DETAILED ACTION
Claims 1, 3-9, 11-17, and 19-20 have been examined.
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 101
35 U.S.C. § 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
The invention, as taught in Claims 1, 3-9, 11-17, and 19-20, is directed to “mental steps” and “mathematical steps” without significantly more.
The claims recite:
• knowledge graph with a semantic model of a rule embodied therein
• semantic model embodied within the knowledge graph comprises nodes that represent entities within the rule
• edges between the nodes that represent relationships between the entities
• identifiers of a data set used by the rule
• input data corresponding to the data set
• traverse the knowledge graph
• based on the input data and applying the semantic model of the rule stored within the knowledge graph to the input data to generate a determination
• notification of the determination
Claim 1
Step 1 inquiry: Does this claim fall within a statutory category?
The preamble of the claim recites “1. A computing system comprising…” Therefore, it is a “system” (or “apparatus”), which is a statutory category of invention. Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: “YES.”
Step 2A (Prong One) inquiry:
Are there limitations in Claim 1 that recite abstract ideas?
YES. The following limitations in Claim 1 recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the 2019 PEG. Specifically, they are “mental steps” and “mathematical steps”:
• knowledge graph with a semantic model of a rule embodied therein
• semantic model embodied within the knowledge graph comprises
nodes that represent entities within a particular rule of the rules
• edges between the nodes that represent relationships between
the entities
• identifiers of a data set used by the particular rule
• input data corresponding to the data set
• traverse the knowledge graph
• based on the input data and applying the semantic model of the rule
stored within the knowledge graph to the input data to generate
a determination
• notification of the determination
• translating the text-based rules into a machine-readable format
• generating the knowledge graph based on the translating of the text
based rules into the machine-readable format
• determining an order in which the missing data should be collected and
one or more entities from whom the missing data is to be collected
• generating and transmitting data requests for the one or more entities in
the determined order to one or more of a user interface and a
computing terminal
• apply the semantic model of the particular rule stored within the
knowledge graph to the input data to generate a determination
Step 2A (Prong Two) inquiry:
Are there additional elements or a combination of elements in the claim that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A “processor”
(2) A “storage configured to store a knowledge graph with a semantic model of a rule embodied therein”
(3) A “receipt” of “input data corresponding to the data set”/“receiving first input data comprising one or more text-based rules”
(4) An “inference engine”
(5) A “display” of a “notification of the determination via a user interface”
(1) A “processor” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites:
2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”).
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
This “processor” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(2) A “storage configured to store a knowledge graph with a semantic model of a rule embodied therein” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
***
iv. Storing and retrieving information in memory, Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1681, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 2015); OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363, 115 USPQ2d at 1092-93;
This “storage configured to store a knowledge graph with a semantic model of a rule embodied therein” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(3) A “receipt” of “input data corresponding to the data set”/“receiving first input data comprising one or more text-based rules” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part:
2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art.").
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception.
This “receipt” of “input data corresponding to the data set” /“receiving first input data comprising one or more text-based rules” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(4) An “inference engine” is a broad, generic term which is described at a high level. Paragraphs [0026] and [0039] of the Specification discuss the generic nature of the claimed inference engine:
[0026] Through an inference engine 127 built within the knowledge graph database which applies input data to rules in the knowledge graph 122 to infer rule results and materialize the results as new individuals into the knowledge graph itself. The inference engine 127 works based on logical standards and may not contain any knowledge about the decision subject itself. Hence with a fully generic implementation of the inference engine 127, the outcomes of the decision making only depend on the rules given as input to the inference engine 127 and not on the logic of the inference engine 127 itself.
***
[0039] In some embodiments, the rules may be formulated as logical or constraint-based deductions on the data. This is known as inference in the context of semantic technologies. There are open standards for semantic technologies that can be used to formulate such rules. The inference engine within the reasoning component 224 can apply the rules on the knowledge graph 223 and materialize the results as new knowledge. Hence decisions are just new instances in the knowledge graph 223. Through the use of open standards, no proprietary knowledge is required for the formulation of rules. Also, the execution on an inherence engine that generically acts on the knowledge graph can be a purely standards-based application.
Since the “inference engine” is well understood, routine and conventional, simply using the inference engine to produce a result is not eligible. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:
For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
Therefore, simply using the inference engine to produce a result is not eligible.
