DETAILED ACTION
This Office Action is in response to the communication filed on 1/22/2026.
Claims 1-20 are pending.
Claims 1-15 have been amended.
Claims 1-20 are rejected.
The Examiner cites particular sections in the references as applied to the claims below for the convenience of the applicant(s). Although the specified citations are representative of the teachings in the art and are applied to the specific limitations within the individual claim, other passages and figures may apply as well. It is respectfully requested that, in preparing responses, the applicant(s) fully consider the references in their entirety as potentially teaching all or part of the claimed invention, as well as the context of the passage as taught by the prior art or disclosed by the Examiner.
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s arguments filed 1/22/2025 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
Applicant argues, on page 9 of Remarks, that Goettfert’s shift registers are not “processing circuits”, however in the next sentence Applicant admits that Goettfert’s shift registers at least perform bit-shifting operations, performing an operations is “processing”, additionally is it clear that Goettfert’s shift registers are circuits. Applicant further states that Goettfert’s shift registers are not separate processing circuits, however the claim do not require separation. Therefore Goettfert’s shift registers are “processing circuits”. Additionally, if the claims did require separation, then Goettfert’s shift registers would still meet a broad definition of a “separate circuits”.
Applicant argues, on page 9 of Remarks, that Goettfert’s shift registers do not “use” a random number for DPA protection. However, paragraph [0048] of Goettfert’s explicitly teaches “The seed source is, for example, a TRNG providing a true random number bit sequence… the true random bit sequence output by seed source 46 is applied to the seed input of influencing gates 44a and 44b…”, the feedback shift registers 10a and 10b are seeded with the same seed. This explicitly discloses that Goettfert’s shift registers use a random number; [0032] teaches that the final output can be used for protection against differential power analysis (DPA) attacks. Therefore Goettfert’s shift registers can use a random number for DPA protection.
Additionally in the following paragraph applicant admits that Goettfert explicitly “uses a seed”, a seed which Goettfert clearly discloses is a random number.
Applicant argues on page 9 of Remarks that Goettfert’s shift registers are producers of random numbers and therefore are fundamentally different from then instant claims.
Examiner disagrees with the characterization because Goettfert both receives and produces random numbers for DPA protection. Goettfert does receive a random number for DPA protection and therefore is not fundamentally different.
On page 10 of Remarks Applicant makes similar arguments to those above, specifically that the shift registers are producers and not consumers of random numbers, however [0048] of Goettfert makes it clear that the shift registers explicitly consume random numbers and additionally produce random numbers.
On page 10 of Remarks Applicant argues that Gangnerot does not cure deficiencies regarding the previously arguments regarding Goettfert. While Gangnerot could be used to teach many identical features it is only being used to teach the concept protection of the respective cryptographic operation which is recited in an extremely broad manner in the claims. Under BRI, Gangnerot clearly teaches the concept “respective”.
In response to Applicant’s arguments that the dependent claims are allowable by virtue of their dependency from allowable independent claims. Examiner respectfully disagrees because the independent claims are not patentable and rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102 and 35 U.S.C. 103 as set forth below.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claims 1-3, 5-8, 11-13, 15, 17 and 19-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Goettfert (U.S. 20090204656), in view of Gagnerot (U.S. 20170373837).
Regarding claim 1,
Goettfert discloses: A system comprising:
a plurality of cryptographic circuits, each being a processing circuit configured to perform a cryptographic operation, wherein each of the plurality of cryptographic circuits is to receive a random number and use the random number for differential power analysis (DPA) protection of the (Goettfert [0001, 0032-0040, 0046-0051, Fig. 4] teaches that cryptographic circuits (Shift registers, Fig. 4-40a-b) receive (loaded into shift registers) random numbers which can be used for (DPA) protection; [0046] teaches using the same seed in multiple shift registers; seed source is, for example, a TRNG providing a true random number bit sequence.).
While Goettfert teaches DPA protection of cryptographic operations, it does not explicitly disclose a circuit performing a cryptographic operation which receives a random number and uses the random number to provide DPA protection of the respective cryptographic operation However, in the same field of endeavor Gagnerot discloses: a cryptographic circuit that performs a cryptographic operation including receiving a random number and using the random number to provide, the respective cryptographic operation, DPA protection (Gagnerot [0002-0005] teaches integrating hardware cryptographic components integrated onto mother boards of computers to protect the respective circuit; [0013-0020; 0036-0055] The circuit CT5 may include the circuit part CTP implementing the operation OPR to be protected and a protection circuit part PTC5. In some implementations, the circuit part PTC5 may include a variable resistor VR controlled by an output of a pseudorandom number generator circuit PRNG receiving as a seed the input data IND of the operation OPR)
Before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, having the teachings of Goettfert and Gagnerot before him or her, to modify the method of Goettfert to include the respective protection of Gagnerot because it will protect the circuit itself against side channel analysis attacks by preventing acquisition of a current consumption trace.
