DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
This written action is responding to the Request for Continued Evaluation (RCE) dated on 01/21/2026.
Claims 1-2, 4-6, 8, 10-13, 15, 17-20 and 28-29 are submitted for examination.
Claims 1, 4, 6, 8, 10, 13, and 17 have been amended and claims 3, 7, 9, 14 and 16 have been canceled.
Claims 1-2, 4-6, 8, 10-13, 15, 17-20 and 28-29 are pending.
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
Continued Examination Under 37 CFR 1.114
A request for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, including the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e), was filed in this application after final rejection. Since this application is eligible for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, and the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e) has been timely paid, the finality of the previous Office action has been withdrawn pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114. Applicant's submission filed on 01/21/2026 has been entered.
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s amendment filed on January 21, 2026 has claims 1, 4, 6, 8, 10, 13, and 17 amended and 3, 7, 9, 14 and 16 canceled.
Applicant’s remark, filed on January 21, 2026 at pages 7-8, indicates, “… As explained in the Response of 25 November 2025, Goncalves, whether considered alone or in any combination with other cited art, fails to teach, suggest, or disclose that a message is encapsulated twice, once using a post-quantum cryptographic algorithm key and again using a quantum key. … Although Applicant does not necessarily agree with Examiner's characterization of the previously presented claims, independent claims 1, 6, and 13 are presently amended to further clarify that the message is encapsulated twice. For example, amended claim 1 includes two "encapsulating" steps of: (1) "encapsulating the message using a post-quantum cryptographic algorithm to produce a codeword, wherein encapsulating the message includes encoding the message using a published public key, wherein the published public key is published by a receiver device;" and (2) "encapsulating the codeword using a quantum key, QK, material derived from QK distribution with the receiver device to produce a QK codeword, wherein encapsulating the codeword includes encoding the codeword using the QK material. As explained in the Response of 25 November 2025, Goncalves, whether considered alone or in any combination with other cited art, fails to teach, suggest, or disclose these features of amended claim 1 (see Response of 25 November 2025). Accordingly, Applicant requests reconsideration and removal of the rejection of claim 1 and its dependent claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Amended claims 6 and 13 include similar features to those of amended claim 1. Accordingly, for the same or similar reasons to those described above and in the Response of 25 November 2025, Applicant requests reconsideration and removal of the rejection of amended claims 6 and 13 and their dependent claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103.”
Applicant’s argument has been considered and is found persuasive. However, a new ground of rejection has been applied on a new combination of Goncalves et al. (US 11,431,498) in view of Garcia-Morchon et al. (US 2020/0259649) hereinafter Garcia-Morchon and further in view of Becker et al. (US 10,630,655) hereinafter Becker.
Specifically, Goncalves discloses an hybrid encryption scheme using a public key encryption (PKE) algorithm and second scheme using a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) algorithm, like FrodoKEM, which is used by a sender to encapsulate a symmetrically encrypted message and its associated symmetric key to generate a pair of ciphertexts for transmission to a recipient. At Col. 2, lines 11-18; Goncalves discloses, an encryption scheme which is used by a sender to encapsulate a symmetrically encrypted message and its associated symmetric key to generate a pair of ciphertexts (i.e., codeword) for transmission to a recipient. In addition, Col. 3, lines 11-20; discloses a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) comprising a key generation algorithm K.KeyGen, which outputs a related pair of public encapsulation and secret decapsulation keys (eK, dK); an encapsulation algorithm K. Encaps; and a decapsulation algorithm K.Decaps. Depending on the chosen KEM, for example FrodoKEM, encapsulation may take as input a single random value, (e.g., ∂), and using a public encapsulation key (e.g., eK) outputs both a ciphertext and symmetric key K.”. In this case Goncalves discloses the use of a post-quantum algorithm to encapsulate and encode a message. Finally, Goncalves teaches at Col. 10, lines 46-60; a hybrid scheme may include at least one quantum cryptographic scheme, at least one post-quantum cryptographic scheme; and/or at least one classical cryptographic scheme; but the hybrid scheme need not be limited only to combining quantum with classical cryptographic algorithms, and in fact all algorithms used in the hybrid scheme may be classical, quantum, or post-quantum. Therefore, Examiner respectfully traverse Applicant argument that Goncalves does not discloses the encapsulation to a message. Goncalves clearly discloses a hybrid encryption scheme using classic and post-quantum cryptography. Therefore, discloses the amended feature “encapsulating the message using a post-quantum cryptographic algorithm to produce a codeword, wherein encapsulating the message …” and “encapsulating the codeword using a quantum key, QK, material derived from QK distribution with the receiver device to produce a QK codeword, wherein encapsulating the codeword includes encoding the codeword using QK material”. A person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it is obvious to combine a PKE scheme and PQC scheme to add an additional layer of security to the message or secret key. See rejection below.
In addition, Examiner acknowledge that Goncalves does not expressly teaches the feature limitation “wherein encapsulating the message includes encoding the message using a published public key, wherein the published public key is published by a receiver device” and “adding noise to the encapsulated message … and sending the noisy encapsulated message.” However, new identified prior-art by Garcia-Morchon, describes at Parag. [0005]; encrypting or encapsulating a message using the recipient’s public key. Thus is obvious to combine the teaching of Goncalves and Garcia-Morchon to produce a double encapsulation process using a public key and a quantum key. Finally, Becker teaches adding noise to plaintext data to generate a ciphertext. The claim indicates that the noise is added to the encapsulated message and not to the plaintext, however, under the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim, the step of adding noise to the encapsulated message encompasses the concept of applying noise at any stage of the message processing, either prior or after encapsulation, so long as the ultimate result is a noisy, more secure form of a message. Further, the application of noise to the encapsulated message would have been an obvious design choice to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. One of ordinary skill would have reasonably applied the noise addition not only to the plaintext but also to other forms of message data to achieve enhance protection against different attacks. Therefore, Examiner submits that Becker cures the deficiency of Goncalves.
Examiner respectfully submits that the combination of Goncalves, Garcia-Morchon and Becker discloses the claim limitations in independent claim 1 and would render the amended features obvious.
Applicant further recites similar remarks as listed above for independent claims 6 and 13. See the aforementioned response on item 9, which addresses how the combination of prior-art references by Goncalves and Becker would render the claimed limitations obvious.
Applicant further recites similar remarks as listed above for dependent claims. Please refer to the aforementioned response, which addresses how the combination of prior-art references by Goncalves, Garcia-Morchon and Becker, along with Gauravaram, Bao and Tomlinson would render the claimed limitations obvious.
Claim Objections
Claim 6 is objected to because of the following informalities: the claim recites, “… outputting the message for use by the receiver device”. However, it is not clear if the outputted message is the same as the decapsulated QK decapsulated message. Thus, the claim could recite, “… outputting the decapsulated QK decapsulated message for use by the receiver device”. Appropriate correction is required.
Claim 29 is objected to because of the following informalities: the claim recites, “… the post-cryptographic algorithm is based on the bit-flipping key encapsulation, BIKE post quantum key encapsulation, KEM, cryptographic algorithm.” However, the term “the bit-flipping key encapsulation” lacks of antecedent basis. Thus, the claim should recite, “the post-cryptographic algorithm is based on a bit-flipping key encapsulation, BIKE post quantum key encapsulation, KEM, cryptographic algorithm”. Appropriate correction is required.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1, 4, 6, 13 and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Goncalves et al. (US 11,431,498) in view of Garcia-Morchon et al. (US 2020/0259649) hereinafter Garcia-Morchon and further in view of Becker et al. (US 10,630,655) hereinafter Becker.
