Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
DETAILED ACTION
This office action is in response to applicant’s reply filed on September 23, 2025.
Restrictions/Elections.
Applicant election of the following species:
1- 2-methyl-2-thiazoline (2MT):
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as the compound of formula (I), and
2- Prevention of post traumatic disorder, as the disease to be treated,
Is also acknowledged.
Status of Claims
Claims 13-18 are currently pending and are the subject of this office action.
Claim 16 is withdrawn since it does not read on the elected species: 2-methyl-2-thiazoline (2MT).
Claims 13-15 and 17-18 are under examination.
Due to Applicant’s election of compound (2MT):
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as the species corresponding to a compound of general formula (I):
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the examination of the instant claims is restricted to the following CORE structure:
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All other structures within the claims are not being examined, since they are not considered part of the elected invention, as such it is suggested that Applicant amends the claims accordingly to remove all non-elected inventions (see Improper Markush Group rejection below).
Priority
The present application is a 371 of PCT/JP2021/028583filed on 08/02/2021 and claims priority to foreign application JAPAN 2020-131872 filed on 08/03/2020.
Claim Rejections – Improper Markush Group.
Claims 13-15 and 17-18 are rejected under Improper Markush Group.
The improper Markush Group Rejection is based on a judicially approved doctrine when the claim contains an improper grouping of alternatively useable species. A Markush claim contains an “improper Markush grouping” if: (1) The species of the Markush group do not share a single structural similarity,” or (2) the species do not share a common use. Members of a Markush group share a "single structural similarity” when they belong to the same recognized physical or chemical class or to the same recognized physical or chemical class or to the same art-recognized class. Members of a Markush group share a common use when they are disclosed in the specification or known in the art to be functionally equivalent (see Federal Register, Vol. 76, No. 27, Wednesday, February 9, 2011, p. 7166, left and middle columns, bridging paragraph).
In the instant case, the alternatives of a compound having the formula I of claim 25:
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encompass a wide variety of chemical species which are in different recognized physical classes and would embrace different chemical compounds that do not share any single structural similarity between the species.
For instance: The A ring encompasses a myriad of heterocycle groups which are so broad and diverse that each one of those will confer the above structure completely different structural and biological properties and will result in different class classification. Essentially the structure (I) encompasses every known 5-7 membered heterocycle containing 1 or 2 heteroatoms, which literally covers thousands of possible heterocycles, all of which belong to a different class classification.
These compounds lack unity of invention since they do not share a common utility and/or they do not share a substantial structural feature essential to that utility: In re Harnisch, 631 F.2d 716, 206 USPQ 300(CCPA 1980); and Ex parte Hozumi, 3 USPQ2d 1059 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1984).
NOTE: To overcome this rejection, Applicant should amend the above claims (13-15 and 17-18) according to the CORE structure:
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Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 13-15 and 17-18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Claims 13-15 and 17-18 encompass compounds of general formula (I):
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wherein A can be any 5 to 7-member heterocycle containing 1 or 2 heteroatoms.
MPEP 2173.04 states:
Breadth of a claim is not to be equated with indefiniteness. In re Miller, 441 F.2d 689, 169 USPQ 597 (CCPA 1971). If the scope of the subject matter embraced by the claims is clear, and if applicants have not otherwise indicated that they intend the invention to be of a scope different from that defined in the claims, then the claims comply with 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph. > See Ultimax Cement Mfg. v. CTS Cement Mfg., 587 F.3d 1339, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding that “a claim to a formula containing over 5000 possible combinations is not necessarily ambiguous if it sufficiently notifies the public of the scope of the claims."). <
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Undue breadth of the claim may be addressed under different statutory provisions, depending on the reasons for concluding that the claim is too broad. If the claim is too broad because it does not set forth that which applicants regard as their invention as evidenced by statements outside of the application as filed, a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, would be appropriate. If the claim is too broad because it is not supported by the original description or by an enabling disclosure, a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, would be appropriate. If the claim is too broad because it reads on the prior art, a rejection under either 35 U.S.C. 102 or 103 would be appropriate.
Further MPEP 2173.05(h) recites:
A Markush claim may encompass a large number of alternative species, but is not necessarily indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph for such breadth. In re Gardner, 427 F.2d 786, 788 (CCPA 1970) (“Breadth is not indefiniteness.”). In certain circumstances, however, a Markush group may be so expansive that persons skilled in the art cannot determine the metes and bounds of the claimed invention. For example, a Markush group that encompasses a massive number of distinct alternative species may be indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph if one skilled in the art cannot determine the metes and bounds of the claim due to an inability to envision all of the members of the Markush group. In such a circumstance, an examiner may reject the claim for indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph.
