Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Status of Claims
This action is in reply to the remarks filed on April 2, 2025.
Claims 1-20 are currently pending and have been examined.
Applicant’s remarks and arguments are addressed below.
Information Disclosure Statement
The Information Disclosure Statement filed on November 15, 2022 has been considered. An initialed copy of the Form 1449 is enclosed herewith (Examiner notes that the previously attached IDS was missing some initials).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112(b)
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. § 112(b):
(B) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 1-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor, or for pre-AIA the applicant regards as the invention. Specifically, independent Claims 1, 19, and 20 recite “a mind-body space.” Many other claims also recite a “creative space” and “practice of a wellness activity.” These are subjective terms (see MPEP § 2173.05(b)(IV)) or, alternatively, terms that are not well defined and arbitrary enough that one of ordinary skill in the art, seeking to avoid infringement, would not be apprised of the metes and bounds of these terms and thus the invention. In other words, what might comprise a “mind-body space,” a “creative space,” or a “practice of a wellness activity” can be different to different people and there is no objective standard provided to the public to determine the scope of these terms. See MPEP § 2173.05(b)(IV). Thus, these claims must be rejected under § 112(b) because the claims are not particularly pointed out or distinctly claimed. Because the dependent claims fail to render these terms any less relative or vague, these claims are also rejected under § 112(b).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. § 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1-6, 10-14, and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Jimenez (US 8,745,940).
Claim 1. Jimenez teaches: A residential development comprising:
at least one residence, each residence includes a living space, a bedroom and a mind-body space (see at least Figure 2 teaching a kitchen, several bedrooms, a living space, i.e., great room A, and a mind-body space in the form of a “pocket library” 11, noting that in Figure 13 the “pocket library” is substituted for a hobby room, which could be an example of a “mind-body” space);
the mind-body space being configured for the practice of a wellness activity (see, e.g., Figures 2 and 13 noting that reading in a library or doing a hobby in a hobby room could be examples of practicing a wellness activity; see also Figures 11 and 16 teaching a separate private library or a sitting nook in a lofted suite); and
the mind-body space being separated from the bedroom (see Figures 2 and 13 teaching the space separated from the bedroom, e.g., by a wall and separated from the living room by a foyer; see also Figures 11 and 16 teaching a separate private library or a sitting nook in a lofted suite).
Claim 2. Jimenez teaches the limitations of Claim 1. Jimenez further teaches: The residential development of claim 1, wherein the development includes at least a first level and a second level, wherein the mind-body space and bedroom are located on separate levels from each other and are laterally displaced relative to each other (see, e.g., column 4 lines 37-50 teaching that the options for layout can be at different elevations).
Claim 3. Jimenez teaches the limitations of Claim 1. Jimenez further teaches: The residential development of claim 1 wherein the residence includes a rectangular perimeter including a front wall, a rear wall, a first sidewall and a second sidewall, wherein the mind-body space is located along the first sidewall, the residence including three bedrooms located on a level separate from the mind-body space, wherein a first bedroom is located along the front wall and the second sidewall; the second bedroom being located along the second sidewall and the rear wall; and the third bedroom being located adjacent to the second bedroom along the rear wall (see, e.g., Figure 4 and staircase 60, noting column 4 lines 37-50 teaching that the options for layout can be at different elevations, as well as a relatively rectangular perimeter of the residential unit; Examiner further notes that any differences between Jimenez and the instant application are just a rearrangement of parts, i.e., a matter of design choice not warranted patentable weight, see MPEP § 2144.04(VI)(C)).
Claim 4. Jimenez teaches the limitations of Claim 1. Jimenez further teaches: The residential development of claim 1, wherein the mind-body space is separated from the bedroom by an air gap (see, e.g., Figures 2 and 13 teaching the pocket library or hobby room being separated by the bedroom by at least a foyer and/or a covered stoop).
Claim 5. Jimenez teaches the limitations of Claim 4. Jimenez further teaches: The residential development of claim 4, wherein the air gap is formed by a stair case (see, e.g., Figure 4 and staircase 60, noting column 4 lines 37-50 teaching that the options for layout can be at different elevations, i.e., the bedrooms could be upstairs and on a different level from the other rooms; Examiner further notes that any differences between Jimenez and the instant application are just a rearrangement of parts, i.e., a matter of design choice not warranted patentable weight, see MPEP § 2144.04(VI)(C)).