As per Claim 1, Goncalves teaches a computer-implemented method of secure communications for a sender device (Goncalves, Col. 2, lines 29-33; “In this description, while a “sender” and “recipient” are used for ease of reference, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that implementation of the hybrid secure encryption scheme does not absolutely require transmission of data from a sender to a recipient.” … Cols. 4-5, lines 61-4; “FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram illustrating an example data communication system in which the hybrid secure encryption scheme may be used. The system of FIG. 1 includes first and second data communication devices 100. These data communication devices 100 may comprise any suitable type of communication device, including, but not limited, to user communication devices such as smartphones, tablet computers, personal digital assistants, portable media players, laptop and desktop computers, smart speakers and other smart devices, building automation systems, smart meters, Internet of Things (IoT)-enabled devices and the like.” … Col. 6, lines 5-9; “FIG. 4 depicts an overview of an initialization or registration process that may be followed by each device 100 utilizing the hybrid secure encryption scheme. At 300, a device 100, such as the sender device, establishes security policies for implementing the scheme.”) comprising:
encapsulating a message (Goncalves, Col. 2, lines 11-18; “Briefly, in the exemplary embodiment described below, the hybrid secure encryption scheme links a first public key encryption (PKE) scheme with a second PKE scheme through a true random or pseudo-random element, which is used by a sender to encapsulate a symmetrically encrypted message and its associated symmetric key to generate a pair of ciphertexts for transmission to a recipient.”) comprising:
encapsulating the message using a post-quantum cryptographic algorithm to produce a codeword (Goncalves, Col. 2, lines 11-18; “Briefly, in the exemplary embodiment described below, the hybrid secure encryption scheme links a first public key encryption (PKE) scheme with a second PKE scheme through a true random or pseudo-random element, which is used by a sender to encapsulate a symmetrically encrypted message and its associated symmetric key to generate a pair of ciphertexts for transmission to a recipient.” … Col. 3, lines 11-20; “K denotes a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) comprising a key generation algorithm K.KeyGen, which also takes as input 1n (nϵ
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) and outputs a related pair of public encapsulation and secret decapsulation keys (eK, dK); an encapsulation algorithm K.Encaps; and a decapsulation algorithm K.Decaps. Depending on the chosen KEM, for example FrodoKEM (i.e., encapsulation post-quantum algorithm), encapsulation may take as input a single random value, (e.g., ∂), and using a public encapsulation key (e.g., eK) outputs both a ciphertext and symmetric key K.” … Col. 10, lines 46-60; “Any suitable symmetric and asymmetric encryption schemes may be employed in the hybrid secure encryption scheme, according to the security needs and computing resources of the devices implementing the hybrid scheme. Thus, for example, the hybrid scheme may include at least one quantum cryptographic scheme, at least one post-quantum cryptographic scheme; and/or at least one classical cryptographic scheme; but the hybrid scheme need not be limited only to combining quantum with classical cryptographic algorithms, and in fact all algorithms used in the hybrid scheme may be classical, quantum, or post-quantum. The two asymmetric encryption/decryption modules may employ the same, or different, asymmetric schemes. The hybrid scheme may further be modified to accommodate different key encapsulation methods, such as FrodoKEM.”), [wherein encapsulating the message includes encoding the message using a published public key, wherein the published public key is published by a receiver device];
encapsulating the codeword using a quantum key, QK, material derived from QK distribution with the receiver device to produce a QK codeword, wherein encapsulating the codeword includes encoding the codeword using QK material (Goncalves, Col. 2, lines 11-18; “Briefly, in the exemplary embodiment described below, the hybrid secure encryption scheme links a first public key encryption (PKE) scheme with a second PKE scheme through a true random or pseudo-random element, which is used by a sender to encapsulate a symmetrically encrypted message and its associated symmetric key to generate a pair of ciphertexts for transmission to a recipient.” … Col. 3, lines 11-20; “K denotes a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) comprising a key generation algorithm K.KeyGen, which also takes as input 1n (nϵ
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) and outputs a related pair of public encapsulation and secret decapsulation keys (eK, dK); an encapsulation algorithm K. Encaps; and a decapsulation algorithm K.Decaps. Depending on the chosen KEM, for example FrodoKEM, encapsulation may take as input a single random value, (e.g., ∂), and using a public encapsulation key (e.g., eK) outputs both a ciphertext and symmetric key K.” … Col. 6, lines 57-60; “At 365, the encapsulation/decapsulation module 240 then encapsulates both the symmetric key K and the intermediate ciphertext C, using the recipient's public keys, while adding distinct randomness generated from ∂ to each encapsulation.” … Col. 10, lines 46-60; “Any suitable symmetric and asymmetric encryption schemes may be employed in the hybrid secure encryption scheme, according to the security needs and computing resources of the devices implementing the hybrid scheme. Thus, for example, the hybrid scheme may include at least one quantum cryptographic scheme, at least one post-quantum cryptographic scheme; and/or at least one classical cryptographic scheme; but the hybrid scheme need not be limited only to combining quantum with classical cryptographic algorithms, and in fact all algorithms used in the hybrid scheme may be classical, quantum, or post-quantum. The two asymmetric encryption/decryption modules may employ the same, or different, asymmetric schemes. The hybrid scheme may further be modified to accommodate different key encapsulation methods, such as FrodoKEM.”);
[adding noise to] the encapsulated message (Goncalves, Col. 2, lines 11-18; “Briefly, in the exemplary embodiment described below, the hybrid secure encryption scheme links a first public key encryption (PKE) scheme with a second PKE scheme through a true random or pseudo-random element, which is used by a sender to encapsulate a symmetrically encrypted message and its associated symmetric key to generate a pair of ciphertexts for transmission to a recipient.” … Col. 3, lines 11-20; “K denotes a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) comprising a key generation algorithm K.KeyGen, which also takes as input 1n (nϵ
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) and outputs a related pair of public encapsulation and secret decapsulation keys (eK, dK); an encapsulation algorithm K. Encaps; and a decapsulation algorithm K.Decaps. Depending on the chosen KEM, for example FrodoKEM, encapsulation may take as input a single random value, (e.g., ∂), and using a public encapsulation key (e.g., eK) outputs both a ciphertext and symmetric key K.” … Col. 10, lines 46-60; “Any suitable symmetric and asymmetric encryption schemes may be employed in the hybrid secure encryption scheme, according to the security needs and computing resources of the devices implementing the hybrid scheme. Thus, for example, the hybrid scheme may include at least one quantum cryptographic scheme, at least one post-quantum cryptographic scheme; and/or at least one classical cryptographic scheme; but the hybrid scheme need not be limited only to combining quantum with classical cryptographic algorithms, and in fact all algorithms used in the hybrid scheme may be classical, quantum, or post-quantum. The two asymmetric encryption/decryption modules may employ the same, or different, asymmetric schemes. The hybrid scheme may further be modified to accommodate different key encapsulation methods, such as FrodoKEM.”); and
sending [the noisy] encapsulated message to the receiver device (Goncalves, Col. 2, lines 11-18; “Briefly, in the exemplary embodiment described below, the hybrid secure encryption scheme links a first public key encryption (PKE) scheme with a second PKE scheme through a true random or pseudo-random element, which is used by a sender to encapsulate a symmetrically encrypted message and its associated symmetric key to generate a pair of ciphertexts for transmission to a recipient.” … Col. 3, lines 11-20; “K denotes a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) comprising a key generation algorithm K.KeyGen, which also takes as input 1n (nϵ
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) and outputs a related pair of public encapsulation and secret decapsulation keys (eK, dK); an encapsulation algorithm K. Encaps; and a decapsulation algorithm K.Decaps. Depending on the chosen KEM, for example FrodoKEM, encapsulation may take as input a single random value, (e.g., ∂), and using a public encapsulation key (e.g., eK) outputs both a ciphertext and symmetric key K.” … Col. 10, lines 46-60; “Any suitable symmetric and asymmetric encryption schemes may be employed in the hybrid secure encryption scheme, according to the security needs and computing resources of the devices implementing the hybrid scheme. Thus, for example, the hybrid scheme may include at least one quantum cryptographic scheme, at least one post-quantum cryptographic scheme; and/or at least one classical cryptographic scheme; but the hybrid scheme need not be limited only to combining quantum with classical cryptographic algorithms, and in fact all algorithms used in the hybrid scheme may be classical, quantum, or post-quantum. The two asymmetric encryption/decryption modules may employ the same, or different, asymmetric schemes. The hybrid scheme may further be modified to accommodate different key encapsulation methods, such as FrodoKEM.”).
