DETAILED ACTION
This Office Action has been issued in response to Applicant's RCE filed January 15, 2026.
Claims 1 and 11 have been amended. Claims 21 and 22 have been added. Claims 5-7 and 15-17 have been cancelled. Claims 1-4, 8-14, and 18-22 have been examined and are pending.
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Continued Examination Under 37 CFR 1.114
A request for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, including the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e), was filed in this application after final rejection. Since this application is eligible for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, and the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e) has been timely paid, the finality of the previous Office action has been withdrawn pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114. Applicant's submission filed on December 12, 2025 has been entered.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed December 12, 2025 have been fully considered but they are moot in view of the new grounds of rejection.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims 1-4, 8-14, and 18-22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention. The amended independent claims recite “determining that values corresponding to vector components of the operand ciphertext are even numbers, wherein each value is obtained by, for the corresponding vector component of the operand ciphertext, multiplying the vector component of the operand ciphertext by a value obtained by dividing a degree of the blind rotation key by a range of the vector component of the operand ciphertext.” Examiner was unable to find support for this in the specification. In particular “multiplying the vector component of the operand ciphertext.” Paragraph [0013] of applicant’s published specification recites “The one or more processors may perform the preprocessing by determining whether a value obtained by multiplying a value, which is obtained by dividing the degree by the range, by the vector component of the blind rotation key is an even number.”
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
Claims 1-4, 8-14, and 18-22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US Pub. No. 2024/0267222 to Chillotti et al. (hereinafter “Chillotti”) and further in view of US Pub. No. 2024/0154786 to Hoshizuki et al. (hereinafter “Hoshizuki”).
As to Claim 1, Chillotti discloses a computing apparatus, comprising: one or more processors; and: a memory storing instructions configured to cause the one or more processors to, for a blind rotation key for performing a blind rotation operation that applies an arbitrary function to an operand ciphertext, wherein the arbitrary function and the operand ciphertext are operands of the blind rotation operation, and wherein the operand ciphertext comprises an encryption of a plaintext message (Paragraph [0037] of Chillotti discloses may be used to apply multiple respective functions to the LWE-encrypted input value. Multiplying the GLWE-encrypted monomial representing the message by a test polynomial representing the function to be applied (e.g., by starting with the test polynomial and applying the blind rotation to it, or by first performing the blind rotation and then multiplying the result with the test polynomial):
generate a preprocessed ciphertext by performing preprocessing on the operand ciphertext based on automorphism (Paragraph [0038] of Chillotti discloses convert a LWE ciphertext to a ciphertext for use in a levelled evaluation, for example, to a GGSW ciphertext); and
generate an operation result of the homomorphic encryption by performing the blind rotation operation for the operand ciphertext and the arbitrary function on a vector component of the preprocessed ciphertext and on a vector component of the blind rotation key, wherein a decryption of the operation result corresponds to applying the arbitrary function to the plaintext message (Paragraph [0195] of Chillotti discloses blind rotation 303 may be applied to the scaled LWE-encrypted ciphertext 330. Paragraph [0189] of Chillotti discloses the blind rotation typically uses a set of bootstrapping keys that allow the LWE decryption to be performed only in the exponent, e.g., it is not possible to decrypt the LWE-encrypted value to obtain its plaintext as such, but only to obtain a GLWE-encrypted monomial that corresponds to the plaintext. Paragraph [0113] of Chillotti discloses By employing homomorphic encryption, data provider device 160 of FIG. 1b, e.g., a client of the cloud provider, can send their data in encrypted form. The cloud provider can still perform the required computations, and/or the required storage, but is not able to know the corresponding to plain data. When computations results are received by data-provider 160 from encrypted computing device 110, a corresponding decryption key may be used to decrypt the encrypted data items)