The motivation for doing so would be [“Due to the variation of the power offset during the processing of an input data IND by the operation OPR, the power offset having a profile only linked to the input data IND currently processed by the operation, it may be possible to provide a protection method that can be effective against all of the above-described side channel analyses”] (Paragraph 0008, 0046-0052 by Gagnerot)].
Therefore, it would have been obvious to combine Goettfert and Gagnerot to obtain the invention as specified in the instant claim.
Regarding claim 5,
Goettfert discloses: A system comprising:
a random number generator (RNG) to generate random numbers; and (Goettfert [0016, 0043-0051]; [Fig. 4] teaches a pseudo random number generator (PRNG))
a plurality of cryptographic circuits operatively coupled to the RNG, wherein each of the plurality of cryptographic circuits being a processing circuit is to receive a random number from the RNG, perform a cryptographic operation, and use the random number for differential power analysis (DPA) protection of the (Goettfert [0032, 0046-0051]; [Fig. 4] teaches that cryptographic circuits (Shift registers, Fig. 4-40a-b) receive (loaded into shift registers) random numbers from a pseudo random number generator (PRNG); [0046] teaches using the same seed in multiple cryptographic circuits; The seed source is, for example, a TRNG providing a true random number bit sequence).
While Goettfert teaches DPA protection of cryptographic operations, it does not explicitly disclose a circuit performing a cryptographic operation which receives a random number and uses the random number to provide DPA protection of the respective cryptographic operation However, in the same field of endeavor Gagnerot discloses: a cryptographic circuit that performs a cryptographic operation including receiving a random number and using the random number to provide, the respective cryptographic operation, DPA protection (Gagnerot [0002-0005] teaches integrating hardware cryptographic components integrated onto mother boards of computers to protect the respective circuit; [0013-0020; 0036-0055] The circuit CT5 may include the circuit part CTP implementing the operation OPR to be protected and a protection circuit part PTC5. In some implementations, the circuit part PTC5 may include a variable resistor VR controlled by an output of a pseudorandom number generator circuit PRNG receiving as a seed the input data IND of the operation OPR)
It would have been obvious to combine Goettfert and Gagnerot to obtain the invention as for similar reasons specified in claim 1.
Regarding claim 15,
Goettfert discloses: A method of operating an entropy source, the method comprising:
receiving, at a first time, a first request for a random number from a first cryptographic circuit, the first cryptographic circuit being a processing circuit, the first cryptographic circuit to perform a first cryptographic operation; (Goettfert [0001, 0032-0040, 0046-0051]; [Fig. 4] teaches that cryptographic circuits (Shift registers, Fig. 4-40a-b) receive (loaded into shift registers) random numbers from a pseudo random number generator (PRNG); [Fig. 4] shows two separate cryptographic circuits where each circuit perform independently including the initialization phase which includes a request from the respective cryptographic circuits [0046] teaches that seeding can take place in parallel or serially))
receiving, at the first time, a second request for a random number from a second cryptographic circuit, the second cryptographic circuit being a processing circuit, the second cryptographic circuit to perform a second cryptographic operation; (Goettfert [0001, 0032-0040, 0046-0051]; [Fig. 4] teaches that cryptographic circuits (Shift registers, Fig. 4-40a-b) receive (loaded into shift registers) random numbers from a pseudo random number generator (PRNG); [Fig. 4] shows two separate cryptographic circuits where each circuit perform independently including the initialization phase which includes a request from the respective cryptographic circuits [0046] teaches that seeding can take place in parallel or serially))
generating a first random number; (Goettfert [0001, 0016, 0032-0048] As becomes clear from the above, the seed of the pseudo random number generator (PRNG) is a relatively short bit sequence which may be "truly" random. The PRNG, then, generates a long pseudo random sequence out of the seed which may be truly random; [0015] The seed source providing the seed could, for example, comprise a true random number generator (TRNG). The true random number generator, in turn, may exploit a physical noise source in order to gain the true random number bit sequence; The seed source is, for example, a TRNG providing a true random number bit sequence.)
