DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 19 and 21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Regarding claim 19, the newly added limitation requiring “high shear of not less than 10,000 revolutions per minute (rpm)” renders the claim indefinite because revolutions per minute are not a recognized unit of shear. Shear is a unit whose dimensionality is expressed in units related to frequency (e.g., s-1). While rotations per minute (rpm) contains a time-based unit (i.e., “per minute”), the unit of “rotations” is ambiguous because there is no controlling definition of “what” is rotating at said rate. The instant Specification indicates that this metric is related to rotations of a stirring shaft (c.f. instant Specification at p. 10, continuing paragraph), but does not give definite metrics as to the size or shape of said stirring shaft. A rotor tip speed of 3,000-5,000 ft/min is referenced, but it is unclear how this range relates to the rotational frequency of the stir shaft (e.g., what RPM corresponds to 3,000 or 5,000 ft/min).
One having ordinary skill in the art would therefore be unable to determine the shear stresses which are required to be applied to the system in order to meet the claimed process limitation.
Regarding claim 21, the claim is rendered indefinite because it directly depends on claim 19 which is indefinite as described above.
Rejection of claims over prior art is inappropriate where considerable speculation is required by the examiner to interpret the claims. See MPEP 2143.03.I. Therefore, the prior art rejection of claims 19 and 21 has been withdrawn.
Double Patenting
The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).
A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b).
The filing of a terminal disclaimer by itself is not a complete reply to a nonstatutory double patenting (NSDP) rejection. A complete reply requires that the terminal disclaimer be accompanied by a reply requesting reconsideration of the prior Office action. Even where the NSDP rejection is provisional the reply must be complete. See MPEP § 804, subsection I.B.1. For a reply to a non-final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.111(a). For a reply to final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.113(c). A request for reconsideration while not provided for in 37 CFR 1.113(c) may be filed after final for consideration. See MPEP §§ 706.07(e) and 714.13.
The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The actual filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA /25, or PTO/AIA /26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/applying-online/eterminal-disclaimer.
Claims 1, 6, 10, and 16 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 11,118,084 B2 in view of McLaughlin (US 5,948,323).
Regarding claim 1, claim 1 of the reference application teaches a flame retardant aqueous dispersion containing a brominated polymer, a binding agent, and further additives. The reference claims are silent with regard to the incorporation of magnesium hydroxide or aluminum trihydrate. In the same field of endeavor, McLaughlin teaches finely divided particles of compounds that provide flame retardancy and/or smoke suppressant properties to, inter alia, coatings (Abstract). McLaughlin teaches the use of aluminum trihydrate and magnesium hydroxide (col. 2, lines 8-13), and teaches that these compounds are specifically useful because they decompose at high temperatures to release water to quench a fire (col. 1, lines 26-36). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing to incorporate aluminum trihydrate and/or magnesium hydroxide within the formulation of Wolfovich as taught by McLaughlin for the purpose of providing flame retardancy to the coating formulation of Wolfovich.
Claim 1 of the reference application includes the claimed tribromophenol end-capped brominated epoxy polymer as claimed.
The claims of the reference application do not require the incorporation of antimony oxide; therefore, the claims of the reference application meet the claimed limitation on antimony oxide content.
Regarding claim 6, as described above, it would have been obvious to include magnesium hydroxide within the formulation of claim 1 of the reference application, in view of McLaughlin.
Regarding claim 10, claim 1 of the reference application further teaches the incorporation of a dispersing agent, a wetting agent, a coalescing agent, an antifoaming agent, a wetting agent, and a thickener (a rheology modifier), all of which read on the claimed list.
Regarding claim 16, the claims of the reference application do not require the incorporation of antimony oxide; therefore, the formulation of claim 1 reads on the limitation wherein the formulation is free of antimony oxide.
Claims 1, 5-8, 10-18, 20, and 22-24 are rejected/further rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claim 12 of US 10,626,289 B2 in view of Wolfovitch (US 2018/0298229 A1), McLaughlin (US 5,948,323), and/or Rapaport (US 2018/0135239 A1).
