DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Location of Application
The subject application is now located in Workgroup 1680, Art Unit 1682, and has been docketed to Primary Examiner Bradley L. Sisson.
Drawings
New corrected drawings in compliance with 37 CFR 1.121(d) are required in this application because:
The lettering is not of proper size, uniform density, and well-defined in Figure(s) 23A and 23B. See 37 CFR 1.84(p)(1) – (5) and 37 CFR 1.84(l). (“Numbers, letters, and reference characters must measure at least .32 cm (1/8 inch) in height.”)
In Figure(s) 2A, 2B, 15-19, 21, 23A, and 23B the reference characters, sheet numbers, and view numbers are not all oriented in the same direction so as to avoid having to rotate the sheet. See 37 CFR 1.84(p)(1).
Applicant is advised to employ the services of a competent patent draftsperson outside the Office, as the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office no longer prepares new drawings. The corrected drawings are required in reply to the Office action to avoid abandonment of the application. The requirement for corrected drawings will not be held in abeyance.
INFORMATION ON HOW TO EFFECT DRAWING CHANGES
Replacement Drawing Sheets
Drawing changes must be made by presenting replacement sheets which incorporate the desired changes and which comply with 37 CFR 1.84. An explanation of the changes made must be presented either in the drawing amendments section, or remarks, section of the amendment paper. Each drawing sheet submitted after the filing date of an application must be labeled in the top margin as either “Replacement Sheet” or “New Sheet” pursuant to 37 CFR 1.121(d). A replacement sheet must include all of the figures appearing on the immediate prior version of the sheet, even if only one figure is being amended. The figure or figure number of the amended drawing(s) must not be labeled as “amended.” If the changes to the drawing figure(s) are not accepted by the examiner, applicant will be notified of any required corrective action in the next Office action. No further drawing submission will be required, unless applicant is notified.
Identifying indicia, if provided, should include the title of the invention, inventor’s name, and application number, or docket number (if any) if an application number has not been assigned to the application. If this information is provided, it must be placed on the front of each sheet and within the top margin.
Annotated Drawing Sheets
A marked-up copy of any amended drawing figure, including annotations indicating the changes made, are required by the examiner. The annotated drawing sheet(s) must be clearly labeled as “Annotated Sheet” and must be presented in the amendment or remarks section that explains the change(s) to the drawings.
Timing of Corrections
Applicant is required to submit acceptable corrected drawings within the time period set in the Office action. See 37 CFR 1.85(a). Failure to take corrective action within the set period will result in ABANDONMENT of the application.
If corrected drawings are required in a Notice of Allowability (PTOL-37), the new drawings MUST be filed within the THREE MONTH shortened statutory period set for reply in the “Notice of Allowability.” Extensions of time may NOT be obtained under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136 for filing the corrected drawings after the mailing of a Notice of Allowability.
Specification
The disclosure is objected to because of the following informalities:
The use of the term TRITIN X-100, which is a trade name or a mark used in commerce, has been noted in this application. See, for example, page 57 line 12; page 66, lines 3, 12, and 22; page 150, lines 21 and 30; page 151, lines 3, 5, and 7; page 229, lines 25 and 27; page 230, lines 11 and 18; page 231, line 6; page 233, lines 19 and 20; page 234, line 4; page 239, lines 20-21; page 248, and lines 28-29.
The use of the term TWEEN 20, which is a trade name or a mark used in commerce, has been noted in this application. See, for example, page 15, lines 5 and 7; page 66, line 22; page 116, lines 7 and 10; page 163, lines 26 and 28; page 234, line 4; and page 287, line 6.
The term should be accompanied by the generic terminology; furthermore the term should be capitalized wherever it appears or, where appropriate, include a proper symbol indicating use in commerce such as ™, SM , or ® following the term.
Although the use of trade names and marks used in commerce (i.e., trademarks, service marks, certification marks, and collective marks) are permissible in patent applications, the proprietary nature of the marks should be respected and every effort made to prevent their use in any manner which might adversely affect their validity as commercial marks.
Appropriate correction is required.
Claim Interpretation
Attention is directed to MPEP 904.01 [R-08.2012].
The breadth of the claims in the application should always be carefully noted; that is, the examiner should be fully aware of what the claims do not call for, as well as what they do require. During patent examination, the claims are given the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 44 USPQ2d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See MPEP § 2111 - § 2116.01 for case law pertinent to claim analysis.
