DETAILED ACTION
Claims 1, 3-4, 6-7, 9-11, and 14-25 have been examined.
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Objections
Claims 1, 3, 4, 6-7, 9-11, and 14-15 are objected to because of the following informalities:
The amendments are so low in resolution and contrast as to be barely legible.
Appropriate correction is required.
Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 101
35 U.S.C. § 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
The invention, as taught in Claims 1-20, is directed to “mental steps” and “mathematical steps” without significantly more.
The claims recite:
• partitioning the transformer input into two first-stage divisions
• combining the processed first-stage divisions into a first output
Claim 1
Step 1 inquiry: Does this claim fall within a statutory category?
The preamble of the claim recites “1. A computerized method comprising…” Therefore, it is a “method” (or “process”), which is a statutory category of invention. Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: “YES.”
Step 2A (Prong One) inquiry:
Are there limitations in Claim 1 that recite abstract ideas?
YES. The following limitations in Claim 1 recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the 2019 PEG. Specifically, they are “mental steps” and “mathematical steps”:
• partitioning the transformer input into two first-stage divisions
• combining the processed first-stage divisions into a first output
Step 2A (Prong Two) inquiry:
Are there additional elements or a combination of elements in the claim that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A “processing” of “the plurality of first-stage portions by a plurality of first transformer models in parallel to obtain a plurality of processed first stage portions with each first-stage portion being processed by a respective one of the plurality of first transformer models to obtain a respective one of the plurality of processed first stage portions”
(2) A “receiving” of “a transformer input”
A “processing” of “the plurality of first-stage portions by a plurality of first transformer models in parallel to obtain a plurality of processed first stage portions with each first-stage portion being processed by a respective one of the plurality of first transformer models to obtain a respective one of the plurality of processed first stage portions” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites:
2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”).
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
The claimed processing is well-understood, routine, and conventional. Applicant's Specification, paragraph [0083] recites:
[0083] The processing structure 522 may also comprise one or more real-time processors, programmable logic controllers (PLCs), microcontroller units (MCUs), p-controllers (UCs), specialized/customized processors, hardware accelerators, and/or controlling circuits (also denoted "controllers") using, for example, field-programmable gate array (FPGA) or application- specific integrated circuit (ASIC) technologies, and/or the like. In some embodiments, the processing structure includes a CPU (otherwise referred to as a host processor) and a specialized hardware accelerator which includes circuitry configured to perform computations of neural networks such as tensor multiplication, matrix multiplication, and the like. The host processor may offload some computations to the hardware accelerator to perform computation operations of neural network. Examples of a hardware accelerator include a graphics processing unit (GPU), Neural Processing Unit (NPU), and Tensor Process Unit (TPU). In some embodiments, the host processors and the hardware accelerators (such as the GPUs, NPUs, and/or TPUs) may be generally considered processors.
This “processing” of “the plurality of first-stage portions by a plurality of first transformer models in parallel to obtain a plurality of processed first stage portions with each first-stage portion being processed by a respective one of the plurality of first transformer models to obtain a respective one of the plurality of processed first stage portions” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
A “receiving” of “a transformer input” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part:
2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art.").
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception.
This “receiving” of “a transformer input” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
The answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements integrate the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Step 2B inquiry:
Does the claim provide an inventive concept, i.e., does the claim recite additional element(s) or a combination of elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in the claim?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A “processing” of “the plurality of first-stage portions by a plurality of first transformer models in parallel to obtain a plurality of processed first stage portions with each first-stage portion being processed by a respective one of the plurality of first transformer models to obtain a respective one of the plurality of processed first stage portions”
(2) A “receiving” of “a transformer input”
A “processing” of “the plurality of first-stage portions by a plurality of first transformer models in parallel to obtain a plurality of processed first stage portions with each first-stage portion being processed by a respective one of the plurality of first transformer models to obtain a respective one of the plurality of processed first stage portions” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites:
2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”).
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
The claimed processing is well-understood, routine, and conventional. Applicant's Specification, paragraph [0083] recites:
[0083] The processing structure 522 may also comprise one or more real-time processors, programmable logic controllers (PLCs), microcontroller units (MCUs), p-controllers (UCs), specialized/customized processors, hardware accelerators, and/or controlling circuits (also denoted "controllers") using, for example, field-programmable gate array (FPGA) or application- specific integrated circuit (ASIC) technologies, and/or the like. In some embodiments, the processing structure includes a CPU (otherwise referred to as a host processor) and a specialized hardware accelerator which includes circuitry configured to perform computations of neural networks such as tensor multiplication, matrix multiplication, and the like. The host processor may offload some computations to the hardware accelerator to perform computation operations of neural network. Examples of a hardware accelerator include a graphics processing unit (GPU), Neural Processing Unit (NPU), and Tensor Process Unit (TPU). In some embodiments, the host processors and the hardware accelerators (such as the GPUs, NPUs, and/or TPUs) may be generally considered processors.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
A “receiving” of “a transformer input” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part:
2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art.").
