DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Status
Claims 12, 48, 50-51, 53, 55-56, 58, 60-63, 65, 68-70, 73-75, 78-80, 83-84, 86, 139, and 148 are withdrawn from further consideration pursuant to 37 CFR 1.142(b), as being drawn to a nonelected invention or species, there being no allowable generic or linking claim.
Claims 1, 8, 10-11, 15, 17, 22, 25, 27, 30-31, 39, 41, 43, 45, 128-129, 132, 144, 146-147, 151, 153, 158, 161-163, and 166 are under consideration in this office action.
Information Disclosure Statement
The information disclosure statement (IDS) submitted on May 7, 2026 in compliance with the provisions of 37 CFR 1.97. Accordingly, the IDS is being considered by the examiner.
Withdrawn Objections/Rejections
Any objection or rejection of record pertaining to cancelled claims 2-3, 7, 14, 20, 135, 138, 142-143, and 156 is rendered moot by applicant’s cancellation of said claim.
All of the objections of record regarding sequence compliance are withdrawn in view of applicant’s amendment to the specification filed May 7, 2026.
The rejections of claims 1, 8, 10-11, 15, 17, 22, 25, 27, 30-31, 41, 43, 45, 132, 144, 153, and 161 under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) as being indefinite are withdrawn in view of applicant’s amendment and persuasive arguments filed May 7, 2026.
The rejection of claim 132 under 35 U.S.C. 112(d) as being of improper dependent form is withdrawn in view of applicant’s amendment of claim 132.
Applicant’s arguments (remarks pg 16-17) with respect to the rejection of claims 1-3, 7-8, 11, 14-15, 17, 20, 22, 25, 27, 30-31, 39, 41, 43, 45, 128-129, 132, 138, 138, 142-144, 147, 151, 153, 156, 158, 161-163, and 166 have been fully considered and are persuasive. The rejection of these claims under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) for failing to meet the written description requirement has been withdrawn.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112(a)
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claim 10 and 146 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claims contain subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
“[T]he purpose of the written description requirement is to ‘ensure that the scope of the right to exclude, as set forth in the claims, does not overreach the scope of the inventor’s contribution to the field of art as described in the patent specification.’” Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 920 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). To satisfy the written description requirement, the specification must describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562-63, 19 USPQ2d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1991). See also MPEP 2163.04.
Claims 10 and 146 are drawn to a human antibody that blocks PD-L2 that; in the specification, “human antibody” is not defined. “Humanized antibody” is defined as an antibody that has at least one CDR derived from a mammal other than a human, and a FR region and the constant region of a human antibody (instant specification, pg 29). While humanized antibodies are an example of a human intervention, human antibodies are a natural product because the intervention is only isolation, which does not significantly change or manipulate the naturally occurring product. The specification does not clearly set forth what “human antibody” means and how “human” antibodies are made and isolated; thus, “human” is interpreted to mean an antibody isolated from a human. Claims 10 and 146 fail to meet the written description requirement because the disclosure fails to describe clearly these human antibodies or show that the inventor was in possession of the human antibodies at the time the invention was filed. Therefore, the limitation of claims 10 and 146 directed to a human antibody must be cancelled from the claim.
Modified Rejections Necessitated by Amendment
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
(a)(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1, 10-11, 15, 22, 27, 31, 39, 41, 43, 45, 128-129, 132, 146-147, 151, 158, and 162-163 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) and 102 (a)(2) as being anticipated by US 2018/0002422, published January 4, 2018 (“Freeman”; PTO-892 from 2/10/2026).
Freeman teaches a method of treating a subject with cancer who is responsive to PD-1 blockade alone comprising administering a combination of agents that selectively blocks RGMb and PD-1 [0007]. According to the specification (pg 19):
“an individual is considered to have failed an anti-PD-1/PD-L1 therapy if the treated cancer is resistant to therapy, if the treated cancer has no response or an incomplete response (e.g., a response that is less than a complete remission) to the therapy, if the treated cancer progresses or relapses after the therapy, if the individual that initially responds to therapy but develops a resistance to the therapy, or if the individual has been taken off of the therapy due to intolerance to the therapy”
Freeman teaches that combination therapy comprising anti-PD1 antibody and anti-RGMb antibody for the treatment of a condition that would benefit from upregulation of an immune response [0008], such as cancer, “especially where PD-1 blockade has some efficacy and/or may be insufficient” [0017]. Also, the methods of Freeman can be applied “for enhancing the efficacy of a cancer therapy… for sensitizing hyperproliferative or otherwise cancerous cells (e.g., resistant cells) to the cancer therapy” [0062]. As the combination therapy of Freeman is administered to those who are not completely responsive to PD-1 monotherapy, Freeman reads on the methods of claims 1, 39, 128-129, and 132 directed to a patient who has previously received and failed a PD-1 therapy and is administered as a combination therapy of PD-1 blocker and RGMb blocker. Because Freeman teaches administering the claimed combination therapy for patients not completely responsive to PD-1 blockade and because this patient population is included within the scope of the claim, the reference expressly discloses the claimed patient selection. Administering the combination to that patient population necessarily required selecting an individual from that population prior to administration.