Regarding claims 1, 5-8, 10-18, 20, and 22-24, claim 1 of the reference application teaches a flame retardant aqueous dispersion comprising the claimed brominated epoxy polymer flame retardant, a binding agent, and additional additives. The claims of the reference application is silent with regard to the incorporation of magnesium hydroxide or aluminum trihydrate, and is silent with regard to the incorporation of said formulation in an aqueous dispersion, however Wolfovitch teaches and therefore makes obvious the incorporation of this type of formulation in an aqueous dispersion (Abstract). Finally, McLaughlin teaches the use of aluminum trihydrate and magnesium hydroxide (col. 2, lines 8-13), and teaches that these compounds are specifically useful because they decompose at high temperatures to release water to quench a fire (col. 1, lines 26-36). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing to incorporate aluminum trihydrate and/or magnesium hydroxide within the formulation of the reference application as taught by McLaughlin for the purpose of providing flame retardancy to the coating formulation. Furthermore, the claims of the reference application do not require the incorporation of antimony oxide; therefore, the claims of the reference application meet the claimed limitation on antimony oxide content.
The claims of the reference application do not teach all limitations the remaining claims; however, all of these limitations are made obvious in view of Wolfovitch, McLaughlin, and/or Rapaport, for the same reasons as are articulated in the 35 USC 103 rejections, below.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The text of those sections of Title 35, U.S. Code not included in this action can be found in a prior Office action.
Claims 1, 5-8, 10-18, 20, and 22-24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Wolfovich (US 2018/0298229 A1) in view of McLaughlin (US 5,948,323). Helmer (US 6,075,079) and Aberdingk (Aberdingk U 9600 Technical DataSheet) are cited as evidentiary references.
Regarding claim 1, Wolfovich teaches flame retardant aqueous coating formulations (Abstract), comprising:
Micronized particles of brominated epoxy polymers (Abstract) which is flame retardant ([0015]), which reads on the claimed “particles of a brominated polymeric flame retardant (BFR).”
At least one binder ([0034])
Wolfovich teaches that antimony oxide flame retardants are specifically optional within the claimed composition ([0034]), and therefore Wolfovich contemplates and teaches compositions which are substantially free of antimony oxide.
Wolfovich explicitly states that the inventive formulations are aqueous dispersions ([0028]).
Wolfovich differs from claim 1 because it is silent with regard to the incorporation of magnesium hydroxide and aluminum trihydrate as claimed.
In the same field of endeavor, McLaughlin teaches finely divided particles of compounds that provide flame retardancy and/or smoke suppressant properties to, inter alia, coatings (Abstract). McLaughlin teaches the use of aluminum trihydrate and magnesium hydroxide (col. 2, lines 8-13), and teaches that these compounds are specifically useful because they decompose at high temperatures to release water to quench a fire (col. 1, lines 26-36). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing to incorporate aluminum trihydrate and/or magnesium hydroxide within the formulation of Wolfovich as taught by McLaughlin for the purpose of providing flame retardancy to the coating formulation of Wolfovich.
Wolfovich teaches the use of a tribromophenol end-capped brominated epoxy polymer ([0019]-[0020]) whose structure is identical to the claimed structure. Wolfovitch therefore meets the claimed structural limitation.
Regarding claim 5, Wolfovich teaches the use of acrylic polymers and polyurethane polymers as the binder ([0034]).
Regarding claim 6, as described above, McLaughlin teaches the use of magnesium hydroxide (col. 2, lines 8-13), and teaches that this compounds is specifically useful because it decomposes at high temperatures to release water to quench a fire (col. 1, lines 26-36). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing to incorporate magnesium hydroxide within the formulation of Wolfovich as taught by McLaughlin for the purpose of providing flame retardancy to the coating formulation of Wolfovich.
Regarding claim 7, Wolfovich teaches the following:
The binder is utilized in amounts ranging from 35% to 85% by weight ([0034]), which may be a polyacrylate binder ([0012] and [0034]) which overlaps the claimed range of “10 to 35 % by weight,” establishing a prima facie case of obviousness.