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements provide an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed abstract ideas the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Claim 1 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 3
Claim 3 recites:
3. The method of claim 1, further comprising the steps of:
broadcasting the first-stage portions; and
broadcasting the processed first-stage portions.
Applicant’s Claim 3 merely teaches generic networked communication used in a generic way. Any computing structure must have communication structures between components. Making something available for receipt (i.e., “broadcasting”) doesn’t mean it is received by anything. There need not be any result of the limitations at all. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part:
2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art.").
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception.
It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 3 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 4
Claim 4 recites:
4. The method of claim 1, further comprising the steps of:
partitioning the first output into a plurality of second-stage portions of the first output;
processing the plurality of second-stage portions by a plurality of second transformer models in parallel to obtain a plurality of processed second-stage portion being processed by a respective one of the plurality of second transformer models to obtain a respective one of the plurality processed second-stage portions; and
combining the processed second-stage portions into a second output.
Applicant’s Claim 4 merely teaches partitioning, parallel processing, and combining calculations. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 4 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 6
Claim 6 recites:
6. The method of claim 4, further comprising the steps of:
broadcasting the second-stage portions; and
broadcasting the processed second-stage portions.
Applicant’s Claim 6 merely teaches generic networked communication used in a generic way. Any computing structure must have communication structures between components. Making something available for receipt (i.e., “broadcasting”) doesn’t mean it is received by anything. There need not be any result of the limitations at all. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part:
2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art.").
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception.
It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 6 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 7
Claim 7 recites:
7. The method of claim 4, further comprising:
partitioning the second output into a plurality of third-stage portions of the second output;
processing the plurality of third stage portions by a plurality of third transformer models in parallel to obtain a plurality of processed third stage portions with each third-stage portion being processed by a respective one of the plurality of third transformer models to obtain a respective one of the plurality of processed third-stage portions; and
combining the processed third-stage portions into a third output.
Applicant’s Claim 7 merely teaches partitioning, parallel processing, and combining calculations. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 7 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 9
Claim 9 recites:
9. The method of claim 7, further comprising the steps of:
broadcasting the third-stage portions; and
broadcasting the processed third-stage portions.
Applicant’s Claim 9 merely teaches merely teaches generic networked communication used in a generic way. Any computing structure must have communication structures between components. Making something available for receipt (i.e., “broadcasting”) doesn’t mean it is received by anything. There need not be any result of the limitations at all. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part:
2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art.").
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception.
It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 9 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 10
Claim 10 recites:
10. The method of claim 1, wherein said partitioning, processing and combining are coordinated by a server.
Applicant’s Claim 10 merely teaches the use of a server (i.e., a generic computer). It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 10 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 11
Step 1 inquiry: Does this claim fall within a statutory category?
The preamble of the claim recites “11. A module comprising…” Therefore, it is a “module”, which is not a statutory category of invention. Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: “NO.”
Step 2A (Prong One) inquiry:
Are there limitations in Claim 11 that recite abstract ideas?
YES. The following limitations in Claim 11 recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the 2019 PEG. Specifically, they are “mental steps” and “mathematical steps”:
• partitioning a transformer input into a plurality of portions at corresponding positions of the transformer input
• a plurality of transformer processing units
• combining the received plurality of processed portions into a first output
Step 2A (Prong Two) inquiry:
Are there additional elements or a combination of elements in the claim that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A “computing device”/ “processing the received portion by a transformer model to obtain a processed portion”
(2) A “transmitting of each of the plurality of portions”/ “receiving of processed divisions”/ “receiving” of a “respective portion of the plurality of portions from the computing device”/ “sending the processed portion to the computing device”
A “computing device”/ “processing the received portion by a transformer model to obtain a processed portion” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites:
2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”).
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
This “computing device”/ “processing the received portion by a transformer model to obtain a processed portion” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
A “transmitting of each of the plurality of portions”/ “receiving of processed divisions”/ “receiving” of a “respective portion of the plurality of portions from the computing device”/ “sending the processed portion to the computing device” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part:
2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art.").
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception.
This “transmitting of each of the plurality of portions”/ “receiving of processed divisions”/ “receiving” of a “respective portion of the plurality of portions from the computing device”/ “sending the processed portion to the computing device” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
The answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements integrate the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Step 2B inquiry:
Does the claim provide an inventive concept, i.e., does the claim recite additional element(s) or a combination of elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in the claim?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A “computing device”/ “processing the received portion by a transformer model to obtain a processed portion”
(2) A “transmitting of each of the plurality of portions”/ “receiving of processed divisions”/ “receiving” of a “respective portion of the plurality of portions from the computing device”/ “sending the processed portion to the computing device”
A “computing device”/ “processing the received portion by a transformer model to obtain a processed portion” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites:
2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”).
