DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
1. The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
2. This action is in response to the papers filed September 11, 2026. Applicant’s remarks and amendments have been fully and carefully considered but are not found to be sufficient to put the application in condition for allowance. Any new grounds of rejection presented in this Office Action are necessitated by Applicant's amendments. Any rejections or objections not reiterated herein have been withdrawn. This action is made FINAL.
Claims 1, 4, 6, 9, 12, 16, 18-19, 21, 31, and 51 are currently pending.
Claim 9 is withdrawn from further consideration pursuant to 37 CFR 1.142(b) as being drawn to a nonelected invention, there being no allowable generic or linking claim. Election was made without traverse in the reply filed on October 20, 2025.
Claim Objections
3. Claim 1 is objected to because of the following informalities: the claim recites “taken from the subject at or the time of beginning a treatment”. It appears that the word “or” might be a typographical error. Appropriate correction is required.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
4. 35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1, 4, 6, 12, 16, 18-19, 21, 31, and 51 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to judicial exception without significantly more. The claims have been evaluated using the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance (see Federal Register Vol. 84, No. 4 Monday, January 7, 2019).
Step 1: The claims are directed to the statutory category of a process.
Step 2A, prong one: Evaluate Whether the Claim Recites a Judicial Exception
The instant claims recite abstract ideas.
The claims recite the following limitations:
-comparing the amount(s) of DS cf-DNA to a threshold value (clm 1);
-determining a treatment or monitoring regimen (clm 4);
-making a treatment management decision (clm 4);
-suggesting monitoring to the subject (clm 12);
-suggesting the use of one or more additional tests (clm 12);
-providing information about a treatment to the subject (clm 16);
-determining that additional testing and/or monitoring is required (clm 18);
The broadest reasonable interpretation of these steps is that they fall within the mental process groupings of abstract ideas because they cover concepts performed in the human mind, including observation, evaluation, judgement, and opinion.
The claims recite a step of “comparing”. The broadest reasonable interpretation of the “comparing” step is that it may be accomplished by a mental processes. For example, one may “compare” the amount of DS-cfDNA and threshold value by reading both values and thinking about them.
The claims recite steps of “determining”, “making”, “suggesting”, “providing”, selecting”. Each of these steps could be performed by a human using mental steps or basic critical thinking.
The instant claims recite a law of nature.
The claims recite a correlation between the amount of DS cfDNA and risk of complications such as transplant rejection, cardiac arrest, required mechanical circulatory support, and death (clms 1 and 51). This type of correlation is a consequence of natural processes, similar to the naturally occurring correlation found to be a law of nature by the Supreme Court in Mayo.
Step 2A, prong two: Evaluate Whether the Judicial Exception Is Integrated Into a Practical Application
The claims do NOT recite additional steps or elements that integrate the recited judicial exceptions into a practical application of the exception(s). For example, the claims do not practically apply the judicial exception by including one or more additional elements that the courts have stated integrate the exception into a practical application:
An additional element reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field;
An additional element that applies or uses a judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition;
An additional element implements a judicial exception with, or uses a judicial exception in conjunction with, a particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim;
An additional element effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing; and
An additional element applies or uses the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological
environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception.
Claim 16 recites a method wherein determining a treatment regimen comprises treating the subject and/or providing information about a treatment to the subject. In view of the recitation of “and/or” the “treating” is optional. Since the “treating” step need not occur, claim 16 does not recite any steps or elements that integrate the judicial exception so as to practically apply the judicial exception. Further it is noted that a claim limitation can integrate a judicial exception by applying or using the judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or a medical condition. Herein, there is nothing particular about the treatment. Therefore even if the “treating” was a required step it is merely instructions to apply the exceptions in a generic way and does not provide a practical application of the judicial exceptions.
Claim 18 recites a method wherein making a treatment management decision comprises determining that additional testing and/or monitoring is required, initiating a treatment, changing the frequency of a treatment, changing the dosage of the treatment, changing the frequency and/or dosage of the treatment, changing the type of treatment to be performed, changing the timing of the treatment, or any combination of the foregoing. In view of the recitation of “any combination of the foregoing” the “treating” is optional. Since the “treating” step need not occur, claim 18 does not recite any steps or elements that integrate the judicial exception so as to practically apply the judicial exception. Further it is noted that a claim limitation can integrate a judicial exception by applying or using the judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or a medical condition. Herein, there is nothing particular about the treatment. Therefore even if the “treating” was a required step it is merely instructions to apply the exceptions in a generic way and does not provide a practical application of the judicial exceptions.