This “inference engine” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(5) A “display” of a “notification of the determination via a user interface” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (h) recites in part:
Examples of limitations that the courts have described as merely indicating a field of use or technological environment in which to apply a judicial exception include:
***
vi. Limiting the abstract idea of collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis to data related to the electric power grid, because limiting application of the abstract idea to power-grid monitoring is simply an attempt to limit the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment, Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354, 119 USPQ2d 1739, 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
This “display” of a “notification of the determination via a user interface” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
The answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements integrate the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Step 2B inquiry:
Does the claim provide an inventive concept, i.e., does the claim recite additional element(s) or a combination of elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in the claim?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A “processor”
(2) A “storage configured to store a knowledge graph with a semantic model of a rule embodied therein”
(3) A “receipt” of “input data corresponding to the data set”/“receiving first input data comprising one or more text-based rules”
(4) An “inference engine”
(5) A “display” of a “notification of the determination via a user interface”
(1) A “processor” is a broad term which is described at a high level and includes general purpose computers. M.P.E.P. § 2016.05(f) recites:
2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception [R-10.2019]
Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”).
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(2) A “storage configured to store a knowledge graph with a semantic model of a rule embodied therein” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
***
iv. Storing and retrieving information in memory, Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1681, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 2015); OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363, 115 USPQ2d at 1092-93;
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(3) A “receipt” of “input data corresponding to the data set”/“receiving first input data comprising one or more text-based rules” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part:
2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art.").
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(4) An “inference engine” is a broad, generic term which is described at a high level. Paragraphs [0026] and [0039] of the Specification discuss the generic nature of the claimed inference engine:
[0026] Through an inference engine 127 built within the knowledge graph database which applies input data to rules in the knowledge graph 122 to infer rule results and materialize the results as new individuals into the knowledge graph itself. The inference engine 127 works based on logical standards and may not contain any knowledge about the decision subject itself. Hence with a fully generic implementation of the inference engine 127, the outcomes of the decision making only depend on the rules given as input to the inference engine 127 and not on the logic of the inference engine 127 itself.
***
[0039] In some embodiments, the rules may be formulated as logical or constraint-based deductions on the data. This is known as inference in the context of semantic technologies. There are open standards for semantic technologies that can be used to formulate such rules. The inference engine within the reasoning component 224 can apply the rules on the knowledge graph 223 and materialize the results as new knowledge. Hence decisions are just new instances in the knowledge graph 223. Through the use of open standards, no proprietary knowledge is required for the formulation of rules. Also, the execution on an inherence engine that generically acts on the knowledge graph can be a purely standards-based application.
Since the “inference engine” is well understood, routine and conventional, simply using the inference engine to produce a result is not eligible. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:
For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
Therefore, simply using the inference engine to produce a result is not eligible.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(5) A “display” of a “notification of the determination via a user interface” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (h) recites in part:
Examples of limitations that the courts have described as merely indicating a field of use or technological environment in which to apply a judicial exception include:
***
vi. Limiting the abstract idea of collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis to data related to the electric power grid, because limiting application of the abstract idea to power-grid monitoring is simply an attempt to limit the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment, Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354, 119 USPQ2d 1739, 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements provide an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed abstract ideas the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Claim 1 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 2
Claim 2 recites:
2. The computing system of claim 1, wherein the processor is configured to determine that the received input data is missing data necessary to apply the rule based on the semantic model of the rule embodied in the knowledge graph, and generate and transmit data requests to one or more of a user interface and a computing terminal to collect missing data to generate a complete data set.
Applicant’s Claim 2 merely teaches a determination that data are needed and a generation of request (i.e., mental steps). It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 2 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 3
Claim 3 recites:
3. The computing system of claim 2, wherein the processor is configured to generate a user interface with input controls to collect the missing data and display the user interface on a computing terminal of a data owner that corresponds to the missing data.
Applicant’s Claim 3 merely teaches a generic user interface display. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 3 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 4
Claim 4 recites:
4. The computing system of claim 1, wherein the processor is further configured to generate the semantic model of the rule via a plurality of interconnected triples stored in the knowledge graph, where each triple includes a subject corresponding to a keyword from the rule, a predicate corresponding to a property of the keyword, and an object corresponding to another keyword from the rule.
Applicant’s Claim 4 merely teaches a knowledge tree (i.e., mental steps). It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 4 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 5
Claim 5 recites:
5. The computing system of claim 1, wherein the processor is further configured to translate a human-readable version of the rule into a machine-readable semantic model based on an ontology of the knowledge graph.
