REISSUE PROCEDURAL REMINDERS
Disclosure of other proceedings. Applicant is reminded of the continuing obligation under 37 CFR 1.178(b), to timely apprise the Office of any prior or concurrent proceed-ing in which the Patent Under Reissue is or was involved. These proceedings would include interferences, reissues, reexaminations, and litigation.
Disclosure of material information. Applicant is further reminded of the continuing obligation under 37 CFR 1.56, to timely apprise the Office of any information which is mate-rial to patentability of the claims under consideration in this reissue appli-cation.
These disclosure obligations rest with each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of this application for reissue. See also MPEP §§ 1404, 1442.01 and 1442.04.
Manner of making amendments. Applicant is reminded that changes to the Instant Application must comply with 37 C.F.R. § 1.173, such that all amendments are made in respect to the Patent Under Reissue as opposed to any prior changes entered in the Instant Application. All added material must be underlined, and all omitted material must be enclosed in brackets, in accordance with Rule 173. Applicant may submit an appendix to any response in which claims are marked up to show changes with respect to a previous set of claims, however, such claims should be clearly denoted as “not for entry.”
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 251
Claims 27-44 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 251 as being an improper recapture of broadened claimed subject matter surrendered in the application for the patent upon which the present reissue is based. See Greenliant Systems, Inc. et al v. Xicor LLC, 692 F.3d 1261, 103 USPQ2d 1951 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Shahram Mostafazadeh and Joseph O. Smith, 643 F.3d 1353, 98 USPQ2d 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2011); North American Container, Inc. v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc., 415 F.3d 1335, 75 USPQ2d 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Pannu v. Storz Instruments Inc., 258 F.3d 1366, 59 USPQ2d 1597 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Hester Industries, Inc. v. Stein, Inc., 142 F.3d 1472, 46 USPQ2d 1641 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Clement, 131 F.3d 1464, 45 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Ball Corp. v. United States, 729 F.2d 1429, 1436, 221 USPQ 289, 295 (Fed. Cir. 1984). A broadening aspect is present in the reissue which was not present in the application for patent. The record of the application for the patent shows that the broadening aspect (in the reissue) relates to claimed subject matter that applicant previously surrendered during the prosecution of the application. Accordingly, the narrow scope of the claims in the patent was not an error within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. 251, and the broader scope of claim subject matter surrendered in the application for the patent cannot be recaptured by the filing of the present reissue application.
It is noted that the following is the three step test for determining recapture in reissue applications (see: MPEP 1412.02(I)):
“(1) first, we determine whether, and in what respect, the reissue claims are broader in scope than the original patent claims;
(2) next, we determine whether the broader aspects of the reissue claims relate to subject matter surrendered in the original prosecution; and
(3) finally, we determine whether the reissue claims were materially narrowed in other respects, so that the claims may not have been enlarged, and hence avoid the recapture rule.”
(Step 1: MPEP 1412.02(A)) In the instant case, the Applicant seeks to broaden original independent claims 27, 33 and 39 by deleting/omitting at least the patent claim language requiring, “electronic device coupled to AC mains” and “control circuitry configured to produce commands in synchronization with a frequency of the AC mains”.
(Step 2: MPEP 1412.02(B)) The record of the prior US application No. 14/573,207 prosecution history indicates that in a Response filed on February 16th, 2016, the Applicant amended the claims in such a manner as to include additional limitations which rendered claims allowable. Accordingly, the newly amended claims recited the allowable subject matter as explained in the step 1 above, hence they overcame the cited prior art (Franklin US Publication No. 2005/0169643 and Grouev US Patent No. 6,333,605).
Subject matter is previously surrendered during the prosecution of the original application by reliance by Applicant to define the original patent claims over the art by presentation of new/amended claims to define over the art, or an argument/statement by applicant that a limitation of the claim(s) defines over the art. It is noted that a patent owner (reissue applicant) is bound by the argument that applicant relied upon to overcome an art rejection in the original application for the patent to be reissued, regardless of whether the Office adopted the argument in allowing the claims. Therefore, in the instant case the claim limitation of “control circuitry configured to produce commands in synchronization with a frequency of the AC mains” are surrendered subject matter and some of the broadening of the reissue claims, as noted above, are clearly in the area of the surrendered subject matter.
