactions between people and businesses such as authorizing and protecting use of protected registry data, and the steps of the claims involve organizing human activity, the claim recites an abstract idea consistent with the “organizing human activity” grouping set forth in the see MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(II).
The conclusion that the claim recites an abstract idea within the groupings of the MPEP 2106.04(a)(2) remains grounded in the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the description of the invention in the specification. For example, [App. Spec page 1], “systems and methods for protecting intellectual property across namespaces”. Accordingly, the Examiner submits claims 2, 9, and 16, recite an abstract idea based on the language identified in claims 2, 9, and 16, and the abstract ideas previously identified based on that language that remains consistent with the groupings of Step 2A Prong 1 of the MPEP 2106.04(a)(1).
If the claims are directed toward the judicial exception of an abstract idea, it must then be determined under Step 2A Prong 2 whether the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application. Examiner notes that considerations under Step 2A Prong 2 comprise most the consideration previously evaluated in the context of Step 2B. The Examiner submits that the considerations discussed previously determined that the claim does not recite “significantly more” at Step 2B would be evaluated the same under Step 2A Prong 1 and result in the determination that the claim does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.
The instant application fails to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application because the instant application merely recites words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception or merely includes instructions to implement an abstract idea. The instant application is directed to a method instructing the reader to implement the identified method of organizing human activity of legal interactions and risk management (i.e., determining domain name availability and filing for protection) on generically claimed computer structure. For instance, the additional elements or combination of elements other than the abstract idea itself include the elements such as a “computer”, “processor”, “database”, “server”, “network”, “registry”, and “repository” recited at a high level of generality. These elements do not themselves amount to an improvement to the interface or computer, to a technology or another technical field. This is consistent with Applicant’s disclosure which states that the computing device can amount to any server computer while listing off various generic and commonly known computer. (App. Spec. ¶ 39).
Accordingly, the claimed “system” read in light of the specification employs any wide range of possible devices comprising a number of components that are “well-known” and included in an indiscriminate “computer”, “processor”, “database”, “server”, “network”, “registry”, and “repository” (e.g., processing device, modules). Thus, the claimed structure amounts to appending generic computer elements to abstract idea comprising the body of the claim. The computing elements are only involved at a general, high level, and do not have the particular role within any of the functions but to be an computer-implemented method using a generically claimed “processor” and “memory” and even basic, generic recitations that imply use of the computer such as storing information via servers would add little if anything to the abstract idea.
Similarly, reciting the abstract idea as software functions used to program a generic computer is not significant or meaningful: generic computers are programmed with software to perform various functions every day. A programmed generic computer is not a particular machine and by itself does not amount to an inventive concept because, as discussed in MPEP 2106.05(a), adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or more instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, as discussed in Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (see MPEP § 2106.05(f)), is not enough to integrate the exception into a practical application. Further, it is not relevant that a human may perform a task differently from a computer. It is necessarily true that a human might apply an abstract idea in a different manner from a computer. What matters is the application, “stating an abstract idea while adding the words ‘apply it with a computer’” will not render an abstract idea non-abstract. Tranxition v. Lenovo, Nos. 2015-1907, -1941, -1958 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 16, 2016), slip op. at 7-8.
Here, the instructions entirely comprise the abstract idea, leaving little if any aspects of the claim for further consideration under Step 2A Prong 2. In short, the role of the generic computing elements recited in claims 2, 9, and 16, is the same as the role of the computer in the claims considered by the Supreme Court in Alice, and the claim as whole amounts merely to an instruction to apply the abstract idea on the generic computerised system. Therefore, the claims have failed to integrate a practical application (see at least 84 Fed. Reg. (4) at 55). Under the MPEP 2106.05, this supports the conclusion that the claim is directed to an abstract idea, and the analysis proceeds to Step 2B.
While many considerations in Step 2A need not be reevaluated in Step 2B because the outcome will be the same. Here, on the basis of the additional elements other than the abstract idea, considered individually and in combination as discussed above, the Examiner respectfully submits that the claims 2, 9, and 16, does not contain any additional elements that individually or as an ordered combination amount to an inventive concept and the claims are ineligible.
With respect to the dependent claims do not recite anything that is found to render the abstract idea as being transformed into a patent eligible invention. The dependent claims are merely reciting further embellishments of the abstract idea and do not claim anything that amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself.