providing the first random number to the first cryptographic circuit in response to the first request; and providing the first random number to the second cryptographic circuit in response to the second request wherein each of the first cryptographic circuit and the second cryptographic circuit is to use the first random number for differential power analysis (DPA) protection of the . (Goettfert [0001, 0032-0040, 0046-0051]; [Fig. 4] teaches that cryptographic circuits (Shift registers, Fig. 4-40a-b) receive (loaded into shift registers) random numbers from a pseudo random number generator (PRNG); [0046] teaches using the same seed in multiple cryptographic circuits); [0015] teaches initialization beginning at the same time for all circuits, at time (T), where T=0); [0046] teaches that seeding can take place in parallel or serially)
While Goettfert teaches DPA protection of cryptographic operations, it does not explicitly disclose a circuit performing a cryptographic operation which receives a random number and uses the random number to provide DPA protection of the respective cryptographic operation. However, in the same field of endeavor Gagnerot discloses: a cryptographic circuit that performs a cryptographic operation including receiving a random number and using the random number to provide, the respective cryptographic operation, DPA protection (Gagnerot [0002-0005] teaches integrating hardware cryptographic components integrated onto mother boards of computers to protect the respective circuit; [0013-0020; 0036-0055] The circuit CT5 may include the circuit part CTP implementing the operation OPR to be protected and a protection circuit part PTC5. In some implementations, the circuit part PTC5 may include a variable resistor VR controlled by an output of a pseudorandom number generator circuit PRNG receiving as a seed the input data IND of the operation OPR)
It would have been obvious to combine Goettfert and Gagnerot to obtain the invention as for similar reasons specified in claim 1.
Regarding claim 2,
Goettfert in view of Gagnerot discloses: The system of claim 1, further comprising:
a random number generator (RNG) operatively coupled to the plurality of cryptographic circuits, wherein the RNG is configured to selectively provide the same random number to the at least two of the plurality of cryptographic circuits. (Goettfert [0046-0051]; [Fig. 4] teaches that a seed source (which generated seeds/keys/random numbers using a PRNG) is connected to multiple cryptographic circuits in order to provide (load) random numbers to multiple cryptographic circuits, wherein the same random number can be loaded into multiple different cryptographic circuits)
Regarding claim 3,
Goettfert in view of Gagnerot discloses: The system of claim 1, wherein the same random number is at least one of a mask, a nonce, a seed value, an initialization vector (IV), or a key. (Goettfert [0051] teaches that random numbers can be keys/seed value)
Regarding claim 6,
Goettfert in view of Gagnerot discloses: The system of claim 5, wherein the RNG is to:
receive a first request from a first cryptographic circuit of the plurality of cryptographic circuits; receive a second request from a second cryptographic circuit of the plurality of cryptographic circuits; (Goettfert [0001, 0032-0040, 0046-0051]; [Fig. 4] teaches that cryptographic circuits (Shift registers, Fig. 4-40a-b) receive (loaded into shift registers) random numbers from a pseudo random number generator (PRNG); [Fig. 4] shows two separate cryptographic circuits where each circuit perform independently including the initialization phase which includes a request from the respective cryptographic circuits)
generate a first random number; and (Goettfert [0001, 0016, 0032-0040] As becomes clear from the above, the seed of the pseudo random number generator (PRNG) is a relatively short bit sequence which may be "truly" random. The PRNG, then, generates a long pseudo random sequence out of the seed which may be truly random; [0015] The seed source providing the seed could, for example, comprise a true random number generator (TRNG). The true random number generator, in turn, may exploit a physical noise source in order to gain the true random number bit sequence)
provide, at a first time, the first random number to the first cryptographic circuit and the second cryptographic circuit, the first random number being the same random number. (Goettfert [0001, 0032-0040, 0046-0051]; [Fig. 4] teaches that cryptographic circuits (Shift registers, Fig. 4-40a-b) receive (loaded into shift registers) random numbers from a pseudo random number generator (PRNG); [0046] teaches using the same seed in multiple cryptographic circuits); [0015] teaches initialization beginning at the same time for all circuits, at time (T), where T=0); [0046] teaches that seeding can take place in parallel or serially)
Regarding claim 7,
Goettfert in view of Gagnerot discloses: The system of claim 6, wherein the RNG is further to:
receive a third request from a third cryptographic circuit of the plurality of cryptographic circuits; and provide, at the first time, a second random number to the third cryptographic circuit, wherein the second random number and the first random number are different. (Goettfert [Fig. 1] teaches that there can be any number of shift registers/cryptographic circuits; [0050-0052] teaches that the plurality of shift registers/cryptographic circuits operate in the same was claim 6. Please see rejection of claim 6; [0046] teaches that seeding can take place in parallel or serially) The specific arrangement of request and provide at specific times is not explicitly disclosed, however Goettfert discloses seeding in parallel and seeding serially meaning that multiple requests can be received at the same or different times (i.e. third random number request from third circuit at first time and fourth request from second circuit serially or in parallel). Additionally, Goettfert discloses generating multiple random numbers using the shift registers meaning that any number of keys can be sent at any time to any circuit.