(Step 3: MPEP 1412.02(C)) It is noted that the reissue claims were not materially narrowed in other respects, so that the claims may not have been enlarged, and hence avoid the recapture rule. When analyzing a reissue claim for the possibility of impermissible recapture, there are two different types of analysis that must be performed. If the reissue claim “fails” either analysis, recapture exists. First, claim scope that was canceled or amended is deemed surrendered and therefore barred from reissue. Clement, 131 F.3d at 1470, 45 USPQ2d at 1165. Second, it must be determined whether the reissue claim omits or broadens any limitation that was added or argued during the original prosecution to overcome an art rejection (i.e. surrendered subject matter). Such an omission in a reissue claim, even if it is accompanied by other limitations making the reissue claim narrower than the patent claim in other aspects, is impermissible recapture. Pannu, 258 F.3d at 1371-72, 59 USPQ2d at 1600. The surrendered subject matter, noted above, has been eliminated from new independent reissue claims 27, 33 and 39. It is noted that the added limitations do not materially narrow the patent claims to avoid recapture.
Therefore, broadened independent reissue claims 27, 33 and 39 attempt impermissible recapture of subject matter surrendered during prosecution of the 14/573,207 application. Dependent reissue claims dependent upon the independent claims mentioned above are rejected for similar rationale.
Claim Interpretation
The examiner finds several instances where the claim term explicitly includes functional language which would invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(f):
(f) Element in Claim for a Combination. – An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The following is a quotation of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
Use of the word “means” (or “step for”) in a claim with functional language creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim element is to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph). The presumption that § 112(f) (pre-AIA § 112, sixth paragraph) is invoked is rebutted when the function is recited with sufficient structure, material, or acts within the claim itself to entirely perform the recited function.
Absence of the word “means” (or “step for”) in a claim creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim element is not to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph). The presumption that § 112(f) (pre-AIA § 112, sixth paragraph) is not invoked is rebutted when the claim element recites function but fails to recite sufficiently definite structure, material or acts to perform that function.
The following claim limitations have been interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), because they use a generic placeholder coupled with functional language without reciting sufficient structure to achieve the function. Furthermore, the generic placeholder is not preceded by structural modifier:
Claims 27 and 39 are directed to a lighting controller and control circuitry which perform following functions:
“determine, from a frequency or phase of a cyclical supply voltage, a first interval and a second interval”
“translate the received command from the network communication protocol to a visible light communication (VLC) protocol”.
Since the claim limitations invoke 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, claims 27-32 and 39-44 have been interpreted to cover the corresponding structure described in the specification that achieves the claimed function, and equivalents thereof.
More specifically the functions of “determin[ing], from a frequency or phase of a cyclical supply voltage, a first interval and a second interval” and “translat[ing] the received command from the network communication protocol to a visible light communication (VLC) protocol” do not appear to have a corresponding structure or algorithm.
With respect to translation, the original disclosure mentions translating carried out by a processor, for instance in 14:58 – 15:2, however there is no clear structure or algorithm recited to carry out such a function.
For a computer-implemented means-plus-function claim limitation invoking 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, a general purpose computer is usually sufficient for the corresponding structure for performing a general computing function (e.g., “means for storing data”), but the corresponding structure for performing a specific function is required to be more than simply a general purpose computer or microprocessor. In In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litigation, 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011), the court stated:
Those cases involved specific functions that would need to be implemented by programming a general purpose computer to convert it into a special purpose computer capable of performing those specified functions. … By contrast, in the seven claims identified above, Katz has not claimed a specific function performed by a special purpose computer, but has simply recited the claimed functions of ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing.’ Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ discussed below, those functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer without special programming. As such, it was not necessary to disclose more structure than the general purpose processor that performs those functions. Those seven claims do not run afoul of the rule against purely functional claiming, because the functions of ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing’ are coextensive with the structure disclosed, i.e., a general purpose processor.).