The brominated epoxy polymer in amounts ranging from 7% to 30% by weight (p. 8, claim 6), which overlaps the claimed range of “5 to 25 % by weight,” establishing a prima facie case of obviousness.
The solids of the composition comprise 25-60% of the formulation ([0025]), and therefore the water within the formulation comprises between 40 and 75 wt% of the formulation, which overlaps the claimed range of “10 to 50 % by weight,” establishing a prima facie case of obviousness.
1.88, 3.77, 7.54, and 11.61 wt% incorporations of antimony pentoxide within the inventive formulations ([0060] and Table 2 on p. 6). McLaughlin teaches that magnesium hydroxide and antimony pentoxide are both finely divided particles suitable as flame retardants (c.f. McLaughlin col. 8, claim 4 and McLaughlin col. 2, lines 8-29). It is prima facie obvious to substitute equivalents known in the art as suitable for the same purpose (see MPEP 2144.06). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing to use magnesium hydroxide in place of the antimony pentoxide within the formulation of Wolfovich as McLaughlin recognizes them both as flame retardants for coatings applications. 3.77 and 7.54 wt % incorporations of magnesium hydroxide both fall within the claimed range of “2 to 10 % by weight,” establishing prima facie cases of obviousness.
Regarding claim 8, Wolfovich teaches the following:
The binder is utilized in amounts ranging from 35% to 85% by weight ([0034]), which may be a polyacrylate binder ([0012] and [0034]) which overlaps the claimed range of “10 to 35 % by weight,” establishing a prima facie case of obviousness.
The brominated epoxy polymer in amounts ranging from 7% to 30% by weight (p. 8, claim 6), which overlaps the claimed range of “5 to 25 % by weight,” establishing a prima facie case of obviousness.
The solids of the composition comprise 25-60% of the formulation ([0025]), and therefore the water within the formulation comprises between 40 and 75 wt% of the formulation, which overlaps the claimed range of “10 to 50 % by weight,” establishing a prima facie case of obviousness.
1.88, 3.77, 7.54, and 11.61 wt% incorporations of antimony pentoxide within the inventive formulations ([0060] and Table 2 on p. 6). McLaughlin teaches that magnesium hydroxide and antimony pentoxide are both finely divided particles suitable as flame retardants (c.f. McLaughlin col. 8, claim 4 and McLaughlin col. 2, lines 8-29). It is prima facie obvious to substitute equivalents known in the art as suitable for the same purpose (see MPEP 2144.06). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing to use magnesium hydroxide in place of the antimony pentoxide within the formulation of Wolfovich as McLaughlin recognizes them both as flame retardants for coatings applications. 3.77 and 7.54 wt % incorporations of magnesium hydroxide both fall within the claimed range of “2 to 10 % by weight,” establishing prima facie cases of obviousness.
Regarding claim 10, Wolfovich teaches a dispersing agent ([0025]), wetting agent ([0025]), rheology modifier (thickener, [0025]), defoamer ([0053]), and coalescing agent ([0058]), all of which read on the claimed list.
Regarding claims 11-13, Wolfovich teaches the incorporation of Disperbyk-2010 ([0066]) which reads on the claimed nonionic surfactant because the instant Specification states that Disperbyk-2010 is a suitable nonionic acrylate copolymer dispersant (c.f. instant Specification at p. 15, lines 4-5). Wolfovich is silent with regard to the incorporation of an anionic dispersant. However, McLaughlin teaches the importance of incorporating a dispersant for preventing reagglomeration of the flame retardant particles (col. 5, lines 9-20), and teaches the incorporation of anionic surfactants such as Colloid 226/35 (col. 5, lines 21-27). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing to incorporate Colloid 226/35 as a dispersant for preventing the reagglomeration of the flame retardant particles within the formulation. Colloid 226/35 is a sodium polyacrylate dispersant (c.f. Helmer col. 20, Table 2), which reads on the claimed “anionic surfactant” because the instant Specification explicitly states that sodium polyacrylate is a suitable anionic surfactant (c.f. instant Specification at p. 13, lines 8-10).