One of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing would have been motivated to modify the arrangement as specified in the claim because doing so would allow for different configurations to be envisioned. The motivation, as indicated in paragraph [0050] Goettfert, teaches that the number and configuration of cryptographic circuits may be varied.
Regarding claim 8,
Goettfert in view of Gagnerot discloses: The system of claim 6, wherein the RNG is further to:
receive a third request from the first cryptographic circuit of the plurality of cryptographic circuits; receive a fourth request from the second cryptographic circuit of the plurality of cryptographic circuits; (Goettfert [Fig. 1]; [Fig. 5-6] teaches that there can be any number of shift registers/cryptographic circuits which are used to generate any number of random numbers; [0050-0052] teaches that the plurality of shift registers/cryptographic circuits operate in the same was claim 6. Please see rejection of claim 6; [0046] teaches that seeding can take place in parallel or serially); The specific arrangement of request and response is not explicitly disclosed, however Goettfert discloses generating multiple random numbers using the seed in parallel and seeding serially meaning that multiple requests can be received at the same or different times (i.e. third request from first circuit and fourth request from second circuit serially or in parallel)
generate a second random number; generate a third random number; and (Goettfert [0001, 0016, 0032-0040] As becomes clear from the above, the seed of the pseudo random number generator (PRNG) is a relatively short bit sequence which may be "truly" random. The PRNG, then, generates a long pseudo random sequence out of the seed which may be truly random; [0015] The seed source providing the seed could, for example, comprise a true random number generator (TRNG). The true random number generator, in turn, may exploit a physical noise source in order to gain the true random number bit sequence) Specifically generating a “second” or “third” random number is not explicitly disclosed, however Goettfert discloses generation of multiple keys meaning that it discloses generating a first, second, third, fourth or any number of keys
provide, at a second time, the second random number to the first cryptographic circuit and the third random number to the second cryptographic circuit, the second random number and the third random number being different. (Goettfert [0001, 0032-0040, 0046-0051]; [Fig. 4] teaches that cryptographic circuits (Shift registers, Fig. 4-40a-b) receive (loaded into shift registers) random numbers from a pseudo random number generator (PRNG); [0046] teaches using the same seed in multiple cryptographic circuits); [0015] teaches initialization beginning at the same time for all circuits, at time (T), where T=0); [0046] teaches that seeding can take place in parallel or serially). Additionally, Goettfert discloses generating multiple random numbers using the shift registers meaning that any number of keys can be sent at any time to any circuit.
Regarding claim 11,
Goettfert in view of Gagnerot discloses: The system of claim 5, further comprising:
a first communication path between the RNG and a first cryptographic circuit of the plurality of cryptographic circuits; a second communication path between the RNG and a second cryptographic circuit of the plurality of cryptographic circuits; and a third communication path between the RNG and both the first cryptographic circuit and the second cryptographic circuit, wherein the RNG is to provide the same random number using the third communication path. (Goettfert [Fig. 4] teaches any number of first second third ect. communication paths which are between an RNG and cryptographic circuits; [Fig. 1, 4, 5, 6]; [0048] teaches that the same random number can be provided to more than one circuit)
Regarding claim 12,
Goettfert in view of Gagnerot discloses: The system of claim 11, wherein the third communication path is between the RNG and a third cryptographic circuit of the plurality of cryptographic circuits, (Goettfert [Fig. 4] teaches any number of first second third ect. communication paths which are between an RNG and cryptographic circuits) wherein the first communication path and the second communication path are dedicated communication paths, and wherein (Goettfert [Fig. 1-4] show many communication paths which are dedicated for communication) the third cryptographic circuit does not include a dedicated communication path to the RNG. (Goettfert [Fig. 2-4] additionally show communication paths which are dedicated but not connected to the RNG (10a 10b)
Regarding claim 13,
Goettfert in view of Gagnerot discloses: The system of claim 5, wherein the same random number is at least one of a mask, a nonce, a seed value, an initialization vector (IV), or a key, (Goettfert [0051] teaches that random numbers can be keys/seed value) wherein each of the at least two of the plurality of cryptographic circuits is to use the same random number in connection with differential power analysis (DPA) protection of a cryptographic operation. (Goettfert [0001, 0032-0040, 0046-0051]; [Fig. 4] teaches that cryptographic circuits (Shift registers, Fig. 4-40a-b) receive (loaded into shift registers) random numbers which can be used for (DPA) protection; [0046] teaches using the same seed in multiple shift registers).