Claims 3-8, 10-15, and 17-22 are directed to further embellishments of the abstract idea in that they are directed to aspects of the domain registration process and ownership validation of domain names which is the central theme of the abstract idea identified above, as well as being directed to data processing and transmission which the courts have recognized as insignificant extra-solution activities (see at least M.P.E.P. 2106.05(g)). Data transmission is one of the most basic and fundamental uses there are for a generic computing device is not sufficient to amount to significantly more. The examiner takes the position that simply appending the judicial exception with such a well understood step of data transmission is not going to amount to significantly more than the abstract idea.
Therefore, since there are no limitations in the claim that transform the abstract idea into a patent eligible application such that the claim amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself, the claims are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. See 84 Fed. Reg. 4 (pages 51-57).
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed with respect to the rejection of claims 2-22 under 35 USC 101 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Examiner notes that applicant relies amended claim language and merely states that the claims amount to patentable subject matter and therefore the claims do not recite the groupings found in the MPEP 2106. Examiner respectfully disagrees. Applicant further submits “The claimed invention provides a technical solution to help prevent this problem by using network-centric requirements for a request for a domain service (e.g., to register a domain name)”. Examiner respectfully disagrees that this amounts to a technical solution as defined in the MPEP 2106.
The phrase "methods of organizing human activity" is used to describe concepts relating to: fundamental economic principles or practices (including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts, legal obligations, advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors, and business relations); and managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people, (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions).
The Supreme Court has identified a number of concepts falling within the "certain methods of organizing human activity" grouping as abstract ideas. In particular, in Alice, the Court concluded that the use of a third party to mediate settlement risk is a ‘‘fundamental economic practice’’ and thus an abstract idea. 573 U.S. at 219–20, 110 USPQ2d at 1982. In addition, the Court in Alice described the concept of risk hedging identified as an abstract idea in Bilski as ‘‘a method of organizing human activity’’. Id. Previously, in Bilski, the Court concluded that hedging is a ‘‘fundamental economic practice’’ and therefore an abstract idea. 561 U.S. at 611–612, 95 USPQ2d at 1010.
The courts have used the phrases "fundamental economic practices" or "fundamental economic principles" to describe concepts relating to the economy and commerce. Fundamental economic principles or practices include hedging, insurance, and mitigating risks.
The term "fundamental" is not used in the sense of necessarily being "old" or "well-known." See, e.g., OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1364, 115 U.S.P.Q.2d 1090, 1092 (Fed Cir. 2015) (a new method of price optimization was found to be a fundamental economic concept); In re Smith, 815 F.3d 816, 818-19, 118 USPQ2d 1245, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (describing a new set of rules for conducting a wagering game as a "fundamental economic practice"); In re Greenstein, 774 Fed. Appx. 661, 664, 2019 USPQ2d 212400 (Fed Cir. 2019) (non-precedential) (claims to a new method of allocating returns to different investors in an investment fund was a fundamental economic concept). However, being old or well-known may indicate that the practice is fundamental. See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 219-20, 110 USPQ2d 1981-82 (2014) (describing the concept of intermediated settlement, like the risk hedging in Bilski, to be a "‘fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce’" and also as "a building block of the modern economy") (citation omitted); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611, 95 USPQ2d 1001, 1010 (2010) (claims to the concept of hedging are a "fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce and taught in any introductory finance class.") (citation omitted); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1313, 120 USPQ2d 1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("The category of abstract ideas embraces ‘fundamental economic practice[s] long prevalent in our system of commerce,’ … including ‘longstanding commercial practice[s]’").
Other examples of "fundamental economic principles or practices" include: i. mitigating settlement risk, Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank,573 U.S. 208, 218, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982 (2014); and iii. financial instruments that are designed to protect against the risk of investing in financial instruments, In re Chorna, 656 Fed. App'x 1016, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (non-precedential).
Alternatively, Examiner notes that claims 2-22 recite a system comprising a memory device storing instructions that, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform operations comprising: storing, in a database at a domain registry, a consent record associated with a first consent identifier, wherein the consent record is associated with a first object and a second object, wherein a first entity is a consent holder associated with the consent record; receiving, by a server of the domain registry, over a network, a request from a second entity for a domain service, the request comprising a second consent identifier and a command related to the second object; in response to determining that the first consent identifier corresponds to the second consent identifier, performing, by the domain registry, the command on the second object; and transmitting, to the second entity over the network, a result of the request, and is similar to the abstract idea identified in MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(II) in grouping “II” in that the claims recite certain methods of organizing human activity such as managing business interactions and managing risk. This is merely further embellishments of the abstract idea and does not further limit the claimed invention to render the claims patentable subject matter. The limitations, substantially comprising the body of the claim, recite standard processes found in standard practice in namespace owners controlling the access and use of protected information. This is common practice when protecting or enforcing a domain name or anything domain associated with a business. Because the limitations above closely follow the steps standard in interactions between people and businesses such as authorizing and protecting use of protected registry data, and the steps of the claims involve organizing human activity, the claim recites an abstract idea consistent with the “organizing human activity” grouping set forth in the see MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(II).