Claim 6. Jimenez teaches the limitations of Claim 1. Jimenez further teaches: The residential development of claim 1, further comprising an interior living wall facing opposite the mind-body space and spaced therefrom defining an air gap between the mind-body space and the living wall (see, e.g., Figures 2 and 13 teaching the pocket library or hobby room being separated from the living room wall by at least a foyer and/or a covered stoop).
Claim 10. Jimenez teaches the limitations of Claim 1. Jimenez further teaches: The residential development of claim 1 further comprising a creative space located adjacent to the mind-body space (see, e.g., Figure 13 teaching that the space can be a mind-body space, e.g., sitting or reading room, and a creative space, e.g., craft/hobby/play room; Examiner further notes that any differences between Jimenez and the instant application are just a rearrangement of parts, i.e., a matter of design choice not warranted patentable weight, see MPEP § 2144.04(VI)(C)).
Claim 11. Jimenez teaches the limitations of Claim 10. Jimenez further teaches: The residential development of claim 10, wherein the creative space and the mind-body space are located along a sidewall of the residence and at least one of the living space and the bedroom are located on an opposite sidewall (see, e.g., Figure 13 teaching that the space can be a mind-body space, e.g., sitting or reading room, and a creative space, e.g., craft/hobby/play room; Examiner notes that Figures 11 alternatively teaches a pocket library, and that either the pocket library or craft/hobby/play room is separate from a bedroom by opposite walls as demonstrated by, e.g., Figure 7 teaching that the pocket library is feature 31 of Figure 7 relative to a master bedroom as further explained in column 5 lines 40-45).
Claim 12. Jimenez teaches the limitations of Claim 1. Jimenez further teaches: The residential development of claim 10, wherein the mind-body space and the creative space are arranged back to back in a center of the residence and wherein at least one of the living space and the bedroom are located at a perimeter of the residence (Examiner notes that any differences between Jimenez and the instant application are just a rearrangement of parts, i.e., a matter of design choice not warranted patentable weight, see MPEP § 2144.04(VI)(C)).
Claim 13. Jimenez teaches the limitations of Claim 1. Jimenez further teaches: The residential development of claim 10, wherein the creative space is separated from the living space by an air gap, wherein a door to creative space is aligned with a portion of the living space and is transparent to allow viewing of an activity within the creative space from the living space (see, e.g., Figure 2 teaching “great room-A,” i.e., the living room, separated from the creative space by air gap foyer but part is aligned to view to and from each room).
Claim 14. Jimenez teaches the limitations of Claim 1. Jimenez further teaches: The residential development of claim 1 further comprising an entryway external to the residence and having a door that opens into the residence, the residence further comprising an external storage space that is formed within a perimeter of the residence and has a door opening external to the residence within the entryway, wherein the external storage space is an elongated space configured to receive at least one outdoor sporting equipment (see, e.g., Figure 2 teaching a 2 car garage, which could receive outdoor sporting equipment).
Claim 19. Jimenez teaches: A residential development comprising:
plural residences (see at least the Abstract teaching multi-family housing units on a shared foundation);
each residence includes multiple levels, wherein a living space, a creative space and a mind-body space are located on one level and at least one bedroom is located on another level vertically separating the mind-body space and the creative space from the at least one bedroom, wherein the mind-body space and the creative space are laterally displaced relative to the at least one bedroom (see at least Figure 2 teaching a kitchen, several bedrooms, a living space, i.e., great room A, and a mind-body space in the form of a “pocket library” 11, noting that in Figure 13 the “pocket library” is substituted for a hobby room, which could be an example of a “mind-body” space; see also, e.g., Figure 4 and staircase 60, noting column 4 lines 37-50 teaching that the options for layout can be at different elevations, as well as a relatively rectangular perimeter of the residential unit; Examiner further notes that any differences between Jimenez and the instant application are just a rearrangement of parts, i.e., a matter of design choice not warranted patentable weight, see MPEP § 2144.04(VI)(C)).
Claim 20 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Romero (US 2021/0140185).