It is noted with particularity that narrowing limitations found in the specification cannot be inferred in the claims where the elements not set forth in the claims are linchpin of patentability. In re Philips Industries v. State Stove & Mfg. Co, Inc., 186 USPQ 458 (CA6 1975). While the claims are to be interpreted in light of the specification, it does not follow that limitations from the specification may be read into the claims. On the contrary, claims must be interpreted as broadly as their terms reasonably allow. See Ex parte Oetiker, 23 USPQ2d 1641 (BPAI, 1992). In added support of this position, attention is directed to MPEP 2111 [R-11.2013], where, citing In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05, 162 USPQ 541, 550-51 (CCPA 1969), is stated:
The court explained that “reading a claim in light of the specification, to thereby interpret limitations explicitly recited in the claim, is a quite different thing from ‘reading limitations of the specification into a claim,’ to thereby narrow the scope of the claim by implicitly adding disclosed limitations which have no express basis in the claim.” The court found that applicant was advocating the latter, i.e., the impermissible importation of subject matter from the specification into the claim.
Additionally, attention is directed to MPEP 2111.01 [R-01.2024], wherein is stated:
II. IT IS IMPROPER TO IMPORT CLAIM LIMITATIONS FROM THE SPECIFICATION
“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not part of the claim. For example, a particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment.” Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875, 69 USPQ2d 1865, 1868 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Attention is also directed to MPEP 2111.02 II [R-07.2022]. As stated herein:
II. PREAMBLE STATEMENTS RECITING PURPOSE OR INTENDED USE
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The claim preamble must be read in the context of the entire claim. The determination of whether preamble recitations are structural limitations or mere statements of purpose or use "can be resolved only on review of the entirety of the [record] to gain an understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to encompass by the claim" as drafted without importing "'extraneous' limitations from the specification." Corning Glass Works, 868 F.2d at 1257, 9 USPQ2d at 1966. If the body of a claim fully and intrinsically sets forth all of the limitations of the claimed invention, and the preamble merely states, for example, the purpose or intended use of the invention, rather than any distinct definition of any of the claimed invention’s limitations, then the preamble is not considered a limitation and is of no significance to claim construction. Shoes by Firebug LLC v. Stride Rite Children’s Grp., LLC, 962 F.3d 1362, 2020 USPQ2d 10701 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (The court found that the preamble in one patent’s claim is limiting but is not in a related patent); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305, 51 USPQ2d 1161, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1999). See also Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478, 42 USPQ2d 1550, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention, the preamble is not a claim limitation")… (Emphasis added)
Attention is directed to MPEP 2111 [R-10.2019]. As stated therein:
During patent examination, the pending claims must be "given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification." The Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316, 75 USPQ2d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) expressly recognized that the USPTO employs the "broadest reasonable interpretation" standard:
The Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") determines the scope of claims in patent applications not solely on the basis of the claim language, but upon giving claims their broadest reasonable construction "in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art." In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364[, 70 USPQ2d 1827, 1830] (Fed. Cir. 2004). Indeed, the rules of the PTO require that application claims must "conform to the invention as set forth in the remainder of the specification and the terms and phrases used in the claims must find clear support or antecedent basis in the description so that the meaning of the terms in the claims may be ascertainable by reference to the description." 37 CFR 1.75(d)(1). (Emphasis added).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112, (b) / Second Paragraph
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Standard for Definiteness.
Attention is directed to MPEP 2171 [R-11.2013]:
Two separate requirements are set forth in 35 U.S.C. 112(b) and pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, namely that:
(A) the claims must set forth the subject matter that the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention; and
(B) the claims must particularly point out and distinctly define the metes and bounds of the subject matter to be protected by the patent grant.
The first requirement is a subjective one because it is dependent on what the inventor or a joint inventor for a patent regards as his or her invention. Note that although pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, uses the phrase "which applicant regards as his invention," pre-AIA 37 CFR 1.41(a) provides that a patent is applied for in the name or names of the actual inventor or inventors.
The second requirement is an objective one because it is not dependent on the views of the inventor or any particular individual, but is evaluated in the context of whether the claim is definite — i.e., whether the scope of the claim is clear to a hypothetical person possessing the ordinary level of skill in the pertinent art.
Attention is directed to MPEP 2173.02 I [R-07.2022]:
During prosecution, applicant has an opportunity and a duty to amend ambiguous claims to clearly and precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention. The claim places the public on notice of the scope of the patentee’s right to exclude. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnston Assoc. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1052, 62 USPQ2d 1225, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc). As the Federal Circuit stated in Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255, 85 USPQ2d 1654, 1663 (Fed. Cir. 2008):
“We note that the patent drafter is in the best position to resolve the ambiguity in the patent claims, and it is highly desirable that patent examiners demand that applicants do so in appropriate circumstances so that the patent can be amended during prosecution rather than attempting to resolve the ambiguity in litigation.”