Examiner notes that the claimed invention is more similar to the identified abstract ideas within Alice and In re Chorna.
Furthermore, "Commercial interactions" or "legal interactions" include agreements in the form of contracts, legal obligations, advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors, and business relations.
An example of a claim reciting a commercial or legal interaction, where the interaction is an agreement in the form of contracts, is found in buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d. 1350, 112 USPQ2d 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The agreement at issue in buySAFE was a transaction performance guaranty, which is a contractual relationship. 765 F.3d at 1355, 112 USPQ2d at 1096. The patentee claimed a method in which a computer operated by the provider of a safe transaction service receives a request for a performance guarantee for an online commercial transaction, the computer processes the request by underwriting the requesting party in order to provide the transaction guarantee service, and the computer offers, via a computer network, a transaction guaranty that binds to the transaction upon the closing of the transaction. 765 F.3d at 1351-52, 112 USPQ2d at 1094. The Federal Circuit described the claims as directed to an abstract idea because they were "squarely about creating a contractual relationship--a ‘transaction performance guaranty’." 765 F.3d at 1355, 112 USPQ2d at 1096.
Examiner notes that the claimed invention is similar to the abstract idea found in buySAFE v. Google, Inc., in that the claimed invention validating consent records based on stored consent and registrant information in response to receiving a command.
An example of a claim reciting a commercial or legal interaction in the form of a legal obligation is found in Fort Properties, Inc. v. American Master Lease, LLC, 671 F.3d 1317, 101 USPQ2d 1785 (Fed Cir. 2012). The patentee claimed a method of "aggregating real property into a real estate portfolio, dividing the interests in the portfolio into a number of deedshares, and subjecting those shares to a master agreement." 671 F.3d at 1322, 101 USPQ2d at 1788. The legal obligation at issue was the tax-free exchanges of real estate. The Federal Circuit concluded that the real estate investment tool designed to enable tax-free exchanges was an abstract concept. 671 F.3d at 1323, 101 USPQ2d at 1789. Examiner notes that the claimed invention is similar to the abstract idea found within Fort Properties in that the system is processing information in the form of registry commands based on the “master agreement” in the form of the consent record stored within the registry.
An example of a claim reciting business relations is found in Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Services, 859 F.3d 1044, 123 USPQ2d 1100 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The business relation at issue in Credit Acceptance is the relationship between a customer and dealer when processing a credit application to purchase a vehicle. The patentee claimed a "system for maintaining a database of information about the items in a dealer’s inventory, obtaining financial information about a customer from a user, combining these two sources of information to create a financing package for each of the inventoried items, and presenting the financing packages to the user." 859 F.3d at 1054, 123 USPQ2d at 1108. The Federal Circuit described the claims as directed to the abstract idea of "processing an application for financing a loan" and found "no meaningful distinction between this type of financial industry practice" and the concept of intermediated settlement in Alice or the hedging concept in Bilski. 859 F.3d at 1054, 123 USPQ2d at 1108. Examiner notes that the claimed invention is similar to the abstract idea in Credit Acceptance Corp., in that the system is processing information related to registry information by processing stored consent records to validate the command entered into the system based on the stored consent record.
Furthermore, Examiner notes that the system is directed to a mental process. The courts consider a mental process (thinking) that "can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper" to be an abstract idea. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372, 99 USPQ2d 1690, 1695 (Fed. Cir. 2011). As the Federal Circuit explained, "methods which can be performed mentally, or which are the equivalent of human mental work, are unpatentable abstract ideas the ‘basic tools of scientific and technological work’ that are open to all.’" 654 F.3d at 1371, 99 USPQ2d at 1694 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 USPQ 673 (1972)). See also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965 (2012) ("‘[M]ental processes[] and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work’" (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 67, 175 USPQ at 675)); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589, 198 USPQ 193, 197 (1978) (same).