To claim a means for performing a specific computer-implemented function and then to disclose only a general purpose computer as the structure designed to perform that function amounts to pure functional claiming. Aristocrat, 521 F.3d 1328 at 1333. In this instance, the structure corresponding to a 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph claim limitation for a computer-implemented function must include the algorithm needed to transform the general purpose computer or microprocessor disclosed in the specification. Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1333; Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008); WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The corresponding structure is not simply a general purpose computer by itself but the special purpose computer as programmed to perform the disclosed algorithm. Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1333. Thus, the specification must sufficiently disclose an algorithm to transform a general purpose microprocessor to the special purpose computer. Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1338 (“Aristocrat was not required to produce a listing of source code or a highly detailed description of the algorithm to be used to achieve the claimed functions in order to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112 P 6. It was required, however, to at least disclose the algorithm that transforms the general purpose microprocessor to a ‘special purpose computer programmed to perform the disclosed algorithm.’ WMS Gaming, 184 F.3d at 1349.”) An algorithm is defined, for example, as “a finite sequence of steps for solving a logical or mathematical problem or performing a task.” Microsoft Computer Dictionary, Microsoft Press, 5th edition, 2002. Applicant may express the algorithm in any understandable terms including as a mathematical formula, in prose, in a flow chart, or “in any other manner that provides sufficient structure.” Finisar, 523 F.3d at 1340; see also Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs., Inc., 319 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Dossel, 115 F.3d 942, 946-47 (Fed. Cir.1997); Typhoon Touch Inc. v. Dell Inc., 659 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
If applicant wishes to provide further explanation or dispute the examiner’s interpretation of the corresponding structure, applicant must identify the corresponding structure with reference to the specification by page and line number, and to the drawing, if any, by reference characters in response to this Office action.
If applicant does not intend to have the claim limitation(s) treated under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112 , sixth paragraph, applicant may amend the claim(s) so that it/they will clearly not invoke 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, or present a sufficient showing that the claim recites/recite sufficient structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function to preclude application of 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph.
For more information, see MPEP §§ 2173 and 2181 et seq. and Supplementary Examination Guidelines for Determining Compliance With 35 U.S.C. 112 and for Treatment of Related Issues in Patent Applications, 76 FR 7162, 7167 (Feb. 9, 2011).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 27-32 and 39-44 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Claims 27 and 39 recite the functions of “determin[ing], from a frequency or phase of a cyclical supply voltage, a first interval and a second interval” and “translat[ing] the received command from the network communication protocol to a visible light communication (VLC) protocol” without corresponding structure or algorithm. Accordingly, the Examiner, is unable to assess the metes and bounds of the claimed invention. For instance, “first and second intervals” are not even mentioned in the original disclosure, let alone having an explanation how they can be determined from a frequency or phase of a cyclical supply voltage.
The Examiner concludes that because claims 27 and 39 are indefinite under § 112 (b), these claims, by definition, cannot be properly construed. See e.g. Honeywell International Inc. v. ITC, 341 F.3d 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Because the claims are indefinite, the claims, by definition, cannot be construed.”). However, in accordance with MPEP § 2173.06 and the USPTO’s policy of trying to advance prosecution by providing prior art rejections even though the claims are indefinite, these indefinite claims are construed and the prior art is applied as much as practically possible.
The Examiner recognizes that in remarks filed on March 5th, 2025, on page 8, the Patent Owner equated periods of time to the first and second time intervals.
Accordingly, in effort to advance prosecution, with respect to first and second intervals, the Examiner considers those two as intervals associated with different LED illumination outputs and translating function is interpreted as a step of receiving command and issuing visible light communication.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims 27-44 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claims contain subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
In this instance, the original disclosure does not teach “determining, by control circuitry, from a frequency or phase of a cyclical supply voltage, a first interval and a second interval” and “translating, by the control circuitry, the received command from the network communication protocol to a visible light communication (VLC) protocol”.
With respect to claims 27, 33 and 39, the Patent Owner pointed to column 16, lines 8-13 as showing support for the newly added limitation “wherein the second interval occurs at least once for each AC cycle”. The cited passage is directed to gaps in communication which are produced at regular, periodic intervals, not to the second interval which includes illumination. In other words, first and second intervals are not discussed in the original disclosure and any amendments made to the claims shall be consistent with the specification.