Claim 20. Romero teaches: A residential development comprising:
plural residences connected to a shared space (see, e.g., Figures 2-4 teaching plural residences 120 connected to a shared space 200);
each residence includes a first level and a second level above the first level; a mind-body space and a bedroom (see, e.g., ¶ 21 teaching a stairwell and ¶s 22 and 24 teaching stairs; see ¶ 21 teaching that the residential unit has a bedroom; see further ¶ 43 teaching that the community amenity area 244 can comprise a gym, yoga studio, spa, etc., i.e., a “mind body space”);
the mind-body space being configured for the practice of a wellness activity (see ¶ 43 teaching that the community amenity area 244 can comprise a gym, yoga studio, spa, etc.);
wherein the mind-body space is located on the first level and the bedroom is located on the second level; wherein the mind-body space and bedroom are laterally displaced relative to each other reducing the likelihood of acoustic transmission from the mind-body space into the bedroom (see, e.g., ¶ 21 teaching a stairwell and ¶s 22 and 24 teaching stairs that can be used between the residential units 120 and the common area 200, that would include the community area 244 that could be the mind-body space 244 as taught in ¶ 43);
the shared space including at least one of a co-working space and a community garden (see, e.g., ¶ 41 teaching that spaces in the common/shared area can include “office rooms 234 where users can work or read quietly;” see also ¶ 43 teaching in the community amenity area 244 a workshop; see further ¶ 29 teaching occupiable spaces including “office spaces 234”).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. § 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966), that are applied for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claim 7 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Jimenez in view of Santarone et al. (US 10,025,887 B1, hereinafter “Santarone”).
Claim 7. Jimenez teaches the limitations of Claim 1. Jimenez fails to teach, however, analogous reference Santarone teaches: The residential development of claim 1, wherein the mind-body space is constructed with a higher insulation value relative to at least one of the living space and bedroom (see, e.g., column 22 lines 4-14 teaching providing a thicker exterior wall with higher insulation value for areas in an adverse environment or for sound proofing). Santarone is analogous to Jimenez and the instant application because it relates to modeling the design of residential structures (see Santarone column 1 lines 24-34).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to apply the known technique of providing a higher insulation value to one wall or room (as disclosed by Santarone) to the known design of multi-family living spaces (as disclosed by Jimenez). One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to apply the known technique of providing a higher insulation value to one wall or room because the proposed usage or demographic considerations can be used when designing a residential structure (see Santarone column 22 lines 4-14).
Furthermore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to apply the known technique of providing a higher insulation value to one wall or room (as disclosed by Santarone) to the known design of multi-family living spaces (as disclosed by Jimenez), because the claimed invention is merely applying a known technique to a known method ready for improvement to yield predictable results. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). In other words, all of the claimed elements were known in the prior art and one skilled in the art could have combined the elements as claimed by known methods with no change in their respective functions, and the combination would have yielded nothing more than predictable results to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (i.e., predictable results are obtained by applying the known technique of providing a higher insulation value to one wall or room to the known design of multi-family living spaces, because predictably higher insulation values in one wall is a design choice that does not make inoperable the rest of the building). See also MPEP § 2143(I)(D).
Claims 8 and 15-16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Jimenez in view of Romero.
Claim 8. Jimenez teaches the limitations of Claim 1. Jimenez fails to teach, however, analogous reference Romero teaches: The residential development of claim 1, wherein the mind-body space further comprises at least one of a fitness mirror, a stationary bike, and a yoga mat (see ¶ 43 teaching that the community amenity area 244 can comprise a gym or a yoga studio). Romero is analogous to Jimenez and the instant application because it relates to the design of a building with efficient use of space by providing shared spaces (see ¶ 1).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to apply the known technique of providing a yoga mat or gym equipment in the shared space (as disclosed by Romero) to the known design of multi-family living spaces (as disclosed by Jimenez). One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to apply the known technique of providing a yoga mat or gym equipment in the shared space because it would thus provide amenities typically used privately by residents but in a way that offsets building costs to help keep the costs affordable for residents (see Romero ¶ 1).
Furthermore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to apply the known technique of providing a yoga mat or gym equipment in the shared space (as disclosed by Romero) to the known design of multi-family living spaces (as disclosed by Jimenez), because the claimed invention is merely applying a known technique to a known method ready for improvement to yield predictable results. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). In other words, all of the claimed elements were known in the prior art and one skilled in the art could have combined the elements as claimed by known methods with no change in their respective functions, and the combination would have yielded nothing more than predictable results to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (i.e., predictable results are obtained by applying the known technique of providing a yoga mat or gym equipment in the shared space to the known design of multi-family living spaces, because predictably shared spaces can work in any multi-family setup where there are private spaces and shared spaces). See also MPEP § 2143(I)(D).