Claims do recite a mental process when they contain limitations that can practically be performed in the human mind, including for example, observations, evaluations, judgments, and opinions. Examples of claims that recite mental processes include: a claim to "collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis," where the data analysis steps are recited at a high level of generality such that they could practically be performed in the human mind, Electric Power Group v. Alstom, S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353-54, 119 USPQ2d 1739, 1741-42 (Fed. Cir. 2016); and a claim to collecting and comparing known information (claim 1), which are steps that can be practically performed in the human mind, Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1067, 100 USPQ2d 1492, 1500 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
Examiner notes that claims 2-22 recite a system comprising a memory device storing instructions that, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform operations comprising: storing, in a database at a domain registry, a consent record associated with a first consent identifier, wherein the consent record is associated with a first object and a second object, wherein a first entity is a consent holder associated with the consent record; receiving, by a server of the domain registry, over a network, a request from a second entity for a domain service, the request comprising a second consent identifier and a command related to the second object; in response to determining that the first consent identifier corresponds to the second consent identifier, performing, by the domain registry, the command on the second object; and transmitting, to the second entity over the network, a result of the request. This is common practice when protecting or enforcing protection a domain name or anything domain associated with a business. Because the limitations above closely follow the steps of receiving identifier information related to consent of using namespace, comparing if the identifier matches stored data and outputting the result of that comparison, and the steps involved human judgments, observations and evaluations that can be practically or reasonably performed in the human mind, the claim recites an abstract idea consistent with the “mental process” grouping set forth in the see MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(III).
Examiner notes that the claimed invention amounts to a mental process in that the system is collecting command information, analyzing or processing the information to determine whether or not there is a consent record, and the subsequently performing the command based on the determination which is similar to the abstract ideas identified in Electric Power Group and Classen.
Claims can recite a mental process even if they are claimed as being performed on a computer. The Supreme Court recognized this in Benson, determining that a mathematical algorithm for converting binary coded decimal to pure binary within a computer’s shift register was an abstract idea. The Court concluded that the algorithm could be performed purely mentally even though the claimed procedures "can be carried out in existing computers long in use, no new machinery being necessary." 409 U.S at 67, 175 USPQ at 675. See also Mortgage Grader, 811 F.3d at 1324, 117 USPQ2d at 1699 (concluding that concept of "anonymous loan shopping" recited in a computer system claim is an abstract idea because it could be "performed by humans without a computer").
In evaluating whether a claim that requires a computer recites a mental process, examiners should carefully consider the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim in light of the specification. For instance, examiners should review the specification to determine if the claimed invention is described as a concept that is performed in the human mind and applicant is merely claiming that concept performed 1) on a generic computer, or 2) in a computer environment, or 3) is merely using a computer as a tool to perform the concept. In these situations, the claim is considered to recite a mental process.
An example of a case identifying a mental process performed on a generic computer as an abstract idea is Voter Verified, Inc. v. Election Systems & Software, LLC, 887 F.3d 1376, 1385, 126 USPQ2d 1498, 1504 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In this case, the Federal Circuit relied upon the specification in explaining that the claimed steps of voting, verifying the vote, and submitting the vote for tabulation are "human cognitive actions" that humans have performed for hundreds of years. The claims therefore recited an abstract idea, despite the fact that the claimed voting steps were performed on a computer. 887 F.3d at 1385, 126 USPQ2d at 1504. Another example is FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 120 USPQ2d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The patentee in FairWarning claimed a system and method of detecting fraud and/or misuse in a computer environment, in which information regarding accesses of a patient’s personal health information was analyzed according to one of several rules (i.e., related to accesses in excess of a specific volume, accesses during a pre-determined time interval, or accesses by a specific user) to determine if the activity indicates improper access. 839 F.3d. at 1092, 120 USPQ2d at 1294. The court determined that these claims were directed to a mental process of detecting misuse, and that the claimed rules here were "the same questions (though perhaps phrased with different words) that humans in analogous situations detecting fraud have asked for decades, if not centuries." 839 F.3d. at 1094-95, 120 USPQ2d at 1296.