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
A “transmitting of each of the plurality of portions”/ “receiving of processed divisions”/ “receiving” of a “respective portion of the plurality of portions from the computing device”/ “sending the processed portion to the computing device” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part:
2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art.").
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements provide an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed abstract ideas the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Claim 11 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 14
Claim 14 recites:
14. The module of claim 11, wherein the computing device is for broadcasting each of the plurality of portions to the plurality of transformer processing units.
Applicant’s Claim 14 merely teaches the use of a “computing device” (i.e., a generic computer). It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 14 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 15
Claim 15 recites:
15. The module of claim 11, wherein each of the transformer processing units is for broadcasting the respective processed portion.
Applicant’s Claim 15 merely teaches mathematical “transformer units”. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 15 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 16
Claim 16 recites:
16. The module of claim 11, wherein the computing device is a server.
Applicant’s Claim 16 merely teaches the use of a server (i.e., a generic computer). It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 16 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 17
Claim 17 recites:
17. The module of claim 11, wherein each of transformer processing units is an edge device.
Applicant’s Claim 17 merely teaches the use of an edge device “processing unit” (i.e., a generic computing unit). It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 17 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 18
Claim 18 recites:
18. The module of claim 11, wherein the computing device is for activating the transformer processing devices.
Applicant’s Claim 18 merely teaches the use of a “computing device” (i.e., a generic computer). It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 18 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 19
Claim 19 recites:
19. The module of claim 11, wherein the computing device is for deactivating the transformer processing devices.
Applicant’s Claim 19 merely teaches the use of a “computing device” (i.e., a generic computer). It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 19 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 20
Claim 20 recites:
20. The module of claim 11, wherein the module is for one or more of a smart phone application, a home automation device, an imaging application and a surveillance system.
Applicant’s Claim 20 merely teaches the use of various generic computing platforms. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites:
2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”).
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 20 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 21
Step 1 inquiry: Does this claim fall within a statutory category?
The preamble of the claim recites “21. (New) One or more non-transitory, computer-readable storage media comprising computer-executable instructions, wherein the computer-executable instructions, when executed, cause one or more processors to perform actions comprising:…” Therefore, it is a “non-transitory, computer-readable storage media” (or “a product of manufacture”), which is a statutory category of invention. Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: “YES.”
Step 2A (Prong One) inquiry:
Are there limitations in Claim 21 that recite abstract ideas?
YES. The following limitations in Claim 21 recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the 2019 PEG. Specifically, they are “mental steps” and “mathematical steps”:
• partitioning the transformer input into a plurality of first-stage portions at corresponding positions of the transformer input
• combining the plurality of processed first-stage portions into a first output
Step 2A (Prong Two) inquiry:
Are there additional elements or a combination of elements in the claim that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A “processing” of “the plurality of first-stage portions by a plurality of first transformer models in parallel to obtain a plurality of processed first-stage portions with each first-stage portion being processed by a respective one of the plurality of first transformer models to obtain a respective one of the plurality of processed first-stage portions”
(2) A “receiving a transformer input”
A “processing” of “the plurality of first-stage portions by a plurality of first transformer models in parallel to obtain a plurality of processed first-stage portions with each first-stage portion being processed by a respective one of the plurality of first transformer models to obtain a respective one of the plurality of processed first-stage portions” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2106.04(d)(I) recites:
The courts have also identified limitations that did not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application:
• Merely reciting the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or merely including instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely using a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea, as discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(f);
• Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception, as discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(g); and
• Generally linking the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use, as discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(h).
This “processing” of “the plurality of first-stage portions by a plurality of first transformer models in parallel to obtain a plurality of processed first-stage portions with each first-stage portion being processed by a respective one of the plurality of first transformer models to obtain a respective one of the plurality of processed first-stage portions” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
A “receiving a transformer input” is a broad term which is described at a high level. A more precise definition of the term “transformer” comes from Applicant’s Specification, where it recites:
[0075] As those skilled in the art will appreciate, the transformer process disclosed herein may be implemented as one or more software and/or firmware programs having necessary computer-executable code or instructions and stored in one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage devices or media which may be any volatile and/or non-volatile, non-removable or removable storage devices such as RAM, ROM, EEPROM, solid-state memory devices, hard disks, CDs, DVDs, flash memory devices, and/or the like. The module may read the computer-executable code from the storage devices and execute the computer-executable code to perform the transformer processes.
M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (f)(2) recites in part:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
TLI Communications provides an example of a claim invoking computers and other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. The court stated that the claims describe steps of recording, administration and archiving of digital images, and found them to be directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner. 823 F.3d at 612, 118 USPQ2d at 1747. The court then turned to the additional elements of performing these functions using a telephone unit and a server and noted that these elements were being used in their ordinary capacity (i.e., the telephone unit is used to make calls and operate as a digital camera including compressing images and transmitting those images, and the server simply receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores the digital images based on the extracted information). 823 F.3d at 612-13, 118 USPQ2d at 1747-48. In other words, the claims invoked the telephone unit and server merely as tools to execute the abstract idea. Thus, the court found that the additional elements did not add significantly more to the abstract idea because they were simply applying the abstract idea on a telephone network without any recitation of details of how to carry out the abstract idea.