Regarding claim 17,
Goettfert in view of Gagnerot discloses: The method of claim 15, further comprising:
receiving, at a second time, a third request for a random number from the first cryptographic circuit; receiving, at the second time, a fourth request for a random number from the second cryptographic circuit; (Goettfert [Fig. 1] teaches that there can be any number of shift registers/cryptographic circuits; [0050-0052] teaches that the plurality of shift registers/cryptographic circuits operate in the same was claim 6. Please see rejection of claim 6; [0046] teaches that seeding can take place in parallel or serially)
generating a second random number; generating a third random number; (Goettfert [0001, 0016, 0032-0040] As becomes clear from the above, the seed of the pseudo random number generator (PRNG) is a relatively short bit sequence which may be "truly" random. The PRNG, then, generates a long pseudo random sequence out of the seed which may be truly random; [0015] The seed source providing the seed could, for example, comprise a true random number generator (TRNG). The true random number generator, in turn, may exploit a physical noise source in order to gain the true random number bit sequence where any number of random numbers can be generated) Specifically generating a “second” random number is not explicitly disclosed, however Goettfert discloses generation of multiple keys meaning that it discloses generating a first, second, third, fourth or any number of keys
providing the second random number to the first cryptographic circuit in response to the third request; and providing the third random number to the second cryptographic circuit in response to the fourth request. (Goettfert [Fig. 1] teaches that there can be any number of shift registers/cryptographic circuits; [0050-0052] teaches that the plurality of shift registers/cryptographic circuits operate in the same was claim 6. Please see rejection of claim 6; [0046] teaches that seeding can take place in parallel or serially)
Regarding claim 19,
Goettfert in view of Gagnerot discloses: The method of claim 15, further comprising: receiving, at a second time, a third request for a random number from the first cryptographic circuit over a direct connection between the entropy source and the first cryptographic circuit; (Goettfert [0015] The true random number generator, in turn, may exploit a physical noise source in order to gain the true random number bit sequence; (Goettfert [Fig. 1-4] show many communication paths which are dedicated for communication; [0046] teaches that seeding can take place in parallel or serially)
generating a second random number; and (Goettfert [0001, 0016, 0032-0040] As becomes clear from the above, the seed of the pseudo random number generator (PRNG) is a relatively short bit sequence which may be "truly" random. The PRNG, then, generates a long pseudo random sequence out of the seed which may be truly random; [0015] The seed source providing the seed could, for example, comprise a true random number generator (TRNG). The true random number generator, in turn, may exploit a physical noise source in order to gain the true random number bit sequence). Specifically generating a “second” or random number is not explicitly disclosed, however Goettfert discloses generation of multiple keys meaning that it discloses generating a first, second, third, fourth or any number of keys
providing the second random number to the first cryptographic circuit only in response to the third request. (Goettfert [0001, 0032-0040, 0046-0051]; [Fig. 4] teaches that cryptographic circuits (Shift registers, Fig. 4-40a-b) receive (loaded into shift registers) random numbers from a pseudo random number generator (PRNG); [0046] teaches using the same seed in multiple cryptographic circuits); [0015] teaches initialization beginning at the same time for all circuits, at time (T), where T=0); [0046] teaches that seeding can take place in parallel or serially)
Regarding claim 20,
Goettfert in view of Gagnerot discloses: The method of claim 15, wherein the first random number is at least one of a mask, a nonce, a seed value, an initialization vector (IV), or a key-wrapping key, (Goettfert [0051] teaches that random numbers can be keys/seed value) wherein each of the first cryptographic circuit and the second cryptographic circuit is to use the first random number in connection with differential power analysis (DPA) protection of a cryptographic operation. (Goettfert [0001, 0032-0040, 0046-0051]; [Fig. 4] teaches that cryptographic circuits (Shift registers, Fig. 4-40a-b) receive (loaded into shift registers) random numbers which can be used for (DPA) protection; [0046] teaches using the same seed in multiple shift registers).