An example of a case in which a computer was used as a tool to perform a mental process is Mortgage Grader, 811 F.3d. at 1324, 117 USPQ2d at 1699. The patentee in Mortgage Grader claimed a computer-implemented system for enabling borrowers to anonymously shop for loan packages offered by a plurality of lenders, comprising a database that stores loan package data from the lenders, and a computer system providing an interface and a grading module. The interface prompts a borrower to enter personal information, which the grading module uses to calculate the borrower’s credit grading, and allows the borrower to identify and compare loan packages in the database using the credit grading. 811 F.3d. at 1318, 117 USPQ2d at 1695. The Federal Circuit determined that these claims were directed to the concept of "anonymous loan shopping", which was a concept that could be "performed by humans without a computer." 811 F.3d. at 1324, 117 USPQ2d at 1699. Another example is Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 125 USPQ2d 1649 (Fed. Cir. 2018), in which the patentee claimed methods for parsing and evaluating data using a computer processing system. The Federal Circuit determined that these claims were directed to mental processes of parsing and comparing data, because the steps were recited at a high level of generality and merely used computers as a tool to perform the processes. 881 F.3d at 1366, 125 USPQ2d at 1652-53.
Both product claims (e.g., computer system, computer-readable medium, etc.) and process claims may recite mental processes. For example, in Mortgage Grader, the patentee claimed a computer-implemented system and a method for enabling borrowers to anonymously shop for loan packages offered by a plurality of lenders, comprising a database that stores loan package data from the lenders, and a computer system providing an interface and a grading module. The Federal Circuit determined that both the computer-implemented system and method claims were directed to "anonymous loan shopping", which was an abstract idea because it could be "performed by humans without a computer." 811 F.3d. at 1318, 1324-25, 117 USPQ2d at 1695, 1699-1700. See also FairWarning IP, 839 F.3d at 1092, 120 USPQ2d at 1294 (identifying both system and process claims for detecting improper access of a patient's protected health information in a health-care system computer environment as directed to abstract idea of detecting fraud); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 1343, 1345, 113 USPQ2d 1354, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (system and method claims of inputting information from a hard copy document into a computer program). Accordingly, the phrase "mental processes" should be understood as referring to the type of abstract idea, and not to the statutory category of the claim.
Examples of product claims reciting mental processes include: An application program interface for extracting and processing information from a diversity of types of hard copy documents – Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1345, 113 USPQ2d at 1356; and A computer readable medium containing program instructions for detecting fraud – CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1368 n. 1, 99 USPQ2d at 1692 n.1.
Examiner notes that the claimed in invention is similar to the Voter Verified, Inc., FairWarning, Mortgage Grader, Berkheimer, Content Extraction and CyberSource applications wherein the court identified computer system, “server”, “network”, and “registry” is merely server as a generic computer, computing environment, or tool to perform the mental process.
The second part of the Alice/Mayo test is often referred to as a search for an inventive concept. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208, 217, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1981 (2014) (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71-72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1966 (2012)).
Evaluating additional elements to determine whether they amount to an inventive concept requires considering them both individually and in combination to ensure that they amount to significantly more than the judicial exception itself. Because this approach considers all claim elements, the Supreme Court has noted that "it is consistent with the general rule that patent claims ‘must be considered as a whole.’" Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 218 n.3, 110 USPQ2d at 1981 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188, 209 USPQ 1, 8-9 (1981)). Consideration of the elements in combination is particularly important, because even if an additional element does not amount to significantly more on its own, it can still amount to significantly more when considered in combination with the other elements of the claim. See, e.g., Rapid Litig. Mgmt. v. CellzDirect, 827 F.3d 1042, 1051, 119 USPQ2d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (process reciting combination of individually well-known freezing and thawing steps was "far from routine and conventional" and thus eligible); BASCOM Global Internet Servs. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350, 119 USPQ2d 1236, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (inventive concept may be found in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of components that are individually well-known and conventional).
Limitations that the courts have found not to be enough to qualify as "significantly more" when recited in a claim with a judicial exception include ii. Simply appending well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception, e.g., a claim to an abstract idea requiring no more than a generic computer to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional activities previously known to the industry, as discussed in Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 225, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); and Generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use, e.g., a claim describing how the abstract idea of hedging could be used in the commodities and energy markets, as discussed in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 595, 95 USPQ2d 1001, 1010 (2010) or a claim limiting the use of a mathematical formula to the petrochemical and oil-refining fields, as discussed in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588-90, 198 USPQ 193, 197-98 (1978) (MPEP § 2106.05(h)).
It is important to note that in order for a method claim to improve computer functionality, the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim must be limited to computer implementation. That is, a claim whose entire scope can be performed mentally, cannot be said to improve computer technology. Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 120 USPQ2d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (a method of translating a logic circuit into a hardware component description of a logic circuit was found to be ineligible because the method did not employ a computer and a skilled artisan could perform all the steps mentally). Similarly, a claimed process covering embodiments that can be performed on a computer, as well as embodiments that can be practiced verbally or with a telephone, cannot improve computer technology. See RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1328, 122 USPQ2d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (process for encoding/decoding facial data using image codes assigned to particular facial features held ineligible because the process did not require a computer).