The pharmaceutical composition comprising the agents that block RGMb and PD-1 of Freeman can be delivered intravenously [0220], which reads on instant claim 31.
The RGMb blocker of Freeman may be an anti-RGMb antibody [0006], which reads on claim 1; further, the anti-RGMb antibody may be humanized [0006], which reads on claims 15 and 151. The PD-1 or PD-L1 blocker is an anti-PD-1 antibody [0006], which reads on instant claims 1 and 162; the anti-PD-1 antibody may be a humanized antibody [0006], which reads on instant claims 22, 158, and 163.
Freeman teaches that the method of treating cancer comprising administering a combination of agents that selectively blocks RGMb and PD-1 may also comprise an anti-PD-L2 antibody or an anti-PD-L2 antibody [0247], which reads on instant claims 11, 27, and 147. The antibodies of Freeman may be monoclonal [0025] or bispecific antibodies [0024], which reads on claims 10, 27, and 146.
Freeman teaches that the cancer is a colorectal cancer ([0004],[0007],[0029]), which reads on claims 41, 43, and 45.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1, 8, 10-11, 15, 22, 27, 31, 39, 41, 43, 45, 128-129, 132, 144, 146-147, 151, 158, and 162-163 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US 2018/0002422, published January 4, 2018 (“Freeman”) in view of US 2018/0201680, published July 19, 2018 (“Sharpe”; PTO-892 from 2/10/2026).
Freeman teaches a method of treating a subject with cancer who is responsive to PD-1 blockade alone comprising administering a combination of agents that selectively blocks RGMb and PD-1 [0007]. Freeman does not teach the anti-PD-L2 antibodies of claims 8 and 144.
Sharpe teaches antibodies comprised of heavy chain variable domain of SEQ ID NO: 15, which is identical to instant SEQ ID NO: 3, and light chain variable domain of SEQ ID NO: 17, which is identical to instant SEQ ID NO: 6, as in the anti-PD-L2 antibody of instant claims 8 and 144.
Given that Freeman teaches a method of treating a subject with cancer who is not responsive to PD-1 blocker therapy comprised of administering an anti-PD-1 antibody and an anti-PD-L2 antibody, and further given that Sharpe teaches the claimed anti-PD-L2 antibodies, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to substitute the antibodies taught by Sharpe in the method of Freeman. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to carry out such a substitution and the results would have been reasonably predictable. As is stated in MPEP §2144.06, substituting one equivalent element for another known for the same purpose renders an invention obvious and an “express suggestion to substitute one equivalent component or process for another is not necessary to render such substitution obvious. In re Fout, 675 F.2d 297, 213 USPQ 532 (CCPA 1982)." One of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable and predictable expectation of arriving at the claimed method based on the combined teachings of Freeman in view of Lee et al because substituting one known element for another to yield predictable results does not meet the threshold for a prima facie case of nonobviousness, absent convincing evidence to the contrary.
Claims 1, 10-11, 15, 17, 22, 27, 31, 39, 41, 43, 45, 128-129, 132, 146-147, 151, 153, 158, and 162-163 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US 2018/0002422, published January 4, 2018 (“Freeman”) in view of US 2016/0347844, published December 1, 2026 (“Dekruyff”; PTO-892 from 2/10/2026).
Freeman teaches a method of treating a subject with cancer who is responsive to PD-1 blockade alone comprising administering a combination of agents that selectively blocks RGMb and PD-1 [0007]. Freeman does not teach the anti-RGMb antibody of claims 17 and 153.
Dekruyff teaches the anti-RGMb antibody comprised of heavy chain variable domain encoded by SEQ ID NO: 28 and light chain variable domain encoded by SEQ ID NO: 26, which are identical to instant SEQ ID NOs: 17 and 16, respectively, as in claims 17 and 153.
Given that Freeman teaches a method of treating a subject with cancer who is not responsive to PD-1 blocker therapy comprised of administering a anti-PD-1 antibody and an anti-RGMb antibody, and further given that Dekruyff teaches the claimed anti-RGMb antibody, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to substitute the antibody taught by Dekruyff in the method of Freeman. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to carry out such a substitution and the results would have been reasonably predictable. As is stated in MPEP §2144.06, substituting one equivalent element for another known for the same purpose renders an invention obvious and an “express suggestion to substitute one equivalent component or process for another is not necessary to render such substitution obvious. In re Fout, 675 F.2d 297, 213 USPQ 532 (CCPA 1982)." One of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable and predictable expectation of arriving at the claimed method based on the combined teachings of Freeman in view of Lee et al because substituting one known element for another to yield predictable results does not meet the threshold for a prima facie case of nonobviousness, absent convincing evidence to the contrary.