Applicant’s Claim 5 merely teaches the translation of a human readable model to a machine readable model…otherwise known as computer programming (i.e., mental steps). It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 5 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 6
Claim 6 recites:
6. The computing system of claim 5, wherein the processor is further configured to receive, via a user interface, inputs that configure the ontology stored of the knowledge graph.
Applicant’s Claim 6 merely teaches generic receipt of data. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 6 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 7
Claim 7 recites:
7. The computing system of claim 1, wherein the semantic model of the rule comprises a plurality of reusable sub-rules corresponding to the rule, wherein each reusable sub-rule comprises a different respective semantic model embodied within the knowledge graph.
Applicant’s Claim 7 merely teaches rules and subrules (i.e., mental steps). It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 7 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 8
Claim 8 recites:
8. The computing system of claim 1, wherein the processor is configured to query the knowledge graph via a semantic query language to determine whether the input data satisfies requirements of the semantic model of the rule embodied within the knowledge graph.
Applicant’s Claim 8 merely teaches a query (i.e., mental steps). It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 8 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 9
Step 1 inquiry: Does this claim fall within a statutory category?
The preamble of the claim recites “9. A method performed automatically, the method comprising…” Therefore, it is a “method” (or “process”), which is a statutory category of invention. Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: “YES.”
Step 2A (Prong One) inquiry:
Are there limitations in Claim 9 that recite abstract ideas?
YES. The following limitations in Claim 9 recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the 2019 PEG. Specifically, they are “mental steps” and “mathematical steps”:
• knowledge graph with a semantic model of a rule embodied therein
• semantic model embodied within the knowledge graph comprises
nodes that represent entities within a particular rule of the rules
• edges between the nodes that represent relationships between
the entities
• identifiers of a data set used by the particular rule
• input data corresponding to the data set
• traverse the knowledge graph
• based on the input data and applying the semantic model of the rule
stored within the knowledge graph to the input data to generate
a determination
• notification of the determination
• translating the text-based rules into a machine-readable format
• generating the knowledge graph based on the translating of the text
based rules into the machine-readable format
• determining an order in which the missing data should be collected and
one or more entities from whom the missing data is to be collected
• generating and transmitting data requests for the one or more entities in
the determined order to one or more of a user interface and a
computing terminal
• apply the semantic model of the particular rule stored within the
knowledge graph to the input data to generate a determination
Step 2A (Prong Two) inquiry:
Are there additional elements or a combination of elements in the claim that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A “storing” of a “knowledge graph with a semantic model of a rule embodied therein”
(2) A “receiving” of “input data corresponding to the rule”/“receiving first input data comprising one or more text-based rules”
(3) A “displaying…via a user interface”
(1) A “storing” of a “knowledge graph with a semantic model of a rule embodied therein” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
***
iv. Storing and retrieving information in memory, Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1681, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 2015); OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363, 115 USPQ2d at 1092-93;
This “storing” of a “knowledge graph with a semantic model of a rule embodied therein” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(2) A “receiving” of “input data corresponding to the rule”/“receiving first input data comprising one or more text-based rules” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part:
2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art.").
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception.
This “receiving” of “input data corresponding to the rule”/“receiving first input data comprising one or more text-based rules” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(3) A “displaying…via a user interface” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (h) recites in part:
Examples of limitations that the courts have described as merely indicating a field of use or technological environment in which to apply a judicial exception include:
***
vi. Limiting the abstract idea of collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis to data related to the electric power grid, because limiting application of the abstract idea to power-grid monitoring is simply an attempt to limit the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment, Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354, 119 USPQ2d 1739, 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
This “displaying…via a user interface” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
The answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements integrate the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Step 2B inquiry:
Does the claim provide an inventive concept, i.e., does the claim recite additional element(s) or a combination of elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in the claim?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A “storing” of a “knowledge graph with a semantic model of a rule embodied therein”
(2) A “receiving” of “input data corresponding to the rule”/“receiving first input data comprising one or more text-based rules”
(3) A “displaying…via a user interface”
(1) A “storing” of a “knowledge graph with a semantic model of a rule embodied therein” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
***
iv. Storing and retrieving information in memory, Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1681, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 2015); OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363, 115 USPQ2d at 1092-93;
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(2) A “receiving” of “input data corresponding to the rule”/“receiving first input data comprising one or more text-based rules” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part:
2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art.").