***
During examination, after applying the broadest reasonable interpretation to the claim, if the metes and bounds of the claimed invention are not clear, the claim is indefinite and should be rejected. Packard, 751 F.3d at 1310 (“[W]hen the USPTO has initially issued a well-grounded rejection that identifies ways in which language in a claim is ambiguous, vague, incoherent, opaque, or otherwise unclear in describing and defining the claimed invention, and thereafter the applicant fails to provide a satisfactory response, the USPTO can properly reject the claim as failing to meet the statutory requirements of § 112(b).”); Zletz, 893 F.2d at 322, 13 USPQ2d at 1322.
Attention is also directed to MPEP 2173.02 III B, which states in part:
To comply with 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, applicants are required to make the terms that are used to define the invention clear and precise, so that the metes and bounds of the subject matter that will be protected by the patent grant can be ascertained. See MPEP § 2173.05(a), subsection I. It is important that a person of ordinary skill in the art be able to interpret the metes and bounds of the claims so as to understand how to avoid infringement of the patent that ultimately issues from the application being examined. See MPEP § 2173.02, subsection II (citing Morton Int ’l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 5 F.3d 1464, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1993)); see also Halliburton Energy Servs., 514 F.3d at 1249, 85 USPQ2d at 1658 (“Otherwise, competitors cannot avoid infringement, defeating the public notice function of patent claims.”). Examiners should bear in mind that “[a]n essential purpose of patent examination is to fashion claims that are precise, clear, correct, and unambiguous. Only in this way can uncertainties of claim scope be removed, as much as possible, during the administrative process.” Zletz, 893 F.2d at 322, 13 USPQ2d at 1322 [Fed. Cir. 1989]. (Emphasis added)
Attention is also directed to MPEP 2173.04 [R-10.2019], which states in part:
A broad claim is not indefinite merely because it encompasses a wide scope of subject matter provided the scope is clearly defined. But a claim is indefinite when the boundaries of the protected subject matter are not clearly delineated and the scope is unclear. For example, a genus claim that covers multiple species is broad, but is not indefinite because of its breadth, which is otherwise clear. But a genus claim that could be interpreted in such a way that it is not clear which species are covered would be indefinite (e.g., because there is more than one reasonable interpretation of what species are included in the claim). (Emphasis added)
Holding and Rationale
Claims 1, 6, 7, 47, 48, 50, 54, 56, 61, 62, 66, 70, 71, 74, 75, 80, 83, 85, 91, and 92 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Each of independent claims 1, 6, 7, 47, 85, and 91 is indefinite with respect to what constitutes the metes and bounds of an “oligonucleotide”, be it an “oligonucleotide tag”, “a capture oligonucleotide”, “a detection oligonucleotide”, “a target oligonucleotide”, or “an anchoring oligonucleotide”.
A review of the disclosure fails to find where applicant has provided a closed definition for the term “oligonucleotide,” and a review of the art finds that there is not a single art-accepted definition. In support of this position, it is noted that Merriam-Webster.com (“Oligonucleotide definition,” Merriam-Webster.com; accessed 08-23-2017) provides the following exemplary definition:
[A] short nucleic-acid chain usually consisting of up to approximately 20 nucleotides. (Emphasis added)
US 2019/0002971 A1 (Kslover et al.), paragraph [0084], teaches:
In some embodiments, binding moieties comprise an oligonucleotide or analog thereof having a length in the range of from 6 to 60 nucleotides.
US 2009/0011943 A1 (Drmanac et al.), at paragraph [0116], teaches:
The length of capture oligonucleotides may vary widely, In one aspect, capture oligonucleotides and their complements in a bridging oligonucleotide have lengths in the range of from 10 to 100 nucleotides; and more preferably, in the range of from 10 to 40 nucleotides. (Emphasis added)
In comparison, US Patent 6,444,661 B1 (Barton et al.), column 6, first paragraph, states:
The probe oligonucleotide can be as short as about 8-10 bases, up to a length of several thousand bases: the probe can be as long or longer than the target polynucleotide. (Emphasis added)
“Oligonucleotide”, Wikipedia.com (accessed February 17, 2019) teaches:
A less than 100% yield of each synthetic step and the occurrence of side reactions set practical limits of the efficiency of the process so that the maximum length of synthetic oligonucleotides hardly exceeds 200 nucleotide residues. (Emphasis added)
When as here it is evident that there is not a single art-accepted meaning for the term, a question as to the metes and bounds of the claim exist.
The term “more” in claims 1, 6, 7, 47, 85, and 92 is a relative term which renders the claims indefinite. The term “more” is not defined by each of the claims, the specification does not provide a standard for ascertaining the requisite degree, and one of ordinary skill in the art would not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the invention.
The term “complementary” in claims 1, 6, 7, 70, and 91 is a relative term which renders the claim indefinite. The term “complementary” is not defined by the claim, the specification does not provide a standard for ascertaining the requisite degree, and one of ordinary skill in the art would not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the invention.
Claims 47, 85, and 91 are indefinite with respect to how the components of the kit are arranged. For example, are the listed components packaged individually within a common carrier or are they in a common mixture?