Claims 4 and 9-10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Goettfert (U.S. 20090204656), in view of Gagnerot (U.S. 20170373837) and in view of Nakarmi (U.S. 20190014509).
Regarding claim 4,
Goettfert in view of Gagnerot discloses: The system of claim 1, wherein
a first cryptographic circuit of the plurality of cryptographic circuits is to send a request for a first random number, (Goettfert [0015, 0021, 0036] describes an “initialization phase” where the shift registers are seeded. This “initialization phase” is being interpreted as including the “request”)
Goettfert in view of Gagnerot does not explicitly disclose: wherein the request comprises an indication that the first random number is shareable with other cryptographic circuits of the plurality of cryptographic circuits, the first random number being the same random number.
However, in the same field of endeavor Nakarmi discloses: wherein the request comprises an indication that the first random number is shareable with other cryptographic circuits of the plurality of cryptographic circuits, the first random number being the same random number. (Nakarmi [0028-0033; 0081-0095] Describes receiving, from a cryptographic circuit, a request for a key (random number), the request includes an indication that indicates whether the key can be reused (shareable))
Goettfert in view of Gagnerot and Nakarmi are analogous art because they are from the same field of endeavor data protection using generated encryption keys.
Before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, having the teachings of Goettfert in view of Gagnerot and Nakarmi before him or her, to modify the method of Goettfert in view of Gagnerot to include the request which includes an indication regarding key reusability of Nakarmi because by reusing keys fewer keys will need to be generated which will save computing power.
The motivation for doing so is to provide for the communication device being able to decide for itself (e.g. based on a policy, based on how much the key has already been reused, etc.) whether or not a key is to be reused (Paragraph 0024-0031 by Nakarmi)].
Regarding claim 9,
Goettfert in view of Gagnerot discloses: The system of claim 5, wherein the RNG is further to:
receive a first request for a first random number from a first cryptographic circuit of the plurality of cryptographic circuits, (Goettfert [0015, 0021, 0036] describes an “initialization phase” where the shift registers are seeded. This “initialization phase” is being interpreted as including the “request”)
generate the first random number; and (Goettfert [0001, 0016, 0032-0040] As becomes clear from the above, the seed of the pseudo random number generator (PRNG) is a relatively short bit sequence which may be "truly" random. The PRNG, then, generates a long pseudo random sequence out of the seed which may be truly random; [0015] The seed source providing the seed could, for example, comprise a true random number generator (TRNG). The true random number generator, in turn, may exploit a physical noise source in order to gain the true random number bit sequence)
provide the first random number to the first cryptographic circuit, the first random number being the same random number. (Goettfert [0001, 0032-0040, 0046-0051]; [Fig. 4] teaches that cryptographic circuits (Shift registers, Fig. 4-40a-b) receive (loaded into shift registers) random numbers from a pseudo random number generator (PRNG); [0046] teaches using the same seed in multiple cryptographic circuits); [0015] teaches initialization beginning at the same time for all circuits, at time (T), where T=0); [0046] teaches that seeding can take place in parallel or serially)
Goettfert in view of Gagnerot does not explicitly disclose wherein the first request comprises an indication that the first random number is shareable with other cryptographic circuits of the plurality of cryptographic circuits;
However, in the same field of endeavor Nakarmi discloses: wherein the first request comprises an indication that the first random number is shareable with other cryptographic circuits of the plurality of cryptographic circuits; (Nakarmi [0028-0033; 0081-0095] Describes receiving, from a cryptographic circuit, a request for a key (random number), the request includes an indication that indicates whether the key can be reused (shareable))
Therefore, it would have been obvious to combine Goettfert in view of Gagnerot and Nakarmi to obtain the invention for similar reasons as specified in claim 4.
Regarding claim 10,
Goettfert in view of Gagnerot discloses: The system of claim 5, wherein the RNG is further to:
receive a first request for a first random number from a first cryptographic circuit of the plurality of cryptographic circuits, (Goettfert [0015, 0021, 0036] describes an “initialization phase” where the shift registers are seeded. This “initialization phase” is being interpreted as including the “request”)
generate the first random number; and (Goettfert [0001, 0016, 0032-0040] As becomes clear from the above, the seed of the pseudo random number generator (PRNG) is a relatively short bit sequence which may be "truly" random. The PRNG, then, generates a long pseudo random sequence out of the seed which may be truly random; [0015] The seed source providing the seed could, for example, comprise a true random number generator (TRNG). The true random number generator, in turn, may exploit a physical noise source in order to gain the true random number bit sequence)
provide the first random number to the first cryptographic circuit, (Goettfert [0001, 0032-0040, 0046-0051]; [Fig. 4] teaches that cryptographic circuits (Shift registers, Fig. 4-40a-b) receive (loaded into shift registers) random numbers from a pseudo random number generator (PRNG); [0046] teaches using the same seed in multiple cryptographic circuits); [0015] teaches initialization beginning at the same time for all circuits, at time (T), where T=0); [0046] teaches that seeding can take place in parallel or serially)
Goettfert in view of Gagnerot does not explicitly disclose wherein the first request comprises an indication that the first random number is not shareable with other cryptographic circuits of the plurality of cryptographic circuits;
wherein the first random number and the same random number are different.