Claims 1, 10-11, 15, 22, 25, 27, 30-31, 39, 41, 43, 45, 128-129, 132, 146-147, 151, 158, 161-163, and 166 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US 2018/0002422, published January 4, 2018 (“Freeman”) in view of Lee et al, March 26, 2019 (PTO-892 from 2/10/2026).
Freeman teaches a method of treating a subject with cancer who is responsive to PD-1 blockade alone comprising administering a combination of agents that selectively blocks RGMb, PD-1, and PD-L2 ([0007],[0247]). Freeman does not teach the anti-PD-1 antibody cemiplimab, as required by claims 25 and 161, or the anti-PD-L1 antibody atezolizumab, as required by claims 30 and 166.
Lee et al teaches that cemiplimab is an anti-PD-1 antibody (see Table 1, pg 3), as in claims 25 and 161, and that atezolizumab is an anti-PD-L1 antibody (see Table 1, pg 3), as in claims 30 and 166.
Given that Freeman teaches a method of treating a subject with cancer who is not responsive to PD-1 blocker therapy comprised of administering an anti-PD-1 antibody and an anti-PD-L2 antibody, and further given that Lee et al teaches the anti-PD-1 antibody cemiplimab and the anti-PD-L1 antibody atezolizumab, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to substitute the antibodies taught by Li et al in the method of Freeman. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to carry out such a substitution and the results would have been reasonably predictable. As is stated in MPEP §2144.06, substituting one equivalent element for another known for the same purpose renders an invention obvious and an “express suggestion to substitute one equivalent component or process for another is not necessary to render such substitution obvious. In re Fout, 675 F.2d 297, 213 USPQ 532 (CCPA 1982)." One of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable and predictable expectation of arriving at the claimed method based on the combined teachings of Freeman in view of Lee et al because substituting one known element for another to yield predictable results does not meet the threshold for a prima facie case of nonobviousness, absent convincing evidence to the contrary.
Double Patenting
The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).
A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b).
The filing of a terminal disclaimer by itself is not a complete reply to a nonstatutory double patenting (NSDP) rejection. A complete reply requires that the terminal disclaimer be accompanied by a reply requesting reconsideration of the prior Office action. Even where the NSDP rejection is provisional the reply must be complete. See MPEP § 804, subsection I.B.1. For a reply to a non-final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.111(a). For a reply to final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.113(c). A request for reconsideration while not provided for in 37 CFR 1.113(c) may be filed after final for consideration. See MPEP §§ 706.07(e) and 714.13.
The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The actual filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA /25, or PTO/AIA /26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/applying-online/eterminal-disclaimer.
Claims 1, 7-8, 10-11, 15, 17, 22, 25, 27, 30-31, 39, 41, 43, 45, 128-129, 132, 143-144, 146-147, 151, 153, 158, 161-163, and 166 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-13 of U.S. Patent No. 11,220,545 in view of US 2018/0002422, published January 4, 2018 (“Freeman”), US 2018/0201680, published July 19, 2018 (“Sharpe”), US 2016/0347844, published December 1, 2026 (“Dekruyff”), and Lee et al, March 26, 2019. Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because they are directed to overlapping subject matter, a method of treating a subject with cancer comprising administering a combination of agents that selectively blocks RGMb and PD-1. Sharpe, Dekruyff, and Lee et al teach the elected antibodies.
The claims of ‘545 are directed to a method of treating a subject with cancer, wherein the patient is administered a combination of agents comprising a first antibody that binds to RGMb and a second antibody that binds to PD-1. ‘545 claims do not teach selection of a patient who has failed an anti-PD-1/PD-L1 therapy. Freeman teaches that combination therapy comprising anti-PD1 antibody and anti-RGMb antibody for cancer, “especially where PD-1 blockade has some efficacy and/or may be insufficient” [0017]. Also, the methods of Freeman can be applied “for enhancing the efficacy of a cancer therapy… for sensitizing hyperproliferative or otherwise cancerous cells (e.g., resistant cells) to the cancer therapy” [0062]. Thus, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to apply the method of ‘545 to the claimed patient population; one would do so with a reasonable expectation of success, given the findings that combination therapy is superior to PD-1 blocker monotherapy alone.
Dekruyff teaches the anti-RGMb antibody comprised of heavy chain variable domain encoded by SEQ ID NO: 28 and light chain variable domain encoded by SEQ ID NO: 26, which are identical to instant SEQ ID NOs: 17 and 16, respectively, as in claims 17 and 153.