Goncalves does not expressly teach:
wherein encapsulating the message includes encoding the message using a published public key, wherein the published public key is published by a receiver device;
adding noise to [the encapsulated] message;
sending the noisy [the encapsulated] message … .
However, Garcia-Morchon teaches:
wherein encapsulating the message includes encoding the message using a published public key, wherein the published public key is published by a receiver device (Garcia-Morchon, Parag. [0005]; “KEM schemes (i.e., post-quantum) may establish a shared secret (i.e., message) between two entities or parties using asymmetric cryptography by one party, usually the initiator (i.e., sender device) of the communication, to encrypt or encapsulate (using the other party’s public-key) and transmit a shared secret to the other party, known as the responder (i.e., receiver device), who can then decrypt or decapsulate it (using her secret-key) and then use it for securely communicating with the initiator party.”);
Goncalves and Garcia-Morchon are from similar field of technology. Prior to the instant application’s effective filling date, there was a need for a method for secure communications using quantum key exchange mechanisms.
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the teachings of Garcia-Morchon system into Goncalves system, with a motivation to provide a double encapsulation technique where the first encapsulation comprises the use of KEM and public key encryption/encoding (PKE) (Garcia-Morchon, Parag. [0005]).
The combination of Goncalves and Garcia-Morchon does not expressly teach:
adding noise to [the encapsulated] message;
sending the noisy [the encapsulated] message … .
However, Becker teaches:
adding noise to … message (Becker, Col. 8, lines 45-51; “During operation, the client 104A uses the inner public key 116 to generate an encrypted representation of plaintext data 122 with added noise. As described in more detail below, the client 104A generates an error vector that is indistinguishable from a random Gaussian noise distribution based on the encrypted data generated using the inner public key.” … Col. 12, lines 29-40; “The process 200 begins as each of the clients 104A-104N generates plaintext data with added noise data for transmission to the aggregator in PSA (block 204). Using client 104A as an example, the processor 108 generates the plaintext data 122 during operation of, for example, a motor vehicle that incorporates the client 104A. Using the example described above, one example of the plaintext data 122 is mileage information that records how far the individual motor vehicle has traveled, which the client 104A stores as a multi-bit numerical quantity. The processor 108 also generates random noise data that are added to the plaintext data 122. In the embodiment of FIG. 1 the processor 108 executes the stored program instructions to implement a discrete Laplace mechanism to generate a discrete, randomly generated integer (noise data) that the processor 108 adds to the plaintext data 122.”);
sending the noisy … message (Becker, Col. 8, lines 45-51; “During operation, the client 104A uses the inner public key 116 to generate an encrypted representation of plaintext data 122 with added noise. As described in more detail below, the client 104A generates an error vector that is indistinguishable from a random Gaussian noise distribution based on the encrypted data generated using the inner public key.” … Col. 12, lines 29-40; “The process 200 begins as each of the clients 104A-104N generates plaintext data with added noise data for transmission to the aggregator in PSA (block 204). Using client 104A as an example, the processor 108 generates the plaintext data 122 during operation of, for example, a motor vehicle that incorporates the client 104A. Using the example described above, one example of the plaintext data 122 is mileage information that records how far the individual motor vehicle has traveled, which the client 104A stores as a multi-bit numerical quantity. The processor 108 also generates random noise data that are added to the plaintext data 122. In the embodiment of FIG. 1 the processor 108 executes the stored program instructions to implement a discrete Laplace mechanism to generate a discrete, randomly generated integer (noise data) that the processor 108 adds to the plaintext data 122.”).
Goncalves, Garcia-Morchon and Becker are from similar field of technology. Prior to the instant application’s effective filling date, there was a need for a method for secure communications using quantum key exchange mechanisms.
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the teachings of Becker system into Goncalves-Garcia Morchon system, with a motivation to increase security and robustness of the encapsulated message against multiple attacks (Becker, Col. 8, lines 45-51).
As per claim 4, the combination of Goncalves, Garcia Morchon and Becker teach the computer-implemented method of claim 1. Goncalves teaches wherein encapsulating the message includes generating the QK codeword by using the QK material to compute an exclusive-OR (XOR) of the QK material with the codeword (Goncalves, Cols. 6-7, lines 57-; “At 365, the encapsulation/decapsulation module 240 then encapsulates both the symmetric key K and the intermediate ciphertext C, using the recipient's public keys, while adding distinct randomness generated from ∂ to each encapsulation. Values are derived from ∂, preferably using one-way functions, which are then combined with K or Ci using a reversible function. Thus, for example, the encapsulation/decapsulation module 240 may apply two different hashing algorithms to ∂ to arrive at two hashes, Hash1 and Hash2. During encapsulation of K, a first hash (e.g., H1) is combined with K (e.g., using XOR), and the result is encrypted by asymmetric encryption/decryption module 250 using the recipient's public encapsulation key eK to produce ciphertext C; and the second hash (e.g., H2) is combined with intermediate ciphertext Ci (e.g., using XOR) and encrypted using the recipient's public encryption key pK to produce ciphertext C0.” … Col. 10, lines 46-60; “Any suitable symmetric and asymmetric encryption schemes may be employed in the hybrid secure encryption scheme, according to the security needs and computing resources of the devices implementing the hybrid scheme. Thus, for example, the hybrid scheme may include at least one quantum cryptographic scheme, at least one post-quantum cryptographic scheme; and/or at least one classical cryptographic scheme; but the hybrid scheme need not be limited only to combining quantum with classical cryptographic algorithms, and in fact all algorithms used in the hybrid scheme may be classical, quantum, or post-quantum. The two asymmetric encryption/decryption modules may employ the same, or different, asymmetric schemes. The hybrid scheme may further be modified to accommodate different key encapsulation methods, such as FrodoKEM.” ).