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(3) A “displaying…via a user interface” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (h) recites in part:
Examples of limitations that the courts have described as merely indicating a field of use or technological environment in which to apply a judicial exception include:
***
vi. Limiting the abstract idea of collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis to data related to the electric power grid, because limiting application of the abstract idea to power-grid monitoring is simply an attempt to limit the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment, Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354, 119 USPQ2d 1739, 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements provide an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed abstract ideas the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Claim 9 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 10
Claim 10 recites:
10. The method of claim 9, wherein the method further comprises determining that the received input data is missing data necessary to apply the rule based on the semantic model of the rule embodied in the knowledge graph, and generating and transmitting data requests to one or more of a user interface and a computing terminal to collect missing data to generate a complete data set.
Applicant’s Claim 10 merely teaches (i.e., mental steps). It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 10 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 11
Claim 11 recites:
11. The method of claim 10, wherein the method further comprises generating a user interface with input controls for collecting the missing data and displaying the user interface on a computing terminal of a corresponding data owner of the missing data.
Applicant’s Claim 11 merely teaches a generic user interface display. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 11 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 12
Claim 12 recites:
12. The method of claim 9, wherein the method further comprises generating the semantic model of the rule via a plurality of interconnected triples stored in the knowledge graph, where each triple includes a subject corresponding to a keyword from the rule, a predicate corresponding to a property of the keyword, and an object corresponding to another keyword from the rule.
Applicant’s Claim 12 merely teaches a knowledge tree (i.e., mental steps). It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 12 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 13
Claim 13 recites:
13. The method of claim 9, wherein the method further comprises translating a human-readable version of the rule into a machine-readable semantic model based on an ontology of the knowledge graph.
Applicant’s Claim 13 merely teaches the translation of a human readable model to a machine readable model…otherwise known as computer programming (i.e., mental steps). It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 13 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 14
Claim 14 recites:
14. The method of claim 13, wherein the method further comprises receiving, via a user interface, inputs configuring the ontology of the knowledge graph.
Applicant’s Claim 14 merely teaches generic receipt of data. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 14 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 15
Claim 15 recites:
15. The method of claim 9, wherein the semantic model of the rule comprises a plurality of reusable sub-rules corresponding to the rule, wherein each reusable sub-rule comprises a different semantic model embodied within the knowledge graph.
Applicant’s Claim 15 merely teaches rules and subrules (i.e., mental steps). It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 15 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 16
Claim 16 recites:
16. The method of claim 9, wherein the generating comprises querying the knowledge graph via a semantic query language to determine whether the input data satisfies requirements of the semantic model of the rule embodied within the knowledge graph.
Applicant’s Claim 16 merely teaches a query (i.e., mental steps). It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 16 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 17
Step 1 inquiry: Does this claim fall within a statutory category?
The preamble of the claim recites “17. A non-transitory computer-readable medium comprising instructions which when executed by a processor cause a computer to perform an automated method comprising…” Therefore, it is a “non-transitory computer-readable medium” (or “product of manufacture”), which is a statutory category of invention. Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is: “YES.”
Step 2A (Prong One) inquiry:
Are there limitations in Claim 17 that recite abstract ideas?
YES. The following limitations in Claim 17 recite abstract ideas that fall within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the 2019 PEG. Specifically, they are “mental steps” and “mathematical steps”:
• knowledge graph with a semantic model of a rule embodied therein
• semantic model embodied within the knowledge graph comprises
nodes that represent entities within a particular rule of the rules
• edges between the nodes that represent relationships between
the entities
• identifiers of a data set used by the particular rule
• input data corresponding to the data set
• traverse the knowledge graph
• based on the input data and applying the semantic model of the rule
stored within the knowledge graph to the input data to generate
a determination
• notification of the determination
• translating the text-based rules into a machine-readable format
• generating the knowledge graph based on the translating of the text
based rules into the machine-readable format
• determining an order in which the missing data should be collected and
one or more entities from whom the missing data is to be collected
• generating and transmitting data requests for the one or more entities in
the determined order to one or more of a user interface and a
computing terminal
• apply the semantic model of the particular rule stored within the
knowledge graph to the input data to generate a determination
Step 2A (Prong Two) inquiry:
Are there additional elements or a combination of elements in the claim that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A “storing a knowledge graph with rules embodied therein”
(2) A “receiving input data corresponding to a rule in the knowledge graph”/“receiving first input data comprising one or more text-based rules”
(3) An “inference engine”
(4) A “outputting…via a user interface”
(1) A “storing a knowledge graph with rules embodied therein” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
***
iv. Storing and retrieving information in memory, Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1681, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 2015); OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363, 115 USPQ2d at 1092-93;
This “storing a knowledge graph with rules embodied therein” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(2) A “receiving input data corresponding to a rule in the knowledge graph”/“receiving first input data comprising one or more text-based rules” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part:
2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art.").