Claim 47 is indefinite with respect to just how long the “amplification template” can be. Said claim is also deemed to be indefinite with respect to what is/are the source(s) of the nucleotide sequence(s) of the “template”.
Claim 80 is indefinite with respect to what constitutes the mets and bounds of “discrete binding domains”.
Claims 48, 50, 54, 56, 61, 62, 66, 70, 71, 74, 75, 80, 83, and 92 which depend from claim 47, fail to overcome the above identified issues and are similarly rejected.
The term "about" in claim 50 is a relative term which renders the claim(s) indefinite. The term "about” is not defined by the claim(s), the specification does not provide a standard for ascertaining the requisite degree, and one of ordinary skill in the art would not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the invention. Attention is directed to MPEP 2173.05(b) III A, which states in part:
In determining the range encompassed by the term "about", one must consider the context of the term as it is used in the specification and claims of the application. Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 476 F.3d 1321, 1326, 81 USPQ2d 1427, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In< W. L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 220 USPQ 303 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the court held that a limitation defining the stretch rate of a plastic as “exceeding about 10% per second” is definite because infringement could clearly be assessed through the use of a stopwatch. However, the court held that claims reciting “at least about” were invalid for indefiniteness where there was close prior art and there was nothing in the specification, prosecution history, or the prior art to provide any indication as to what range of specific activity is covered by the term “about.” Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 18 USPQ2d 1016 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
"The use of the word 'about,' avoids a strict numerical boundary to the specified parameter." Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1995)); see also In re Harris, 409 F.3d 1339, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("[U]se of the term 'about' shows that the applicants did not intend to limit the claimed ranges to their exact end-points."). However, "the word 'about' does not have a universal meaning in patent claims[;]" rather, "the meaning depends on the technological facts of the particular case." Pall Corp., 66 F.3d at 1217; see also Eiselstein v. Frank, 52 F.3d 1035, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("The meaning of the word 'about' is dependent on the facts of a case, the nature of the invention, and the knowledge imparted by the totality of the.., disclosure to those skilled in the art."). Thus, in evaluating the scope of the "about," it is appropriate to look how the Specification and other claims use the term, as well as considering the effects of varying the parameter described by the term. Pall Corp., 66 F.3d at 1217.
The term “adjacent” in claims 7, 70, and 91 is a relative term which renders the claims indefinite. The term “adjacent” is not defined by the claims, the specification does not provide a standard for ascertaining the requisite degree, and one of ordinary skill in the art would not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the invention.
Claim 92 is indefinite as one of the components of the kit is “TWEEN 20”, which is a product defined by a trademark. It is recognized that the product is subject to change without public notice. Given such, it is less than clear as to just which compound/composition are encompassed by the term, and with it, the claimed kit.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112, Enablement
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims 1, 6, 7, 47-48, 50, 54, 56, 61, 62, 66, 70, 71, 74, 75, 80, 83, 85, 9, and 92 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to enable one skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and/or use the invention.
As set forth in Cephalon Inc. v. Watson Pharmaceuticals Inc. 105 USPQ2d 1817, 1821 (CAFC, 2013):
To satisfy section 112 of the 1952 Patent Act, the specification must enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶1. This requirement is met when at the time of filing the application one skilled in the art, having read the specification, could practice the invention without “undue experimentation.” In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736-37 [8 USPQ2d 1400] (Fed. Cir. 1988). Whether undue experimentation is required “is not a single, simple factual determination, but rather is a conclusion reached by weighing many factual considerations.” ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharms., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940 [94 USPQ2d 1823] (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Wands, 858 F.2d at 737).
The following factors may be considered when determining if a disclosure requires undue experimentation:
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims.
Wands, 858 F.2d at 737 (“Wands factors”); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1372 [52 USPQ2d 1129] (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The Wands factors, when applied from the proper temporal perspective … are a useful methodology for determining enablement….”). These factors while illustrative are not mandatory. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 188 F.3d at 1371. What is relevant depends on the facts, and although experimentation must not be undue, a reasonable amount of routine experimentation required to practice a claimed invention does not violate the enablement requirement. Id. The burden of proof here is on Watson to show that the Khankari patents are invalid for lack of enablement by clear and convincing evidence. See Auto. Tech. Int'l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1281 [84 USPQ2d 1109] (Fed. Cir. 2007).
It is noted that claims drawn to an asserted pioneering invention are not entitled to a lesser showing of enablement. In support of this position, attention is directed to Plant Genetic Systems N. V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp. 65 USPQ2d 1452 (Fed. Cir. 2003), which states at 1456:
Regarding PGS' extensive citation of statements from Hogan [In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 604 [194 USPQ 527] (CCPA 1977)] such as that pioneering inventions “deserve broad claims to the broad concept,” id. at 606, we conclude that they are taken out of context and thus unconvincing. As the concurrence in Hogan pointed out, these statements are “extended dicta.” Id. at 610. We do not need to address all of the insightful comments made by the concurring judge; it is sufficient for the present case that we hold the district court did not err in not applying Hogan‘s dicta to its enablement analysis.