As per claim 6, Goncalves teaches a computer-implemented method of secure communications for a receiver (Goncalves, Col. 2, lines 18-22; “The recipient decrypts and decapsulates the ciphertexts, retrieves the random or quasi-random element, and may conduct one or more verification steps to ensure that the ciphertexts were well-formed, and to detect any re-encryption or encapsulation attacks.” … Col. 2, lines 29-33; “In this description, while a “sender” and “recipient” are used for ease of reference, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that implementation of the hybrid secure encryption scheme does not absolutely require transmission of data from a sender to a recipient.” … Cols. 4-5, lines 61-4; “FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram illustrating an example data communication system in which the hybrid secure encryption scheme may be used. The system of FIG. 1 includes first and second data communication devices 100. These data communication devices 100 may comprise any suitable type of communication device, including, but not limited, to user communication devices such as smartphones, tablet computers, personal digital assistants, portable media players, laptop and desktop computers, smart speakers and other smart devices, building automation systems, smart meters, Internet of Things (IoT)-enabled devices and the like.”) comprising:
receiving a [noisy] encapsulated message from a sender device (Goncalves, Col. 2, lines 11-18; “Briefly, in the exemplary embodiment described below, the hybrid secure encryption scheme links a first public key encryption (PKE) scheme with a second PKE scheme through a true random or pseudo-random element, which is used by a sender to encapsulate a symmetrically encrypted message and its associated symmetric key to generate a pair of ciphertexts for transmission to a recipient.” … Col. 3, lines 11-20; “K denotes a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) comprising a key generation algorithm K.KeyGen, which also takes as input 1n (nϵ
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) and outputs a related pair of public encapsulation and secret decapsulation keys (eK, dK); an encapsulation algorithm K. Encaps; and a decapsulation algorithm K.Decaps. Depending on the chosen KEM, for example FrodoKEM, encapsulation may take as input a single random value, (e.g., ∂), and using a public encapsulation key (e.g., eK) outputs both a ciphertext and symmetric key K.” … Col. 10, lines 46-60; “Any suitable symmetric and asymmetric encryption schemes may be employed in the hybrid secure encryption scheme, according to the security needs and computing resources of the devices implementing the hybrid scheme. Thus, for example, the hybrid scheme may include at least one quantum cryptographic scheme, at least one post-quantum cryptographic scheme; and/or at least one classical cryptographic scheme; but the hybrid scheme need not be limited only to combining quantum with classical cryptographic algorithms, and in fact all algorithms used in the hybrid scheme may be classical, quantum, or post-quantum. The two asymmetric encryption/decryption modules may employ the same, or different, asymmetric schemes. The hybrid scheme may further be modified to accommodate different key encapsulation methods, such as FrodoKEM.”), the [noisy] encapsulated message having been encapsulated using a post-quantum cryptographic algorithm and encapsulated using a quantum key, QK, material derived from QK distribution with the sender device (Goncalves, Col. 2, lines 11-18; “Briefly, in the exemplary embodiment described below, the hybrid secure encryption scheme links a first public key encryption (PKE) scheme with a second PKE scheme through a true random or pseudo-random element, which is used by a sender to encapsulate a symmetrically encrypted message and its associated symmetric key to generate a pair of ciphertexts for transmission to a recipient.” … Col. 3, lines 11-20; “K denotes a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) comprising a key generation algorithm K.KeyGen, which also takes as input 1n (nϵ
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) and outputs a related pair of public encapsulation and secret decapsulation keys (eK, dK); an encapsulation algorithm K. Encaps; and a decapsulation algorithm K.Decaps. Depending on the chosen KEM, for example FrodoKEM, encapsulation may take as input a single random value, (e.g., ∂), and using a public encapsulation key (e.g., eK) outputs both a ciphertext and symmetric key K.” … Col. 10, lines 46-60; “Any suitable symmetric and asymmetric encryption schemes may be employed in the hybrid secure encryption scheme, according to the security needs and computing resources of the devices implementing the hybrid scheme. Thus, for example, the hybrid scheme may include at least one quantum cryptographic scheme, at least one post-quantum cryptographic scheme; and/or at least one classical cryptographic scheme; but the hybrid scheme need not be limited only to combining quantum with classical cryptographic algorithms, and in fact all algorithms used in the hybrid scheme may be classical, quantum, or post-quantum. The two asymmetric encryption/decryption modules may employ the same, or different, asymmetric schemes. The hybrid scheme may further be modified to accommodate different key encapsulation methods, such as FrodoKEM.”);
decapsulating the received message using the corresponding QK used by the sender device (Goncalves, Col. 3, lines 11-25; “K denotes a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) comprising a key generation algorithm K.KeyGen, which also takes as input 1n (nϵ
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) and outputs a related pair of public encapsulation and secret decapsulation keys (eK, dK); an encapsulation algorithm K.Encaps; and a decapsulation algorithm K.Decaps. Depending on the chosen KEM, for example FrodoKEM, encapsulation may take as input a single random value, (e.g., ∂), and using a public encapsulation key (e.g., eK) outputs both a ciphertext and symmetric key K. In other implementations of a KEM, the key K may be generated randomly then encapsulated with a random value, using the encapsulation key. The decapsulation algorithm K.Decaps takes as input a secret decapsulation key (e.g., dK) and a ciphertext and returns the related ephemeral key K.”);
decapsulating the QK decapsulated message using the corresponding post-quantum cryptographic algorithm used by the sender (Goncalves, Col. 3, lines 11-25; “K denotes a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) comprising a key generation algorithm K.KeyGen, which also takes as input 1n (nϵ
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) and outputs a related pair of public encapsulation and secret decapsulation keys (eK, dK); an encapsulation algorithm K.Encaps; and a decapsulation algorithm K.Decaps. Depending on the chosen KEM, for example FrodoKEM, encapsulation may take as input a single random value, (e.g., ∂), and using a public encapsulation key (e.g., eK) outputs both a ciphertext and symmetric key K. In other implementations of a KEM, the key K may be generated randomly then encapsulated with a random value, using the encapsulation key. The decapsulation algorithm K.Decaps takes as input a secret decapsulation key (e.g., dK) and a ciphertext and returns the related ephemeral key K.”); and
outputting the message for use by the receiver device (Goncalves, Col. 9, lines59-64; “Given C′i and K′, C′i may be decrypted using the symmetric encryption/decryption module 540 and K′ to produce m′∥∂′. In this example, we presume that ∂ is of known length L, and therefore ∂ can be easily extracted and m′ isolated. If no validation is carried out, then message m′ is the final product and may be processed.” Examiner submits that under broadest reasonable interpretation, once the message has been decapsulated the receiver needs to decrypt it to obtain the message as a plaintext.);
wherein the method further comprises choosing a secret and publishing a public key (Goncalves, Col. 6, lines 17-31; “The device 100 then generates two asymmetric key pairs 305, 310. These key pairs may be generated in accordance with the hybrid secure encryption scheme depicted in Table 1. Thus, a first public-secret key pair (pK, sK) may be generated using a selected PKE key generation algorithm Πasym.KeyGen and a second public-secret key pair (eK, dK) may be generated using a selected key encapsulation algorithm K.KeyGen, given appropriate initialization vectors generated at the device 100. The public keys pK, eK of the key pairs are then transmitted at 315 to a server system 30. The server system 30 receives the public keys from the device 100 at 320, and stores them at 325 in a keystore in association with the device 100 or the user of the device 100. The public keys are made accessible to other users of the system 30.”), [wherein the received message comprises a codeword, wherein the codeword is generated by encoding the message using the published public key].