wherein generating the preprocessed ciphertext comprises:
determining that values corresponding to vector components of the operand ciphertext are even numbers, wherein each value is obtained by, for the corresponding vector component of the operand ciphertext, multiplying the vector component of the operand ciphertext by a value obtained by dividing a degree of the blind rotation key by a range of the vector component of the operand ciphertext (Paragraph [0038] of Chillotti discloses convert a LWE ciphertext to a ciphertext for use in a levelled evaluation, for example, to a GGSW ciphertext. Paragraph [0195] of Chillotti discloses blind rotation 303 may be applied to the scaled LWE-encrypted ciphertext 330. Paragraph [0033] of Chillotti discloses the LWE-encrypted constant output correct up to the sign may be converted to a GLWE-encrypted constant polynomial up to the sign, e.g., ±1.Math.X.sup.0. The GLWE-encrypted monomial of the programmable bootstrapping, e.g., ±X.sup.m′, may be multiplied by the GLWE-encrypted constant polynomial); and
generating the preprocessed ciphertext by modifying a vector component of the operand ciphertext based on a result of the determining (Paragraph [0038] of Chillotti discloses convert a LWE ciphertext to a ciphertext for use in a levelled evaluation, for example, to a GGSW ciphertext. Paragraph [0195] of Chillotti discloses blind rotation 303 may be applied to the scaled LWE-encrypted ciphertext 330. Paragraph [0033] of Chillotti discloses the LWE-encrypted constant output correct up to the sign may be converted to a GLWE-encrypted constant polynomial up to the sign, e.g., ±1.Math.X.sup.0. The GLWE-encrypted monomial of the programmable bootstrapping, e.g., ±X.sup.m′, may be multiplied by the GLWE-encrypted constant polynomial).
Hoshizuki further discloses considering the evenness.
Paragraph [0382] of Hoshizuki discloses a process of making the number of times of BlindRotate only one may be performed in the Gate Bootstrapping process for the TLWE ciphertext ct. Paragraph [0383] of Hoshizuki discloses the encryption processing apparatus 1 arranges different coefficients between even order terms and odd order terms in a test vector polynomial and makes all coefficients in a TLWE ciphertext even.
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing of the invention to combine homomorphic encryption system as disclosed by Chillotti, with considering the evenness as disclosed by Hoshizuki. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine to apply a known technique to a known device ready for improvement to yield predictable results. Chillotti and Hoshizuki are directed toward homomorphic encryption systems and as such it would be obvious to use the techniques of one in the other. Paragraph [0382] of Hoshizuki discloses a process of making the number of times of BlindRotate only one.
As to Claim 2, Chillotti-Hoshizuki discloses the computing apparatus of claim 1, wherein the operand ciphertext comprises a learning with error (LWE) ciphertext (Paragraph [0038] of Chillotti discloses convert a LWE ciphertext), and the blind rotation key comprises a ring Gentry, Sahai, Waters (RGSW) ciphertext or ring learning with error (RLWE) ciphertext (Paragraph [0086] of Chillotti discloses the instantiation of GGSW with k=1 and N>1 is a RLWE-based ciphertext referred to as a RGSW ciphertext).
As to Claim 3, Chillotti-Hoshizuki discloses the computing apparatus of claim 1, wherein the blind rotation key is generated based on a secret key corresponding to the operand ciphertext and a secret key corresponding to an RLWE ciphertext (Paragraph [0189] of Chillotti discloses the blind rotation typically uses a set of bootstrapping keys that allow the LWE decryption to be performed only in the exponent, e.g., it is not possible to decrypt the LWE-encrypted value to obtain its plaintext as such, but only to obtain a GLWE-encrypted monomial that corresponds to the plaintext).
As to Claim 4, Chillotti-Hoshizuki discloses the computing apparatus of claim 1, wherein a form of the blind rotation key is determined by comparing a range of a vector component of the operand ciphertext with a degree of an RLWE ciphertext (Paragraph [0086] of Chillotti discloses the instantiation of GGSW with k=1 and N>1 is a RLWE-based ciphertext referred to as a RGSW ciphertext. These types of ciphertexts are known per se for use in producing bootstrapping keys or supporting certain levelled operations).