PGS also cites Hormone Research Foundation Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1568 [15 USPQ2d 1039] (Fed. Cir. 1990), for its proposition that “a rigid application of the enablement requirement cannot be permitted to destroy the incentives in our patent system that encourage the early disclosure of pioneering inventions.” In Hormone Research, the enablement challenge focused on the lack of disclosure regarding how to make the compound as later produced with higher purity and potency. This court vacated a summary judgment of non-enablement because, inter alia, it was not clear from the record whether the technology of making the compound of higher purity and potency existed at the time the application was filed, and therefore, “[f]urther factual developments as to the state of the art at the date of the application … [were] required.” Id. at 1568-69.
Again, PGS relies on dicta from Hormone Research but ignores the holding of the case. In both Hogan and Hormone Research, which relied on Hogan, compounds having better qualities did not seem to be in existence on the date when the patent applications were filed, but the claims (albeit with a narrower scope) might be nevertheless enabled in view of the state of the art then existing. In the present case, PGS does not allege that monocots or stably transformed monocot cells were not in existence in 1987 or that the cell claims were enabled in 1987 under the standard enablement analysis. Instead, PGS attempts to use the dicta from Hogan and Hormone Research to expand the coverage of claims, yet create a new, lower standard of enablement.
We conclude that the law does not support PGS' assertion that the ′236 patent is entitled to both a broad scope of coverage and a lower standard of enablement. The extended dicta PGS cites cannot be used to alter the holdings of these precedents. PGS' reliance on Hogan and related cases is misplaced. (Emphasis added)
The nature of the invention, The state of the prior art, & The breadth of the claims
Claims 1, 6, 47, and 91 are deemed to be representative and, for convenience, are reproduced below.
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Applicant, at page 102, lines 23-25, provides the following description of the target analytes. As stated therein:
In one aspect, the target analyte is cDNA. In one aspect, the target analyte is mRNA. In
one aspect, cDNA is synthesized from poly-A tailed mRNAs using oligo-dT primers. In one aspect, cDNA can be generated from mRNA using random primed cDNA synthesis.
Applicant, at page 120, lines 6-9, provides the following description of target analytes and the sample from which it is obtained. As asserted to therein:
The method or kit described herein are suitable for detecting one or more target analytes
in a sample that contains or is suspected of containing the one or more target analytes. In one aspect, the target analyte includes a target nucleotide sequence. In another aspect, the target analyte includes a target protein. In one aspect, the sample includes or is suspected to include one or more prokaryotic or eukaryotic DNA or RNA sequences of interest. In one aspect, the sample is a biological sample obtained from an organism such as a human or other mammal, including, but not limited, to non-human primates, dogs, cats, cattle, sheep, poultry, horses; or other organisms such as plants, bacteria, fungi, protists or viruses. (Emphasis added)
Attention is directed to the following publications which teach of the enormity of the subphylum Vertebrata as well as the enormity of the genera of virus, plants, insects, bacteria, mammals, and species encompassed by the subfamily Murinae as the detection of any and all genes from all members of the various genera are encompassed by the instant claims.
“Vertebrate” (Wikipedia.com, accessed 04 September 2025) teaches:
Vertebrates (j'v3:rtabrit, - ~~.!!D, also called Craniates, are animals with a vertebral column and a cranium. The vertebral column surrounds and protects the spinal cord, while the cranium protects the brain.
The vertebrates make up the sub hylum Vertebrata ({ V3:rta'bre,ta/ VUR-ta-BRAY-ta) with some 65,000 species, by far the largest ranked grouping in the phylum Chordata. The vertebrates include mammals, birds, amphibians, and various classes of fish and reptiles. (Emphasis added)
“Viruses” (Wikipedia.com, accessed 08 September 2023), teaches:
An enormous variety of genomic structures can be seen among viral species; as a group, they contain more structural genomic diversity than plants, animals, archaea, or bacteria. There are millions of different types of viruses, although fewer than 7,000 types have been described in detail. (Emphasis added)
“How many species of bacteria are there” (wisegeek.com; accessed 21 January 2014) teaches:
Currently, estimates of the total number of species of bacteria range from about 10 million to a billion, but these estimates are tentative, and may be off by many orders of magnitude. By comparison, there are probably between 10 and 30 million species of animals, the vast majority of them insects. The number of scientifically recognized species of animals is about 1,250,000. There are almost 300,000 recognized species of plants.