Goncalves does not expressly teach:
receiving a noisy [encapsulated] message …
the noisy [encapsulated] message …;
wherein the received message comprises a codeword, wherein the codeword is generated by encoding the message using the published public key.
However, Garcia-Morchon teaches:
wherein the received message comprises a codeword, wherein the codeword is generated by encoding the message using the published public key (Garcia-Morchon, Parag. [0005]; “KEM schemes (i.e., post-quantum) may establish a shared secret (i.e., message) between two entities or parties using asymmetric cryptography by one party, usually the initiator (i.e., sender device) of the communication, to encrypt or encapsulate (using the other party’s public-key) and transmit a shared secret to the other party, known as the responder (i.e., receiver device), who can then decrypt or decapsulate it (using her secret-key) and then use it for securely communicating with the initiator party.”);
Goncalves and Garcia-Morchon are from similar field of technology. Prior to the instant application’s effective filling date, there was a need for a method for secure communications using quantum key exchange mechanisms.
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the teachings of Garcia-Morchon system into Goncalves system, with a motivation to provide a double encapsulation technique where the first encapsulation comprises the use of KEM and public key encryption/encoding (PKE) (Garcia-Morchon, Parag. [0005]).
The combination of Goncalves and Garcia-Morchon does not expressly teach:
receiving a noisy [encapsulated] message …
the noisy [encapsulated] message …;
However, Becker teaches:
receiving a noisy [encapsulated] message (Becker, Col. 8, lines 45-51; “During operation, the client 104A uses the inner public key 116 to generate an encrypted representation of plaintext data 122 with added noise. As described in more detail below, the client 104A generates an error vector that is indistinguishable from a random Gaussian noise distribution based on the encrypted data generated using the inner public key.” … Col. 12, lines 29-40; “The process 200 begins as each of the clients 104A-104N generates plaintext data with added noise data for transmission to the aggregator in PSA (block 204). Using client 104A as an example, the processor 108 generates the plaintext data 122 during operation of, for example, a motor vehicle that incorporates the client 104A. Using the example described above, one example of the plaintext data 122 is mileage information that records how far the individual motor vehicle has traveled, which the client 104A stores as a multi-bit numerical quantity. The processor 108 also generates random noise data that are added to the plaintext data 122. In the embodiment of FIG. 1 the processor 108 executes the stored program instructions to implement a discrete Laplace mechanism to generate a discrete, randomly generated integer (noise data) that the processor 108 adds to the plaintext data 122.”);
the noisy [encapsulated] message (Becker, Col. 8, lines 45-51; “During operation, the client 104A uses the inner public key 116 to generate an encrypted representation of plaintext data 122 with added noise. As described in more detail below, the client 104A generates an error vector that is indistinguishable from a random Gaussian noise distribution based on the encrypted data generated using the inner public key.” … Col. 12, lines 29-40; “The process 200 begins as each of the clients 104A-104N generates plaintext data with added noise data for transmission to the aggregator in PSA (block 204). Using client 104A as an example, the processor 108 generates the plaintext data 122 during operation of, for example, a motor vehicle that incorporates the client 104A. Using the example described above, one example of the plaintext data 122 is mileage information that records how far the individual motor vehicle has traveled, which the client 104A stores as a multi-bit numerical quantity. The processor 108 also generates random noise data that are added to the plaintext data 122. In the embodiment of FIG. 1 the processor 108 executes the stored program instructions to implement a discrete Laplace mechanism to generate a discrete, randomly generated integer (noise data) that the processor 108 adds to the plaintext data 122.”).
Goncalves, Garcia-Morchon and Becker are from similar field of technology. Prior to the instant application’s effective filling date, there was a need for a method for secure communications using quantum key exchange mechanisms.
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the teachings of Becker system into Goncalves-Garcia-Morchon system, with a motivation to increase security and robustness of the encapsulated message against multiple attacks (Becker, Col. 8, , lines 45-51).
As per claim 13, it is a computer-implemented method that recites similar limitations presented on independent claims 1 and 6. Therefore, claim 13 is rejected based on the same rationale applied to claims 1 and 6.
As per claim 17, the rejection of claim 13 is included and it is a method claim that recites similar limitations as disclosed in claim 4. Therefore, claim 17 is rejected based on the same rationale applied to claim 4.
Claims 2, 8 and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Goncalves et al. (US 11,431,498) in view of Garcia-Morchon et al. (US 2020/0259649) hereinafter Garcia-Morchon and further in view of Becker et al. (US 10,630,655) hereinafter Becker as applied to claim 1, and further in view of Gauravaram (US 2016/0080146).
As per claim 2, the combination of Goncalves, Garcia-Morchon and Becker teach the computer-implemented method of claim 1.
The combination of Goncalves, Garcia-Morchon and Becker does not expressly teach:
further comprising:
generating a random message M of length L using a random source.
However, Gauravaram teaches:
further comprising:
generating a random message M of length L using a random source (Gauravaram, Parag. [0026]; “FIG. 1 illustrates a computing environment 100 implementing a randomized message generation system 102. in accordance with an implementation of the present subject matter. The randomized message generation system 102, hereinafter referred to as the system 102, is configured to generate randomized messages for cryptographic hash functions.” … Parag. [0036]; “In an implementation, for randomization of the message M, the message envelope generator 118 obtains a random value r in a binary bit form. In an example, the random value r may be of a bit size or length of at least 128 bits and at most equivalent to a block length b of the compression function f for the cryptographic hash function H. … In an example, the random value r may be generated using a random bit generator”).
Goncalves, Garcia-Morchon, Becker and Gauravaram are from similar field of technology. Prior to the instant application’s effective filling date, there was a need for a method for secure communications using quantum key exchange mechanisms.
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the teachings of Gauravaram system into Goncalves-Garcia-Morchon-Becker system, with a motivation to generate a fixed length message to be encapsulated/encrypted (Gauravaram, Parag. [0026]).
As per claim 8, the rejection of claim 6 is included and it is a method claim that recites similar limitations as disclosed in claim 2. Therefore, claim 8 is rejected based on the same rationale applied to claim 2.
As per claim 15, the rejection of claim 13 is included and it is a method claim that recites similar limitations as disclosed in claim 2. Therefore, claim 15 is rejected based on the same rationale applied to claim 2.
Claim 5 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Goncalves et al. (US 11,431,498) in view of Garcia-Morchon et al. (US 2020/0259649) hereinafter Garcia-Morchon and further in view of Becker et al. (US 10,630,655) hereinafter Becker as applied to claim 4, and further in view of Tomlinson et al. (US 2015/0163060) hereinafter Tomlinson.