In addition to the judicial exceptions, the claims recite steps of extracting cf-DNA from a sample, preparing a preparation of amplified DNA by performing PCR amplification, and quantifying the amount of DS cf-DNA in a sample taken from the subject. The additionally recited steps are not considered to integrate the judicial exceptions into a practical application because they merely add insignificant extra-solution activity (data gathering) to the judicial exceptions.
Step 2B: Evaluate Whether the Claim Provides an Inventive Concept
In addition to the judicial exceptions, the claims recite steps of extracting cf-DNA from a sample, preparing a preparation of amplified DNA by performing PCR amplification, and quantifying the amount of DS cf-DNA in a sample taken from the subject. The additionally recited steps do NOT amount to significantly more because they simply append well understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known in the art to the judicial exceptions.
The steps are recited at a high level of generality. Extracting cf-DNA in a sample in order to perform tests is well understood, routine, and conventional activity for those in the field of diagnostics. The step of performing PCR amplification is also recited at a high level of generality because it broadly encompass numerous different types of PCR amplification and does not recite any particular non-conventional reagents (primers or probes). The step of quantifying the amount of DS cf-DNA in a sample merely instructs a scientist to use any technique capable of quantification. When recited at this high level of generality, there is no meaningful limitation that distinguishes this step from well understood, routine, and conventional activities engaged in by scientists prior to applicant’s invention and at the time the application was filed.
The prior art also demonstrates the well understood, routine, conventional nature of additional elements because it teaches that the additional elements are well known. For example see the prior art of Mitchell (WO 2018/237078 Pub 12/27/2018) discussed in detail in the 102 rejection set forth below.
Further it is noted that the courts have recognized the following laboratory techniques as well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the life science arts when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
Determining the level of a biomarker in blood by any means, Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 101 USPQ2d at 1968; Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics, LLC, 859 F.3d 1352, 1362, 123 USPQ2d 1081, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 2017);
Using polymerase chain reaction to amplify and detect DNA, Genetic Techs. v. Merial LLC, 818 F.3d 1369, 1376, 118 USPQ2d 1541, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1377, 115 USPQ2d 1152, 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
Detecting DNA or enzymes in a sample, Sequenom, 788 F.3d at 1377-78, 115 USPQ2d at 1157); Cleveland Clinic Foundation 859 F.3d at 1362, 123 USPQ2d at 1088 (Fed. Cir. 2017);
Analyzing DNA to provide sequence information or detect allelic variants, Genetic Techs., 818 F.3d at 1377; 118 USPQ2d at 1546;
Amplifying and sequencing nucleic acid sequences, University of Utah Research Foundation v. Ambry Genetics, 774 F.3d 755, 764, 113 USPQ2d 1241, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
For the reasons set forth above the claims are not directed to patent eligible subject matter.
Response To Arguments
5. In the response the Applicants traversed the rejection under 35 USC 101. The Applicants argue that similar to the claim found patent eligible by the Federal Circuit in Illumina v. Ariosa Diagnostics, amended claim 1 recites steps such as extracting cf-DNA from a sample, preparing a preparation of amplified DNA by performing amplification, and quantifying an amount of donor-specific cell-free DNA (DS cf-DNA). Accordingly, consistent with the Federal Circuit decision in Illumina v. Ariosa Diagnostics, the amended claims of the instant application are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept.
This argument has been fully considered but is not persuasive. The instant claims are NOT analogous to those that were found patent eligible by the Federal Circuit in Illumina V. Ariosa Diagnostics. The instant claims recite a correlation between the amount of DS cfDNA and risk of complications such as transplant rejection, cardiac arrest, required mechanical circulatory support, and death. These correlations are a consequence of natural processes, similar to the naturally occurring correlation found to be a law of nature by the Supreme Court in Mayo. Additionally the claims recite numerous limitations that fall within the mental processes groupings of abstract ideas because they cover concepts performed in the human mind, including observations, evaluation, judgment, and opinion. It is maintained that the claims recite judicial exceptions.
Further the Applicants argue that any alleged judicial exception recited is integrated into a practical application. They argue that the practical application is assay DS cf-DNA samples. They argue that the Examiner has not considered the claims as a whole.