Sharpe teaches antibodies that bind the immunogenic epitope CFTVTVPKDLYVVEYGSN [0120], as in the anti-PD-L2 antibodies of instant claims 7 and 143. Sharpe teaches antibodies comprised of heavy chain variable domain of SEQ ID NO: 15, which is identical to instant SEQ ID NO: 3, and light chain variable domain of SEQ ID NO: 17, which is identical to instant SEQ ID NO: 6, as in the anti-PD-L2 antibody of instant claims 8 and 144.
Lee et al teaches that cemiplimab is an anti-PD-1 antibody (see Table 1, pg 3), as in claims 25 and 161, and that atezolizumab is an anti-PD-L1 antibody (see Table 1, pg 3), as in claims 30 and 166.
Given that Freeman teaches a method of treating a subject with cancer who is not responsive to PD-1 blocker therapy comprised of administering an anti-PD-1 antibody and an anti-PD-L2 antibody or RGMb antibody, and further given that Sharpe teaches the claimed anti-PD-L2 antibodies, Dekruyff teaches the claimed anti-RGMb antibody, and Lee et al teach the anti-PD-1 antibody cemiplimab and the anti-PD-L1 antibody atezolizumab, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to substitute the antibodies taught by Sharpe, Dekruyff, and Li et al in the method of Freeman. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to carry out such a substitution and the results would have been reasonably predictable. As is stated in MPEP §2144.06, substituting one equivalent element for another known for the same purpose renders an invention obvious and an “express suggestion to substitute one equivalent component or process for another is not necessary to render such substitution obvious. In re Fout, 675 F.2d 297, 213 USPQ 532 (CCPA 1982)." One of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable and predictable expectation of arriving at the claimed method based on the combined teachings of Freeman in view of Lee et al because substituting one known element for another to yield predictable results does not meet the threshold for a prima facie case of nonobviousness, absent convincing evidence to the contrary.
The scope of the reference patent in view of Freeman, Sharpe, Dekruyff, and Lee et al fully encompasses the scope of the instant claims, and the claims are not patentably distinct from each other.
Response to Arguments
In applicant’s response filed May 7, 2026, applicant has failed to address the rejection under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) as lacking written description for human antibody. The rejection of claims 10 and 146 for being drawn to a human antibody are maintained.
Applicant's arguments regarding the rejection under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) and 102(a)(2) over US 2018/0002422(“Freeman”) filed May 7, 2026 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Applicant asserts that Freeman is silent as to methods for treating cancer in an individual that has failed an anti-PD1 or PD-L1 therapy, the method comprising selecting an individual that has failed a prior anti-PD1 or PD-L1 therapy, and that Freeman does not teach each and every element of the claims and therefore does not anticipate the amended claims (pg 17). Applicant is directed to [0017] of Freeman, which specifically identifies the patient population claimed, where PD-1 blockade has some efficacy and/or may be insufficient, to receive the combination antibody blockade of RGMb and PD-1. Because Freeman expressly discloses the patient population to be treated, treatment of this subgroup inherently requires selecting patients from that group. The selecting step does not impart patentable weight because it merely identifies the intended recipient of the treatment. Without the selecting step, there is no delivery of the treatment.
Further, the express disclosure that the treatment is suitable for that subgroup of nonresponsive or partially responsive subjects is sufficient when all the other claim limitations are met. A genus disclosure can anticipate a claimed species when the species is expressly identified or otherwise directly and unambiguously disclosed. Selecting patients based on a known clinical characteristic is satisfied by a prior art method that instruct treating that same patient population. Also, it is to be presumed that skilled workers would as a matter of course, if they do not immediately obtain desired results, make certain experiments and adaptations, within the skill of the competent worker. In re Michalek, 162 F.2d 229, 74 USPQ 107 (CCPA 1947); In re Reid, 179 F.2d 998, 84 USPQ 478 (CCPA 1950).
Arguments related to the rejections under 35 U.S.C. 103 have been considered (remarks, 17-21). The examiner has maintained the 102 rejection over Freeman, and evidence of unpredictability in the art and unexpected results are not persuasive. While Sharpe, Dekruyff, and Lee do not disclose a method of treating an individual that has failed an anti-PD1 or PD-L1 therapy, it is not necessary for these secondary references to do so, as they used merely to teach the sequences of the claimed antibodies. For similar reasons, the double patenting rejection over U.S. Patent No. 11,220,545 in view of Freeman, Sharpe, Dekruyff, and Lee is maintained.
Conclusion
No claim is allowed.
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to JENNIFER BENAVIDES whose telephone number is (571)272-0545. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 9AM-5PM (EST).
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Jennifer Benavides
Examiner
Art Unit 1675
/JENNIFER A BENAVIDES/Examiner, Art Unit 1675
/AURORA M FONTAINHAS/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1675
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