“Fungi,” (Wikipedia.com; accessed 08 September 2023), teaches:
As of 2020, around 148,000 species of fungi have been described by taxonomists,[6] but the global biodiversity of the fungus kingdom is not fully understood.[48] A 2017 estimate suggests there may be between 2.2 and 3.8 million species.[5]
“Insect”, (Wikipedia.com; accessed 09/10/2020) teaches:
Insects are the most diverse group of animals; they include more than a million described species and represent more than half of all known living organisms. The total number of extant species is estimated at between six and ten million; potentially over 90% of the animal life forms on Earth are insects.
“Plant,” (Wikipedia.com; accessed 08 September 2023) teaches:
There are about 380,000 known species of plants, of which the majority, some 260,000, produce seeds.
“Mammal,” (Wikipedia.com; accessed 08 September 2023) teaches:
According to Mammal Species of the World, which is updated through periodic editions, 5,416 species were identified in 2006. These were grouped into 1,229 genera, 153 families and 29 orders.[5]
“Murinae,” (Wikipedia.com, accessed 10 June 2024) teaches:
The Old World rats and mice, part of the subfamily Murinae in the family Muridae, comprise at least 519 species. Members of this subfamily are called murines. In terms of species richness, this subfamily is larger than all mammal families except the Cricetidae and Muridae, and is larger than all mammal orders except the bats and the remainder of the rodents.
“Fish,” (Wikipedia.com, accessed 08 September 2023) teaches:
Fish are abundant in most bodies of water. They can be found in nearly all aquatic environments, from high mountain streams (e.g., char and gudgeon) to the abyssal and even hadal depths of the deepest oceans (e.g., cush-eels and snailfish), although no species has yet been documented in the deepest 25% of the ocean.[4] At 34,300 described species, fish exhibit greater species diversity than any other group of vertebrates.[5]
“Archaea,” Wikipedia.com (accessed 08 September 2023), teaches:
The classification of archaea into species is also controversial. Ernst Mayr defined a species as a group of interbreeding organisms which are reproductively isolated, but this is of no help since archaea only reproduce asexually.[37]
Archaea show high levels of horizontal gene transfer between lineages. Some researchers suggest that individuals can be grouped into species-like populations given highly similar genomes and infrequent gene transfer to/from cells with less-related genomes, as in the genus Ferroplasma.[38] On the other hand, studies in Halorubrum found significant genetic transfer to/from less-related populations, limiting the criterion's applicability. Some researchers question whether such species designations have practical meaning.[40]
Current knowledge on genetic diversity is fragmentary, so the total number of species cannot be estimated with any accuracy.[22] (Emphasis added)
“Algae,” Wikipedia.com (accessed 03-04-2016) teaches:
The most recent estimate suggests 72,500 algal species worldwide.
“Protozoa,” Wikipedia.com (accessed 05-11-2016), teaches:
The classification of protozoa has been and remains a problematic area of taxonomy. Where they are available, DNA sequences are used as the basis for classification; however, for the majority of described protozoa, such material is not available. (Emphasis added)
Attention is directed to “Eukaryotic Genome Complexity” (Pray, Nature Education, 1(1):36, 2008, pages 1-4.). As seen therein, a table of estimated protein encoding genes in different genomes is provided.
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The quantity of experimentation necessary
The quantity of experimentation necessary is great, on the order of many man-years, and then with little if any reasonable expectation of successfully enabling the full scope of the claims. In support of this position, it is noted that the art suggests that there are millions of species of viruses and fungi that are yet to be identified and characterized. Assuming, arguendo, that one were to identify a new virus or fungus every day, 365 days a year, and to also determine in the same day the nucleotide sequence of the genome of said organism, and additionally, identify probes and primers that would be useful in the identification of a target sequence found in said new organism wherein said target sequence has utility under 35 USC 101, it would take approximately 2739 years to sequence even 1 million viruses or fungi. Clearly, such an effort to enable the full scope of that claimed would constitute undue experimentation. In support of this position attention is directed to Cephalon, 1823:
Permissible experimentation is, nevertheless, not without bounds. This court has held that experimentation was unreasonable, for example, where it was found that eighteen months to two years’ work was required to practice the patented invention. See, e.g., White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc., 713 F.2d 788, 791 [218 USPQ 961] (Fed. Cir. 1983). Likewise, we have held that the amount of experimentation would be undue where: (1) the specification lacks guidance by teaching away from the subject matter that was eventually claimed; and (2) there is evidence of the patentee's own failures to make and use the later claimed invention at the time of the application. See, e.g., AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 [68 USPQ2d 1280] (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Alternatively, even if the claimed method was limited to the detection of known organisms, the selection of probes and primers would also constitute undue experimentation. In support of this position, it is noted that if one were to utilize a probe or primer that was but 20 nucleotides long, and to then substitute each of the positions with the four common dNTPs, there are some 420, or 1.099 x 1012 different sequences to screen/evaluate. In support of the position that to screen such a number of candidate molecules would constitute undue experimentation, attention is directed to Wyeth v. Abbott Laboratories 107 USPQ2d 1273, 1276 (Fed. Cir. June 2013):