This argument has been fully considered but is not persuasive. The claim as a whole has been considered and the Examiner does NOT agree that the judicial exceptions have been integrated into a practical application. The steps that are recited in addition to the judicial exception are nothing more than the collection of data which is insignificant extra-solution activity. Data gathering steps do not make an otherwise nonstatutory claim statutory. Further the claim does not practically apply the judicial exceptions by including one or more additional elements that the courts have stated integrate the exception into a practical application (these are noted in the rejection). It is maintained that the claim as a whole fails to integrate the recited judicial exceptions into a practical application of the exceptions.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
6. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 1, 4, 6, 12, 16, 18-19, 21, 31, and 51 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Claims 1, 4, 6, 12, 16, 18-19, 21, 31, and 51 are rejected over the recitation of the phrase “the time of beginning a treatment” in claim 1 step c. There is insufficient antecedent basis for this limitation in the claim.
Claim 51 is rejected over the recitation of the phrase “The method of any one of claims 1, 4, 6, 9, 12, 16, 18-19, 21, and 31”. This phrase is confusing in so far as it refers to claim 9 because claim 9 is a product claim, not a method claim.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
7. The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1, 4, 6, 12, 16, 18, 19, 21, 31, and 51 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Mitchell (WO 2018/237078 Pub 12/27/2018).
Regarding Claim 1 Mitchell teaches a method comprising determining an amount of donor-specific cell-free DNA (DS cf-DNA) in at least two samples taken from a subject each at a different time, wherein at least one sample is taken prior to rejection treatment and the other taken post treatment (page 75, clm 54). As shown in Figs 75-77 a sample was taken at the beginning of treatment then numerous samples were taken thereafter. In particular Fig 77 shows samples that were taken on day 14. Mitchell teaches the method further comprises comparing the amounts of DS cf-DNA to threshold values (page 76, claim 62). Mitchell teaches a method wherein an amount of DS cf-DNA that is greater than a threshold value represents an increased or increasing risk (page 78, claim 78). Mitchell teaches the risk can be of complications (page 20, line 20). Mitchell further teaches that cf-DNA may be extracted using any method known in the art (page 31 lines 8-29). Mitchell teaches a pre-amplification step where cf-DNA is amplified by PCR (page 31 line 30-page 32 line 3). Thus Mitchell teaches method of assaying donor specific cfDNA in a sample from a transplant subject, the method comprising: (a) extracting cf-DNA from the sample, (b) preparing a preparation of amplified DNA by performing PCR amplification on the cf-DNA, (c) quantifying an amount of donor-specific cell-free DNA (DS cf-DNA) in a sample taken from the subject at the beginning of treatment for transplant rejection and 14 days after the beginning of the treatment for the transplant rejection, and (d) comparing the amount(s) of DS cf-DNA to a threshold value, wherein when the amounts are both greater than or equal to the threshold value, risk of complications, is indicated or increased.
Regarding Claim 4 Mitchell teaches determining a treatment or monitoring regimen for the subject based on the amounts of DS cf-DNA compared to the threshold values and/or amounts from one or more time points (page 76, claim 64). Thus Mitchell teaches a method further comprising determining a treatment or monitoring regimen for the subject based on the comparisons.
Regarding Claim 6 Mitchell teaches a method wherein a sample is taken prior to rejection treatment and then numerous samples are taken post treatment (see Figs 75-77 where samples are taken serially following the initiation of treatment). Thus Mitchell teaches a method wherein one or more further amounts of DS cf-DNA are obtained from a sample taken from the subject at a different point in time.
Regarding Claim 12 Mitchell teaches a method wherein a sample is taken prior to rejection treatment and then numerous samples are taken post treatment (page 75, claim 54, see Figs 75-77 where samples are taken serially following the initiation of treatment). Thus Mitchell teaches a monitoring regimen that comprises determining the amount of DS cf-DNA in the subject over time.
Regarding Claim 16 Mitchell teaches a method wherein determining a treatment regimen comprises treating the subject (page 79, claim 84).
Regarding Claim 18 Mitchell teaches a method wherein determining a treatment regimen comprises selecting or suggesting a treatment for the subject or changing the treatment of the subject or suggesting such change (page 79, claim 83).
Regarding Claim 19 Mitchell teaches the analysis of plasma samples (page 79, claim 87).
Regarding Claim 21 Mitchell teaches a method wherein the transplant subject is a pediatric heart transplant subject (page 79, claim 88).
Regarding Claim 31 Mitchell teaches a method comprising reporting and/or recording the amounts of DS cfDNA (page 75, claim 56).
Regarding Claim 51 Mitchell teaches a method wherein the risk is risk of transplant rejection (page 20, lines 8-10).
Response To Arguments
8. In the response the Applicants traversed the rejection under 35 USC 102. The response notes that claim 1 has been amended. The Applicants argue that it has not been established that Mitchell teaches all of the features of the claims.