Regarding claim 14, Wolfovich teaches the use of self-crosslinking acrylate binders ([0034]).
Regarding claim 15, Wolfovich teaches the use of, inter alia, Alberdingk U 9600 polyurethane ([0034]), which is an aliphatic polyester-polyurethane (c.f. Alberdingk p. 1, Characteristic section).
Regarding claim 16, Wolfovich teaches that antimony oxide flame retardants are specifically optional within the claimed composition ([0034]), and therefore Wolfovich contemplates and teaches compositions which are substantially free of antimony oxide.
Regarding claim 17, Wolfovich teaches the formation of the inventive dispersion by mixing the inventive ingredients, including the brominated polymeric flame retardant, into a water-based dispersion ([0066]-[0070]). As described above, it would have been obvious to substitute magnesium hydroxide in place of the antimony pentoxide within the formulation, as McLaughlin recognizes magnesium hydroxide and antimony pentoxide as equivalent flame retardant additives (c.f. McLaughlin col. 8, claim 4 and McLaughlin col. 2, lines 8-29). In doing so, the inventive formulation of Wolfovich is formed which contains all of the claimed components, incorporated together as claimed. Furthermore, since the antimony pentoxide has been replaced with magnesium hydroxide, the formulation is free of a “metal oxide synergist.” This falls within the teachings of Wolfovich, which further state that metal oxide synergists are among optional – but not required – components (p. 8, claim 1).
Regarding claim 18, Wolfovich teaches the use of acrylic polymers and polyurethane polymers as the binder ([0034]).
Regarding claim 20, Wolfovich teaches that the brominated flame retardant polymer has a d50 of <5 microns and a d90 of <10 microns (p. 8, claim 3). Furthermore, McLaughlin teaches that, preferably, at least 99.9% of the flame retardant particulates have particle sizes less than 1 micron (col. 2, lines 63-64), which falls within the claimed ranges of “d50≤3 µm and d90≤6 µm” and “d50 ≤ 10 µm” establishing a prima facie case of obviousness.
Regarding claim 22, Wolfovich teaches a process of obtaining a flame retarded wood-based substrate, comprising applying the inventive flame retardant formulation to a flammable wooden surface (p. 8, claim 9). Wolfovich further teaches that this application may form a coating (p. 8, claim 10).
Regarding claims 23-24, as described above, Wolfovich teaches that antimony oxide flame retardants are specifically optional within the claimed composition ([0034]), and therefore Wolfovich contemplates and teaches compositions which are substantially free of antimony oxide (0.0 wt%), which falls within each of the claimed ranges, establishing prima facie cases of obviousness.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed December 29, 2025 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
Applicant first asserts that the Office has “failed to provide a reason or appropriate evidence for modifying Wolfovitch by applying the teaching of McLaughlin to arrive at the claimed invention;” however, as stated in the previous Office action and as stated above, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing to incorporate aluminum trihydrate and/or magnesium hydroxide within the formulation of Wolfovich as taught by McLaughlin for the purpose of providing flame retardancy to the coating formulation of Wolfovich. Furthermore, it is prima facie obvious to substitute equivalents known in the art as suitable for the same purpose (see MPEP 2144.06), and it is prima facie obvious to select a known material based on its art-recognized suitability for its intended use (see MPEP 2144.07). Therefore, the Office has properly provided reasoning and evidence for the modification of Wolfovitch in view of McLaughlin.
Applicant repeatedly refers to the “laundry list” of compounds provided by McLaughlin while arguing what is tantamount to allegations of insufficient specificity in disclosure. However, the question of sufficient specificity is one of anticipation, not obviousness (see MPEP 2131.03.II.). The instant claims are rejected on the basis of obviousness under 35 USC 103; not on the basis of anticipation under 35 USC 102. Therefore, the combination of the flame retardants of McLaughlin within the formulation of Wolfovitch would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art regardless of the numerosity of other acceptable alternatives.
Applicant additionally argues that McLaughlin fails to particularly point out the combined flame retardants as claimed; however, patents are relevant as prior art for all of the information that they contain, and non-preferred and alternative embodiments nonetheless constitute prior art (see MPEP 2123.I and II). The claimed combination of flame retardants would therefore have been obvious despite McLaughlin not particularly pointing to said combination as a preferred embodiment.