This “receiving a transformer input” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
The answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements integrate the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Step 2B inquiry:
Does the claim provide an inventive concept, i.e., does the claim recite additional element(s) or a combination of elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in the claim?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A “processing” of “the plurality of first-stage portions by a plurality of first transformer models in parallel to obtain a plurality of processed first-stage portions with each first-stage portion being processed by a respective one of the plurality of first transformer models to obtain a respective one of the plurality of processed first-stage portions”
(2) A “receiving a transformer input”
A “processing” of “the plurality of first-stage portions by a plurality of first transformer models in parallel to obtain a plurality of processed first-stage portions with each first-stage portion being processed by a respective one of the plurality of first transformer models to obtain a respective one of the plurality of processed first-stage portions” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (I)(A)(i-ii) recites:
Limitations that the courts have found not to be enough to qualify as “significantly more” when recited in a claim with a judicial exception include:
i. Adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, e.g., a limitation indicating that a particular function such as creating and maintaining electronic records is performed by a computer, as discussed in Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 225-26, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (see MPEP § 2106.05(f));
ii. Simply appending well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception, e.g., a claim to an abstract idea requiring no more than a generic computer to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional activities previously known to the industry, as discussed in Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 225, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (see MPEP § 2106.05(d));
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites:
2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”).
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process.
Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
A “receiving a transformer input” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part:
2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art.").
The claimed “receiving a transformer input” is well-understood, routine, and conventional. Applicant's Specification recites:
[0075] As those skilled in the art will appreciate, the transformer process disclosed herein may be implemented as one or more software and/or firmware programs having necessary computer-executable code or instructions and stored in one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage devices or media which may be any volatile and/or non-volatile, non-removable or removable storage devices such as RAM, ROM, EEPROM, solid-state memory devices, hard disks, CDs, DVDs, flash memory devices, and/or the like. The module may read the computer- executable code from the storage devices and execute the computer-executable code to perform the transformer processes.
[0036] FIG. 1 illustrates the workflow of a transformer model 100 using a naive partition method. Referring to FIG. 1, the transformer model 100 receives an input 102 which may be considered raw data for processing by a first layer of multiple layers of the transformer model100.
Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements provide an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed abstract ideas the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Claim 21 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 22
Claim 22 recites:
22. (New) The one or more non-transitory, computer-readable storage media of claim 21, further comprising:
broadcasting the first-stage portions; and
broadcasting the processed first-stage portions.
Applicant’s Claim 22 merely teaches the well-understood and routine process of broadcasting. It is the clamed computing device that performs the broadcasting.
[0017] In an embodiment, the computing device is for broadcasting each of the divisions to the transformer processing units.
[0018] In an embodiment, each of the transformer processing units is for broadcasting the processed division.
M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (f)(2) recites in part:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
TLI Communications provides an example of a claim invoking computers and other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. The court stated that the claims describe steps of recording, administration and archiving of digital images, and found them to be directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner. 823 F.3d at 612, 118 USPQ2d at 1747. The court then turned to the additional elements of performing these functions using a telephone unit and a server and noted that these elements were being used in their ordinary capacity (i.e., the telephone unit is used to make calls and operate as a digital camera including compressing images and transmitting those images, and the server simply receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores the digital images based on the extracted information). 823 F.3d at 612-13, 118 USPQ2d at 1747-48. In other words, the claims invoked the telephone unit and server merely as tools to execute the abstract idea. Thus, the court found that the additional elements did not add significantly more to the abstract idea because they were simply applying the abstract idea on a telephone network without any recitation of details of how to carry out the abstract idea.
It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 22 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 23
Claim 23 recites:
23. (New) The one or more non-transitory, computer-readable storage media of claim 21, further comprising:
partitioning the first output into a plurality of second-stage portions of the first output;
processing the plurality of second-stage portions by a plurality of second transformer models in parallel to obtain a plurality of processed second-stage portions with each second-stage portion being processed by a respective one of the plurality of second transformer models to obtain a respective one of the plurality of processed second-stage portions; and
combining the processed second-stage portions into a second output.
Applicant’s Claim 23 merely teaches processing data in parallel and the mental steps of partitioning and combining.
M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (I)(A)(i-ii) recites:
Limitations that the courts have found not to be enough to qualify as “significantly more” when recited in a claim with a judicial exception include:
i. Adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, e.g., a limitation indicating that a particular function such as creating and maintaining electronic records is performed by a computer, as discussed in Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 225-26, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (see MPEP § 2106.05(f));
ii. Simply appending well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception, e.g., a claim to an abstract idea requiring no more than a generic computer to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional activities previously known to the industry, as discussed in Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 225, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (see MPEP § 2106.05(d));
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites:
2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”).