Claim 15. Jimenez teaches the limitations of Claim 1. Jimenez fails to teach, however, analogous reference Jimenez teaches: The residential development of claim 1, further comprising a shared space having at least one of a co-working space and a community garden (see, e.g., ¶ 41 teaching that spaces in the common/shared area can include “office rooms 234 where users can work or read quietly;” see also ¶ 43 teaching in the community amenity area 244 a workshop; see further ¶ 29 teaching occupiable spaces including “office spaces 234”). Romero is analogous to Jimenez and the instant application because it relates to the design of a building with efficient use of space by providing shared spaces (see ¶ 1).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to apply the known technique of providing a co-working space in the shared space (as disclosed by Romero) to the known design of multi-family living spaces (as disclosed by Jimenez). One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to apply the known technique of providing a co-working space in the shared space because it would thus provide amenities typically used privately by residents but in a way that offsets building costs to help keep the costs affordable for residents (see Romero ¶ 1).
Furthermore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to apply the known technique of providing a co-working space in the shared space (as disclosed by Romero) to the known design of multi-family living spaces (as disclosed by Jimenez), because the claimed invention is merely applying a known technique to a known method ready for improvement to yield predictable results. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). In other words, all of the claimed elements were known in the prior art and one skilled in the art could have combined the elements as claimed by known methods with no change in their respective functions, and the combination would have yielded nothing more than predictable results to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (i.e., predictable results are obtained by applying the known technique of providing a co-working space in the shared space to the known design of multi-family living spaces, because predictably shared spaces can work in any multi-family setup where there are private spaces and shared spaces). See also MPEP § 2143(I)(D).
Claim 16. The combination of Jimenez and Romero teaches the limitations of Claim 1. Romero further teaches: The residential development of claim 15, wherein the development includes at least two residences, wherein the shared space is connected to the at least two residences (see, e.g., ¶ 33 teaching that there can be different ratios or connections of residences to common/shared spaces; see also Figure 2-4 teaching that the shared areas 200 et seq. are internal and connected to the plurality of residences 120).
Claim 9 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Jimenez in view of Ross (US 2020/0340704).
Claim 9. Jimenez teaches the limitations of Claim 1. Jimenez fails to teach, however, analogous reference Ross teaches: The residential development of claim 1, wherein the residence includes a home automation system connected to at least the mind-body space, wherein the home automation system defines the mind-body space as a separate zone having at least one of an independently adjustable temperature, lighting and sound (see ¶ 45 teaching that there can be separate thermostats 232a-c to maintain different temperatures in each zone of a house, which, as shown in Figures 4-7 correspond to an individual room). Ross is analogous to Jimenez and the instant application because it relates to housing design.
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to apply the known technique of providing independently adjustable temperatures per room or zone (as disclosed by Ross) to the known design of multi-family living spaces including mind-body spaces (as disclosed by Jimenez). One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to apply the known technique of providing independently adjustable temperatures per room or zone because different people in different rooms might want different temperatures or the same person might want different temperatures in different parts of the living area for different purposes.
Furthermore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to apply the known technique providing independently adjustable temperatures per room or zone (as disclosed by Ross) to the known design of multi-family living spaces including mind-body spaces (as disclosed by Jimenez), because the claimed invention is merely applying a known technique to a known method ready for improvement to yield predictable results. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). In other words, all of the claimed elements were known in the prior art and one skilled in the art could have combined the elements as claimed by known methods with no change in their respective functions, and the combination would have yielded nothing more than predictable results to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (i.e., predictable results are obtained by applying the known technique of providing independently adjustable temperatures per room or zone to the known design of multi-family living spaces including mind-body spaces, because predictably different rooms in any building set up with different rooms can be modified as in Ross to provide different climate control via different thermostats per room). See also MPEP § 2143(I)(D).
Claim 17 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Jimenez in view of Baker (US 2019/0003195 A1).
Claim 17. Jimenez teaches the limitations of Claim 1. Jimenez fails to teach, however, analogous reference Baker teaches: The residential development of claim 1, wherein the shared space includes a front façade and a rear façade; wherein at least one of the front façade and rear façade includes a living wall having plant material thereon (see ¶ 227 teaching that “the exterior enclosures 728, 730 can include living walls;” see also ¶s 326 and 399 teaching substantially the same, though they additionally expressly note that these are exterior enclosures, i.e., façades). Baker is analogous to Jimenez and the instant application because it relates to real estate technology (see ¶ 7).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to apply the known technique of providing a living wall (as disclosed by Baker) to the known design of multi-family living spaces including mind-body spaces (as disclosed by Jimenez). One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to apply the known technique of providing a living wall because in addition to the aesthetic benefit of having plants covering the walls, the plants could be used to filter graywater (see Baker ¶ 340).
