Prosecution Insights
Last updated: November 04, 2026
Application No. 17/968,102

SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR DETECTING DIGITAL INTRUSION AND REDIRECTING TO SAFE ZONE IN REAL-TIME

Non-Final OA §103§112
Filed
Oct 18, 2022
Examiner
DUFFIELD, JEREMY S
Art Unit
2498
Tech Center
2400 — Computer Networks
Assignee
Power Analytics Global Corporation
OA Round
3 (Non-Final)
50%
Grant Probability
Moderate
3-4
OA Rounds
0m
Est. Remaining
99%
With Interview

Examiner Intelligence

Grants 50% of resolved cases
50%
Career Allowance Rate
224 granted / 452 resolved
-8.4% vs TC avg
Strong +53% interview lift
Without
With
+52.7%
Interview Lift
resolved cases with interview
Typical timeline
3y 8m
Avg Prosecution
17 currently pending
Career history
479
Total Applications
across all art units

Statute-Specific Performance

§101
7.9%
-32.1% vs TC avg
§103
62.0%
+22.0% vs TC avg
§102
9.2%
-30.8% vs TC avg
§112
14.2%
-25.8% vs TC avg
Black line = Tech Center average estimate • Based on career data from 452 resolved cases

Office Action

§103 §112
DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Continued Examination Under 37 CFR 1.114 A request for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, including the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e), was filed in this application after final rejection. Since this application is eligible for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, and the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e) has been timely paid, the finality of the previous Office action has been withdrawn pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114. Applicant's submission filed on 15 June 2026 has been entered. Priority No priority claims exist for the instant application. Therefore, the effective filing date of the claims will be 18 October 2022. Response to Arguments Applicant’s arguments, see page 15, filed 15 June 2026, with respect to the rejection of claim 1 and 17 under 35 U.S.C. 103—“the pulse injector configured to receive a pulse template from the pulse oracle, collect pulse data for filling the pulse template from the pulse data manager”, have been fully considered and are persuasive in light of the new claim amendments. Therefore, the rejection has been withdrawn. However, upon further consideration, a new ground(s) of rejection is made in view of Costello et al. (US 2020/0220722 A1), Louth (US 10,148,388B1), and Cohen et al. (US 2023/0006844 A1). For a detailed analysis see the 35 U.S.C. 103 section below. Applicant's additional arguments filed 15 June 2026 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. In response to applicant’s arguments regarding the “whereby the pulse injector configured to…construct a set of micro pulses and corresponding values that are continuously and programmatically changeable into a pulse” and “multiple pulse layers formed from the set of micro pulses and corresponding values, and wherein the corresponding values include information selected from user names, private keys, passwords, MAC addresses, cookies, applications, data types, session passwords, wireless information, wireline information, public Wi-Fi information, LAN information, WAN information, VPN information, GPS information, zip-code information, authentication information, certification information, timestamps, links to one or more databases, parameters of micro-pulse interactions, and acceptable or unacceptable combinations of the layers” limitations of claims 1 and 17, stated on pages 13-15, the examiner respectfully disagrees. Costello discloses an encrypted communication signal 210 that includes a start pulse 206 (which may be similar if not the same as secondary digital signals 202) followed by an 8-bit word in which two pulses include secondary digital signals 202A and 202B, and concluding with a stop pulse 208 (Fig. 9, el. 202A, 202B, 204, 206, 210; Para. 65). XCVR 89 inserts these secondary digital signals 202 (data authentication pulses 202) into communication signal 200 to obtain encrypted communication signal 204 (Para. 66). XCVR 89 may transmit encrypted communication signal 204 (or 210) to XCVR 79, which may receive encrypted communication signal 204/210, wherein XCVR 79 may determine whether data authentication pulse 202 has been superimposed over at least one of the one or more pulses (Para. 70). Applicant further states “Office Action appears to treat Costello’s plurality of signal pulses within encrypted communication signal 210 as the claimed set of micro pulses” on page 14. The examiner notes that neither the claims nor the original disclosure provide any indication as to the definition of a pulse or a micro pulse. Therefore, the broadest reasonable interpretation of a pulse would include being a short segment of data. Therefore, a micro pulse would be some portion of the pulse. Costello discloses an encrypted communication signal that includes a data authentication pulse that has been superimposed over at least one of the one or pulses. The examiner suggests providing clarifying language in the independent claims, in accordance with the original disclosure, for the “pulse” and “micro pulse” terms. Applicant also states “Costello itself confirms that its relied-upon ‘pulse’ is a signal-waveform feature, not a micro-pulse value structure as claimed” on page 16. The examiner notes that the independent claims state that “the pulse is injected into at least one of:…a communication”. A communication is an example of a “signal-waveform feature”. Costello discloses an encrypted communication signal that includes a data authentication pulse that has been superimposed over at least one of the one or pulses. The claimed “layers” may be interpreted as the elements of the pulse, e.g., a micro pulse or corresponding value since the claims do not indicate how the layers are structured. The examiner suggests providing clarifying language in the independent claims, in accordance with the original disclosure, for the “layers” term if there is a specific type of layered structure desired. Therefore, the combination of the cited prior art teaches the aforementioned limitations. Examiner note: Claim 1 includes both a “first computing device” and a “third computing device” in the “system”. However, the “first computing device” does not appear to do anything in the system and is never mentioned again in any claim. The examiner suggests amending the claim, in accordance with the original disclosure, to indicate the steps performed by the “first computing device” in claim 1. For example, if the intention was each of the “first computing device” and the “third computing device” includes a separate process, separate memory, and a separate pulse intrusion detection module, then claim 1 should be amended to indicate the clearly separate items. Examiner note: Claim 1 includes a “digital intrusion detection module” in the “system”. However, the “digital intrusion detection module” does not appear to do anything in the system and is never mentioned again in any claim. The examiner suggests amending the claim, in accordance with the original disclosure, to indicate the steps performed by the “digital intrusion detection module” in claim 1. In response to applicant's argument that the references fail to show certain features of the invention, it is noted that the features upon which applicant relies (i.e., “the claimed system can validate…a combination of user, device, application, data, session, network, location, time, database-link, and layer-interaction information), as stated on page 18, are not recited in the rejected claims. Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The independent claims state that the “corresponding values may include information selected from” the list of options. This limitation does not require more than one of the listed options to be selected from the list. Therefore, if one of the items, e.g., “authentication information”, is included as a value, then the limitation is satisfied. The examiner suggests amending the independent claims, in accordance with the original disclosure, to clearly indicate that a plurality of the items are selected from the list and included in the pulse. Drawings No issues have been found with the drawings filed 18 September 2025. Specification No issues have been found with the specification amendments filed 15 June 2026. Claim Objections Claims 1, 17, 31, and 32 are objected to because of the following informalities: Regarding claim 1, line 7—“whereby the pulse injector configured to”, should be amended to --whereby the pulse injector is configured to--, in order to include the missing word. Regarding claim 1, line 22—“MAC”, line 24—“LAN”, “WAN”, and “VPN”, and line 25—“GPS”, the abbreviations should be written out for at least the first recitations in the claim. Claim 17 includes similar language and is similarly analyzed. Regarding claim 17, line 11—“the pulses”, appears to be referring to “micro pulses” of line 3. This objection may be overcome by amending line 11 to state --the micro pulses--. Regarding claim 17, line 12—“the pulse oracle continuously change”, the phrase appears to be missing one or more words. This objection may be overcome by amending line 12 to state --the pulse oracle continuously changing--, for example. Regarding claim 31, line 2—“the processor”, lacks sufficient antecedent basis for the claim. This objection may be overcome by amending line 2 to state --a processor--. Regarding claim 32, line 2—“the processor”, lacks sufficient antecedent basis for the claim. This objection may be overcome by amending line 2 to state --a processor--. Regarding claim 32, line 3—“IP”, the abbreviation should be written out for at least the first recitation in the claim. Appropriate correction is required. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112 The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a): (a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention. The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112: The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b): (b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph: The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention. Claim 25 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventors, at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention. In this case, the specification does not provide any disclosure for “emerging advanced attacks”. Therefore, claim 25 contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention. Claim 25 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention. Regarding claim 25, line 3—“emerging advanced attacks”, it is unclear as to the scope of claim 25. For example, one of ordinary skill in the art would not be able to differentiate between an “emerging advanced” attack and one that is not “emerging advanced” as there is no threshold claimed for the determination and the original disclosure of the application does not provide a definition that would enable one of ordinary skill in the art to distinguish attacks. For examination purposes, “brute-force, continuously guessing, and emerging advanced attacks” of lines 2-3 will be interpreted to be “brute-force, continuously guessing attacks” since the phrase appears to be referring to the same types of attacks and the specification of the instant application at paragraph 89 discloses this embodiment. In order to overcome this rejection, lines 2-3 may be amended to state --brute-force, continuously guessing attacks--. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made. This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention. Claims 1, 4, 6, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 20, 22, 25, 26, 28, 30, and 31 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Costello et al. (US 2020/0220722 A1) in view of Louth (US 10,148,388 B1) and further in view of Cohen et al. (US 2023/0006844 A1). Regarding claim 1, Costello teaches a system for detecting digital intrusion in real-time…, e.g., optical system 70 (Fig. 2, el. 70), comprising: a first computing device, e.g., controller 72 (Fig. 2, el. 72); first sensor 82 (Fig. 2, el. 82), and a third computing device, e.g., controller 72 (Fig. 2, el. 72); first sensor 82 (Fig. 2, el. 82), comprising a processor, e.g., processing circuitry 77 (Fig. 2, el. 77); processing circuitry 86 may include an MCU (Fig. 2, el. 86; Para. 52), a memory, e.g., controller 72 includes memory (Para. 49); an MCU includes a computer on a single integrated circuit containing a processor core, memory, and programmable input/output peripheral (Para. 49), and a pulse intrusion detection module, wherein the processor coupled with the memory configured to store a digital intrusion detection module, the pulse intrusion detection module comprises a pulse injector, a pulse reader, a pulse oracle, and a pulse data manager, e.g., XCVR 79 (Fig. 2, el. 79); XCVR 89 (Fig. 2, el. 89); XCVR 89 may transmit encrypted communication signal 204 (or 210) to XCVR 79, which may receive encrypted communication signal 204/210, wherein XCVR 79 may determine whether data authentication pulse 202 has been superimposed over at least one of the one or more pulses (Fig. 2, el. 202, 204, 210; Para. 70); XCVR 79 may perform authentication, based on the determination of whether the data authentication pulse has been superimposed over at least one of the one or more pulses of encrypted communication signal 204/210 (Para. 74); responsive to a failed authentication of the one or more pulses as the valid representation of the data, XCVR 79 may reconfigure the frequency filter to obtain a different subset of the plurality of frequency components (Para. 75); XCVR 79 and XCVR 89 may adapt frequency, amplitudes and dampening factors responsive to detecting a potential cyberattack (Para. 78); whereby the pulse injector configured to…construct a set of micro pulses and corresponding values that are continuously and programmatically changeable into a pulse and the pulse is injected into at least one of: content; a document; and a communication thereby creating at least one of: a pulse protected content; a pulse-protected document; and a pulse-protected communication, e.g., XCVR 89 inserts these secondary digital signals 202 (data authentication pulses 202) into communication signal 200 to obtain encrypted communication signal 204 (Para. 66); an encrypted communication signal 210 that includes a start pulse 206 (which may be similar if not the same as secondary digital signals 202) followed by an 8-bit word in which two pulses include secondary digital signals 202A and 202B, and concluding with a stop pulse 208 (Fig. 9, el. 202A, 202B, 204, 206, 210; Para. 65); XCVR 89 may transmit encrypted communication signal 204 (or 210) to XCVR 79, which may receive encrypted communication signal 204/210, wherein XCVR 79 may determine whether data authentication pulse 202 has been superimposed over at least one of the one or more pulses (Para. 70); responsive to a failed authentication of the one or more pulses as the valid representation of the data, XCVR 79 may reconfigure the frequency filter to obtain a different subset of the plurality of frequency components (Para. 75); XCVR 79 and XCVR 89 may adapt frequency, amplitudes and dampening factors responsive to detecting a potential cyberattack, and in the event a hacker or other malicious agent spoofs the system and transmits data, XCVR 79 may detect such intrusion and a time of attack, providing a log or other timeline that may facilitate identification the malicious agents (Para. 78); the pulse reader configured to remain in synchronization with the pulse injector, e.g., XCVR 89 may vary frequencies and amplitudes of data authentication pulses 202 according to a pseudo random sequence, and/or pulse location within communication signal 200 in which data authentication pulses 202 are inserted according to the pseudo random sequence (Para. 66); if the data frequencies and damping ratios are known in advance, a Goertzel-like approach may be more efficient for a small number of frequencies (Para. 73); both electrical transmitter 62 and electrical receiver 64 may be configured to identify which of the one or more pulses (are to, in the context of electrical transmitter 62) include the data authentication pulse according to a pseudo random sequence (and both electrical transmitter 62 and electrical receiver 64 use the same pseudo random sequence—e.g., by configuring both electrical transmitter 62 and electrical transmitter 64 with the same seed value) (Fig. 1, el. 62, 64; Para. 41), the pulse reader configured to validate the pulse of at least one of: a valid user; and an unauthorized user, e.g., XCVR 79 may perform authentication, based on the determination of whether the data authentication pulse has been superimposed over at least one of the one or more pulses of encrypted communication signal 204/210 (Para. 74); responsive to a failed authentication of the one or more pulses as the valid representation of the data, XCVR 79 may reconfigure the frequency filter to obtain a different subset of the plurality of frequency components (Para. 75); XCVR 79 and XCVR 89 may adapt frequency, amplitudes and dampening factors responsive to detecting a potential cyberattack (Para. 78); the pulse oracle configured to continuously and programmatically change the micro pulses and corresponding values to mitigate brute-force and quantum-level attacks, e.g., responsive to a failed authentication of the one or more pulses as the valid representation of the data, XCVR 79 may reconfigure the frequency filter to obtain a different subset of the plurality of frequency components (Para. 75); XCVR 79 and XCVR 89 may adapt frequency, amplitudes and dampening factors responsive to detecting a potential cyberattack, and in the event a hacker or other malicious agent spoofs the system and transmits data, XCVR 79 may detect such intrusion and a time of attack, providing a log or other timeline that may facilitate identification the malicious agents (Para. 78), to generate forensic evidence, e.g., XCVR 79 and XCVR 89 may adapt frequency, amplitudes and dampening factors responsive to detecting a potential cyberattack, and in the event a hacker or other malicious agent spoofs the system and transmits data, XCVR 79 may detect such intrusion and a time of attack, providing a log or other timeline that may facilitate identification the malicious agents (Para. 78); and …; wherein the pulse comprises multiple pulse layers formed from the set of micro pulses and corresponding values, e.g., XCVR 89 inserts these secondary digital signals 202 (data authentication pulses 202) into communication signal 200 to obtain encrypted communication signal 204 (Para. 66); an encrypted communication signal 210 that includes a start pulse 206 (which may be similar if not the same as secondary digital signals 202) followed by an 8-bit word in which two pulses include secondary digital signals 202A and 202B, and concluding with a stop pulse 208 (Fig. 9, el. 202A, 202B, 204, 206, 210; Para. 65); XCVR 89 may transmit encrypted communication signal 204 (or 210) to XCVR 79, which may receive encrypted communication signal 204/210, wherein XCVR 79 may determine whether data authentication pulse 202 has been superimposed over at least one of the one or more pulses (Para. 70); and wherein the corresponding values include information selected from user names, private keys, passwords, MAC addresses, cookies, applications, data types, session passwords, wireless information, wireline information, public Wi-Fi information, LAN information, WAN information, VPN information, GPS information, zip-code information, authentication information, certification information, timestamps, links to one or more databases, parameters of micro-pulse interactions, and acceptable or unacceptable combinations of the layers, e.g., XCVR 89 inserts these secondary digital signals 202 (data authentication pulses 202)—authentication information-- into communication signal 200 to obtain encrypted communication signal 204 (Para. 66). Costello does not clearly teach redirecting to a safe zone; whereby the pulse injector configured to receive a pulse template from the pulse oracle, collect pulse data for filling the pulse template from the pulse data manager; and to redirect the unauthorized user to the safe zone. Louth teaches whereby the pulse injector configured to receive a pulse template from the pulse oracle, collect pulse data for filling the pulse template from the pulse data manager, e.g., Block 601: Obtain watermark raw data or watermark template, and Block 602: Modify and/or add to watermark template (Fig. 6, el. 601, 602; Col. 11, lines 53-55); in an example embodiment, blocks 601 to 603 are executed by the server, and the applied watermark is sent from the server to the second user device 102 so that the second user device stores the applied watermark (block 604), and in another example embodiment, the server sends to the second user device 102 the watermark template and the modification and styling information, so that the second user device 102 executes the blocks 601 to 604 (Fig. 6; Col. 1, lines 60-67); the server can automatically modify these watermarks templates can be automatically modified (e.g. size, position, transparency or opaqueness setting, color, content of watermark, etc.), where the watermark template can include a static portion and a modifiable content portion, such as an ID portion (e.g. image, letters, numbers, symbols, etc.), that is modified to be unique for every instance of a video being sent to a different receiving user, where for example, the instance of a video from Bob sent to Cody will have a watermark with a first ID, and the instance of the same video from Bob sent to Dave will have a watermark with a second ID (Col. 7, lines 51-62). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Costello to include whereby the pulse injector configured to receive a pulse template from the pulse oracle, collect pulse data for filling the pulse template from the pulse data manager, using the known method of modifying a watermark template by adding data to it, as taught by Louth, in combination with the pulse protection system of Costello, for the purpose of preventing the system from having to generate the pulse from the ground up every single time by starting with a template and filling-in the details, thereby saving the system time and resources. Costello in view of Louth does not clearly teach redirecting to a safe zone; and to redirect the unauthorized user to the safe zone. Cohen teaches redirecting to a safe zone; and the…oracle configured…to redirect the unauthorized user to the safe zone, e.g., at step 414, it is determined whether to authenticate a use of the account based on matching of the dynamic values, and if the dynamic values do not match, authentication may be refused, and/or step-up authentication may be required, wherein if the dynamic value from the received cookie is flagged, the device requesting the login may be monitored and/or honeypot pages may be deployed (Fig. 4A, el. 414; Fig. 6, el. 616; Para. 93); if the dynamic value has been flagged as compromised previously, service provider server 130 may also deploy one or more honeypot traps, such as fake interfaces for login, electronic transaction processing requests, and the like, which may attempt to gain additional information from malicious device 120, wherein this may also include accessing computing logs associated with the login to monitor additional data (Fig. 1, el. 120, 130; Para. 55). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Costello in view of Louth to include redirecting to a safe zone; and to redirect the unauthorized user to the safe zone, using the known method of deploying fake interfaces for login to gain additional information from the malicious device, as taught by Cohen, in combination with the pulse protection system of Costello in view of Louth, for the purpose of allowing the untrusted network device to be monitored while preventing the untrusted network device from performing any malicious activities to the network. Regarding claim 4, Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen teaches the system of claim 1. Costello further teaches wherein the processor executing the instructions for an unauthorized attempt detection module of the pulse reader…, e.g., XCVR 89 may transmit encrypted communication signal 204 (or 210) to XCVR 79, which may receive encrypted communication signal 204/210, wherein XCVR 79 may determine whether data authentication pulse 202 has been superimposed over at least one of the one or more pulses (Fig. 2, el. 202, 204, 210; Para. 70); XCVR 79 may perform authentication, based on the determination of whether the data authentication pulse has been superimposed over at least one of the one or more pulses of encrypted communication signal 204/210 (Para. 74); responsive to a failed authentication of the one or more pulses as the valid representation of the data, XCVR 79 may reconfigure the frequency filter to obtain a different subset of the plurality of frequency components (Para. 75); Costello in view of Louth does not clearly teach wherein the processor executing the instructions for an unauthorized attempt detection module of the pulse reader is configured to provide neutral feedback or misleading responses, including portraying incorrect authentication results or prolonging the spoofed connection, upon considering an attempt deemed to be malicious. Cohen further teaches wherein the processor executing the instructions for an unauthorized attempt detection module of the…reader is configured to provide neutral feedback or misleading responses, including portraying incorrect authentication results or prolonging a spoofed connection, upon considering an attempt deemed to be malicious, e.g., at step 414, it is determined whether to authenticate a use of the account based on matching of the dynamic values, and if the dynamic values do not match, authentication may be refused, and/or step-up authentication may be required, wherein if the dynamic value from the received cookie is flagged, the device requesting the login may be monitored and/or honeypot pages may be deployed (Fig. 4A, el. 414; Fig. 6, el. 616; Para. 93); if the dynamic value has been flagged as compromised previously, service provider server 130 may also deploy one or more honeypot traps, such as fake interfaces for login, electronic transaction processing requests, and the like, which may attempt to gain additional information from malicious device 120, wherein this may also include accessing computing logs associated with the login to monitor additional data (Fig. 1, el. 120, 130; Para. 55). Examiner note: claim 4 indicates the two alternative options of providing neutral feedback or providing misleading responses. The “portraying incorrect authentication results or prolonging the spoofed connection” could be interpreted to be part of either option. The examiner suggests clarifying the claim language. Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Costello in view of Louth to include wherein the processor executing the instructions for an unauthorized attempt detection module of the pulse reader is configured to provide neutral feedback or misleading responses, including portraying incorrect authentication results or prolonging the spoofed connection, upon considering an attempt deemed to be malicious, using the known method of deploying fake interfaces for login to gain additional information from the malicious device, as taught by Cohen, in combination with the pulse protection system of Costello in view of Louth, using the same motivation as in claim 1. Regarding claim 6, Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen teaches the system of claim 1, wherein the processor executing instructions for an unauthorized attempt detection module is configured to re-direct the unauthorized user into the safe zone or a virtual environment for gathering forensic data, intent, and origin, e.g., at step 414, it is determined whether to authenticate a use of the account based on matching of the dynamic values, and if the dynamic values do not match, authentication may be refused, and/or step-up authentication may be required, wherein if the dynamic value from the received cookie is flagged, the device requesting the login may be monitored and/or honeypot pages may be deployed (Cohen-Fig. 4A, el. 414; Fig. 6, el. 616; Para. 93); if the dynamic value has been flagged as compromised previously, service provider server 130 may also deploy one or more honeypot traps, such as fake interfaces for login, electronic transaction processing requests, and the like, which may attempt to gain additional information from malicious device 120, wherein this may also include accessing computing logs associated with the login to monitor additional data (Cohen-Fig. 1, el. 120, 130; Para. 55). Regarding claim 9, Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen teaches the system of claim 1, wherein the pulse oracle is configured to continuously rotate and reprogram the micro pulses and corresponding values in real-time to remove a progress of brute-force attacks, e.g., responsive to a failed authentication of the one or more pulses as the valid representation of the data, XCVR 79 may reconfigure the frequency filter to obtain a different subset of the plurality of frequency components (Costello-Para. 75); XCVR 79 and XCVR 89 may adapt frequency, amplitudes and dampening factors responsive to detecting a potential cyberattack, and in the event a hacker or other malicious agent spoofs the system and transmits data, XCVR 79 may detect such intrusion and a time of attack, providing a log or other timeline that may facilitate identification the malicious agents (Costello-Para. 78). Regarding claim 10, Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen teaches the system of claim 1, wherein the pulse oracle is configured to dynamically change the pulse in real-time to provide resilience against quantum-level attacks without impact on communication quality, e.g., XCVR 89 may vary frequencies and amplitudes of data authentication pulses 202 according to a pseudo random sequence, and/or pulse location within communication signal 200 in which data authentication pulses 202 are inserted according to the pseudo random sequence (Costello-Para. 66); XCVR 79 may decode, responsive to authenticating the one or more pulses as the valid representation of the data, the one or more pulses to obtain the data (Costello-Para. 74); responsive to a failed authentication of the one or more pulses as the valid representation of the data, XCVR 79 may reconfigure the frequency filter to obtain a different subset of the plurality of frequency components (Costello-Para. 75); XCVR 79 and XCVR 89 may adapt frequency, amplitudes and dampening factors responsive to detecting a potential cyberattack, and in the event a hacker or other malicious agent spoofs the system and transmits data, XCVR 79 may detect such intrusion and a time of attack, providing a log or other timeline that may facilitate identification the malicious agents (Costello-Para. 78). Regarding claim 12, Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen teaches the system of claim 1. Costello in view of Louth does not clearly teach wherein the pulse oracle comprising an information-gathering module is configured to request additional intelligence from the unauthorized user as part of a spoofed connection strategy while maintaining a connection. Cohen further teaches wherein the pulse oracle comprising an information-gathering module is configured to request additional intelligence from the unauthorized user as part of a spoofed connection strategy while maintaining a connection, e.g., at step 414, it is determined whether to authenticate a use of the account based on matching of the dynamic values, and if the dynamic values do not match, authentication may be refused, and/or step-up authentication may be required, wherein if the dynamic value from the received cookie is flagged, the device requesting the login may be monitored and/or honeypot pages may be deployed (Cohen-Fig. 4A, el. 414; Fig. 6, el. 616; Para. 93); if the dynamic value has been flagged as compromised previously, service provider server 130 may also deploy one or more honeypot traps, such as fake interfaces for login, electronic transaction processing requests, and the like, which may attempt to gain additional information from malicious device 120, wherein this may also include accessing computing logs associated with the login to monitor additional data (Cohen-Fig. 1, el. 120, 130; Para. 55). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Costello in view of Louth to include wherein the pulse oracle comprising an information-gathering module is configured to request additional intelligence from the unauthorized user as part of a spoofed connection strategy while maintaining a connection, using the known method of deploying fake interfaces for login to gain additional information from the malicious device, as taught by Cohen, in combination with the pulse protection system of Costello in view of Louth, using the same motivation as in claim 1. Regarding claim 14, Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen teaches the system of claim 1. Costello in view of Louth does not clearly teach wherein the processor executing instructions for a redirecting module of the pulse intrusion detection module is configured to re-direct the unauthorized user into a reverse-phishing virtual environment intended to run forensic analysis and capture forensic data on the unauthorized user's origin and intent. Cohen further teaches wherein the processor, e.g., Client device 110, malicious device 120, and/or service provider server 130 may each include one or more processors, memories, and other appropriate components for executing instructions (Cohen-Para. 23), executing instructions for a redirecting module of the…intrusion detection module is configured to re-direct the unauthorized user into a reverse-phishing virtual environment intended to run forensic analysis and capture forensic data on the unauthorized user's origin and intent, e.g., at step 414, it is determined whether to authenticate a use of the account based on matching of the dynamic values, and if the dynamic values do not match, authentication may be refused, and/or step-up authentication may be required, wherein if the dynamic value from the received cookie is flagged, the device requesting the login may be monitored and/or honeypot pages may be deployed (Cohen-Fig. 4A, el. 414; Fig. 6, el. 616; Para. 93); if the dynamic value has been flagged as compromised previously, service provider server 130 may also deploy one or more honeypot traps, such as fake interfaces for login, electronic transaction processing requests, and the like, which may attempt to gain additional information from malicious device 120, wherein this may also include accessing computing logs associated with the login to monitor additional data (Cohen-Fig. 1, el. 120, 130; Para. 55). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Costello in view of Louth to include wherein the processor executing instructions for a redirecting module of the pulse intrusion detection module is configured to re-direct the unauthorized user into a reverse-phishing virtual environment intended to run forensic analysis and capture forensic data on the unauthorized user's origin and intent, using the known method of deploying fake interfaces for login to gain additional information from the malicious device, as taught by Cohen, in combination with the pulse protection system of Costello in view of Louth, using the same motivation as in claim 1. Regarding claim 15, Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen teaches the system of claim 1, wherein the processor executing instructions for an analytics module of the pulse intrusion detection module is configured to perform analytics to identify additional intelligence about the unauthorized user, e.g., responsive to a failed authentication of the one or more pulses as the valid representation of the data, XCVR 79 may reconfigure the frequency filter to obtain a different subset of the plurality of frequency components (Costello-Para. 75); XCVR 79 and XCVR 89 may adapt frequency, amplitudes and dampening factors responsive to detecting a potential cyberattack, and in the event a hacker or other malicious agent spoofs the system and transmits data, XCVR 79 may detect such intrusion and a time of attack, providing a log or other timeline that may facilitate identification the malicious agents (Costello-Para. 78); Also note Cohen discloses at step 414, it is determined whether to authenticate a use of the account based on matching of the dynamic values, and if the dynamic values do not match, authentication may be refused, and/or step-up authentication may be required, wherein if the dynamic value from the received cookie is flagged, the device requesting the login may be monitored and/or honeypot pages may be deployed (Fig. 4A, el. 414; Fig. 6, el. 616; Para. 93), and if the dynamic value has been flagged as compromised previously, service provider server 130 may also deploy one or more honeypot traps, such as fake interfaces for login, electronic transaction processing requests, and the like, which may attempt to gain additional information from malicious device 120, wherein this may also include accessing computing logs associated with the login to monitor additional data (Fig. 1, el. 120, 130; Para. 55). Regarding claim 17, Costello teaches a method for detecting digital intrusion and…, comprising: constructing a set of dynamically reprogrammable micro pulses and corresponding values into a pulse and injecting into content, a document, or a communication…, e.g., XCVR 89 inserts these secondary digital signals 202 (data authentication pulses 202) into communication signal 200 to obtain encrypted communication signal 204 (Para. 66); an encrypted communication signal 210 that includes a start pulse 206 (which may be similar if not the same as secondary digital signals 202) followed by an 8-bit word in which two pulses include secondary digital signals 202A and 202B, and concluding with a stop pulse 208 (Fig. 9, el. 202A, 202B, 204, 206, 210; Para. 65); XCVR 89 may transmit encrypted communication signal 204 (or 210) to XCVR 79, which may receive encrypted communication signal 