Examples that the courts have indicated may not be sufficient to show an improvement in computer-functionality: ii. Accelerating a process of analyzing audit log data when the increased speed comes solely from the capabilities of a general-purpose computer, FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095, 120 USPQ2d 1293, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2016), iii. Mere automation of manual processes, such as using a generic computer to process an application for financing a purchase, Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Services, 859 F.3d 1044, 1055, 123 USPQ2d 1100, 1108-09 (Fed. Cir. 2017) or speeding up a loan-application process by enabling borrowers to avoid physically going to or calling each lender and filling out a loan application, LendingTree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 656 Fed. App'x 991, 996-97 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (non-precedential); vii. Providing historical usage information to users while they are inputting data, in order to improve the quality and organization of information added to a database, because "an improvement to the information stored by a database is not equivalent to an improvement in the database’s functionality," BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1287-88, 127 USPQ2d 1688, 1693-94 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
To show that the involvement of a computer assists in improving the technology, the claims must recite the details regarding how a computer aids the method, the extent to which the computer aids the method, or the significance of a computer to the performance of the method. Merely adding generic computer components to perform the method is not sufficient. Thus, the claim must include more than mere instructions to perform the method on a generic component or machinery to qualify as an improvement to an existing technology. See MPEP § 2106.05(f) for more information about mere instructions to apply an exception.
Examiner notes that the application is more similar to the examples that the courts have indicated may not be sufficient to show an improvement to technology include: i. A commonplace business method being applied on a general purpose computer, Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1976; Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1681, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Limitations that the courts have found not to be enough to qualify as "significantly more" when recited in a claim with a judicial exception include: Adding the words "apply it" (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, e.g., a limitation indicating that a particular function such as creating and maintaining electronic records is performed by a computer, as discussed in Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 225-26, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (see MPEP § 2106.05(f)). Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, "claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer" does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field. Examiner notes that the claimed invention is more similar to the identified tools above in that the system “server”, “network”, and “registry”.
Simply appending well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception, e.g., a claim to an abstract idea requiring no more than a generic computer to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional activities previously known to the industry, as discussed in Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 225, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)). The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. Storing and retrieving information in memory, Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1681, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 2015); OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363, 115 USPQ2d at 1092-93 an Electronically scanning or extracting data from a physical document, Content Extraction and Transmission, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, 776 F.3d 1343, 1348, 113 USPQ2d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (optical character recognition). Examiner notes that the claimed invention is more similar to the Versata Dev. Group, Inc. and Content Extraction in that the system is merely applying known computer elements such as a “server”, “network”, and “registry” in order to access stored data and process the data for display.
Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception, e.g., mere data gathering in conjunction with a law of nature or abstract idea such as a step of obtaining information about credit card transactions so that the information can be analyzed by an abstract mental process, as discussed in CyberSource v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375, 99 USPQ2d 1690, 1694 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (see MPEP § 2106.05(g)). Below are examples of activities that the courts have found to be insignificant extra-solution activity: Mere Data Gathering: Consulting and updating an activity log, Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715, 112 USPQ2d at 1754.
Generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use, e.g., a claim describing how the abstract idea of hedging could be used in the commodities and energy markets, as discussed in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 595, 95 USPQ2d 1001, 1010 (2010) or a claim limiting the use of a mathematical formula to the petrochemical and oil-refining fields, as discussed in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588-90, 198 USPQ 193, 197-98 (1978) (MPEP § 2106.05(h)). Examples of limitations that the courts have described as merely indicating a field of use or technological environment in which to apply a judicial exception include: Limiting the abstract idea of collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis to data related to the electric power grid, because limiting application of the abstract idea to power-grid monitoring is simply an attempt to limit the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment, Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354, 119 USPQ2d 1739, 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2016); and Specifying that the abstract idea of monitoring audit log data relates to transactions or activities that are executed in a computer environment, because this requirement merely limits the claims to the computer field, i.e., to execution on a generic computer, FairWarning v. Iatric Sys., 839 F.3d 1089, 1094-95, 120 USPQ2d 1293, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Examine notes that the claimed invention is more similar to that of Electric Power Group and FairWarning in that the system is using a specific technological environment to apply the judicial exception.
The claims stand rejected.
Conclusion
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
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/Michael Young/Examiner, Art Unit 3626