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception.
This “receiving input data corresponding to a rule in the knowledge graph”/“receiving first input data comprising one or more text-based rules” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(3) An “inference engine” is a broad, generic term which is described at a high level. Paragraphs [0026] and [0039] of the Specification discuss the generic nature of the claimed inference engine:
[0026] Through an inference engine 127 built within the knowledge graph database which applies input data to rules in the knowledge graph 122 to infer rule results and materialize the results as new individuals into the knowledge graph itself. The inference engine 127 works based on logical standards and may not contain any knowledge about the decision subject itself. Hence with a fully generic implementation of the inference engine 127, the outcomes of the decision making only depend on the rules given as input to the inference engine 127 and not on the logic of the inference engine 127 itself.
***
[0039] In some embodiments, the rules may be formulated as logical or constraint-based deductions on the data. This is known as inference in the context of semantic technologies. There are open standards for semantic technologies that can be used to formulate such rules. The inference engine within the reasoning component 224 can apply the rules on the knowledge graph 223 and materialize the results as new knowledge. Hence decisions are just new instances in the knowledge graph 223. Through the use of open standards, no proprietary knowledge is required for the formulation of rules. Also, the execution on an inherence engine that generically acts on the knowledge graph can be a purely standards-based application.
Since the “inference engine” is well understood, routine and conventional, simply using the inference engine to produce a result is not eligible. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:
For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
Therefore, simply using the inference engine to produce a result is not eligible.
This “inference engine” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
(4) A “outputting…via a user interface” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (h) recites in part:
Examples of limitations that the courts have described as merely indicating a field of use or technological environment in which to apply a judicial exception include:
***
vi. Limiting the abstract idea of collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis to data related to the electric power grid, because limiting application of the abstract idea to power-grid monitoring is simply an attempt to limit the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment, Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354, 119 USPQ2d 1739, 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
This “outputting…via a user interface” limitation does not integrate the additional element into a practical application and represents “insignificant extra-solution activity”. (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(I)(A)).
The answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements integrate the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Step 2B inquiry:
Does the claim provide an inventive concept, i.e., does the claim recite additional element(s) or a combination of elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in the claim?
Applicant’s claims contain the following “additional elements”:
(1) A “storing a knowledge graph with rules embodied therein”
(2) A “receiving input data corresponding to a rule in the knowledge graph”/“receiving first input data comprising one or more text-based rules”
(3) An “inference engine”
(4) A “outputting…via a user interface”
(1) A “storing a knowledge graph with rules embodied therein” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
***
iv. Storing and retrieving information in memory, Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1681, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 2015); OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363, 115 USPQ2d at 1092-93;
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(2) A “receiving input data corresponding to a rule in the knowledge graph”/“receiving first input data comprising one or more text-based rules” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) recites in part:
2. A factual determination is required to support a conclusion that an additional element (or combination of additional elements) is well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368, 125 USPQ2d 1649, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, this does not mean that a prior art search is necessary to resolve this inquiry. Instead, examiners should rely on what the courts have recognized, or those in the art would recognize, as elements that are well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the relevant field when making the required determination. For example, in many instances, the specification of the application may indicate that additional elements are well-known or conventional. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1317; 120 USPQ2d at 1359 ("The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional"); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on specification’s description of additional elements as "well-known", "common" and "conventional"); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 614, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Specification described additional elements as "either performing basic computer functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions ‘known’ in the art.").
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d)(II) recites:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity.
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); …
Merely using the conventional computer to receive data is well known, understood, and conventional. Thus, it adds nothing significantly more to the judicial exception.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(3) An “inference engine” is a broad, generic term which is described at a high level. Paragraphs [0026] and [0039] of the Specification discuss the generic nature of the claimed inference engine:
[0026] Through an inference engine 127 built within the knowledge graph database which applies input data to rules in the knowledge graph 122 to infer rule results and materialize the results as new individuals into the knowledge graph itself. The inference engine 127 works based on logical standards and may not contain any knowledge about the decision subject itself. Hence with a fully generic implementation of the inference engine 127, the outcomes of the decision making only depend on the rules given as input to the inference engine 127 and not on the logic of the inference engine 127 itself.