204/210, wherein XCVR 79 may determine whether data authentication pulse 202 has been superimposed over at least one of the one or more pulses (Para. 70); XCVR 79 and XCVR 89 may adapt frequency, amplitudes and dampening factors responsive to detecting a potential cyberattack, and in the event a hacker or other malicious agent spoofs the system and transmits data, XCVR 79 may detect such intrusion and a time of attack, providing a log or other timeline that may facilitate identification the malicious agents (Para. 78); enabling a pulse reader, e.g., XCVR 79 (Fig. 2, el. 79); XCVR 89 (Fig. 2, el. 89), to validate the pulse of a valid user or unauthorized user, e.g., XCVR 79 may perform authentication, based on the determination of whether the data authentication pulse has been superimposed over at least one of the one or more pulses of encrypted communication signal 204/210 (Para. 74); responsive to a failed authentication of the one or more pulses as the valid representation of the data, XCVR 79 may reconfigure the frequency filter to obtain a different subset of the plurality of frequency components (Para. 75); XCVR 79 and XCVR 89 may adapt frequency, amplitudes and dampening factors responsive to detecting a potential cyberattack (Para. 78); synchronizing the pulse injector with the pulse reader to detect unauthorized access attempts, e.g., XCVR 79 may perform authentication, based on the determination of whether the data authentication pulse has been superimposed over at least one of the one or more pulses of encrypted communication signal 204/210 (Para. 74); responsive to a failed authentication of the one or more pulses as the valid representation of the data, XCVR 79 may reconfigure the frequency filter to obtain a different subset of the plurality of frequency components (Para. 75); XCVR 79 and XCVR 89 may adapt frequency, amplitudes and dampening factors responsive to detecting a potential cyberattack (Para. 78); determining whether the pulses are valid or appear in a bad actor list;, e.g., XCVR 79 may perform authentication, based on the determination of whether the data authentication pulse has been superimposed over at least one of the one or more pulses of encrypted communication signal 204/210 (Para. 74); responsive to a failed authentication of the one or more pulses as the valid representation of the data, XCVR 79 may reconfigure the frequency filter to obtain a different subset of the plurality of frequency components (Para. 75); XCVR 79 and XCVR 89 may adapt frequency, amplitudes and dampening factors responsive to detecting a potential cyberattack, and in the event a hacker or other malicious agent spoofs the system and transmits data, XCVR 79 may detect such intrusion and a time of attack, providing a log or other timeline that may facilitate identification the malicious agents (Para. 78); synchronizing a pulse oracle, the pulse oracle continuously change the micro pulses and values, e.g., responsive to a failed authentication of the one or more pulses as the valid representation of the data, XCVR 79 may reconfigure the frequency filter to obtain a different subset of the plurality of frequency components (Para. 75); XCVR 79 and XCVR 89 may adapt frequency, amplitudes and dampening factors responsive to detecting a potential cyberattack, and in the event a hacker or other malicious agent spoofs the system and transmits data, XCVR 79 may detect such intrusion and a time of attack, providing a log or other timeline that may facilitate identification the malicious agents (Para. 78); to generate forensic evidence, e.g., XCVR 79 and XCVR 89 may adapt frequency, amplitudes and dampening factors responsive to detecting a potential cyberattack, and in the event a hacker or other malicious agent spoofs the system and transmits data, XCVR 79 may detect such intrusion and a time of attack, providing a log or other timeline that may facilitate identification the malicious agents (Para. 78); refuse unauthorized access, e.g., responsive to a failed authentication of the one or more pulses as the valid representation of the data, XCVR 79 may reconfigure the frequency filter to obtain a different subset of the plurality of frequency components (Para. 75); XCVR 79 and XCVR 89 may adapt frequency, amplitudes and dampening factors responsive to detecting a potential cyberattack, and in the event a hacker or other malicious agent spoofs the system and transmits data, XCVR 79 may detect such intrusion and a time of attack, providing a log or other timeline that may facilitate identification the malicious agents (Para. 78); assuming valid authentication of encrypted communication signal 204′, signal processing and decryption unit 402 may output communication signal 200′ to decoding unit 404, which may perform additional decoding to obtain the underlying data (Fig. 10, el. 200’, 204’, 402, 404; Para. 83), and …; wherein the pulse comprises multiple pulse layers formed from the set of micro pulses and corresponding values, e.g., XCVR 89 inserts these secondary digital signals 202 (data authentication pulses 202) into communication signal 200 to obtain encrypted communication signal 204 (Para. 66); an encrypted communication signal 210 that includes a start pulse 206 (which may be similar if not the same as secondary digital signals 202) followed by an 8-bit word in which two pulses include secondary digital signals 202A and 202B, and concluding with a stop pulse 208 (Fig. 9, el. 202A, 202B, 204, 206, 210; Para. 65); XCVR 89 may transmit encrypted communication signal 204 (or 210) to XCVR 79, which may receive encrypted communication signal 204/210, wherein XCVR 79 may determine whether data authentication pulse 202 has been superimposed over at least one of the one or more pulses (Para. 70), and wherein the corresponding values include information selected from user names, private keys, passwords, MAC addresses, cookies, applications, data types, session passwords, wireless information, wireline information, public Wi-Fi information, LAN information, WAN information, VPN information, GPS information, zip-code information, authentication information, certification information, timestamps, links to one or more databases, parameters of micro-pulse interactions, and acceptable or unacceptable combinations of the layers, e.g., XCVR 89 inserts these secondary digital signals 202 (data authentication pulses 202)—authentication information-- into communication signal 200 to obtain encrypted communication signal 204 (Para. 66). Costello does not clearly teach redirecting to a reverse-phishing area to spoof authentication in real-time; wherein a pulse injector is configured to receive a pulse template and collect data to fill the pulse template; and to redirect the unauthorized user to the safe zone for spoof authentication. Louth teaches wherein a pulse injector is configured to receive a pulse template and collect data to fill the pulse template, e.g., Block 601: Obtain watermark raw data or watermark template, and Block 602: Modify and/or add to watermark template (Fig. 6, el. 601, 602; Col. 11, lines 53-55); in an example embodiment, blocks 601 to 603 are executed by the server, and the applied watermark is sent from the server to the second user device 102 so that the second user device stores the applied watermark (block 604), and in another example embodiment, the server sends to the second user device 102 the watermark template and the modification and styling information, so that the second user device 102 executes the blocks 601 to 604 (Fig. 6; Col. 1, lines 60-67); the server can automatically modify these watermarks templates can be automatically modified (e.g. size, position, transparency or opaqueness setting, color, content of watermark, etc.), where the watermark template can include a static portion and a modifiable content portion, such as an ID portion (e.g. image, letters, numbers, symbols, etc.), that is modified to be unique for every instance of a video being sent to a different receiving user, where for example, the instance of a video from Bob sent to Cody will have a watermark with a first ID, and the instance of the same video from Bob sent to Dave will have a watermark with a second ID (Col. 7, lines 51-62). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Costello to include wherein a pulse injector is configured to receive a pulse template and collect data to fill the pulse template, using the known method of modifying a watermark template by adding data to it, as taught by Louth, in combination with the pulse protection system of Costello, for the purpose of preventing the system from having to generate the pulse from the ground up every single time by starting with a template and filling-in the details, thereby saving the system time and resources. Costello in view of Louth does not clearly teach redirecting to a reverse-phishing area to spoof authentication in real-time; and to redirect the unauthorized user to the safe zone for spoof authentication. Cohen teaches redirecting to a reverse-phishing area to spoof authentication in real-time, e.g., at step 414, it is determined whether to authenticate a use of the account based on matching of the dynamic values, and if the dynamic values do not match, authentication may be refused, and/or step-up authentication may be required, wherein if the dynamic value from the received cookie is flagged, the device requesting the login may be monitored and/or honeypot pages may be deployed (Fig. 4A, el. 414; Fig. 6, el. 616; Para. 93); if the dynamic value has been flagged as compromised previously, service provider server 130 may also deploy one or more honeypot traps, such as fake interfaces for login, electronic transaction processing requests, and the like, which may attempt to gain additional information from malicious device 120, wherein this may also include accessing computing logs associated with the login to monitor additional data (Fig. 1, el. 120, 130; Para. 55); and to redirect the unauthorized user to the safe zone for spoof authentication, e.g., at step 414, it is determined whether to authenticate a use of the account based on matching of the dynamic values, and if the dynamic values do not match, authentication may be refused, and/or step-up authentication may be required, wherein if the dynamic value from the received cookie is flagged, the device requesting the login may be monitored and/or honeypot pages may be deployed (Fig. 4A, el. 414; Fig. 6, el. 616; Para. 93); if the dynamic value has been flagged as compromised previously, service provider server 130 may also deploy one or more honeypot traps, such as fake interfaces for login, electronic transaction processing requests, and the like, which may attempt to gain additional information from malicious device 120, wherein this may also include accessing computing logs associated with the login to monitor additional data (Fig. 1, el. 120, 130; Para. 55). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Costello in view of Louth to include redirecting to a reverse-phishing area to spoof authentication in real-time, and to redirect the unauthorized user to the safe zone for spoof authentication, using the known method of deploying fake interfaces for login to gain additional information from the malicious device, as taught by Cohen, in combination with the pulse protection system of Costello in view of Louth, for the purpose of allowing the untrusted network device to be monitored while preventing the untrusted network device from performing any malicious activities to the network. Regarding claim 20, Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen teaches the method of claim 17. Costello in view of Louth does not clearly teach a step of providing neutral or deceptive feedback designed to prolong a spoofed connection upon detecting a malicious attempt. Cohen further teaches a step of providing neutral or deceptive feedback designed to prolong a spoofed connection upon detecting a malicious attempt, e.g., at step 414, it is determined whether to authenticate a use of the account based on matching of the dynamic values, and if the dynamic values do not match, authentication may be refused, and/or step-up authentication may be required, wherein if the dynamic value from the received cookie is flagged, the device requesting the login may be monitored and/or honeypot pages may be deployed (Fig. 4A, el. 414; Fig. 6, el. 616; Para. 93); if the dynamic value has been flagged as compromised previously, service provider server 130 may also deploy one or more honeypot traps, such as fake interfaces for login, electronic transaction processing requests, and the like, which may attempt to gain additional information from malicious device 120, wherein this may also include accessing computing logs associated with the login to monitor additional data (Fig. 1, el. 120, 130; Para. 55). Examiner note: claim 20 indicates the two alternative options of providing neutral feedback or providing deceptive feedback. The “designed to prolong a spoofed connection upon detecting a malicious attempt” could be interpreted to be part of either option. The examiner suggests clarifying the claim language. Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Costello in view of Louth to include a step of providing neutral or deceptive feedback designed to prolong a spoofed connection upon detecting a malicious attempt, using the known method of deploying fake interfaces for login to gain additional information from the malicious device, as taught by Cohen, in combination with the pulse protection system of Costello in view of Louth, using the same motivation as in claim 17. Regarding claim 22, Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen teaches the method of claim 17, comprising a step of re-directing the unauthorized user into a forensic deception environment for intelligence gathering, e.g., at step 414, it is determined whether to authenticate a use of the account based on matching of the dynamic values, and if the dynamic values do not match, authentication may be refused, and/or step-up authentication may be required, wherein if the dynamic value from the received cookie is flagged, the device requesting the login may be monitored and/or honeypot pages may be deployed (Cohen-Fig. 4A, el. 414; Fig. 6, el. 616; Para. 93); if the dynamic value has been flagged as compromised previously, service provider server 130 may also deploy one or more honeypot traps, such as fake interfaces for login, electronic transaction processing requests, and the like, which may attempt to gain additional information from malicious device 120, wherein this may also include accessing computing logs associated with the login to monitor additional data (Cohen-Fig. 1, el. 120, 130; Para. 55). Regarding claim 25, Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen teaches the method of claim 17, comprising a step of continuously rotating and reprogramming the micro pulses and values to nullify brute-force, automated guessing, and emerging advanced attacks, e.g., responsive to a failed authentication of the one or more pulses as the valid representation of the data, XCVR 79 may reconfigure the frequency filter to obtain a different subset of the plurality of frequency components (Costello-Para. 75); XCVR 79 and XCVR 89 may adapt frequency, amplitudes and dampening factors responsive to detecting a potential cyberattack, and in the event a hacker or other malicious agent spoofs the system and transmits data, XCVR 79 may detect such intrusion and a time of attack, providing a log or other timeline that may facilitate identification the malicious agents (Costello-Para. 78). Regarding claim 26, Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen teaches the method of claim 17, comprising a step of mutating the pulse content in real-time to resist quantum-level attacks without degrading communication quality, e.g., XCVR 89 may vary frequencies and amplitudes of data authentication pulses 202 according to a pseudo random sequence, and/or pulse location within communication signal 200 in which data authentication pulses 202 are inserted according to the pseudo random sequence (Costello-Para. 66); XCVR 79 may decode, responsive to authenticating the one or more pulses as the valid representation of the data, the one or more pulses to obtain the data (Costello-Para. 74); responsive to a failed authentication of the one or more pulses as the valid representation of the data, XCVR 79 may reconfigure the frequency filter to obtain a different subset of the plurality of frequency components (Costello-Para. 75); XCVR 79 and XCVR 89 may adapt frequency, amplitudes and dampening factors responsive to detecting a potential cyberattack, and in the event a hacker or other malicious agent spoofs the system and transmits data, XCVR 79 may detect such intrusion and a time of attack, providing a log or other timeline that may facilitate identification the malicious agents (Costello-Para. 78). Regarding claim 28, Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen teaches the method of claim 17. Costello in view of Louth does not clearly teach a step of requesting additional intelligence from the unauthorized user through controlled deceptive interaction thereby maintaining a spoofed connection to gather the forensic evidence. Cohen further teaches a step of requesting additional intelligence from the unauthorized user through controlled deceptive interaction thereby maintaining a spoofed connection to gather the forensic evidence, e.g., at step 414, it is determined whether to authenticate a use of the account based on matching of the dynamic values, and if the dynamic values do not match, authentication may be refused, and/or step-up authentication may be required, wherein if the dynamic value from the received cookie is flagged, the device requesting the login may be monitored and/or honeypot pages may be deployed (Cohen-Fig. 4A, el. 414; Fig. 6, el. 616; Para. 93); if the dynamic value has been flagged as compromised previously, service provider server 130 may also deploy one or more honeypot traps, such as fake interfaces for login, electronic transaction processing requests, and the like, which may attempt to gain additional information from malicious device 120, wherein this may also include accessing computing logs associated with the login to monitor additional data (Cohen-Fig. 1, el. 120, 130; Para. 55). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Costello in view of Louth to include a step of requesting additional intelligence from the unauthorized user through controlled deceptive interaction thereby maintaining a spoofed connection to gather the forensic evidence, using the known method of deploying fake interfaces for login to gain additional information from the malicious device, as taught by Cohen, in combination with the pulse protection system of Costello in view of Louth, using the same motivation as in claim 17. Regarding claim 30, Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen teaches the method of claim 17. Costello in view of Louth does not clearly teach a step of re-directing the unauthorized user into a reverse-phishing virtual environment to analyze origin, intent, and attack behaviour. Cohen further teaches a step of re-directing the unauthorized user into a reverse-phishing virtual environment to analyze origin, intent, and attack behaviour, e.g., at step 414, it is determined whether to authenticate a use of the account based on matching of the dynamic values, and if the dynamic values do not match, authentication may be refused, and/or step-up authentication may be required, wherein if the dynamic value from the received cookie is flagged, the device requesting the login may be monitored and/or honeypot pages may be deployed (Cohen-Fig. 4A, el. 414; Fig. 6, el. 616; Para. 93); if the dynamic value has been flagged as compromised previously, service provider server 130 may also deploy one or more honeypot traps, such as fake interfaces for login, electronic transaction processing requests, and the like, which may attempt to gain additional information from malicious device 120, wherein this may also include accessing computing logs associated with the login to monitor additional data (Cohen-Fig. 1, el. 120, 130; Para. 55). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Costello in view of Louth to include a step of re-directing the unauthorized user into a reverse-phishing virtual environment to analyze origin, intent, and attack behaviour, using the known method of deploying fake interfaces for login to gain additional information from the malicious device, as taught by Cohen, in combination with the pulse protection system of Costello in view of Louth, using the same motivation as in claim 17. Regarding claim 31, Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen teaches the method of claim 17, comprising a step of performing analytics to identify the additional intelligence about the unauthorized user by the processor executing instructions for an analytics module, e.g., responsive to a failed authentication of the one or more pulses as the valid representation of the data, XCVR 79 may reconfigure the frequency filter to obtain a different subset of the plurality of frequency components (Costello-Para. 75); XCVR 79 and XCVR 89 may adapt frequency, amplitudes and dampening factors responsive to detecting a potential cyberattack, and in the event a hacker or other malicious agent spoofs the system and transmits data, XCVR 79 may detect such intrusion and a time of attack, providing a log or other timeline that may facilitate identification the malicious agents (Costello-Para. 78); Also note Cohen discloses at step 414, it is determined whether to authenticate a use of the account based on matching of the dynamic values, and if the dynamic values do not match, authentication may be refused, and/or step-up authentication may be required, wherein if the dynamic value from the received cookie is flagged, the device requesting the login may be monitored and/or honeypot pages may be deployed (Fig. 4A, el. 414; Fig. 6, el. 616; Para. 93) and if the dynamic value has been flagged as compromised previously, service provider server 130 may also deploy one or more honeypot traps, such as fake interfaces for login, electronic transaction processing requests, and the like, which may attempt to gain additional information from malicious device 120, wherein this may also include accessing computing logs associated with the login to monitor additional data (Fig. 1, el. 120, 130; Para. 55). Claims 7 and 23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen and further in view of Novick et al. (US 2020/0273040 A1). Regarding claim 7, Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen teaches the system of claim 1. Costello in view of Louth does not clearly teach wherein the processor executing instructions for an unauthorized attempt detection module is configured to portray the unauthorized user that a password entered is wrong, and request retries, and thereby collect forensic intelligence through deceptive interaction. Cohen further teaches wherein the processor executing instructions for an unauthorized attempt detection module is configured to…thereby collect forensic intelligence through deceptive interaction, at step 414, it is determined whether to authenticate a use of the account based on matching of the dynamic values, and if the dynamic values do not match, authentication may be refused, and/or step-up authentication may be required, wherein if the dynamic value from the received cookie is flagged, the device requesting the login may be monitored and/or honeypot pages may be deployed (Cohen-Fig. 4A, el. 414; Fig. 6, el. 616; Para. 93); if the dynamic value has been flagged as compromised previously, service provider server 130 may also deploy one or more honeypot traps, such as fake interfaces for login, electronic transaction processing requests, and the like, which may attempt to gain additional information from malicious device 120, wherein this may also include accessing computing logs associated with the login to monitor additional data (Cohen-Fig. 1, el. 120, 130; Para. 55). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Costello in view of Louth to include wherein the processor executing instructions for an unauthorized attempt detection module is configured to thereby collect forensic intelligence through deceptive interaction, using the known method of deploying fake interfaces for login to gain additional information from the malicious device, as taught by Cohen, in combination with the pulse protection system of Costello in view of Louth, using the same motivation as in claim 1. Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen does not clearly teach wherein the processor executing instructions for an unauthorized attempt detection module is configured to portray the unauthorized user that a password entered is wrong, and request retries, and thereby collect forensic intelligence through deceptive interaction. Novick teaches wherein the unauthorized attempt detection module is configured to portray the unauthorized user that a password entered is wrong, and requests to try again, e.g., if the analysis indicates that the current user of the device is not the genuine user, then, one or more fraud-stopping operations or additional authentication operations may be triggered and performed, for example, requiring the user to re-enter his password or pass-phrase or Personal Identification Number (PIN) (Para. 367). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen to include wherein the unauthorized attempt detection module is configured to portray the unauthorized user that a password entered is wrong, and requests to try again, using the known method of requiring the user to re-enter his password if the analysis indicates that the current user is not the genuine user, as taught by Novick, in combination with the pulse protection system of Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen, for the purpose of collecting additional fraudulent password data. Regarding claim 23, Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen teaches the method of claim 17. Costello in view of Louth does not clearly teach a step of portraying the unauthorized user that a password entered is wrong, and requesting retries, and collecting intelligence through the repeated interaction. Cohen further teaches …collecting intelligence through the repeated interaction, at step 414, it is determined whether to authenticate a use of the account based on matching of the dynamic values, and if the dynamic values do not match, authentication may be refused, and/or step-up authentication may be required, wherein if the dynamic value from the received cookie is flagged, the device requesting the login may be monitored and/or honeypot pages may be deployed (Cohen-Fig. 4A, el. 414; Fig. 6, el. 616; Para. 93); if the dynamic value has been flagged as compromised previously, service provider server 130 may also deploy one or more honeypot traps, such as fake interfaces for login, electronic transaction processing requests, and the like, which may attempt to gain additional information from malicious device 120, wherein this may also include accessing computing logs associated with the login to monitor additional data (Cohen-Fig. 1, el. 120, 130; Para. 55). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Costello in view of Louth to include collecting intelligence through the repeated interaction, using the known method of deploying fake interfaces for login to gain additional information from the malicious device, as taught by Cohen, in combination with the pulse protection system of Costello in view of Louth, using the same motivation as in claim 17. Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen does not clearly teach a step of portraying the unauthorized user that a password entered is wrong, and requesting retries, and collecting intelligence through the repeated interaction. Novick teaches a step of portraying the unauthorized user that a password entered is wrong, and requesting retries, and collecting intelligence through the repeated interaction, e.g., if the analysis indicates that the current user of the device is not the genuine user, then, one or more fraud-stopping operations or additional authentication operations may be triggered and performed, for example, requiring the user to re-enter his password or pass-phrase or Personal Identification Number (PIN) (Para. 367). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen to include a step of portraying the unauthorized user that a password entered is wrong, and requesting retries, and collecting intelligence through the repeated interaction, using the known method of requiring the user to re-enter his password if the analysis indicates that the current user is not the genuine user, as taught by Novick, in combination with the pulse protection system of Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen, for the purpose of collecting additional fraudulent password data. Claims 16 and 32 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen in view of Novick in view of Moore et al. (US 2022/0021651 A1) and further in view of Williams, JR et al. (US 2015/0254555 A1). Regarding claim 16, Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen teaches the system of claim 15. Costello in view of Louth does not clearly teach wherein the processor executing instructions for the analytics module is configured to compare Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to a bad-actors list, correlate regional origin information against known threat databases, detect base64-encoded malware, and generate forensic intelligence reports on unauthorized user activity. Cohen further teaches wherein the processor executing instructions for the analytics module is configured to compare Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to a bad-actors list…generate forensic intelligence reports on unauthorized user activity, e.g., information from computing logs and the like may be analyzed for these logins, such as to determine device identifiers, IP addresses, and the like to identify fraudsters (Cohen-Para. 18); at step 414, it is determined whether to authenticate a use of the account based on matching of the dynamic values, and if the dynamic values do not match, authentication may be refused, and/or step-up authentication may be required, wherein if the dynamic value from the received cookie is flagged, the device requesting the login may be monitored and/or honeypot pages may be deployed (Cohen-Fig. 4A, el. 414; Fig. 6, el. 616; Para. 93); if the dynamic value has been flagged as compromised previously, service provider server 130 may also deploy one or more honeypot traps, such as fake interfaces for login, electronic transaction processing requests, and the like, which may attempt to gain additional information from malicious device 120, wherein this may also include accessing computing logs associated with the login to monitor additional data (Cohen-Fig. 1, el. 120, 130; Para. 55). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Costello in view of Louth to include wherein the processor executing instructions for the analytics module is configured to compare Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to a bad-actors list, and generate forensic intelligence reports on unauthorized user activity, using the known method of deploying fake interfaces for login to gain additional information from the malicious device, as taught by Cohen, in combination with the pulse protection system of Costello in view of Louth, using the same motivation as in claim 1. Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen does not clearly teach wherein the processor executing instructions for the analytics module is configured to compare Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to a bad-actors list, correlate regional origin information against known threat databases, detect base64-encoded malware, and generate forensic intelligence reports on unauthorized user activity. Novick teaches wherein the processor, e.g., processor 111 (Fig. 1, el. 111), executing instructions for the analytics module, e.g., IP Spoofing/Proxy Server Detector module 175 (Fig. 1, el. 175), is configured to compare Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to a bad-actors list, correlate regional origin information against…databases,…, e.g., the system may detect that the bank account of victim Victor, particularly during the usage session in which the wire transferred was commanded, was controlled by an end-user device that performed IP address spoofing, for example, based on lags or delays or latency that are detected in the communication channel (e.g., the spoofed IP address is a nearby IP address in the same country as the bank server computer, but a Ping time indicates a far-away end-user-device in a far country), and/or by using a Bogon Filtering mechanism (e.g., detecting a bogus/fake IP address that is not in any range allocated by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) or by a delegated Regional Internet Registry (RIR) for public Internet use) (Para. 71); and generate forensic intelligence reports on unauthorized user activity, e.g., based on such detection, and by detecting that a wire transfer was performed during the Remote Access usage session from the remotely-controlled bank account to the recipient account, an IP-Spoofing-Based Mule-Account Detector module 176 determines that the bank account of the recipient (Bob in this example) is actually a Mule bank account, and generates a mule account notification with regard to that bank account, and triggers a fraud mitigation process (Para. 71). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen to include wherein the processor executing instructions for the analytics module is configured to compare Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to a bad-actors list, correlate regional origin information against databases, and generate forensic intelligence reports on unauthorized user activity, using the known method of detecting a bogus/fake IP address that is not in any range allocated by the IANA or by a delegated Regional Internet Registry (RIR) for public Internet use, as taught by Novick, in combination with the pulse protection system of Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen, for the purpose of improving the security of the system by detecting fake IP addresses that are not in any regional approved IP address database. Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen in view of Novick does not clearly teach wherein the processor executing instructions for the analytics module is configured to compare Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to a bad-actors list, correlate regional origin information against known threat databases, detect base64-encoded malware, and generate forensic intelligence reports on unauthorized user activity. Moore teaches wherein the processor executing instructions for the analytics module is configured to compare Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to a bad-actors list, correlate regional origin information against known threat databases,…, and generate forensic intelligence reports on unauthorized user activity, e.g., the identification of communications that are associated with Internet threats may leverage databases of cyber threat intelligence (CTI) reports that are available from many CTI provider organizations, wherein these CTI reports may include indicators, or threat indicators, or Indicators-of-Compromise (IoCs), that are unique identifiers of Internet hosts or Internet hosts' resources that are associated with malicious activity, wherein the CTI indicators may include Internet network addresses—in the form of IP addresses, hostnames/domain names, URIs, and the like—of resources that may be controlled and/or operated by threat actors, or that otherwise may be associated with malicious activity, wherein in addition to threat indicators, CTI reports may include additional information associated with the threat, such as the type of threat, threat attribution and threat actor(s), characteristic behaviors, attack targets, geographic and geo-political information, and the like (Para. 32); the enterprise may create policies composed of packet-filtering rules derived from the CTI indicators, configure packet filtering devices with the policies, and protect its enterprise networks from Internet threats (Para. 33). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen in view of Novick to include wherein the processor executing instructions for the analytics module is configured to compare Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to a bad-actors list, correlate regional origin information against known threat databases, and generate forensic intelligence reports on unauthorized user activity, using the known method of creating policies from CTI indicators, wherein the CTI indicators include threat information such as IP addresses and geographic information and wherein the CTI indicators be provided from multiple databases, as taught by Moore, in combination with the pulse protection system of Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen in view of Novick, for the purpose of improving the security of the system by utilizing multiple CTI databases. Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen in view of Novick in view of Moore does not clearly teach wherein the processor executing instructions for the analytics module is configured to compare Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to a bad-actors list, correlate regional origin information against known threat databases, detect base64-encoded malware, and generate forensic intelligence reports on unauthorized user activity. Williams, JR teaches wherein the processor executing instructions for the analytics module, e.g., these program instructions may be provided to a processor to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute on the processor, create means for implementing the actions specified in the flowchart block or blocks (Para. 151), is configured to…detect base64-encoded malware, and generate forensic intelligence reports on unauthorized user activity, e.g., FIG. 12 is a table diagram showing the sample results of a real-time scoring of website files being analyzed for malicious code, wherein a Base64 type of exploit was detected (Fig. 12; Para. 164). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen in view of Novick in view of Moore to include wherein the processor executing instructions for the analytics module is configured to detect base64-encoded malware, and generate forensic intelligence reports on unauthorized user activity, using the known method of detecting a Base64 type of exploit, as taught by Williams, JR, in combination with the pulse protection system of Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen in view of Novick in view of Moore, for the purpose of improving the security of the system by detecting a Base64 type of exploit. Regarding claim 32, Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen teaches the method of claim 17. Costello in view of Louth does not clearly teach a step of combining multiple analytics by the processor executing instructions for an analytics module, the analytics including IP bad actor check, region correlation, base64 encoded malware detection and threat database comparison, and redirecting the unauthorized user to the safe zone for intelligence gathering. Cohen further teaches a step of combining multiple analytics by the processor executing instructions for an analytics module, the analytics including IP bad actor check,…and redirecting the unauthorized user to the safe zone for intelligence gathering, e.g., information from computing logs and the like may be analyzed for these logins, such as to determine device identifiers, IP addresses, and the like to identify fraudsters (Cohen-Para. 18); at step 414, it is determined whether to authenticate a use of the account based on matching of the dynamic values, and if the dynamic values do not match, authentication may be refused, and/or step-up authentication may be required, wherein if the dynamic value from the received cookie is flagged, the device requesting the login may be monitored and/or honeypot pages may be deployed (Cohen-Fig. 4A, el. 414; Fig. 6, el. 616; Para. 93); if the dynamic value has been flagged as compromised previously, service provider server 130 may also deploy one or more honeypot traps, such as fake interfaces for login, electronic transaction processing requests, and the like, which may attempt to gain additional information from malicious device 120, wherein this may also include accessing computing logs associated with the login to monitor additional data (Cohen-Fig. 1, el. 120, 130; Para. 55). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Costello in view of Louth to include a step of combining multiple analytics by the processor executing instructions for an analytics module, the analytics including IP bad actor check, region correlation, and redirecting the unauthorized user to the safe zone for intelligence gathering, using the known method of deploying fake interfaces for login to gain additional information from the malicious device, as taught by Cohen, in combination with the pulse protection system of Costello in view of Louth, using the same motivation as in claim 17. Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen does not clearly teach a step of combining multiple analytics by the processor executing instructions for an analytics module, the analytics including IP bad actor check, region correlation, base64 encoded malware detection and threat database comparison, and redirecting the unauthorized user to the safe zone for intelligence gathering. Novick teaches a step of combining multiple analytics by the processor executing instructions for an analytics module, e.g., IP Spoofing/Proxy Server Detector module 175 (Fig. 1, el. 175), the analytics including IP bad actor check, region correlation, and…database comparison, and redirecting the unauthorized user to the safe zone for intelligence gathering, e.g., the system may detect that the bank account of victim Victor, particularly during the usage session in which the wire transferred was commanded, was controlled by an end-user device that performed IP address spoofing, for example, based on lags or delays or latency that are detected in the communication channel (e.g., the spoofed IP address is a nearby IP address in the same country as the bank server computer, but a Ping time indicates a far-away end-user-device in a far country), and/or by using a Bogon Filtering mechanism (e.g., detecting a bogus/fake IP address that is not in any range allocated by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) or by a delegated Regional Internet Registry (RIR) for public Internet use) (Para. 71); and generate forensic intelligence reports on unauthorized user activity, e.g., based on such detection, and by detecting that a wire transfer was performed during the Remote Access usage session from the remotely-controlled bank account to the recipient account, an IP-Spoofing-Based Mule-Account Detector module 176 determines that the bank account of the recipient (Bob in this example) is actually a Mule bank account, and generates a mule account notification with regard to that bank account, and triggers a fraud mitigation process (Para. 71). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen to include a step of combining multiple analytics by the processor executing instructions for an analytics module, the analytics including IP bad actor check, region correlation, and database comparison, and redirecting the unauthorized user to the safe zone for intelligence gathering, using the known method of detecting a bogus/fake IP address that is not in any range allocated by the IANA or by a delegated Regional Internet Registry (RIR) for public Internet use, as taught by Novick, in combination with the pulse protection system of Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen, for the purpose of improving the security of the system by detecting fake IP addresses that are not in any regional approved IP address database. Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen in view of Novick does not clearly teach a step of combining multiple analytics by the processor executing instructions for an analytics module, the analytics including IP bad actor check, region correlation, base64 encoded malware detection and threat database comparison, and redirecting the unauthorized user to the safe zone for intelligence gathering. Moore teaches a step of combining multiple analytics by the processor executing instructions for an analytics module, the analytics including IP bad actor check, region correlation,…and threat database comparison, and redirecting the unauthorized user to the safe zone for intelligence gathering, e.g., the identification of communications that are associated with Internet threats may leverage databases of cyber threat intelligence (CTI) reports that are available from many CTI provider organizations, wherein these CTI reports may include indicators, or threat indicators, or Indicators-of-Compromise (IoCs), that are unique identifiers of Internet hosts or Internet hosts' resources that are associated with malicious activity, wherein the CTI indicators may include Internet network addresses—in the form of IP addresses, hostnames/domain names, URIs, and the like—of resources that may be controlled and/or operated by threat actors, or that otherwise may be associated with malicious activity, wherein in addition to threat indicators, CTI reports may include additional information associated with the threat, such as the type of threat, threat attribution and threat actor(s), characteristic behaviors, attack targets, geographic and geo-political information, and the like (Para. 32); the enterprise may create policies composed of packet-filtering rules derived from the CTI indicators, configure packet filtering devices with the policies, and protect its enterprise networks from Internet threats (Para. 33). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen in view of Novick to include a step of combining multiple analytics by the processor executing instructions for an analytics module, the analytics including IP bad actor check, region correlation, and threat database comparison, and redirecting the unauthorized user to the safe zone for intelligence gathering, using the known method of creating policies from CTI indicators, wherein the CTI indicators include threat information such as IP addresses and geographic information and wherein the CTI indicators be provided from multiple databases, as taught by Moore, in combination with the pulse protection system of Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen in view of Novick, for the purpose of improving the security of the system by utilizing multiple CTI databases. Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen in view of Novick in view of Moore does not clearly teach a step of combining multiple analytics by the processor executing instructions for an analytics module, the analytics including IP bad actor check, region correlation, base64 encoded malware detection and threat database comparison, and redirecting the unauthorized user to the safe zone for intelligence gathering. Williams, JR teaches a step of combining multiple analytics by the processor executing instructions for an analytics module, e.g., these program instructions may be provided to a processor to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute on the processor, create means for implementing the actions specified in the flowchart block or blocks (Para. 151), the analytics including base64 encoded malware detection, e.g., FIG. 12 is a table diagram showing the sample results of a real-time scoring of website files being analyzed for malicious code, wherein a Base64 type of exploit was detected (Fig. 12; Para. 164). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen in view of Novick in view of Moore to include a step of combining multiple analytics by the processor executing instructions for an analytics module, the analytics including IP bad actor check, region correlation, base64 encoded malware detection and threat database comparison, and redirecting the unauthorized user to the safe zone for intelligence gathering, using the known method of detecting a Base64 type of exploit, as taught by Williams, JR, in combination with the pulse protection system of Costello in view of Louth in view of Cohen in view of Novick in view of Moore, for the purpose of improving the security of the system by detecting a Base64 type of exploit. Relevant Prior Art The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure. Gwilliams (US 2020/0265144 A1)—Gwilliams discloses determining a penetration test script comprises providing one or more values for one or more parameters in a template script (Para. 8). McConnell (US 2008/0004805 A1)—McConnell discloses a network-based system 120 includes threat database 122, which may contain Intrusion Detection System ("IDS") or Firewall logs identifying a threat in the system. For example, IDS or Firewall logs may contain the attack type, description, and impacted GPS device information such as an IP Address of the impacted GPS device. In addition, GPS device 140 is capable of providing information such as the IP address and geographic coordinates (e.g., latitude and longitude) of the device. Finally, mapping system 150 includes mapping database 152, which may correlate and contain data from threat database and GPS device(s), as described below, to map the intrusion(s) (Para. 38). Isola et al. (US 2019/0036926 A1)—Isola discloses logically disabling or blocking an endpoint device 106 may involve rerouting data traffic associated with the endpoint device 106 to a safe zone, wherein transferring the traffic associated with the endpoint device 106 to the safe zone allows the endpoint device 106 to be monitored and recorded in a low-risk environment without jeopardizing the system 100 and communications network 102 (Para. 45). Ding (CN 105681323 B)—Ding discloses an information hiding type wireless transmission method based on time reversal, belonging to the electronic technical field. The invention emits broadband narrow pulse A (t), the processed time domain cloak signal C (t) to obtain the pulse or pulse train S code (t), synthesizing one signal Y (t) and C (t). S (t) and C (t) is time interval is Δ t, Y (t) into the first reverberation chamber, which is processed to form a new signal Z (t) (Abstract). Conclusion Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to JEREMY DUFFIELD whose telephone number is (571)270-1643. The examiner can normally be reached Monday - Friday, 7:00 AM - 3:00 PM (ET). Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Yin-Chen Shaw can be reached at (571) 272-8878. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. 07 October 2026 /Jeremy S Duffield/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2498
Read full office action