In the instant case, the claims are incredibly broad, the universe of 5 to 7-member heterocycle containing 1 or 2 heteroatoms with all the different R1, R2, R3 and R4 substituents is almost infinite.
Definitively, the claims are not supported by the original description or by an enabling disclosure, and no person skilled in the art will be able to determine the metes and bounds of the claimed invention.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims 13-15 and 17-18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention. This is a written description rejection.
Claims 13-15 and 17-18 encompass compounds of general formula (I):
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wherein A can be any 5 to 7-member heterocycle containing 1 or 2 heteroatoms.
M.P.E.P. #2163 states: “An applicant shows possession of the claimed invention by describing the claimed invention with all of its limitations using such descriptive means as words, structures, figures, diagrams, and formulas that fully set forth the claimed invention….one must define a compound by ‘whatever characteristics sufficiently distinguish it’. A lack of adequate written description issue also arises if the knowledge and level of skill in the art would not permit one skilled in the art to immediately envisage the product claimed from the disclosed process”.
In Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc), the Federal Circuit stated that “the hallmark of written description is disclosure.” A specification adequately describes an invention when it “reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Id. at 1351. “A ‘mere wish or plan’ for obtaining the claimed invention is not adequate written description.” Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs, 636 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
The description requirement of the patent statute requires a description of an actual invention, not merely an indication of a result that one might achieve if one made that invention. See, e.g., In re Wilder, 22 USPQ 369, 372-3 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that a claim was not adequately described because the specification did ‘little more than outline goals appellants hope the claimed invention achieves and the problems the invention will hopefully ameliorate’). This matter is of particular importance in the evaluation of claims drawn to a chemical genus which identifies a core compound bearing variable substituents. It has been held that “a generic claim may define the boundaries of a vast genus of chemical compounds, and yet the question may still remain whether the specification...demonstrates that the applicant has invented species sufficient to support a claim to a genus” with such breadth. Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 USPQ2D 1161, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2010). An adequate written description requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, physical properties, or other properties of species falling within the genus sufficient to distinguish the genus from other materials. Id., quoting Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
However, merely drawing a fence around the outer limits of a purported genus is not an adequate substitute for describing a variety of materials constituting the genus and showing that one has invented a genus and not just a species. Ariad, 94 USPQ2D at 1171. 35 U.S. C. 112, first paragraph, requires a description of the invention that “clearly allow[s] persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that the inventor invented what is claimed.” Ariad at 1172, quoting Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555 (1562-63) (Fed. Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). A sufficient disclosure is one which reasonably conveys to one having ordinary skill in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date of the application in question. Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563. The description must reasonably describe the invention, not simply indicate a result which one might achieve if one actually made the invention. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568. To properly evaluate whether an applicant has complied with the written description requirement therefore requires an analysis of whether the skilled artisan would recognize, from the description provided, the applicants were in possession of sufficient compounds representing the full breadth of diversity of the genus claimed.
A description of a chemical genus will usually comprise a recitation of structural features common to the members of the genus, which features constitute a substantial portion of the members of the genus, which features constitute substantial portion of the genus. See Univ. of California vs. Eli Lilly, 43 USPQ 2d 1398, 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1997). This is analogous to enablement of a genus under section 112 first, by showing enablement of a representative number of species within the genus. A chemical genus can be adequately described if the disclosure presents a sufficient number of representative species that encompass the genus. If the genus has a substantial variance, the disclosure must describe a sufficient number of species to reflect the variation within that genus.
Here, applicants have claimed an extraordinarily large genus of chemical compounds encompassed by general formula (I). The specification discloses a list of several compounds that are encompassed by the general formula (I) of claim 13 (see paragraph [0039] of the specification):
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The number of different A rings disclosed is very limited compared to what is claimed (almost every 5 to 7-member heterocycle ring containing 1 or 2 heteroatoms). Furthermore, each R substituent can be a variety and diverse set of groups including any 5 or 6-membered heteroaryl group, when the examples on paragraph [0039] of the specification contain R groups like methyl, ethyl, acetyl, isothiocyanate, but no heterocycle at all.