As per claim 5, the combination of Goncalves, Garcia-Morchon and Becker teach the computer-implemented method of claim 4. Goncalves teaches wherein [adding noise] to the encapsulated message includes generating a ciphertext (Goncalves, Col. 2, lines 11-18; “Briefly, in the exemplary embodiment described below, the hybrid secure encryption scheme links a first public key encryption (PKE) scheme with a second PKE scheme through a true random or pseudo-random element, which is used by a sender to encapsulate a symmetrically encrypted message and its associated symmetric key to generate a pair of ciphertexts for transmission to a recipient.” … Col. 3, lines 11-20; “K denotes a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) comprising a key generation algorithm K.KeyGen, which also takes as input 1n (nϵ
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) and outputs a related pair of public encapsulation and secret decapsulation keys (eK, dK); an encapsulation algorithm K. Encaps; and a decapsulation algorithm K.Decaps. Depending on the chosen KEM, for example FrodoKEM, encapsulation may take as input a single random value, (e.g., ∂), and using a public encapsulation key (e.g., eK) outputs both a ciphertext and symmetric key K.” … Col. 10, lines 46-60; “Any suitable symmetric and asymmetric encryption schemes may be employed in the hybrid secure encryption scheme, according to the security needs and computing resources of the devices implementing the hybrid scheme. Thus, for example, the hybrid scheme may include at least one quantum cryptographic scheme, at least one post-quantum cryptographic scheme; and/or at least one classical cryptographic scheme; but the hybrid scheme need not be limited only to combining quantum with classical cryptographic algorithms, and in fact all algorithms used in the hybrid scheme may be classical, quantum, or post-quantum. The two asymmetric encryption/decryption modules may employ the same, or different, asymmetric schemes. The hybrid scheme may further be modified to accommodate different key encapsulation methods, such as FrodoKEM.”)
Becker teaches adding noise to the … message (Becker, Col. 8, lines 45-51; “During operation, the client 104A uses the inner public key 116 to generate an encrypted representation of plaintext data 122 with added noise. As described in more detail below, the client 104A generates an error vector that is indistinguishable from a random Gaussian noise distribution based on the encrypted data generated using the inner public key.” … Col. 12, lines 29-40; “The process 200 begins as each of the clients 104A-104N generates plaintext data with added noise data for transmission to the aggregator in PSA (block 204). Using client 104A as an example, the processor 108 generates the plaintext data 122 during operation of, for example, a motor vehicle that incorporates the client 104A. Using the example described above, one example of the plaintext data 122 is mileage information that records how far the individual motor vehicle has traveled, which the client 104A stores as a multi-bit numerical quantity. The processor 108 also generates random noise data that are added to the plaintext data 122. In the embodiment of FIG. 1 the processor 108 executes the stored program instructions to implement a discrete Laplace mechanism to generate a discrete, randomly generated integer (noise data) that the processor 108 adds to the plaintext data 122.”),
[wherein a portion of the ciphertext is generated by corrupting or flipping random bits of the QK codeword]; and
wherein sending the [noisy] encapsulated message to the receiver device includes sending the ciphertext to the receiver device (Goncalves, Col. 2, lines 11-18; “Briefly, in the exemplary embodiment described below, the hybrid secure encryption scheme links a first public key encryption (PKE) scheme with a second PKE scheme through a true random or pseudo-random element, which is used by a sender to encapsulate a symmetrically encrypted message and its associated symmetric key to generate a pair of ciphertexts for transmission to a recipient.” … Col. 3, lines 11-20; “K denotes a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) comprising a key generation algorithm K.KeyGen, which also takes as input 1n (nϵ
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) and outputs a related pair of public encapsulation and secret decapsulation keys (eK, dK); an encapsulation algorithm K. Encaps; and a decapsulation algorithm K.Decaps. Depending on the chosen KEM, for example FrodoKEM, encapsulation may take as input a single random value, (e.g., ∂), and using a public encapsulation key (e.g., eK) outputs both a ciphertext and symmetric key K.” … Col. 10, lines 46-60; “Any suitable symmetric and asymmetric encryption schemes may be employed in the hybrid secure encryption scheme, according to the security needs and computing resources of the devices implementing the hybrid scheme. Thus, for example, the hybrid scheme may include at least one quantum cryptographic scheme, at least one post-quantum cryptographic scheme; and/or at least one classical cryptographic scheme; but the hybrid scheme need not be limited only to combining quantum with classical cryptographic algorithms, and in fact all algorithms used in the hybrid scheme may be classical, quantum, or post-quantum. The two asymmetric encryption/decryption modules may employ the same, or different, asymmetric schemes. The hybrid scheme may further be modified to accommodate different key encapsulation methods, such as FrodoKEM.”)
Becker teaches (Becker, Col. 8, lines 45-51; “During operation, the client 104A uses the inner public key 116 to generate an encrypted representation of plaintext data 122 with added noise. As described in more detail below, the client 104A generates an error vector that is indistinguishable from a random Gaussian noise distribution based on the encrypted data generated using the inner public key.” … Col. 12, lines 29-40; “The process 200 begins as each of the clients 104A-104N generates plaintext data with added noise data for transmission to the aggregator in PSA (block 204). Using client 104A as an example, the processor 108 generates the plaintext data 122 during operation of, for example, a motor vehicle that incorporates the client 104A. Using the example described above, one example of the plaintext data 122 is mileage information that records how far the individual motor vehicle has traveled, which the client 104A stores as a multi-bit numerical quantity. The processor 108 also generates random noise data that are added to the plaintext data 122. In the embodiment of FIG. 1 the processor 108 executes the stored program instructions to implement a discrete Laplace mechanism to generate a discrete, randomly generated integer (noise data) that the processor 108 adds to the plaintext data 122.”).
The combination of Goncalves, Garcia-Morchon and Becker does not expressly teach:
wherein a portion of the ciphertext is generated by corrupting or flipping random bits of the QK codeword;
However, Tomlinson teaches:
wherein a portion of the ciphertext is generated by corrupting or flipping random bits of the QK codeword (Tomlinson, Parag. [0007]; “The digital cryptogram is formed from code words corrupted by exactly t randomly, or t pseudo-randomly, chosen bit errors.” … Parag. [0010]; “In the invention, a message is encrypted by first partitioning the message into message vectors of length kbits each and encoding these message vectors into codewords which are corrupted by a combination of bit errors and bit deletions to form the cryptogram.”)
Goncalves, Garcia-Morchon, Becker and Tomlinson are from similar field of technology. Prior to the instant application’s effective filling date, there was a need for a method for secure communications using quantum key exchange mechanisms.
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the teachings of Tomlinson system into Goncalves-Garcia-Morchon-Becker system, with a motivation to provide secure message by corrupting randomly a set of bits (Tomlinson, Parag. [0007]).
Claims 10-11 and 18-19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Goncalves et al. (US 11,431,498) in view of Garcia-Morchon et al. (US 2020/0259649) hereinafter Garcia-Morchon and further in view of Becker et al. (US 10,630,655) hereinafter Becker as applied to claim 6, and further in view of Tomlinson et al. (US 2015/0163060) hereinafter Tomlinson.
As per claim 10, the combination of the combination of Goncalves, Garcia-Morchon and Becker teach the computer-implemented method of claim 6.