Furthermore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to apply the known technique of providing a living wall (as disclosed by Baker) to the known design of multi-family living spaces including mind-body spaces (as disclosed by Jimenez), because the claimed invention is merely applying a known technique to a known method ready for improvement to yield predictable results. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). In other words, all of the claimed elements were known in the prior art and one skilled in the art could have combined the elements as claimed by known methods with no change in their respective functions, and the combination would have yielded nothing more than predictable results to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (i.e., predictable results are obtained by applying the known technique of providing a living wall on a façade of a building to the known design of multi-family living spaces including mind-body spaces, because predictably the outside wall can operate in the same way as Baker and the inside spaces can operate the same way as in Jimenez). See also MPEP § 2143(I)(D).
Claim 18 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Jimenez in view of Briggs et al. (US 2021/0388604 A1).
Claim 18. Jimenez teaches the limitations of Claim 1. Jimenez fails to teach, however, analogous reference Briggs teaches: The residential development of claim 1, wherein the shared space includes a first floor, a second floor and a roof top terrace, wherein the roof top terrace is divided into a front portion and a rear portion by a central stairwell, wherein at least one of the front portion and the rear portion includes a community garden area (see ¶ 46 teaching common areas including gardens throughout the building as well as a roof and stairways; see also ¶s 85 and 100 teaching gardens in the rooftop common space; Examiner further notes that any differences between the combination of Jimenez and Briggs and the instant application are just a rearrangement of parts, i.e., a matter of design choice not warranted patentable weight, see MPEP § 2144.04(VI)(C)). Briggs is analogous to Jimenez and the instant application because it relates to manufactured homes with shared resources such as common areas, balconies, recreation areas, and flex spaces (see Briggs ¶ 6).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to apply the known technique of providing a roof top community garden (as disclosed by Briggs) to the known design of multi-family living spaces including mind-body spaces (as disclosed by Jimenez). One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to apply the known technique of providing a roof top terrace community garden because all of the residents of the entire multi-family community could enjoy the aesthetic benefits of the garden.
Furthermore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to apply the known technique providing a roof top terrace community garden (as disclosed by Briggs) to the known design of multi-family living spaces including mind-body spaces (as disclosed by Jimenez), because the claimed invention is merely applying a known technique to a known method ready for improvement to yield predictable results. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). In other words, all of the claimed elements were known in the prior art and one skilled in the art could have combined the elements as claimed by known methods with no change in their respective functions, and the combination would have yielded nothing more than predictable results to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (i.e., predictable results are obtained by applying the known technique of providing a roof top terrace community garden to the known design of multi-family living spaces including mind-body spaces, because predictably a roof top terrace community garden can be modified as in Briggs without modifying any of the design of the rooms as in Jimenez). See also MPEP § 2143(I)(D).
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s arguments have been fully considered. In the remarks, Applicant specifically addresses the following:
Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 112:
Claims 1-20 were rejected because they contained subjective terms such as “a mind-body space,” a “creative space,” and “practice of a wellness activity.” Applicant argues that this § 112(b) rejection is in error (see Remarks pages 2-3). First, Applicant argues that residential architects and building designers would be apprised of the term, citing the “Well© building standard and other similar residential design standards” (see Remarks page 2). Applicant is encouraged to submit any particular definitions from such standards or similar standards if those standards provide an objective, industry-specific definition for “a mind-body space,” a “creative space,” and “practice of a wellness activity.” Examiner’s search has not uncovered any definitions or usage of these terms as terms of art in this field that would provide anything other than a subjective term, because what could be “a mind-body space,” a “creative space,” and “practice of a wellness activity” is in the eyes of the beholder. Thus, because there is no specific, objective industry definition of these terms in the art or the specification, the argument is not persuasive.