This argument has been fully considered but is not persuasive. The rejection has been modified to address the claims as amended. The rejection is maintained because the Applicants have not pointed to any particular limitations that are not disclosed by Mitchell.
Double Patenting
9. The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).
A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b).
The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA /25, or PTO/AIA /26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/process/file/efs/guidance/eTD-info-I.jsp.
10. Claims 1, 4, 6, 12, 16, 18-19, 21, 31, and 51 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-12 of U.S. Patent No. 10,385,396 in view of Mitchell (WO 2018/237078 Pub 12/27/2018). Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other.
Regarding Claim 1 both sets of claims require determining an amount of DS cf-DNA in a sample and comparing the amount of DS cf-DNA to a threshold, wherein when the amount is greater than or equal to the threshold value risk is indicated or increased (clm 1 of the patent).
Regarding Claim 19 both sets of claims state that the sample is plasma (clm 11 of the patent). Regarding Claim 21 both sets of claims state that the subject is a pediatric heart transplant subject (clms 8 and 9 of the patent). Regarding Claim 51 both sets of claims state that the risk is risk of transplant rejection (clm 2 of the patent). The instant claims are different from the Patent because they further recite steps of extracting cf-DNA from the sample; (b) preparing a preparation of amplified DNA by performing PCR amplification on the cf-DNA; and quantifying an amount of DS cf-DNA in a sample taken from the subject at the beginning of a treatment for transplant rejection and 14 days after the beginning of the treatment for transplant rejection (clm 1). The instant claims are different from those of the Patent because they further require the limitations set forth in claims 4, 6, 12, 16, 18, and 31. However as discussed above in the 102 rejections, Mitchell teaches each of these limitations and it would have been obvious to modify the claims of the Patent in view of the teachings of Mitchell for the benefit of being able to monitor transplant patients at risk.
11. Claims 1, 4, 6, 12, 16, 18-19, 21, 31, and 51 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-12 of U.S. Patent No. 10,472,680 in view of Mitchell (WO 2018/237078 Pub 12/27/2018). Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other.
Regarding Claim 1 both sets of claims require determining an amount of DS cf-DNA in a sample and comparing the amount of DS cf-DNA to a threshold, wherein when the amount is greater than or equal to the threshold value risk is indicated or increased (clm 1 of the patent). Regarding Claim 19 both sets of claims state that the sample is plasma (clm 11 of the patent). Regarding Claim 21 both sets of claims state that the subject is a pediatric heart transplant subject (clms 8 and 9 of the patent). Regarding Claim 51 both sets of claims state that the risk is risk of transplant rejection (clm 2 of the patent). The instant claims are different from the Patent because they further recite steps of extracting cf-DNA from the sample; (b) preparing a preparation of amplified DNA by performing PCR amplification on the cf-DNA; and quantifying an amount of DS cf-DNA in a sample taken from the subject at the beginning of a treatment for transplant rejection and 14 days after the beginning of the treatment for transplant rejection (clm 1).The instant claims are different from those of the Patent because they further require the limitations set forth in claims 4, 6, 12, 16, 18, and 31. However as discussed above in the 102 rejections, Mitchell teaches each of these limitations and it would have been obvious to modify the claims of the Patent in view of the teachings of Mitchell for the benefit of being able to monitor transplant patients at risk.
12. Claims 1, 4, 6, 12, 16, 18-19, 21, 31, and 51 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1, 3-7, 13-14, 48, 104, 118, and 159 of Application 16/504,469 in view of Mitchell (WO 2018/237078 Pub 12/27/2018). Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other.
Regarding Claim 1 both sets of claims require extracting cf-DNA from a sample, preparing the cf-DNA by performing PCR on the cf-DNA, determining an amount of DS cf-DNA in a sample and comparing the amount of DS cf-DNA to a threshold, wherein when the amount is greater than or equal to the threshold value risk is indicated or increased (clm 1 of the copending application). Regarding Claim 51 both sets of claims state that the risk is risk of transplant rejection (clm 3 of the copending application). The instant claims are different from the Patent because they further recite quantifying an amount of DS cf-DNA in a sample taken from the subject at the beginning of a treatment for transplant rejection and 14 days after the beginning of the treatment for transplant rejection (clm 1).The instant claims are different from those of the Patent because they further require the limitations set forth in claims 4, 6, 12, 16, 18, 19, 21, and 31. However as discussed above in the 102 rejections, Mitchell teaches each of these limitations and it would have been obvious to modify the claims of the Patent in view of the teachings of Mitchell for the benefit of being able to monitor transplant patients at risk.