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process.
Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 23 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 24
Claim 24 recites:
24. (New) The one or more non-transitory, computer-readable storage media of claim 23, further comprising:
broadcasting the second-stage portions; and
broadcasting the processed second-stage portions.
Applicant’s Claim 24 merely teaches the well-understood, routine, and conventional process of broadcasting. It is the clamed computing device that performs the broadcasting.
[0017] In an embodiment, the computing device is for broadcasting each of the divisions to the transformer processing units.
[0018] In an embodiment, each of the transformer processing units is for broadcasting the processed division.
M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (f)(2) recites in part:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
TLI Communications provides an example of a claim invoking computers and other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. The court stated that the claims describe steps of recording, administration and archiving of digital images, and found them to be directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner. 823 F.3d at 612, 118 USPQ2d at 1747. The court then turned to the additional elements of performing these functions using a telephone unit and a server and noted that these elements were being used in their ordinary capacity (i.e., the telephone unit is used to make calls and operate as a digital camera including compressing images and transmitting those images, and the server simply receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores the digital images based on the extracted information). 823 F.3d at 612-13, 118 USPQ2d at 1747-48. In other words, the claims invoked the telephone unit and server merely as tools to execute the abstract idea. Thus, the court found that the additional elements did not add significantly more to the abstract idea because they were simply applying the abstract idea on a telephone network without any recitation of details of how to carry out the abstract idea.
It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 24 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 25
Claim 25 recites:
25. (New) The one or more non-transitory, computer-readable storage media of of (sic.) claim 21, wherein said partitioning, processing, and combining are coordinated by a server.
Applicant’s Claim 25 merely teaches processing data in parallel and the mental steps of partitioning and combining.
M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (I)(A)(i-ii) recites:
Limitations that the courts have found not to be enough to qualify as “significantly more” when recited in a claim with a judicial exception include:
i. Adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, e.g., a limitation indicating that a particular function such as creating and maintaining electronic records is performed by a computer, as discussed in Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 225-26, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (see MPEP § 2106.05(f));
ii. Simply appending well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception, e.g., a claim to an abstract idea requiring no more than a generic computer to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional activities previously known to the industry, as discussed in Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 225, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (see MPEP § 2106.05(d));
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites:
2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”).
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process.
Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 25 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 102
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. § 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1, 3, 10-11, 14-16, and 18-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Aminabadi, et al., DeepSpeed Inference: Enabling Efficient Inference of Transformer Models at Unprecedented Scale, arXiv:2207.00032v1 [cs.LG] 30 Jun 2022, 30 JUN 2022, pp. 1-13, in its entirety. Specifically:
Claim 1
Claim 1’s “receiving a transformer input;” is anticipated by Aminabadi, et al., page 5, Figure 1(c), where it shows the input “x.”
Claim 1’s “partitioning the transformer input into a plurality of first-stage portions at corresponding positions of the transformer input;” is anticipated by Aminabadi, et al., page 5, Figure 1(c), where it shows “Query” and “Key” divisions.
Claim 1’s “processing the plurality of first stage portions by a plurality of first transformer models in parallel to obtain a plurality of processed first stage portions with each first-stage portion being processed by a respective one of the plurality of first transformer models to obtain a respective one of the plurality of processed first-stage portions; and” is anticipated by Aminabadi, et al., page 5, Figure 1(c), where it shows “Q-trans” and “K-trans” results.
Claim 1’s “combining the plurality of processed first-stage portions into a first output” is anticipated by Aminabadi, et al., page 5, Figure 1(c), where it shows the output of the “Attn Score.”
Claim 3
Claim 3’s “broadcasting the first-stage portions” is anticipated by Aminabadi, et al., page 5, Fig. 1(a), where it recites “Input Broadcast to all blocks.”
Claim 3’s “broadcasting the processed first-stage portions” is anticipated by Aminabadi, et al., page 5, Fig. 1(a), where it recites “Input Broadcast to all blocks.” Note that Applicant does not define what kind of processing is performed. Any kind of manipulation is a “processing”…even storing as a “batch” as in the prior art or “broadcasting”. Processing need not change the data at all (e.g., “unity gain feedback” in a control system.)
Claim 10
Claim 10’s “The method of claim 1, wherein said partitioning, processing and combining are coordinated by a server.” is anticipated by Aminabadi, et al., page 9, right column, third full paragraph, where it recites:
4) Testbeds: We conduct our experiments on: a cluster of up to 256 NVIDIA Ampere A100 40GB GPUs (32 8xA100 DGX boxes [38]), a lambda A6000 workstation [39] (2xA6000-48GB-GPU, 256GB DRAM, and 2TB NVME) and a DGX2 V100 server [40] (16xV100-32GB-SXM-GPU, 1500GB DRAM, and 30TB NVME).