As to Claim 8, Chillotti-Hoshizuki discloses the computing apparatus of claim 1, wherein the instructions are further configured to cause the one or more processors to: perform the blind rotation operation by performing an increment operation, an automorphism operation, and a key switching operation based on the preprocessed ciphertext (Paragraph [0108] of Chillotti discloses configured to perform a sequence of homomorphic encryption operations, which may include arithmetic operations on encrypted values such as addition and multiplication, but may also include arithmetic operations on encrypted polynomials. Homomorphic operations may also include operations like a key switching, a bootstrap, and the like).
As to Claim 9, Chillotti-Hoshizuki discloses the computing apparatus of claim 1, wherein the instructions are further configured to cause the one or more processors to: determine a form of a secret key used in an increment operation based on the vector component of the blind rotation key, a range of a vector component of the operand ciphertext, and a degree of an RLWE ciphertext; and modify a vector component used in the increment operation based on the vector component of the blind rotation key, the range of the vector component of the operand ciphertext, and the degree of the RLWE ciphertext (Paragraph [0124] of Chillotti discloses GenMult unit 205 may then transform the polynomial product to a degree-1 polynomial in the secret key using a relinearization key. This relinearization key may be arranged for such transforming of a degree-2 polynomial in the secret key to a degree-1 polynomial in the secret key. Such an approach is known for the particular case of RLWE ciphertexts).
As to Claim 10, Chillotti-Hoshizuki discloses the computing apparatus of claim 6, wherein the instructions are further configured to cause the one or more processors to: perform an automorphism operation based on a component of a modified vector generated by modifying a vector component of the blind rotation key based on a result of determining whether the value obtained by the multiplying is an even number, and a reciprocal of the component of the modified vector; and perform key switching based on a result of the automorphism operation (Paragraph [0108] of Chillotti discloses configured to perform a sequence of homomorphic encryption operations, which may include arithmetic operations on encrypted values such as addition and multiplication, but may also include arithmetic operations on encrypted polynomials. Homomorphic operations may also include operations like a key switching, a bootstrap, and the like. Paragraph [0124] of Chillotti discloses GenMult unit 205 may then transform the polynomial product to a degree-1 polynomial in the secret key using a relinearization key. This relinearization key may be arranged for such transforming of a degree-2 polynomial in the secret key to a degree-1 polynomial in the secret key. Such an approach is known for the particular case of RLWE ciphertexts).
As to Claim 11, Chillotti discloses An operation method of homomorphic encryption performed by a computing device comprising storage hardware and processing hardware, the operation method comprising:
receiving a blind rotation key for performing a blind rotation operation that applies an arbitrary function to an operand ciphertext, wherein the arbitrary function and the operand ciphertext are operands of the blind rotation operation, and wherein the operand ciphertext comprises an encryption of a plaintext message and storing the blind rotation key in the storage hardware (Paragraph [0037] of Chillotti discloses may be used to apply multiple respective functions to the LWE-encrypted input value. Multiplying the GLWE-encrypted monomial representing the message by a test polynomial representing the function to be applied (e.g., by starting with the test polynomial and applying the blind rotation to it, or by first performing the blind rotation and then multiplying the result with the test polynomial. Paragraph [0189] of Chillotti discloses the blind rotation typically uses a set of bootstrapping keys that allow the LWE decryption to be performed only in the exponent, e.g., it is not possible to decrypt the LWE-encrypted value to obtain its plaintext as such, but only to obtain a GLWE-encrypted monomial that corresponds to the plaintext);
generating, by the processing hardware, a preprocessed ciphertext by performing preprocessing on the operand ciphertext based on automorphism (Paragraph [0038] of Chillotti discloses convert a LWE ciphertext to a ciphertext for use in a levelled evaluation, for example, to a GGSW ciphertext); and