Applicant further argues that mind-body spaces “allow for mind-body practices within that space without, in turn, disrupting the other areas of the residence” and that they are “configured for a wellness activity[,] … such as, yoga, meditation, online subscription fitness classes, and the like” (see Remarks page 2, citing paragraph 65 of the specification). This argument is not persuasive. While those examples are examples of things that some people may consider a “wellness activity,” different people find different activities that could affect his or her “wellness” and could have different opinions regarding what “space” might be required to perform such functions. Similarly, Applicant argues that “creative space” is not subjective because the specification provides examples in specification paragraph 84 of places where “writing, art, crafting, reading, children’s activities, play space, and music” are conducted (see Remarks page 2). While these examples are things that certainly could fall within the metes and bounds of “creative spaces,” the subjectivity of what is “creative” and where such activities could take place means that the outer bounds of the term would not be known by those seeking to avoid infringement. Thus, because Applicant’s arguments are not persuasive, the § 112(b) rejection is maintained.
Claim Rejections - Prior Art:
Regarding the application of the prior art to the claims, Applicant provides several arguments regarding the application of the prior art to the claims. The first argument is that Jimenez fails to teach a “mind-body space within a residence that is separated from a bedroom within the residence” in Claim 1 (see Remarks page 3). This argument is not persuasive because the claim language does not require the level of separation assumed by Applicant. “Separate” can mean “to keep apart or divide, as by an intervening barrier or space.” See Dictionary.com “separate” definition 1. In Jimenez Figures 2 and 13, the “pocket library” and “craft space” are kept apart, perhaps not by a barrier, but by space from the bedroom. Examiner further notes Figure 11 showing the pocket library completely separated from any room. “Opening into the bedroom” can still include “an intervening … space.” Thus, this argument is not persuasive. Additionally, Applicant’s argument that the “multi-function flex space” used in the Jimenez prior art reference “is no less definite or arbitrary” than Applicant’s terms (see Remarks pages 2-3) is not persuasive. The issue when applying § 112 to the terms in the instant application is not with the definiteness of terms in other references but with the terms in the claims at hand.
Applicant next argues that Jimenez fails to anticipate Claim 2 because it does not show a mind-body space and a bedroom on separate levels (see Remarks pages 3-4). As noted in the rejection above, however, Jimenez teaches that the architect has the design choice of adjusting each of the layout options “at different elevations” (see, e.g., column 4 lines 37-50). While this may not be shown in the drawings of Jimenez, it is part of Jimenez’s disclosure (and, as Applicant notes, Figure 16 does teach a “loft suite,” i.e., a space lofted above, i.e., at a different elevation, from other rooms). Thus, this argument is not persuasive.
Applicant argues that Jimenez fails to anticipate Claim 3 because it fails to “show” an “irregular shaped perimeter” or three bedrooms on a separate level from the mind-body space with different bedrooms on different sidewalls (see Remarks page 4). This argument is not persuasive because, as noted in the rejection above, such aesthetic design choices are not warranted patentable weight. See MPEP § 2144.04(VI)(C).
Applicant argues that Jimenez fails to anticipate Claim 4 because Jimenez fails to teach an “air-gap” separating the mind-body space from the bedroom (see Remarks page 4). This argument is somewhat duplicative of the one in Claim 1 above. As noted in the rejection, the pocket library or hobby room is separated from the bedroom by a bit of space or a foyer or covered stoop (see Figures 2, 11, and 13 and column 5 lines 40-52 teaching the different combinations of spaces and how they can be separated from other rooms).
Applicant argues that Jimenez fails to anticipate Claim 5 because Jimenez fails to teach an “air-gap,” specifically, a “stairway,” separating the mind-body space from the bedroom (see Remarks page 4). This argument is somewhat duplicative of the one in Claim 1 above. As noted in the rejection, Jimenez teaches different layouts that include stairways that can, e.g., separate different parts of a living unit into different levels (see, e.g., Figure 4 and staircase 60, noting column 4 lines 37-50 teaching that the options for layout can be at different elevations, i.e., the bedrooms could be upstairs and on a different level from the other rooms). Examiner additionally notes that any differences between Jimenez and the instant application are just a rearrangement of parts, i.e., a matter of aesthetic design choice not warranted patentable weight, see MPEP § 2144.04(VI)(C).
Applicant argues that Jimenez fails to anticipate Claim 6 because Jimenez fails to teach a “living wall adjacent to the mind-body space” (see Remarks page 5). As noted in the rejection, the pocket library or hobby room is separated from the living room wall by at least a foyer or covered stoop or additional wall (see Figures 2, 11, and 13 and column 5 lines 40-52 teaching the different combinations of spaces and how they can be separated from other rooms). Examiner additionally notes that any differences between Jimenez and the instant application are just a rearrangement of parts, i.e., a matter of aesthetic design choice not warranted patentable weight, see MPEP § 2144.04(VI)(C).