Prosecution Timeline

Oct 18, 2022
Application Filed
Jun 26, 2025
Non-Final Rejection mailed — §103, §112
Sep 18, 2025
Response Filed
Dec 15, 2025
Final Rejection mailed — §103, §112
Jun 15, 2026
Request for Continued Examination
Jun 21, 2026
Response after Non-Final Action
Oct 08, 2026
Non-Final Rejection mailed — §103, §112 (current)

Precedent Cases

Applications granted by this same examiner with similar technology

Patent 12756550
TIMESTAMP GENERATION METHOD AND APPARATUS, AND ELECTRONIC DEVICE AND STORAGE MEDIUM
2y 10m to grant Granted Oct 06, 2026
Patent 12739096
Circuit for a Combined Key Value-Dependent Exchange and Randomization of Two Values
2y 10m to grant Granted Sep 15, 2026
Patent 12724932
CRAM VALIDATION USING AN EXTERNAL DEVICE
2y 6m to grant Granted Sep 01, 2026
Patent 12706911
Secure Collection of Diagnostics Data about Integrated Circuit Memory Cells
4y 1m to grant Granted Aug 11, 2026
Patent 12707259
SELECTING A SUBSCRIPTION FOR DECIPHERING POSITIONING SYSTEM INFORMATION BLOCKS
2y 7m to grant Granted Aug 11, 2026
Study what changed to get past this examiner. Based on 5 most recent grants.

Strategy Recommendation AI-generated — please review before filing

Get a prosecution strategy drawn from examiner precedents, rejection analysis, and claim mapping.
Typically takes 5-10 seconds — AI-generated, attorney review required before filing

Prosecution Projections

3-4
Expected OA Rounds
50%
Grant Probability
99%
With Interview (+52.7%)
3y 8m (~0m remaining)
Median Time to Grant
High
PTA Risk
Based on 452 resolved cases by this examiner. Grant probability derived from career allowance rate.

Sign in with your work email

Enter your email to receive a magic link. No password needed.

Personal email addresses (Gmail, Yahoo, etc.) are not accepted.

Free tier: 3 strategy analyses per month