The remaining question is whether having to synthesize and screen each of at least tens of thousands of candidate compounds constitutes undue experimentation. We hold that it does. Undue experimentation is a matter of degree. Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1253 [70 USPQ2d 1321] (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted). Even “a considerable amount of experimentation is permissible,” as long as it is “merely routine” or the specification “provides a reasonable amount of guidance” regarding the direction of experimentation. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1360-61 [47 USPQ2d 1705] (Fed. Cir. 1998) (internal quotation omitted). Yet, routine experimentation is “not without bounds.” Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 707 F.3d 1330, 1339 [105 USPQ2d 1817] (Fed. Cir. 2013). (Emphasis added)
Our cases have described limits on permissible experimentation in the context of enablement. For example, in ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, LLC, we affirmed a judgment of nonenablement where the specification provided “only a starting point, a direction for further research.” 603 F.3d 935, 941 [94 USPQ2d 1823] (Fed. Cir. 2010) (internal quotation omitted). We concluded that one of ordinary skill “would have been required to engage in an iterative, trial-and-error process to practice the claimed invention even with the help of the … specification.” Id. at 943. In Cephalon, although we ultimately reversed a finding of nonenablement, we noted that the defendant had not established that required experimentation “would be excessive, e.g., that it would involve testing for an unreasonable length of time.” 707 F.3d at 1339 (citing White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc., 713 F.2d 788, 791 [218 USPQ 961] (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Finally, in In re Vaeck, we affirmed the PTO's nonenablement rejection of claims reciting heterologous gene expression in as many as 150 genera of cyanobacteria. 947 F.2d 488, 495-96 [20 USPQ2d 1438] (Fed. Cir. 1991). The specification disclosed only nine genera, despite cyanobacteria being a “diverse and relatively poorly understood group of microorganisms,” with unpredictable heterologous gene expression. Id. at 496. (Emphasis added)
Here, the specification similarly discloses only a starting point for further iterative research in an unpredictable and poorly understood field. Synthesizing candidate compounds derived from sirolimus could, itself, require a complicated and lengthy series of experiments in synthetic organic chemistry. Even putting the challenges of synthesis aside, one of ordinary skill would need to assay each of at least tens of thousands of candidates. Wyeth's expert conceded that it would take technicians weeks to complete each of these assays. The specification offers no guidance or predictions about particular substitutions that might preserve the immunosuppressive and antirestenotic effects observed in sirolimus. The resulting need to engage in a systematic screening process for each of the many rapamycin candidate compounds is excessive experimentation. We thus hold that there is no genuine dispute that practicing the full scope of the claims, measured at the filing date, required undue experimentation. (Emphasis added)
The amount of direction or guidance presented,
The amount of guidance provided is limited, generally prophetic, and not commensurate with the scope of the claims.
The disclosure is found to comprise a Sequence Listing which comprises some 1,675 sequences. A review of these 1,675 sequences find that each and every one is identified as being both DNA and an “Artificial Sequence”. In short, the disclosure has not been found to teach the first target sequence that occurs in any organism, be it RNA or DNA, much less any sequence that has a specific and substantial utility.
The presence or absence of working examples
The disclosure has been found to comprise the following 25 examples:
“Example 1. Selection of Non-Interacting Capture Oligonucleotides”, page 228;
“Example 2. Formation of Capture Oligonucleotide Arrays”, page 229;
“Example 3. A Procedure for Measuring Biotin-Labeled Oligonucleotides with Sequences Complementary to Capture Oligonucleotides in an Array”, page 230;
“Example 4. Uniformity and Cross-Reactivity of Capture Oligonucleotide Arrays”, page 231;
“Example 5. Comparison of Linkers for Capture Oligonucleotides”, page 232;
“Example 6. Comparison of Blocking Conditions for Preparing Arrays”, page 233;
“Example 7. A Procedure for Oligonucleotide Ligation Assay (OLA) to Detect Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs ).”, page 234;
“Example 8. Using OLA to Detect SNPs in Synthetic DNA Targets”, page 240;
“Example 9. Use of blocking oligos for reducing non-specific assay background”, page 241;
“Example 10. Effect of blocking oligos on OLA sensitivity and specificity”, page 243;
“Example 11. Use of Hot Soak or Blocking Probes to Reduce Non-Specific Background in OLA Format”, page 243;
“Example 12. Use of OLA to Detect Mutations in Whole Genome Amplification (WGA) Products and genomic DNA without amplification”, page 245;
“Example 13. Use of OLA to Detect PCR Products”, page 246;
“Example 14. A Procedure for Polymerase Extension Assay (PEA) to Detect Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs)”, page 248;
“Example 15. Using PEA to Detect SNPs in Synthetic DNA Targets”, page 249;
“Example 16. Use of PEA to Detect PCR Products”, page 250;
“Example 17. Oligonucleotide Ligation Assay (OLA) to Detect Cystic Fibrosis (CF) mutations”, page 252;
“Example 18. Oligonucleotide Ligation Assay (OLA) to Detect BRCA mutations”, page 253;
“Example 19. Lung Cancer SNP Panel”, page 254;
“Example 20. miRNA Detection Using an RNase Protection Assay”, page 259;
“Example 21. ASO Detection Using Three Protocols (RNase protection, OLA using Taq DNA ligase, and OLA using T4 DNA ligase)”, page 261;
“Example 22. ADA Detection Using Two Protocols (one-step and two-step)”, page 262;
“Example 23. Detection of antisense oligonucleotides (ASO) with an extended detection sequence”, page 266;
“Example 24: Detection of antisense oligonucleotides (ASO) with an extended detection sequence”, page 267, lines 18-22;
“Example 25. Detection of antisense oligonucleotides (OLA) using an Oligonucleotide Ligation Assay (OLA) and an extended detection sequence”, page 267, lines 25-29.