Applicant argues that Jimenez fails to anticipate Claim 10 because Jimenez fails to teach “a creative space adjacent to the mind-body space” (see Remarks page 5). This argument dovetails with the § 112(b) issues above because both “spaces” are subjective terms. A bedroom or any other room of any living unit could be a “creative space,” a “mind-body space,” or both, at the personal and subjective taste of the individual. Additionally, any differences between Jimenez and the instant application are just a rearrangement of parts, i.e., a matter of aesthetic design choice not warranted patentable weight, see MPEP § 2144.04(VI)(C).
Applicant argues that Jimenez fails to anticipate Claims 11-13 because Jimenez fails to teach “a mind-body space and creative space along a sidewall and a living space and a bedroom located on an opposite sidewall” (Claim 11), the two spaces “arranged back-to-back in the center of the residence and the bedroom located at a perimeter of a residence” (Claim 12), and an air gap with a transparent door that allows activity within the creative space to be visible from the living space (Claim 13) (see Remarks pages 5-6). First, Examiner notes that any differences between Jimenez and the instant application are just a rearrangement of parts, i.e., a matter of aesthetic design choice not warranted patentable weight, see MPEP § 2144.04(VI)(C). Specifically, rearranging different creative spaces mind-body spaces in different arrangements can be done by any architect and Jimenez particularly notes that all of the different options provided in that reference can be arranged, mixed, rotated, etc. in “distinctly different orientations” and “many combinations may be achieved” (see column 26 lines 26-42). Further, as noted in the rejection of Claim 11 above, Figures 11 and 13 teach a pocket library or multi-function space that is separate from a bedroom by opposite walls (see also, e.g., Figure 7, noting that the pocket library is feature 31 of Figure 7 relative to the master bedroom as explained in column 5 lines 40-45). Regarding Claim 13, as noted in the rejection above, the pocket library is separated from the foyer and “great room” by a dotted line that would indicate some kind of door or “air gap” (see Figure 2).
Applicant argues that Jimenez fails to anticipate Claim 14 because Jimenez fails to teach an “entryway external to the residence and having a door that opens into the residence, the residence further comprising an external storage space that is formed within a perimeter of the residence and has a door opening external to the residence within the entryway, wherein the external storage space is an elongated space configured to receive at least one outdoor sporting equipment” (see Remarks page 6). Examiner is not persuaded that the garage disclosed by Jimenez fails to read on this claim. The garage of Jimenez has an entryway external to the residence (the garage door), a door that opens into the residence (it opens into the laundry room), that it is external to the residence, and that it includes storage space that can receive outdoor sporting equipment (this is inherent to garages) (see Figure 2). Applicant seems to be reading into the claim a connection between the door to the garage and the door to the residence area that Examiner is not seeing as a necessary reading of the claims. Thus, Jimenez teaches the limitations of Claim 14 under a broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims.
Applicant argues that Jimenez fails to anticipate Claim 19 because Jimenez fails to teach “plural residences; each residence includes multiple levels, wherein a living space, a creative space and a mind-body space are located on one level and at least one bedroom is located on another level vertically separating the mind-body space and the creative space from the at least one bedroom, wherein the mind-body space and the creative space are laterally displaced relative to the at least one bedroom” (see Remarks pages 6-7). Examiner is not persuaded by these arguments. First, Figure 2 is not the only layout disclosed by Jimenez. As noted in the rejection, Jimenez teaches that the options for layout can be at different elevations (see column 4 lines 37-50; see also Figure 4 teaching staircase 60 and Figure 16 teaching a loft suite with a “sitting nook”). Applicant’s argument that aesthetic design choices is more of an obviousness argument is well-taken, but the point remains that any differences between Jimenez and the instant application (if applicable) are not patentable. Furthermore, Jimenez does teach such rearrangements of the different layouts taught within the disclosure when Jimenez states that all of the different options provided in that reference can be arranged, mixed, rotated, etc. in “distinctly different orientations” and “many combinations may be achieved” (see column 26 lines 26-42). Thus, changing what wall something is on or any lateral displacement from one room to another is within the teachings of Jimenez. Thus, the § 102 rejections utilizing Jimenez are maintained.