generating, by the processing hardware, an operation result of the homomorphic encryption by performing the blind rotation operation for the operand ciphertext and the arbitrary function on a vector component of the preprocessed ciphertext based on the blind rotation key, wherein a decryption of the operation result corresponds to applying the arbitrary function to the plaintext message (Paragraph [0195] of Chillotti discloses blind rotation 303 may be applied to the scaled LWE-encrypted ciphertext 330. Paragraph [0189] of Chillotti discloses the blind rotation typically uses a set of bootstrapping keys that allow the LWE decryption to be performed only in the exponent, e.g., it is not possible to decrypt the LWE-encrypted value to obtain its plaintext as such, but only to obtain a GLWE-encrypted monomial that corresponds to the plaintext. Paragraph [0113] of Chillotti discloses By employing homomorphic encryption, data provider device 160 of FIG. 1b, e.g., a client of the cloud provider, can send their data in encrypted form. The cloud provider can still perform the required computations, and/or the required storage, but is not able to know the corresponding to plain data. When computations results are received by data-provider 160 from encrypted computing device 110, a corresponding decryption key may be used to decrypt the encrypted data items)
wherein generating the preprocessed ciphertext comprises:
determining that values corresponding to vector components of the operand ciphertext are even numbers, wherein each value is obtained by, for the corresponding vector component of the operand ciphertext, multiplying the vector component of the operand ciphertext by a value obtained by dividing a degree of the blind rotation key by a range of the vector component of the operand ciphertext (Paragraph [0038] of Chillotti discloses convert a LWE ciphertext to a ciphertext for use in a levelled evaluation, for example, to a GGSW ciphertext. Paragraph [0195] of Chillotti discloses blind rotation 303 may be applied to the scaled LWE-encrypted ciphertext 330. Paragraph [0033] of Chillotti discloses the LWE-encrypted constant output correct up to the sign may be converted to a GLWE-encrypted constant polynomial up to the sign, e.g., ±1.Math.X.sup.0. The GLWE-encrypted monomial of the programmable bootstrapping, e.g., ±X.sup.m′, may be multiplied by the GLWE-encrypted constant polynomial); and
generating the preprocessed ciphertext by modifying a vector component of the operand ciphertext based on a result of the determining (Paragraph [0038] of Chillotti discloses convert a LWE ciphertext to a ciphertext for use in a levelled evaluation, for example, to a GGSW ciphertext. Paragraph [0195] of Chillotti discloses blind rotation 303 may be applied to the scaled LWE-encrypted ciphertext 330. Paragraph [0033] of Chillotti discloses the LWE-encrypted constant output correct up to the sign may be converted to a GLWE-encrypted constant polynomial up to the sign, e.g., ±1.Math.X.sup.0. The GLWE-encrypted monomial of the programmable bootstrapping, e.g., ±X.sup.m′, may be multiplied by the GLWE-encrypted constant polynomial).
Hoshizuki further discloses considering the evenness.
Paragraph [0382] of Hoshizuki discloses a process of making the number of times of BlindRotate only one may be performed in the Gate Bootstrapping process for the TLWE ciphertext ct. Paragraph [0383] of Hoshizuki discloses the encryption processing apparatus 1 arranges different coefficients between even order terms and odd order terms in a test vector polynomial and makes all coefficients in a TLWE ciphertext even.
Examiner recites the same rationale to combine used for claim 1.
As to Claim 12, Chillotti-Hoshizuki discloses the operation method of claim 11, wherein the operand ciphertext comprises a learning with error (LWE) ciphertext (Paragraph [0038] of Chillotti discloses convert a LWE ciphertext), and the blind rotation key comprises a ring Gentry, Sahai, Waters (RGSW) ciphertext or ring learning with error (RLWE) ciphertext (Paragraph [0086] of Chillotti discloses the instantiation of GGSW with k=1 and N>1 is a RLWE-based ciphertext referred to as a RGSW ciphertext).
As to Claim 13, Chillotti-Hoshizuki discloses the operation method of claim 11, wherein the blind rotation key is generated based on a secret key corresponding to the operand ciphertext and a secret key corresponding to an RLWE ciphertext (Paragraph [0189] of Chillotti discloses the blind rotation typically uses a set of bootstrapping keys that allow the LWE decryption to be performed only in the exponent, e.g., it is not possible to decrypt the LWE-encrypted value to obtain its plaintext as such, but only to obtain a GLWE-encrypted monomial that corresponds to the plaintext).