It is noted that none of the examples provide DNA target sequences found in any organism, much less any mRNA sequence found in any organism, and lesser still any mRNA sequence that has a specific and substantial utility.
The predictability or unpredictability of the art
As noted in In re Fisher 166 USPQ 18 (CCPA, 1970):
In cases involving predictable factors, such as that, once imagined, other embodiments can be made without difficulty and their performance characteristics predicted by resort to known scientific laws. In cases involving unpredictable factors, such as most chemical reactions and physiological activity, the scope of enablement obviously varies inversely with the degree of unpredictability of the factors involved.
Attention is also directed to Wyeth v. Abbott Laboratories 107 USPQ2d 1273 (Fed. Cir. June 2013):
The remaining question is whether having to synthesize and screen each of at least tens of thousands of candidate compounds constitutes undue experimentation. We hold that it does. Undue experimentation is a matter of degree. Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1253 [70 USPQ2d 1321] (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted). Even “a considerable amount of experimentation is permissible,” as long as it is “merely routine” or the specification “provides a reasonable amount of guidance” regarding the direction of experimentation. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1360-61 [47 USPQ2d 1705] (Fed. Cir. 1998) (internal quotation omitted). Yet, routine experimentation is “not without bounds.” Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 707 F.3d 1330, 1339 [105 USPQ2d 1817] (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Our cases have described limits on permissible experimentation in the context of enablement. For example, in ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, LLC, we affirmed a judgment of nonenablement where the specification provided “only a starting point, a direction for further research.” 603 F.3d 935, 941 [94 USPQ2d 1823] (Fed. Cir. 2010) (internal quotation omitted). We concluded that one of ordinary skill “would have been required to engage in an iterative, trial-and-error process to practice the claimed invention even with the help of the … specification.” Id. at 943. In Cephalon, although we ultimately reversed a finding of nonenablement, we noted that the defendant had not established that required experimentation “would be excessive, e.g., that it would involve testing for an unreasonable length of time.” 707 F.3d at 1339 (citing White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc., 713 F.2d 788, 791 [218 USPQ 961] (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Finally, in In re Vaeck, we affirmed the PTO's nonenablement rejection of claims reciting heterologous gene expression in as many as 150 genera of cyanobacteria. 947 F.2d 488, 495-96 [20 USPQ2d 1438] (Fed. Cir. 1991). The specification disclosed only nine genera, despite cyanobacteria being a “diverse and relatively poorly understood group of microorganisms,” with unpredictable heterologous gene expression. Id. at 496.
Here, the specification similarly discloses only a starting point for further iterative research in an unpredictable and poorly understood field. Synthesizing candidate compounds derived from sirolimus could, itself, require a complicated and lengthy series of experiments in synthetic organic chemistry. Even putting the challenges of synthesis aside, one of ordinary skill would need to assay each of at least tens of thousands of candidates. Wyeth's expert conceded that it would take technicians weeks to complete each of these assays. The specification offers no guidance or predictions about particular substitutions that might preserve the immunosuppressive and antirestenotic effects observed in sirolimus. The resulting need to engage in a systematic screening process for each of the many rapamycin candidate compounds is excessive experimentation. We thus hold that there is no genuine dispute that practicing the full scope of the claims, measured at the filing date, required undue experimentation.
In view of the breadth of scope clamed, the limited guidance provided, the unpredictable nature of the art to which the claimed invention is directed, and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, the claims are deemed to be non-enabled by the disclosure.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112, Written Description
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such f