Applicant next argues that Claim 20 is not anticipated by Romero (see Remarks page 8). Specifically, Applicant argues that Romero fails to teach that each residence has multiple levels (see Remarks page 8). This is not persuasive because Romero teaches that the residence can be connected to the mind-body space via a staircase (see, e.g., Romero ¶ 24). In this reading of the claims, the “common area” of Romero is accessible to and part of the building with the bedroom, etc., so it is part of the user’s “residence.” Regarding “reducing the likelihood of acoustic transmission from the mind-body space to the bedroom,” Examiner notes that this is merely an intended result of the arrangement is not warranted patentable weight (see MPEP § 2111.04(I)), though Romero is replete with references to sound buffers throughout its building (see, e.g., Romero ¶ 23). Thus, this argument has been considered but is not considered persuasive.
Applicant next argues that Claim 7 is not rendered obvious over Jimenez and Santarone (see Remarks page 9). Specifically, Applicant argues that Jimenez fails to teach Claim 1 (which is addressed above) and that Santarone “is merely a software programmed to include design considerations” and that it “does not speak to insulation of a mind-body space” (see Remarks page 9). This is not persuasive because Applicant is attacking the references separately rather than as a combination of teachings. See MPEP § 2145(IV). Because Jimenez teaches the separation of the mind-body space from other spaces and Santarone teaches the specifics of insulation, the combination provides the teachings.
Applicant next argues that Claims 8 and 15-16 are not rendered obvious over Jimenez and Romero (see Remarks page 9). Specifically, with regard to Claim 16, Applicant argues that Romero “teaches away” from “connection of residences with a common area” because Romero “provid[es] hallways to keep the common area from physically connecting the residential spaces” (see Remarks page 9). This argument is not persuasive because a hallway is still a “connection” between residences and the common area/shared space. Thus, this is a teaching that is on point rather than “teaching away” from the claims.
Applicant next argues that Claim 9 is not rendered obvious over Jimenez and Ross (see Remarks pages 9-10). Specifically, Applicant argues that Ross could only be combined with Jimenez via “improper use of hindsight” as well as that Ross is “not from the same field of invention as it relates to HVAC” (see Remarks page 10). First, regarding impermissible hindsight, Examiner asserts that only the teachings in each of the references were utilized in constructing the combination of Jimenez and Ross. See MPEP § 2145(X)(A). Second, regarding Ross being from the same field of invention as the instant application, Examiner asserts that Ross qualifies as proper, analogous prior art. The test for analogous art is found in MPEP § 2141.01(a), which states that the reference must be “from the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention (even if it addresses a different problem); or (2) the reference is reasonably pertinent to the problem faced by the inventor (even if it is not in the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention). Applying this test, Examiner asserts that Ross is reasonably pertinent to the problem faced by the inventor, even if it is not in the same field of endeavor (which Examiner does not concede), because, as claimed in the instant application’s claim 9, Applicant is attempting to claim the design of a living space with different zones with, e.g., independently adjustable temperature. Ross is also attempting to address this same problem of designing living spaces to have different spaces or zones each with adjustable temperatures. Additionally, Examiner argues that even though Ross is “limited to” HVAC, the design of HVAC systems is one part of home design, and thus is the same field of endeavor as any other endeavor seeking to design living spaces. Thus, this argument is not persuasive.
Applicant next argues that Claim 17 is not rendered obvious over Jimenez and Baker (see Remarks page 10). This argument is limited to Applicant’s argument that Jimenez fails to teach Claim 1, which is addressed above.
Applicant’s final argument is that Claim 18 is not rendered obvious over Jimenez and Briggs (see Remarks page 10). Specifically, Applicant argues that Briggs fails to teach that the rooftop garden is “divided into a front portion and a rear portion by a central stairwell” (see Remarks page 10). This is not persuasive because Briggs does teach that there can be stairways that access, in structured columns, the roof, as well as other breaks in the roof such as ventilation towers (see Briggs ¶ 46). Furthermore, any structural differences regarding the relative location of the roof-top gardens to stairwells or each other is merely a design choice or rearrangement of parts and per se obvious, see MPEP § 2144.04(V)(C).
Thus, Applicant’s arguments have been fully considered but are not considered persuasive and the various prior art rejections have been maintained.
Conclusion
Applicant’s amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the date of this final action.