Claim 11
Claim 11’s “a computing device for:” is anticipated by Aminabadi, et al., page 5, Figure 1(c).
Claim 11’s “partitioning a transformer input into a plurality of portions at corresponding positions of the transformer input” is anticipated by Aminabadi, et al., page 5, Figure 1(c), where it shows “Query,” “Key,” and “Value” divisions.
Claim 11’s “transmitting each of the plurality of portions” is anticipated by Aminabadi, et al., page 5, Figure 1(c), where it shows “Query,” “Key,” and “Value” divisions.
Claim 11’s “receiving a plurality of processed portions, and combining the received plurality of processed portions into a first output” is anticipated by Aminabadi, et al., page 5, Figure 1(c), where it shows the outputs of the “Query,” “Key,” and “Value” divisions.
Claim 11’s “receiving a respective portion of the plurality of portions from the computing device” is anticipated by Aminabadi, et al., page 5, Figure 1(c), where it shows the input of the “Attn Score.”
Claim 11’s “processing the received portion by a transformer model to obtain a processed portion” is anticipated by Aminabadi, et al., page 5, Figure 1(c), where it shows the output of the “Attn Score.”
Claim 11’s “sending the processed portion to the computing device” is anticipated by Aminabadi, et al., page 5, Figure 1(c), where it shows the output of the “Attn Context.”
Claim 14
Claim 14’s “The module of claim 11, wherein the computing device is for broadcasting each of the plurality of portions to the plurality of transformer processing units.” is anticipated by Aminabadi, et al., page 9, right column, third full paragraph, where it recites:
4) Testbeds: We conduct our experiments on: a cluster of up to 256 NVIDIA Ampere A100 40GB GPUs (32 8xA100 DGX boxes [38]), a lambda A6000 workstation [39] (2xA6000-48GB-GPU, 256GB DRAM, and 2TB NVME) and a DGX2 V100 server [40] (16xV100-32GB-SXM-GPU, 1500GB DRAM, and 30TB NVME).
Claim 15
Claim 15’s “The module of claim 11, wherein each of the transformer processing units is for broadcasting the respective processed portion” is anticipated by Aminabadi, et al., page 5, Fig. 1(a), where it recites “Input Broadcast to all blocks.”
Claim 16
Claim 16’s “The module of claim 11, wherein the computing device is a server” is anticipated by Aminabadi, et al., page 9, right column, third full paragraph, where it recites:
4) Testbeds: We conduct our experiments on: a cluster of up to 256 NVIDIA Ampere A100 40GB GPUs (32 8xA100 DGX boxes [38]), a lambda A6000 workstation [39] (2xA6000-48GB-GPU, 256GB DRAM, and 2TB NVME) and a DGX2 V100 server [40] (16xV100-32GB-SXM-GPU, 1500GB DRAM, and 30TB NVME).
Claim 18
Claim 18’s “The module of claim 11, wherein the computing device is for activating the transformer processing devices.” is anticipated by Aminabadi, et al., page 9, right column, third full paragraph, where it recites:
4) Testbeds: We conduct our experiments on: a cluster of up to 256 NVIDIA Ampere A100 40GB GPUs (32 8xA100 DGX boxes [38]), a lambda A6000 workstation [39] (2xA6000-48GB-GPU, 256GB DRAM, and 2TB NVME) and a DGX2 V100 server [40] (16xV100-32GB-SXM-GPU, 1500GB DRAM, and 30TB NVME).
Claim 19
Claim 19’s “The module of claim 11, wherein the computing device is for deactivating the transformer processing devices” is anticipated by Aminabadi, et al., page 9, right column, third full paragraph, where it recites:
4) Testbeds: We conduct our experiments on: a cluster of up to 256 NVIDIA Ampere A100 40GB GPUs (32 8xA100 DGX boxes [38]), a lambda A6000 workstation [39] (2xA6000-48GB-GPU, 256GB DRAM, and 2TB NVME) and a DGX2 V100 server [40] (16xV100-32GB-SXM-GPU, 1500GB DRAM, and 30TB NVME).
Claim 20
Claim 20’s “The module of claim 11, wherein the module is for one or more of a smart phone application, a home automation device, an imaging application and a surveillance system” is anticipated by Aminabadi, et al., page 11, left column, first full paragraph, where it recites:
C. Throughput Oriented Massive Model Inference
Massive models are capable of processing large input prompts and generating large number of coherent tokens. In some applications (e.g., offline query rewriting in web-scale search and recommendation systems), this token generation process can be less latency focused and more throughput oriented.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed 29 DEC 2025 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Specifically, Applicant argues:
Argument 1
Step 2A (Prong One) inquiry: Are there limitations in Claim 1 that recite abstract ideas?