However, in the same field of endeavor Nakarmi discloses: wherein the first request comprises an indication that the first random number is not shareable with other cryptographic circuits of the plurality of cryptographic circuits; (Nakarmi [0028-0033; 0081-0095] Describes receiving, from a cryptographic circuit, a request for a key (random number), the request includes an indication that indicates whether the key can be reused (shareable))
wherein the first random number and the same random number are different. (Nakarmi [0110-0111] teaches generating and performing using a different key when the original key cannot be reused)
Therefore, it would have been obvious to combine Goettfert in view of Gagnerot and Nakarmi to obtain the invention for similar reasons as specified in claim 4.
Claims 16 and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Goettfert (U.S. 20090204656), in view of Gagnerot (U.S. 20170373837) and in further view of Nakarmi (U.S. 20190014509).
Regarding claim 16,
Goettfert in view of Gagnerot discloses: The method of claim 15, further comprising:
receiving, at the first time, a third request for a random number from a third cryptographic circuit; (Goettfert [0001, 0032-0040, 0046-0051]; [Fig. 4] teaches that cryptographic circuits (Shift registers, Fig. 4-40a-b) receive (loaded into shift registers) random numbers from a pseudo random number generator (PRNG); [Fig. 4] shows two separate cryptographic circuits where each circuit perform independently including the initialization phase which includes a request from the respective cryptographic circuits [0046] teaches that seeding can take place in parallel or serially)) The specific arrangement of request and response is not explicitly disclosed, however Goettfert discloses seeding in parallel and seeding serially meaning that multiple requests can be received at the same or different times (i.e. third request from third circuit serially or in parallel)
generating a second random number; and (Goettfert [0001, 0016, 0032-0040] As becomes clear from the above, the seed of the pseudo random number generator (PRNG) is a relatively short bit sequence which may be "truly" random. The PRNG, then, generates a long pseudo random sequence out of the seed which may be truly random; [0015] The seed source providing the seed could, for example, comprise a true random number generator (TRNG). The true random number generator, in turn, may exploit a physical noise source in order to gain the true random number bit sequence) Specifically generating a “second” or random number is not explicitly disclosed, however Goettfert discloses generation of multiple keys meaning that it discloses generating a first, second, third, fourth or any number of keys
providing the second random number to the third cryptographic circuit in response to the third request. (Goettfert [0001, 0032-0040, 0046-0051]; [Fig. 4] teaches that cryptographic circuits (Shift registers, Fig. 4-40a-b) receive (loaded into shift registers) random numbers from a pseudo random number generator (PRNG); [0046] teaches using the same seed in multiple cryptographic circuits); [0015] teaches initialization beginning at the same time for all circuits, at time (T), where T=0); [0046] teaches that seeding can take place in parallel or serially)
Goettfert in view of Gagnerot does not explicitly disclose: determining that the third request is for a non-shared random number;
However, in the same field of endeavor Nakarmi discloses: determining that the third request is for a non-shared random number; (Nakarmi [0028-0033; 0081-0095] Describes receiving, from a cryptographic circuit, a request for a key (random number), the request includes an indication that indicates whether the key can be reused (shareable))
It would have been obvious to combine Goettfert and Nakarmi to obtain the invention as for similar reasons specified in claim 4.