[wherein the received message comprises a ciphertext wherein a portion of the ciphertext is generated by corrupting or flipping random bits of a QK codeword], wherein the QK codeword is generated by using the quantum key material to compute an exclusive-OR, XOR, of the QK material with the codeword (Goncalves, Cols. 6-7, lines 57-; “At 365, the encapsulation/decapsulation module 240 then encapsulates both the symmetric key K and the intermediate ciphertext C, using the recipient's public keys, while adding distinct randomness generated from ∂ to each encapsulation. Values are derived from ∂, preferably using one-way functions, which are then combined with K or Ci using a reversible function. Thus, for example, the encapsulation/decapsulation module 240 may apply two different hashing algorithms to ∂ to arrive at two hashes, Hash1 and Hash2. During encapsulation of K, a first hash (e.g., H1) is combined with K (e.g., using XOR), and the result is encrypted by asymmetric encryption/decryption module 250 using the recipient's public encapsulation key eK to produce ciphertext C; and the second hash (e.g., H2) is combined with intermediate ciphertext Ci (e.g., using XOR) and encrypted using the recipient's public encryption key pK to produce ciphertext C0.” … Col. 10, lines 46-60; “Any suitable symmetric and asymmetric encryption schemes may be employed in the hybrid secure encryption scheme, according to the security needs and computing resources of the devices implementing the hybrid scheme. Thus, for example, the hybrid scheme may include at least one quantum cryptographic scheme, at least one post-quantum cryptographic scheme; and/or at least one classical cryptographic scheme; but the hybrid scheme need not be limited only to combining quantum with classical cryptographic algorithms, and in fact all algorithms used in the hybrid scheme may be classical, quantum, or post-quantum. The two asymmetric encryption/decryption modules may employ the same, or different, asymmetric schemes. The hybrid scheme may further be modified to accommodate different key encapsulation methods, such as FrodoKEM.”).
The combination of Goncalves, Garcia-Morchon and Becker does not expressly teach:
wherein the received message comprises a ciphertext wherein a portion of the ciphertext is generated by corrupting or flipping random bits of a QK codeword.
However, Tomlinson teaches:
wherein the received message comprises a ciphertext wherein a portion of the ciphertext is generated by corrupting or flipping random bits of a QK codeword (Tomlinson, Parag. [0007]; “The digital cryptogram is formed from code words corrupted by exactly t randomly, or t pseudo-randomly, chosen bit errors.” … Parag. [0010]; “In the invention, a message is encrypted by first partitioning the message into message vectors of length kbits each and encoding these message vectors into codewords which are corrupted by a combination of bit errors and bit deletions to form the cryptogram.”)
Goncalves, Garcia-Morchon, Becker and Tomlinson are from similar field of technology. Prior to the instant application’s effective filling date, there was a need for a method for secure communications using quantum key exchange mechanisms.
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the teachings of Tomlinson system into Goncalves-Garcia-Morchon-Becker system, with a motivation to provide secure message by corrupting randomly a set of bits (Tomlinson, Parag. [0007]).
As per claim 11, the combination of the combination of Goncalves, Garcia-Morchon, Becker and Tomlinson teach the computer-implemented method of claim 10. Goncalves teaches wherein receiving [the noisy] encapsulated message includes receiving the ciphertext from the sender device (Goncalves, Col. 2, lines 11-18; “Briefly, in the exemplary embodiment described below, the hybrid secure encryption scheme links a first public key encryption (PKE) scheme with a second PKE scheme through a true random or pseudo-random element, which is used by a sender to encapsulate a symmetrically encrypted message and its associated symmetric key to generate a pair of ciphertexts for transmission to a recipient.” … Col. 3, lines 11-20; “K denotes a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) comprising a key generation algorithm K.KeyGen, which also takes as input 1n (nϵ
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) and outputs a related pair of public encapsulation and secret decapsulation keys (eK, dK); an encapsulation algorithm K. Encaps; and a decapsulation algorithm K.Decaps. Depending on the chosen KEM, for example FrodoKEM, encapsulation may take as input a single random value, (e.g., ∂), and using a public encapsulation key (e.g., eK) outputs both a ciphertext and symmetric key K.” … Col. 10, lines 46-60; “Any suitable symmetric and asymmetric encryption schemes may be employed in the hybrid secure encryption scheme, according to the security needs and computing resources of the devices implementing the hybrid scheme. Thus, for example, the hybrid scheme may include at least one quantum cryptographic scheme, at least one post-quantum cryptographic scheme; and/or at least one classical cryptographic scheme; but the hybrid scheme need not be limited only to combining quantum with classical cryptographic algorithms, and in fact all algorithms used in the hybrid scheme may be classical, quantum, or post-quantum. The two asymmetric encryption/decryption modules may employ the same, or different, asymmetric schemes. The hybrid scheme may further be modified to accommodate different key encapsulation methods, such as FrodoKEM.”);
wherein decapsulating the received message using the corresponding QK used by the sender device includes decapsulating or decrypting the portion of the ciphertext using the QK material (Goncalves, Col. 3, lines 11-25; “K denotes a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) comprising a key generation algorithm K.KeyGen, which also takes as input 1n (nϵ
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) and outputs a related pair of public encapsulation and secret decapsulation keys (eK, dK); an encapsulation algorithm K.Encaps; and a decapsulation algorithm K.Decaps. Depending on the chosen KEM, for example FrodoKEM, encapsulation may take as input a single random value, (e.g., ∂), and using a public encapsulation key (e.g., eK) outputs both a ciphertext and symmetric key K. In other implementations of a KEM, the key K may be generated randomly then encapsulated with a random value, using the encapsulation key. The decapsulation algorithm K.Decaps takes as input a secret decapsulation key (e.g., dK) and a ciphertext and returns the related ephemeral key K.”); and
wherein decapsulating the QK-decapsulated message using the corresponding post-quantum cryptographic algorithm includes further decapsulating the portion of the ciphertext using the post-quantum cryptography algorithm (Goncalves, Col. 3, lines 11-25; “K denotes a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) comprising a key generation algorithm K.KeyGen, which also takes as input 1n (nϵ
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) and outputs a related pair of public encapsulation and secret decapsulation keys (eK, dK); an encapsulation algorithm K.Encaps; and a decapsulation algorithm K.Decaps. Depending on the chosen KEM, for example FrodoKEM, encapsulation may take as input a single random value, (e.g., ∂), and using a public encapsulation key (e.g., eK) outputs both a ciphertext and symmetric key K. In other implementations of a KEM, the key K may be generated randomly then encapsulated with a random value, using the encapsulation key. The decapsulation algorithm K.Decaps takes as input a secret decapsulation key (e.g., dK) and a ciphertext and returns the related ephemeral key K.”).
In addition, Becker teaches:
The noisy message … (Becker, Col. 8, lines 45-51; “During operation, the client 104A uses the inner public key 116 to generate an encrypted representation of plaintext data 122 with added noise. As described in more detail below, the client 104A generates an error vector that is indistinguishable from a random Gaussian noise distribution based on the encrypted data generated using the inner public key.” … Col. 12, lines 29-40; “The process 200 begins as each of the clients 104A-104N generates plaintext data with added noise data for transmission to the aggregator in PSA (block 204). Using client 104A as an example, the processor 108 generates the plaintext data 122 during operation of, for example, a motor vehicle that incorporates the client 104A. Using the example described above, one example of the plaintext data 122 is mileage information that records how far the individual motor vehicle has traveled, which the client 104A stores as a multi-bit numerical quantity. The processor 108 also generates random noise data that are added to the plaintext data 122. In the embodiment of FIG. 1 the processor 108 executes the stored program instructions to implement a discrete Laplace mechanism to generate a discrete, randomly generated integer (noise data) that the processor 108 adds to the plaintext data 122.”).