Claim 1 is directed to a computerized method for artificial intelligence (AI) using transformer models. Therefore, the limitations in claim 1 are generally tied to AI technologies using transformer models. Accordingly, the limitations in claim 1 are generally performed by AI platforms (that is, computing devices with AI functionalities). Thus, there are no limitations in claim 1 that recite abstract ideas.
Examiner notes that, in this regard, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(h) recites:
2106.05(h) Field of Use and Technological Environment [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than generally linking the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use. As explained by the Supreme Court, a claim directed to a judicial exception cannot be made eligible “simply by having the applicant acquiesce to limiting the reach of the patent for the formula to a particular technological use.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 n.14, 209 USPQ 1, 10 n. 14 (1981). Thus, limitations that amount to merely indicating a field of use or technological environment in which to apply a judicial exception do not amount to significantly more than the exception itself, and cannot integrate a judicial exception into a practical application.
The courts often cite to Parker v. Flook as providing a classic example of a field of use limitation. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612, 95 USPQ2d 1001, 1010 (2010) (“Flook established that limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or adding token postsolution components did not make the concept patentable”) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 198 USPQ 193 (1978)). In Flook, the claim recited steps of calculating an updated value for an alarm limit (a numerical limit on a process variable such as temperature, pressure or flow rate) according to a mathematical formula “in a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons.” 437 U.S. at 586, 198 USPQ at 196. Processes for the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons were used in the petrochemical and oil-refining fields. Id. Although the applicant argued that limiting the use of the formula to the petrochemical and oil-refining fields should make the claim eligible because this limitation ensured that the claim did not preempt all uses of the formula, the Supreme Court disagreed. 437 U.S. at 588-90, 198 USPQ at 197-98. Instead, the additional element in Flook regarding the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons was not sufficient to make the claim eligible, because it was merely an incidental or token addition to the claim that did not alter or affect how the process steps of calculating the alarm limit value were performed. Further, the Supreme Court found that this limitation did not amount to an inventive concept. 437 U.S. at 588-90, 198 USPQ at 197-98. The Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would “exalt[] form over substance”, because a competent claim drafter could attach a similar type of limitation to almost any mathematical formula. 437 U.S. at 590, 198 USPQ at 197.
In contrast, the additional elements in Diamond v. Diehr as a whole provided eligibility and did not merely recite calculating a cure time using the Arrhenius equation “in a rubber molding process”. Instead, the claim in Diehr recited specific limitations such as monitoring the elapsed time since the mold was closed, constantly measuring the temperature in the mold cavity, repetitively calculating a cure time by inputting the measured temperature into the Arrhenius equation, and opening the press automatically when the calculated cure time and the elapsed time are equivalent. 450 U.S. at 179, 209 USPQ at 5, n. 5. These specific limitations act in concert to transform raw, uncured rubber into cured molded rubber. 450 U.S. at 177-78, 209 USPQ at 4.
Therefore, an assertion in the preamble of a “computerized method” that “generally ties” (i.e., “generally links”) the argued “AI technology” to the claims is not sufficient to create a per se rule of eligibility to such claims.
Applicant's argument is unpersuasive.
The rejections stand.
Argument 2
Step 2A (Prong Two) inquiry: Are there additional elements or a combination of elements in the claim that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception?
Claim 1 contains the following additional elements (emphasis added):
* "partitioning the transformer input into a plurality of first-stage portions at
corresponding positions of the transformer input;"
* "processing the plurality of first-stage portions by a plurality of first transformer models in parallel to obtain a plurality of processed first-stage portions with each first-stage portion being processed by a respective one of the plurality of first transformer models to obtain a respective one of the plurality of processed first- stage portions;" and
* "combining the plurality of processed first-stage portions into a first output."
Applicant respectfully submits that the additional elements recited above integrate the judicial exception (if any) into a practical application with significantly more.
As described in paragraph [0035] of the subject application, "Transformer models are used in a wide variety of applications. However, their significant computational-resource requirements often pose challenges when deployed in computationally resource-constrained devices such as edge devices."
By partitioning the transformer input into a plurality of first-stage portions at corresponding positions of the transformer input, then processing the portions by a plurality of first transformer models in parallel, and combining the processed portions into an output, the claimed invention provides an improved AI method, in which "inference computations of transformer models are distributed among multiple edge devices to accelerate the speed of inference computations." "As the self-attention mechanism of inference computations are generally the most time-consuming operation, consideration is directed towards self-attention mechanisms specifically." (paragraph [0035])
Clearly, the additional elements integrate the judicial exception (if any) into a practical application in computer technologies with significantly more. Accordingly, claim 1 purports to improve computer capabilities and to improve an existing technology (e.g., transformer models). Accordingly to M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2), "In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more."
Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: "YES."
Not everything that Applicant argues is an “additional element” is actually so. For instance, the partitioning of data step is a mental step. Further details on this matter can be seen in the rejections above.