Furthermore claims 29-32, 35-38 and 41-44 are also rejected because they depend on claims 27, 33 and 39 respectively, and claims 30-31, 36-37 and 42-43 also disclose the limitations reciting second interval with respect to the AC cycle, which is not taught in the passage cited by the Patent Owner.
Moreover, with respect to “first and second intervals” the Examiner would like to note that this wording has not been proposed in the original specification. The MPEP 608.01(c) clearly recites:
“Usually the terminology of the original claims follows the nomenclature of the specification, but sometimes in amending the claims or in adding new claims, new terms are introduced that do not appear in the specification. The use of a confusing variety of terms for the same thing should not be permitted.
New claims and amendments to the claims already in the application should be scrutinized not only for new matter but also for new terminology. While an applicant is not limited to the nomenclature used in the application as filed, he or she should make appropriate amendment of the specification whenever this nomenclature is departed from by amendment of the claims so as to have clear support or antecedent basis in the specification for the new terms appearing in the claims. This is necessary in order to ensure certainty in construing the claims in the light of the specification, Ex parte Kotler, 1901 C.D. 62, 95 O.G. 2684 (Comm'r Pat. 1901). See 37 CFR 1.75, MPEP § 608.01(i) and § 1302.01.”
Allowable Subject Matter
Claims 27-44 would be allowed contingent upon resolving all the rejections/objections recited above and furthermore it should be noted that modifying the scope of the independent claims, may also affect allowable subject as the limitations from all the preceding claims on which the objected claims depend on are also part of those claims, so any significant changes to the base claims would intrinsically affect the scope of the objected claims.
The following is a statement of reasons for the indication of allowable subject matter:
With respect to claims 27, 33 and 39, the prior art of record does not teach or render obvious the control circuitry communicating the received command via the VLC protocol and determining, from a frequency or phase of a cyclical supply voltage a first interval and a second interval, wherein the cyclical supply voltage is synchronized with an alternating current (AC) supply voltage, and wherein the second interval occurs at least once for each AC cycle, along with the remaining limitations as recited in claims 27, 33 and 39.
With respect to claims 28-32, 34-38 and 40-44, those claims also disclose allowable subject matter by the virtue of their dependency on claims 27, 33 and 39 respectively.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed on June 10, 2026 have been fully considered but they are not found persuasive.
In the first argument on page 8 of the remarks filed on June 10, 2026, the Applicant contends “The Office has ignored the fact that in some ways (yellow highlight above), the present application's claims are narrower that the '668 Patent's claims. The above claim 33 may not recite "regular, periodic intervals of each cycle of the AC mains" but it does recite "determining, by control circuitry, from a frequency or phase of a cyclical supply voltage, a first interval and a second interval" which is hardly "entirely eliminated" as asserted by the Office”.
The Examiner’s Response: The Examiner did not find the above argument persuasive because according to MPEP 1412.02, II (3) “if the reissue claims were materially narrowed in aspects related to the surrendered subject matter, there is no recapture; if the claims were not materially narrowed in related aspects or were narrowed in unrelated aspects, there is recapture”.
In this instance, it appears that the amendments made did not further narrow aspects related to the surrendered subject matter, and therefore the Examiner has concluded that recapture rejection is maintained.
More specifically, the Applicant asserts “The above claim 33 may not recite "regular, periodic intervals of each cycle of the AC mains" but it does recite "determining, by control circuitry, from a frequency or phase of a cyclical supply voltage, a first interval and a second interval" which is hardly "entirely eliminated" as asserted by the Office”. Since the surrendered subject matter recited “"regular, periodic intervals of each cycle of the AC mains" and the amendment recited first and second intervals determined from a frequency or phase of a cyclical voltage. Evidently, the introduced “new” limitation was not materially narrowed in aspects related to the surrendered subject matter, therefore the recapture still applies.