Regarding claim 18,
Goettfert in view of Gagnerot discloses: The method of claim 15, further comprising:
receiving, at a second time, a third request for a random number from the first cryptographic circuit; (Goettfert [Fig. 1] teaches that there can be any number of shift registers/cryptographic circuits; [0050-0052] teaches that the plurality of shift registers/cryptographic circuits operate in the same was claim 6. Please see rejection of claim 6; [0046] teaches that seeding can take place in parallel or serially); The specific arrangement of request and response is not explicitly disclosed, however Goettfert discloses seeding in parallel and seeding serially meaning that multiple requests can be received at the same or different times (i.e. third request from first circuit and fourth request from second circuit serially or in parallel)
generating a second random number; and (Goettfert [0001, 0016, 0032-0040] As becomes clear from the above, the seed of the pseudo random number generator (PRNG) is a relatively short bit sequence which may be "truly" random. The PRNG, then, generates a long pseudo random sequence out of the seed which may be truly random; [0015] The seed source providing the seed could, for example, comprise a true random number generator (TRNG). The true random number generator, in turn, may exploit a physical noise source in order to gain the true random number bit sequence). Specifically generating a “second” random number is not explicitly disclosed, however Goettfert discloses generation of multiple keys meaning that it discloses generating a first, second, third, fourth or any number of keys
providing the second random number to the first cryptographic circuit in response to the third request. (Goettfert [0001, 0032-0040, 0046-0051]; [Fig. 4] teaches that cryptographic circuits (Shift registers, Fig. 4-40a-b) receive (loaded into shift registers) random numbers from a pseudo random number generator (PRNG); [0046] teaches using the same seed in multiple cryptographic circuits); [0015] teaches initialization beginning at the same time for all circuits, at time (T), where T=0); [0046] teaches that seeding can take place in parallel or serially)
Goettfert in view of Gagnerot does not explicitly disclose: determining that the third request comprises an indication that the random number be a non-shared random number;
However, in the same field of endeavor Nakarmi discloses: determining that the third request comprises an indication that the random number be a non-shared random number; (Nakarmi [0028-0033; 0081-0095] Describes receiving, from a cryptographic circuit, a request for a key (random number), the request includes an indication that indicates whether the key can be reused (shareable))
It would have been obvious to combine Goettfert and Nakarmi to obtain the invention as for similar reasons specified in claim 4.
Claim 14 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Goettfert (U.S. 20090204656), in view of Gagnerot (U.S. 20170373837) and in further view of Ling (U.S. 20200310759).
Regarding claim 14,
Goettfert in view of Gagnerot discloses: The system of claim 5, wherein the RNG comprises:
a noise source; (Goettfert [0015] The true random number generator, in turn, may exploit a physical noise source in order to gain the true random number bit sequence)
distribution logic coupled to the control block to receive an entropy output from the control block, wherein the distribution logic is to provide the entropy output as the same random number to the at least two of the plurality of cryptographic circuits. (Goettfert [0014-0017, 0032-0040, 0051]; [Fig. 2-4] teaches controllers which are coupled with distribution logic and receive entropy (random) outputs; Goettfert [0001, 0032-0040, 0046-0051]; [Fig. 4] teaches that cryptographic circuits (Shift registers, Fig. 4-40a-b) receive (loaded into shift registers) random numbers from a pseudo random number generator (PRNG); [0046] teaches using the same seed in multiple cryptographic circuits).
Goettfert in view of Gagnerot does not explicitly teach a digitizer coupled to the noise source; one or more accumulators coupled to the digitizer; an control block coupled to the one or more accumulators;
However, in the same field of endeavor Ling teaches: a digitizer coupled to the noise source; one or more accumulators coupled to the digitizer; a control block coupled to the one or more accumulators; and (Ling [0033-0035]; [Fig. 1] teaches a digitizer which is connected to a noise source and accumulators)
Goettfert in view of Gagnerot and Ling are analogous art because they are from the same field of endeavor random number generation.
Before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, having the teachings of Goettfert and Ling before him or her, to modify the method of Goettfert to include the RNG of Ling.
The motivation for doing so is to prevent low quality RNG generation (Paragraph 0003-0004 by Ling)].
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's
disclosure.
Coric 1/25/2013 (US 20140211937) teaches A data processing system includes a module for generating and distributing random masks to a number of cryptographic accelerators while providing for fewer total interconnects among the components generating the random masks. The module segments the tasks associated with generating random masks across a number of modules and blocks such that routing and timing problems can be minimized and layout can be optimized. A method for generating and distributing random masks to a number of cryptographic accelerators is also provided. The random masks are utilized by cryptographic accelerators to protect secret keys, and data associated with those keys, from discovery by unauthorized users.
Kocher 8/15/2001 (US 20010053220) teaches Methods and apparatuses are disclosed for improving DES and other cryptographic protocols against external monitoring attacks by reducing the amount (and signal-to-noise ratio) of useful information leaked during processing.
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
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THOMAS A. CARNES
Examiner
Art Unit 2436
/THOMAS A CARNES/Examiner, Art Unit 2436
/SHEWAYE GELAGAY/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2436