As to Claim 14, Chillotti-Hoshizuki discloses the operation method of claim 11, wherein a form of the blind rotation key is determined by comparing a range of a vector component of the operand ciphertext with a degree of an RLWE ciphertext (Paragraph [0086] of Chillotti discloses the instantiation of GGSW with k=1 and N>1 is a RLWE-based ciphertext referred to as a RGSW ciphertext. These types of ciphertexts are known per se for use in producing bootstrapping keys or supporting certain levelled operations).
As to Claim 18, Chillotti-Hoshizuki discloses the operation method of claim 11, wherein the generating of the operation result comprises: performing, by the processing hardware, the blind rotation operation by performing an increment operation, an automorphism operation, and a key switching operation based on the preprocessed ciphertext (Paragraph [0108] of Chillotti discloses configured to perform a sequence of homomorphic encryption operations, which may include arithmetic operations on encrypted values such as addition and multiplication, but may also include arithmetic operations on encrypted polynomials. Homomorphic operations may also include operations like a key switching, a bootstrap, and the like).
As to Claim 19, Chillotti-Hoshizuki discloses the operation method of claim 11, wherein the generating of the operation result comprises: determining, by the processing hardware, a form of a secret key used in an increment operation based on a vector component of the blind rotation key, a range of a vector component of the operand ciphertext, and a degree of an RLWE ciphertext; and modifying a vector component used in the increment operation based on the vector component of the blind rotation key, the range of the vector component of the operand ciphertext, and the degree of the RLWE ciphertext (Paragraph [0124] of Chillotti discloses GenMult unit 205 may then transform the polynomial product to a degree-1 polynomial in the secret key using a relinearization key. This relinearization key may be arranged for such transforming of a degree-2 polynomial in the secret key to a degree-1 polynomial in the secret key. Such an approach is known for the particular case of RLWE ciphertexts).
As to Claim 20, Chillotti-Hoshizuki discloses the operation method of claim 16, wherein the generating of the operation result comprises: performing, by the processing hardware, an automorphism operation based on a component of a modified vector generated by modifying a vector component of the blind rotation key based on a result of determining whether the value obtained by the multiplying is an even number, and a reciprocal of the component of the modified vector; and performing, by the processing hardware, key switching based on a result of the automorphism operation (Paragraph [0108] of Chillotti discloses configured to perform a sequence of homomorphic encryption operations, which may include arithmetic operations on encrypted values such as addition and multiplication, but may also include arithmetic operations on encrypted polynomials. Homomorphic operations may also include operations like a key switching, a bootstrap, and the like. Paragraph [0124] of Chillotti discloses GenMult unit 205 may then transform the polynomial product to a degree-1 polynomial in the secret key using a relinearization key. This relinearization key may be arranged for such transforming of a degree-2 polynomial in the secret key to a degree-1 polynomial in the secret key. Such an approach is known for the particular case of RLWE ciphertexts).
As to Claim 21, Chillotti-Hoshizuki discloses the computing apparatus of claim 1, wherein the generating the preprocessed ciphertext by modifying the vector component of the operand ciphertext comprises: when the values are even numbers, generating the preprocessed ciphertext based on converting the first vector component of the operand ciphertext using subtraction operation (Paragraph [0039] of Chillotti discloses By subtracting the LWE-encrypted least significant part from the LWE-encrypted input value, an LWE-encrypted remainder may be obtained, on which this process may be repeated).
As to Claim 22, Chillotti-Hoshizuki discloses the operation method of claim 11, wherein the generating the preprocessed ciphertext by modifying the vector component of the operand ciphertext comprises: when the values are even numbers, generating the preprocessed ciphertext based on converting the first vector component of the operand ciphertext using subtraction operation (Paragraph [0039] of Chillotti discloses By subtracting the LWE-encrypted least significant part from the LWE-encrypted input value, an LWE-encrypted remainder may be obtained, on which this process may be repeated).
Conclusion
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Kevin S Mai whose telephone number is (571)270-5001. The examiner can normally be reached Monday to Friday 9AM to 5PM.
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If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Philip Chea can be reached at 5712723951. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/KEVIN S MAI/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2499
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