Applicant's argument is unpersuasive.
The rejections stand.
Argument 3
For completeness, Applicant continues to provide the analysis of Step 2B.
Step 2B inquiry: Does the claim provide an inventive concept, i.e., does the claim recite additional element(s) or a combination of elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in the claim?
Claim 1 contains the following additional elements (emphasis added):
* "partitioning the transformer input into a plurality of first-stage portions at corresponding positions of the transformer input;"
* "processing the plurality of first-stage portions by a plurality of first transformer models in parallel to obtain a plurality of processed first-stage portions with each first-stage portion being processed by a respective one of the plurality of first transformer models to obtain a respective one of the plurality of processed first- stage portions;" and
* "combining the plurality of processed first-stage portions into a first output."
As the Examiner cited, M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) states: "Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words "apply it" (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do "more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words 'apply it'."
As analyzed above, the additional elements not merely amount to a recitation of the words "apply it" (or an equivalent), nor are mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. Rather, the additional elements amount to a computer technology that solves the challenges of conventional transformer models with improvement of the computer capabilities and improvement of an existing technology (e.g., transformer models).
Therefore, the additional elements do "more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words 'apply it'."
Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: "YES."
Not everything that Applicant argues is an “additional element” is actually so. For instance, the partitioning of data step is a mental step. Further details on this matter can be seen in the rejections above.
Applicant's argument is unpersuasive.
The rejections stand.
Argument 4
Claim 1
The amended claim 1 is directed to a computerized method and recites:
* receiving a transformer input;
* partitioning the transformer input into a plurality of first-stage portions at corresponding positions of the transformer input;
* processing the plurality of first-stage portions by a plurality of first transformer models in parallel to obtain a plurality of processed first-stage portions with each first-stage portion being processed by a respective one of the plurality of first transformer models to obtain a respective one of the plurality of processed first- stage portions; and
* combining the plurality of processed first-stage portions into a first output.
In other words, the partitioning of the transformer input is at a plurality of positions, and the processing of the partitioned first-stage portions is performed in parallel by a plurality of first transformer models.
In contrary, while Aminabadi, et al., page 5, Figure 1(c) (reproduced below) shows "Query,""Key," and "Value" divisions, and shows "Q-trans,""K-trans," and "V-trans" results, this figure and related description do not disclose:
* the partitioning is based on positions (but rather based on the types of "Query," "Key," and "Value"); and
* the processing of the partitioned portions is performed by a plurality of first transformer models in parallel (no transformer models involved, and each processing is merely a combination of the partitioned portion (Query, Key, Value) with a corresponding bias (Q-bias, K-bias, or V-bias).
***
Therefore, without disclosing each and every limitation of Applicant's claim 1, Aminabadi, et al. does not anticipate Applicant's claim 1. Accordingly, Applicant's claim 1 is allowable.
Firstly, "Query," "Key," and "Value" are partitioned into different channels, which requires different places.
Secondly, "Query," "Key," and "Value" are actually processed by the transformers labeled: “Q-trans,” “K-trans,” and “V-trans.”
Applicant's argument is unpersuasive.
The rejections stand.
Argument 5
Claims 3-4 and 10 are dependent from allowable claim 1 and thus are also allowable.
Since Claim 1 is not eligible, no eligible matter is incorporated by reference to dependent Claims 3-4 and 10. Claims 1, 3, 10 are also rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102.
Applicant's argument is unpersuasive.
The rejections stand.
Argument 6
Claim 11
Claim 11 recites limitations similar to those of claim 1. At least for above-described reasons, claim 11 is not anticipated by Aminabadi, et al. and is allowable.
Similar arguments for similar claims are similarly unpersuasive.
Applicant's argument is unpersuasive.
The rejections stand.
Argument 7
Claims 14-16 and 18-20 are dependent from allowable claim 11 and thus are also allowable.
Since Claim 11 is not eligible, no eligible matter is incorporated by reference to dependent Claims 14-16 and 18-20. Claims 14-16, and 18-20 are also rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102.
Applicant's argument is unpersuasive.
The rejections stand.
Argument 8
Claim 21 recites limitations similar to those of claim 1. At least for above-described reasons, claim 21 is not anticipated by Aminabadi, et al. and is allowable.
Similar arguments for similar claims are similarly unpersuasive.
Applicant's argument is unpersuasive.
The rejections stand.
Argument 9
Claims 22-25 are dependent from allowable claim 21 and thus are also allowable.
Since Claim 21 is not eligible, no eligible matter is incorporated by reference to dependent Claims 22-25.
Applicant's argument is unpersuasive.
The rejections stand.
Conclusion
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiries concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Wilbert L. Starks, Jr., who may be reached Monday through Friday, between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. EST. or via telephone at (571) 272-3691 or email: Wilbert.Starks@uspto.gov.
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/WILBERT L STARKS/
Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2122
WLS
23 MAR 2026