13. Claims 1, 4, 6, 12, 16, 18-19, 21, 31, and 51 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-2, 4, 50, 57, 60, 66, 70, 74, 78, 89, 92 of Application 16/623,719 in view of Mitchell (WO 2018/237078 Pub 12/27/2018). Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other.
Regarding Claim 1 both sets of claims require extracting cf-DNA from a sample, preparing the cf-DNA by performing PCR on the cf-DNA, determining an amount of DS cf-DNA in a sample and comparing the amount of DS cf-DNA to a threshold, wherein when the amount is greater than or equal to the threshold value risk is indicated or increased (clms 1 and 2 of the copending application). Regarding Claim 19 both sets of claims state that the sample is plasma (clm 1 of the copending application). Regarding Claim 21 both sets of claims state that the subject is a heart transplant subject (clm 89 of the copending application). Regarding Claim 51 both sets of claims state that the risk is risk of transplant rejection (clm 1 of the copending application). The instant claims are different from the Patent because they further recite quantifying an amount of DS cf-DNA in a sample taken from the subject at the beginning of a treatment for transplant rejection and 14 days after the beginning of the treatment for transplant rejection (clm 1).The instant claims are different from those of the Patent because they further require the limitations set forth in claims 4, 6, 12, 16, 18, and 31. However as discussed above in the 102 rejections, Mitchell teaches each of these limitations and it would have been obvious to modify the claims of the Patent in view of the teachings of Mitchell for the benefit of being able to monitor transplant patients at risk.
14. Claims 1, 4, 6, 12, 16, 18-19, 21, 31, and 51 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-3, 6-9, 13, 17-26 of Application 17/493,293 in view of Mitchell (WO 2018/237078 Pub 12/27/2018). Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other.
Regarding Claim 1 both sets of claims require extracting cf-DNA from a sample, preparing the cf-DNA by performing PCR on the cf-DNA, determining an amount of DS cf-DNA in a sample and comparing the amount of DS cf-DNA to a threshold, wherein when the amount is greater than or equal to the threshold value risk is indicated or increased (clms 1 and 5 of the copending application). Regarding Claim 19 both sets of claims state that the sample is plasma (clm 26 of the copending application). Regarding Claim 21 both sets of claims state that the subject is a heart transplant subject (clm 29 of the copending application). The instant claims are different from the Patent because they further recite quantifying an amount of DS cf-DNA in a sample taken from the subject at the beginning of a treatment for transplant rejection and 14 days after the beginning of the treatment for transplant rejection (clm 1). The instant claims are different from those of the Patent because they further require the limitations set forth in claims 4, 6, 12, 16, 18, 31, and 51. However as discussed above in the 102 rejections, Mitchell teaches each of these limitations and it would have been obvious to modify the claims of the Patent in view of the teachings of Mitchell for the benefit of being able to monitor transplant patients at risk.
15. Claims 1, 4, 6, 12, 16, 18-19, 21, 31, and 51 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-5, 10, 13, 17, 20, 22, 26, 28, 29-31, 35, 39, 43-46, 51, 85 of Application 17/493,230 in view of Mitchell (WO 2018/237078 Pub 12/27/2018). Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other.
Regarding Claim 1 both sets of claims require extracting cf-DNA from a sample, preparing the cf-DNA by performing PCR on the cf-DNA, determining an amount of DS cf-DNA in a sample and comparing the amount of DS cf-DNA to a threshold, wherein when the amount is greater than or equal to the threshold value risk is indicated or increased (clms 1 and 2 of the copending application). Regarding Claim 21 both sets of claims state that the subject is a heart transplant subject (clm 22 of the copending application). The instant claims are different from the Patent because they further recite quantifying an amount of DS cf-DNA in a sample taken from the subject at the beginning of a treatment for transplant rejection and 14 days after the beginning of the treatment for transplant rejection (clm 1). The instant claims are different from those of the Patent because they further require the limitations set forth in claims 4, 6, 12, 16, 18, 19, 31, and 51. However as discussed above in the 102 rejections, Mitchell teaches each of these limitations and it would have been obvious to modify the claims of the Patent in view of the teachings of Mitchell for the benefit of being able to monitor transplant patients at risk.
Response To Arguments
16. In the response the Applicants traversed the double patenting rejections. They argue that the Office has not established that the amended claims of the instant application are anticipated or rendered obvious by the claims of the above-referenced patents and patent applications.
This argument has been fully considered but is not persuasive. The rejections have been modified to address the claims as amended. The rejections are maintained.
17. Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the date of this final action.
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/AMANDA HANEY/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1634