The size of the genus thus described is phenomenal, against which the applicants have offered evidence of being in possession of about 20 compounds (see paragraph [0039] of the specification). This small set of compounds cannot be viewed as being reasonably representative of the genus of compounds of formula I in its claimed scope because no readily apparent combination of identifying characteristics is provided, other than the disclosure of those specific species as examples of the claimed genus, and in no way either represent the breadth of variable moieties which applicants have claimed, nor permit the skilled artisan to recognize that such claim breadth was actually in the applicants possession as of the time of filing the instant application.
Given the broad scope of the claimed subject matter, Applicant has not provided sufficient written description that would allow the skilled in the art to recognize that Applicant was in possession of most the compounds of the above general formula I claimed.
NOTE: In order to overcome this rejection, it is suggested that Applicant amends the above claims according to the CORE structure (see above Improper Markush rejection):
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and within the above CORE structure to a more reasonable set that closely resembles the compounds of the specification (wherein R1, R2, R3 and R4 are mostly alkyl).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims 13-15 and 17-18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, because the specification, while being enabling for the treatment of a psychiatric disorder, does not reasonably provide enablement for the prevention of a psychiatric disorder. The specification does not enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to use the invention commensurate in scope with these claims. This is a scope of enablement rejection.
To be enabling, the specification of the patent application must teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fd. Cir. 1993). Explaining what is meant by "undue experimentation," the Federal Circuit has stated that:
The test is not merely quantitative, since a considerable amount of experimentation is permissible, if it is merely routine, or if the specification in question provides a reasonable amount of guidance with respect to the direction in which experimentation should proceed to enable the determination of how to practice a desired embodiment of the claimed invention. PPG v. Guardian, 75 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996). As pointed out by the court in In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498 at 504 (CCPA 1976), the key word is "undue", not "experimentation".
The factors that may be considered in determining whether a disclosure would require undue experimentation are set forth In re Wands, 8 USPQ2d 1400 (CAFC 1988) at 1404 wherein, citing Ex parte Forman, 230 USPQ 546 (Bd. Apls. 1986) at 547 the court recited eight factors:
1- the quantity of experimentation necessary,
2- the amount of direction or guidance provided,
3- the presence or absence of working examples,
4- the nature of the invention,
5- the state of the prior art,
6- the relative skill of those in the art,
7- the predictability of the art, and
8- the breadth of the claims
These factors are always applied against the background understanding that scope of enablement varies inversely with the degree of unpredictability involved. In re Fisher, 57 CCPA 1099, 1108, 427 F.2d 833, 839, 166 USPQ 18, 24 (1970). Keeping that in mind, the Wands factors are relevant to the instant fact situation for the following reasons:
1. The nature of the invention
Claims 13-15 and 17-18 recite:
A method for preventing or treating a psychiatric disorder comprising the administration of a composition comprising a compound of formula (I) (see above Improper Markush Rejection):
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2. The relative skill of those in the art
The relative skill of those in the art is high, generally that of an M.D. or Ph.D.
The artisan using Applicant’s invention would generally be a physician with a M.D. degree and several years of experience.
3. The state and predictability of the art
First, the term prevention is synonymous with the term curing, and both circumscribe methods of treatment having absolute success (100% success). Humans in need of prevention of a psychiatric disorder do not yet suffer from psychiatric disorder, and if they were to be administer a compound of formula (I) according to the instant claims, they will never ever suffer from a psychiatric disorder. The general knowledge of the prior art clearly indicates that the art of preventing any diseases including psychiatric disorders, is highly unpredictable.
Second, an extensive search of the prior art reveals that there are no references disclosing any type of prevention of psychiatric disorders with any drug.
4. The breadth of the claims
The breadth of the claims is not commensurate in scope with the disclosure.
The instant claims recite a broad spectrum of psychiatric disorders.
Further the claims recite a broad spectrum of compounds within the following core structure:
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wherein R1, R2, R3 and R4 can be alkyl, alkoxy, halogen, amino, thio, alkylthio, alkenylthio, alkyl-carbonyl, formyl, aryl, alkoxy-carbonyl. Heteroaryl, etc. despite the limited number of compounds disclosed in the specification, wherein the R groups are almost always alkyl.