Applicant next argues that “Wolfovitch is silent about magnesium hydroxide, aluminum trihydrate, other hydroxides/hydrates, or other magnesium/aluminum compounds.” However, Wolfovitch is not relied upon for teaching these compounds; rather, in the rejection above and in the previous Office action, Wolfovitch is modified by McLaughlin, which provides the relevant teachings. In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Applicant next argues that one having ordinary skill in the art would not be motivated to combine Wolfovitch and McLaughlin based on the applicant-recognized unique flame retardancy performance. However, the motivation or reason to combine the prior art references need not be the same as that of the Applicant’s. The reason to or motivation to modify the reference may often suggest what is claimed, but for a different purpose or to solve a different problem. It is not necessary that the prior art suggest the combination to achieve the same advantage or result discovered by the Applicant. See MPEP 2144(IV).
Applicant argues that one having ordinary skill in the art would only be motivated to combine the teachings of McLaughlin with the most highly-performing compositions of Wolfovitch, which contain antimony pentoxide in amounts which fall outside of the claimed range; however, as described above, patents are relevant as prior art for all of the information that they contain, and non-preferred and alternative embodiments nonetheless constitute prior art (see MPEP 2123.I and II). One having ordinary skill in the art would therefore be motivated to combine the teachings of McLaughlin with all of the teachings of Wolfovitch despite some of Wolfovitch’s teachings having a lower performance than others.
Applicant again appeals to the breadth of the teachings of McLaughlin to assert that one having ordinary skill in the art would not be motivated to select the claimed components. As described above, however, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Furthermore, as described above, the instant claims are rejected on the basis of obviousness under 35 USC 103; not on the basis of anticipation under 35 USC 102. Therefore, the combination of the flame retardants of McLaughlin within the formulation of Wolfovitch would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art regardless of the numerosity of other acceptable alternatives.
Applicant’s next arguments are tantamount to allegations of unexpected results. Whether unexpected results are the result of unexpectedly improved results or a property not taught by the prior art, the objective evidence of nonobviousness must be commensurate in scope with the claims which the evidence is offered to support. In other words, the showing of unexpected results must be reviewed to see if the results occur over the entire claimed range. See MPEP 716.02(d).
In this case, the Applicant points to Inventive Examples 4-6 and 15-16 to support the aforementioned allegations. These results appear to be reflected in Table 2 (p. 26) and Table 7 (p. 38) of the instant Specification. However at best, these results are limited to single embodiments of water-based acrylic and polyurethane compositions, despite the claims being open to virtually any acrylate or polyurethane binder (c.f. claim 5). Furthermore, these compositions consist of around 16-22 wt% of said binders (c.f. Example 15 contains 45.9% of a polyurethane binder which comprises approximately 35% solids; Examples 4 and 5 each contain 40.0/45.9% of an acrylate binder which comprises approximately 48% solids), despite the claims being open to a range of 10-35% of an acrylate (e.g., claims 7-8) or virtually any amount of polyurethane. For at least these foregoing reasons, the applicant has essentially asserted that a showing of unexpected results for a narrow portion of the claimed composition would be sufficient to rebut a prima facie determination of obviousness.
The applicant need not provide evidence for every possible embodiment of the formulation as claimed; however, the evidence provided is not reasonably commensurate in scope with the claims, and thus is insufficient to rebut a prima facie determination of obviousness.
Applicant appears to repeat many of the above-described arguments when responding to the previously (and currently) applied double-patenting rejection. Said arguments are unpersuasive for the same reasons described above. The logic and fact-patterns described above additionally apply to the Applicant’s arguments regarding the combination of prior art document Rappaport with the reference applications. In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to JOSHUA CALEB BLEDSOE whose telephone number is (703)756-5376. The examiner can normally be reached Monday-Friday 8:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m. EST.
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/JOSHUA CALEB BLEDSOE/Examiner, Art Unit 1762
/ROBERT S JONES JR/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 1762