As per claim 18, the rejection of claim 17 is included and it is a method claim that recites similar limitations as disclosed in claim 10. Therefore, claim 18 is rejected based on the same rationale applied to claim 10.
As per claim 19, the rejection of claim 18 is included and it is a method claim that recites similar limitations as disclosed in claim 11. Therefore, claim 19 is rejected based on the same rationale applied to claim 11.
Claims 12, 20 and 28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Goncalves et al. (US 11,431,498) in view of Garcia-Morchon et al. (US 2020/0259649) hereinafter Garcia-Morchon and further in view of Becker et al. (US 10,630,655) hereinafter Becker and Tomlinson et al. (US 2015/0163060) hereinafter Tomlinson as applied to claim 11, and further in view of Bao et al. (US 11,201,731) hereinafter Bao.
As per claim 12, the combination of the combination of Goncalves, Garcia-Morchon, Becker and Tomlinson teach the computer-implemented method of claim 11. Goncalves teaches further comprising:
generating a noisy codeword computing an exclusive-OR, XOR, of the QK material with the portion of the ciphertext (Goncalves, Cols. 6-7, lines 57-; “At 365, the encapsulation/decapsulation module 240 then encapsulates both the symmetric key K and the intermediate ciphertext C, using the recipient's public keys, while adding distinct randomness generated from ∂ to each encapsulation. Values are derived from ∂, preferably using one-way functions, which are then combined with K or Ci using a reversible function. Thus, for example, the encapsulation/decapsulation module 240 may apply two different hashing algorithms to ∂ to arrive at two hashes, Hash1 and Hash2. During encapsulation of K, a first hash (e.g., H1) is combined with K (e.g., using XOR), and the result is encrypted by asymmetric encryption/decryption module 250 using the recipient's public encapsulation key eK to produce ciphertext C; and the second hash (e.g., H2) is combined with intermediate ciphertext Ci (e.g., using XOR) and encrypted using the recipient's public encryption key pK to produce ciphertext C0.”); and
[decapsulating the noisy codeword by applying an error decoding algorithm to recover the encoded message].
The combination of Goncalves, Garcia-Morchon, Becker and Tomlinson does not expressly teach:
decapsulating the noisy codeword by applying an error decoding algorithm to recover the encoded message.
However, Bao teaches:
decapsulating the noisy codeword by applying an error decoding algorithm to recover the encoded message (Bao, Col. 3, lines 30-42; “To perform the binary QC-MDPC decoding operations, soft and hard decoding techniques that are developed for Low-Density Parity-Check (LDPC) codes including binary belief-prorogation (BP) and a bit-flipping (BF) algorithm may be applied. It is worth mentioning that more general GFq LDPC decoders have been developed as well. Unfortunately, using LDPC decoding techniques for decoding binary and non-binary QC-MDPC codes generally yields sub-optimal performance due to the difference in densities of the two types of codes. A modified bit-flipping decoding algorithm has been developed for binary QC-MDPC (but not for non-binary QC-MDPC) to improve its decoding optimality.”).
Goncalves, Garcia-Morchon, Becker, Tomlinson and Bao are from similar field of technology. Prior to the instant application’s effective filling date, there was a need for a method for secure communications using quantum key exchange mechanisms.
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the teachings of Bao system into Goncalves-Garcia-Morchon-Becker-Tomlinson system, with a motivation to provide a decoding algorithm that eliminates the error/noise from the message (Bao, Col. 3, lines 30-42).
As per claim 20, the rejection of claim 19 is included and it is a method claim that recites similar limitations as disclosed in claim 12. Therefore, claim 20 is rejected based on the same rationale applied to claim 12.
As per claim 28, the combination of Goncalves, Garcia-Morchon, Becker, Tomlinson and Bao teach the computer-implemented method of claim 20. Bao teaches wherein the error decoding algorithm is a medium density parity check code, MDPC, decoding algorithm (Bao, Col. 3, lines 30-42; “To perform the binary QC-MDPC decoding operations, soft and hard decoding techniques that are developed for Low-Density Parity-Check (LDPC) codes including binary belief-prorogation (BP) and a bit-flipping (BF) algorithm may be applied. It is worth mentioning that more general GFq LDPC decoders have been developed as well. Unfortunately, using LDPC decoding techniques for decoding binary and non-binary QC-MDPC codes generally yields sub-optimal performance due to the difference in densities of the two types of codes. A modified bit-flipping decoding algorithm has been developed for binary QC-MDPC (but not for non-binary QC-MDPC) to improve its decoding optimality.”).
Claim 29 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Goncalves et al. (US 11,431,498) in view of Garcia-Morchon et al. (US 2020/0259649) hereinafter Garcia-Morchon and further in view of Becker et al. (US 10,630,655) hereinafter Becker as applied to claim 13, and further in view of Reinders et al. (US 2019/0319787) hereinafter Reinders.
As per claim 29, the combination of Goncalves, Garcia-Morchon and Becker teach the computer-implemented method of claim 13.
The combination of Goncalves, Garcia-Morchon and Becker does not expressly teach:
wherein the post-cryptographic algorithm is based on the bit-flipping key encapsulation, BIKE post quantum key encapsulation, KEM, cryptographic algorithm.
However, Reinders teaches:
wherein the post-cryptographic algorithm is based on the bit-flipping key encapsulation, BIKE post quantum key encapsulation, KEM, cryptographic algorithm (Reinders, Parag. [0013]; “Bit Flipping Key Encapsulation (BIKE) is a key-exchange proposal to for post-quantum cryptography. BIKE is based on the difficulty of decoding QC-MDPC (Quasi-Cyclic Moderate Density Parity-Check) codes. The most expensive step in the BIKE algorithm is the QC-MDPC decoding procedure. The reference implementation for BIKE uses a bit-flipping decoder, which picks error bits to flip based on a number of parity check equations associated with the bits are unsatisfied.”)
Goncalves, Garcia-Morchon, Becker and Reinders are from similar field of technology. Prior to the instant application’s effective filling date, there was a need for a method for secure communications using quantum key exchange mechanisms.
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the teachings of Reinders system into Goncalves-Becker system, with a motivation to provide a decoding algorithm based on QC-MDPC codes (Reinders, Parag. [0013]).
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure.
Zaverucha (US 9,172,529) relates to methods, systems, and computer programs for using hybrid encryption schemes are disclosed. In some implementations, a random value is obtained by a pseudorandom generator. A symmetric key is generated based on the random value. A public component is also generated based on the random value. Additionally, an initialization vector is generated based on the random value. The symmetric key and the initialization vector are used to generate an encrypted message based on an input message. The encrypted message and the public component are transmitted to an entity. At least one of the public component or the symmetric key is generated based additionally on a public key of the entity.
Chang (US 10,637,503) relates to methods and systems for decoding a low density parity check (LDPC) encoded codeword. The methods may include receiving a codeword over a data channel. The codeword may be encoded with a preset number of data bits having one or more shortened data bits. The methods may also include obtaining a parity check matrix that defines relationships between a plurality of variable nodes and a plurality of check nodes. The methods may further include decoding the codeword by iteratively estimating values with respect to the codeword at the plurality of variable nodes and the plurality of check nodes. During each iteration, a same part of the plurality of variable nodes related to one or more shortened data bits are skipped from estimation.
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/A.D.C./Examiner, Art Unit 2498
/Jeremy S Duffield/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2498