5. The amount of direction or guidance provided and the presence or absence of working examples
MPEP 2164.03 cites: “the amount of guidance or direction needed to enable the invention is inversely related to the amount of knowledge in the state of the art as well as the predictability in the art. In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839, 166 USPQ 18, 24 (CCPA 1970). The “amount of guidance or direction” refers to that information in the application, as originally filed, that teaches exactly how to make or use the invention. The more that is known in the prior art about the nature of the invention, how to make, and how to use the invention, and the more predictable the art is, the less information needs to be explicitly stated in the specification. In contrast, if little is known in the prior art about the nature of the invention and the art is unpredictable, the specification would need more detail as to how to make and use the invention in order to be enabling. >See, e.g., Chiron Corp. v. Genentech Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1254, 70 USPQ2d 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Nascent technology, however, must be enabled with a specific and useful teaching.’ The law requires an enabling disclosure for nascent technology because a person of ordinary skill in the art has little or no knowledge independent from the patentee’s instruction. Thus, the public’s end of the bargain struck by the patent system is a full enabling disclosure of the claimed technology.”
The specification teaches some examples (see Examples 1-3) that correlate with the administration of very specific thiazolidines with the treatment of psychiatric disorders
Thus, while the specification provides a procedure for treating psychiatric disorders, the specification appears to be silent on a nexus between:
treating a psychiatric disorder and preventing a psychiatric disorder
As such, if there is no correlation then the examples do not constitute working examples.
While it is understood that the absence of working examples should never be the sole reason for rejecting a claim as being broader than an enabling disclosure, the criticality of working examples in an unpredictable art, such as the prevention (100% success) psychiatric disorders, is required for practice of the claimed invention.
6. The Quantity of experimentation necessary
Because of the known unpredictability of the art (see section 3) and in the absence of experimental evidence commensurate with the claims (see section 5), the skilled in the art will not accept that the administration of a composition a compound of formula (I), can prevent (100% success) psychiatric disorders as inferred by the claims and contemplated by the specification.
7. Conclusion
Accordingly, the inventions of claims 13-15 and 17-18 do not comply with the scope of enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C 112, first paragraph, since to practice the claimed invention, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have to engage in undue experimentation with no reasonable expectation of success.
NOTE: In order to overcome this rejection, it is suggested that Applicant:
1- amends the above claims according to the CORE structure:
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and within the above CORE structure (see above Improper Markush rejection) to a more reasonable set that closely resembles the compounds of the specification (wherein the R groups are almost always alkyl), and
2- delete the word prevention.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
While the examination has not been expanded beyond the elected compound: 2MT and the corresponding CORE structure:
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(see improper Markush above), the following rejection is made to further prosecution with regards to the claims that read on the elected species (2MT; claims 13-15 and 17-18), and that are anticipated by the prior art based on other compounds that are still encompassed by the instant claims like: 4-amino-3-isoxazolidine (D-cycloserine, DCS).
Claim(s) 13, 15 and 17 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Baker et. al. (Ment. Health. Clin (2017) 2:88-94, cited by Applicant).
For claims 13, 15 and 17, Baker teaches a method of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) comprising the administration of a composition comprising 4-amino-3-isoxazolidine (D-cycloserine, DCS):
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(see title and entire document).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
While the examination has not been expanded beyond the elected compound: 2MT and the corresponding CORE structure:
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(see improper Markush above), the following rejection is made to further prosecution with regards to the claims that read on the elected species (2MT; claims 13-15 and 17-18), and that are anticipated by the prior art based on other compounds that are still encompassed by the instant claims like: 4-amino-3-isoxazolidine (D-cycloserine, DCS).
Claims 13, 15 and 17-18 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over by Baker et. al. (Ment. Health. Clin (2017) 2:88-94, cited by Applicant).
As stated in the above 102 rejection, Baker anticipates and as such makes claims 13, 15 and 17 obvious (see above 102(a)(1) rejection.
Baker teaches all the limitations of claim 18 (see above 102(a)(1) rejection), except for the intranasal administration. However, intranasal administration of known drugs is routine practice in the pharmaceutical art, thus resulting in the practice of claim 18 with a reasonable expectation of success.
Conclusion
No claims are allowed.
Correspondence
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to MARCOS L SZNAIDMAN whose telephone number is (571)270-3498. The examiner can normally be reached on Flexing M-F 7 AM-7 PM.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Amy L. Clark can be reached on 571 272-1310. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see http://pair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
/MARCOS L SZNAIDMAN/
Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1628
October 10, 2025.