In the second argument starting on page 8 through page 9, the Applicant contends “Applicant reiterates that FIG. 8 fully supports the claims … FIG. 8 is an example timing diagram from transmitting data optically from electronic device 16 … the current supplied to the LEDs 36 is periodically reduced from I1 103 to I0 102 to produce communication gaps 100 and 101 in synchronization preferentially with the AC mains 31. As noted in the priority applications, the communication gaps are produced at regular periodic intervals of each cycle of the AC mains.” Id. Col 16, lines 1-11 (emphasis added). The intervals may be broken down further, for example, the specification states “the time duration of said communication gaps may be less than one quarter of each cycle of the AC mains.” Id. Col.16 lines 11-13 … (Office Action at page 13) appears to be needlessly restrictive - there are obviously multiple intervals, so is it really unrecognizable to recite a first interval and a second interval to help describe different actions that are occurring in different intervals? Moreover, FIG. 8 demonstrates that the communication gaps 100 and 101 are occurring at the same interval of the AC cycle (in this illustration, which is not limiting, at the start of the AC half cycle). Furthermore, the communication gaps aren't taking up the whole interval, they occupy only a portion of the interval. Similarly, the specification notes "To minimize possible flicker produced by gaps 101 during which data is transmitted at high brightness, during time 105 preceding gap 101, as shown in FIG. 8, or after gap 101 (not shown), the current through LEDs 36 is reduced from I1 103 to 10 102, such that the average brightness of light produced by LEDs 36 is the same whether or not data is transmitted during the gap times." id. col. 16. lines 25-31 (emphasis added). Applicant submits that time 105 is an example of a second portion of the first interval, the second portion immediately preceding the second interval.”.
The Examiner’s Response: The Examiner did not find the above argument persuasive. The Applicant equates certain parts of the Figure 81, to first and second intervals, however the original specification did not identify the intervals let alone explain how the step of “determining, from a frequency or phase of a cyclical supply voltage, a first interval and a second interval” is carried out (emphasis added). As explained above in the section 35 U.S.C 112(a), the language used in the claim should be consistent with the original disclosure.
Although the Examiner acknowledges that Figure 8 has been annotated such that the “intervals” have been equated to the half of the AC Mains cycle, the original disclosure and the original Figure 8 did not teach how to determine first and second intervals. Accordingly, the Examiner maintains that this is new matter.
Furthermore, the Applicant alleges that “[the office action] appears to be needlessly restrictive - there are obviously multiple intervals, so is it really unrecognizable to recite a first interval and a second interval to help describe different actions that are occurring in different intervals”. The Examiner disagrees with this allegation. Even though, there might be multiple intervals (although the term “interval” has been used only once in the specification), annotating an pre-existing Figure, such that portions of it are identified as “intervals”, does not automatically show that there was a support in the original disclosure, especially when the “intervals” are mentioned in the claims multiple times and in a specific configuration, the original disclosure must support such teaching instead of relying on assumptions.
Lastly, on page 10, the Applicant contends “Regarding VLC, Applicant's Summary states, "In such a lamp, control circuitry receives input from one or more such data communication network or networks and produces commands encoded and transmitted according to a visible light communication protocol such as that described in the one or more priority applications listed herein." Id. at col. 6, lines 28-34. Similarly, one of ordinary skill viewing FIGS. 2 and 3 (lamps 30 and 40 equipped with control circuitry, a VLC controller/communication interface, and a network interface) would clearly appreciate that Applicant had possession of the limitation”.
The Examiner’s Response: The Examiner did not find the above argument persuasive because as clearly indicated above, receiving commands is not the limitation which triggered rejection, but rather translation step. The cited parts of the specification discuss receiving input and producing commands and the means for transmitting such commands, however the original disclosure is silent with respect to translation and what it entails. If such step is well known in the art and involves standard procedure, then the Applicant is invited to explain that.
In addition, the argument on pages 10 and 11, addressing indefiniteness rejection under 35 U.S.C. 112(b), has been considered and found persuasive, hence that part of the 112(b) rejection has been withdrawn.
Conclusion
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Inquiry
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to ANGELA M LIE whose telephone number is (571)272-8445. The examiner can normally be reached on M-F, 5:30 am - 2:00 pm.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Hetul Patel can be reached on 571-272-4184.
All correspondence relating to this reissue proceeding should be directed:
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/ANGELA M LIE/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3992
Conferees:
/LUKE S WASSUM/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3992
/ANDREW J. FISCHER/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3992
1 Annotated Figure 8 in the remarks filed on June 10, 2026, page 8
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