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[0039] In some embodiments, the rules may be formulated as logical or constraint-based deductions on the data. This is known as inference in the context of semantic technologies. There are open standards for semantic technologies that can be used to formulate such rules. The inference engine within the reasoning component 224 can apply the rules on the knowledge graph 223 and materialize the results as new knowledge. Hence decisions are just new instances in the knowledge graph 223. Through the use of open standards, no proprietary knowledge is required for the formulation of rules. Also, the execution on an inherence engine that generically acts on the knowledge graph can be a purely standards-based application.
Since the “inference engine” is well understood, routine and conventional, simply using the inference engine to produce a result is not eligible. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f) recites:
For claim limitations that do not amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), such as mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, examiners should explain why they do not meaningfully limit the claim in an eligibility rejection. For example, an examiner could explain that implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two…
Further, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(f)(2) recites:
(2) Whether the claim invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process. Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical equation) does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262, 120 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cellular telephone); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (computer server and telephone unit). Similarly, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In contrast, a claim that purports to improve computer capabilities or to improve an existing technology may integrate a judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-15, 120 USPQ2d 1091, 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 118 USPQ2d 1684, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a) for a discussion of improvements to the functioning of a computer or to another technology or technical field.
Therefore, simply using the inference engine to produce a result is not eligible.
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
(4) A “outputting…via a user interface” is a broad term which is described at a high level. M.P.E.P. § 2106.05 (h) recites in part:
Examples of limitations that the courts have described as merely indicating a field of use or technological environment in which to apply a judicial exception include:
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vi. Limiting the abstract idea of collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis to data related to the electric power grid, because limiting application of the abstract idea to power-grid monitoring is simply an attempt to limit the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment, Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354, 119 USPQ2d 1739, 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
Therefore, the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself (i.e., there is no inventive concept in the claim). (See, M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(II)).
Therefore, the answer to the inquiry is “NO”, no additional elements provide an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed abstract ideas the claimed abstract idea into a practical application.
Claim 17 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 18
Claim 18 recites:
18. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 17, wherein the method further comprises determining that the received input data is missing data necessary to apply the rule based on the semantic model of the rule embodied in the knowledge graph, and generating and transmitting data requests to one or more of a user interface and a computing terminal to collect missing data to generate a complete data set.
Applicant’s Claim 18 merely teaches a determination that data are necessary (i.e., mental steps). It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 18 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 19
Claim 19 recites:
19. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 18, wherein the method further comprises generating a user interface with input controls for collecting the missing data and displaying the user interface on a computing terminal of a corresponding data owner of the missing data.
Applicant’s Claim 19 merely teaches a generic user interface display. It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 19 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 20
Claim 20 recites:
20. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 17, wherein the method further comprises generating the semantic model of the rule via a plurality of interconnected triples stored in the knowledge graph, where each triple includes a subject corresponding to a keyword from the rule, a predicate corresponding to a property of the keyword, and an object corresponding to another keyword from the rule.
Applicant’s Claim 20 merely teaches a knowledge graph (i.e., mental steps). It does not integrate the abstract idea to a practical application, nor is it anything significantly more than the abstract idea. (See, 2106.05(a)(II).)
Claim 20 is, therefore, NOT ELIGIBLE subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Reasons for Not Rejecting the Clams Under Art
Claims 1, 3-9, 11-17, and 19-20 are not rejected since when reading the claims in light of the Specification, as per MPEP § 2111.01, none of the references of record, whether taken alone or in combination, discloses or suggests the combination of limitations specified in independent Claim 1. Specifically, the closest prior art of: Guu, et al., Traversing Knowledge Graphs in Vector Space, arXiv:1506.01094v2 [cs.CL] 19 AUG 2015, pp. 1-10 fails to expressly teach:
Claim 1's "...generating and transmitting data requests for the one or more entities in the determined order to one or more of a user interface and a computing terminal to collect the missing data to generate a complete data set..."
Claim 1's "...traversing the knowledge graph via a computer-implemented inference engine based on the input data and the received missing data..."
Further, none of the references of record, whether taken alone or in combination, discloses or suggests the combination of limitations specified in independent Claim 9. Specifically, the closest prior art of: Guu, et al. fails to expressly teach:
Claim 9's "...generating and transmitting data requests for the one or more entities in the determined order to one or more of a user interface and a computing terminal to collect the missing data to generate a complete data set..."
Claim 9's "...traversing the knowledge graph via a computer-implemented inference engine based on the input data and the received missing data..."
Further, none of the references of record, whether taken alone or in combination, discloses or suggests the combination of limitations specified in independent Claim 17. Specifically, the closest prior art of: Guu, et al. fails to expressly teach:
Claim 17's "...generating and transmitting data requests for the one or more entities in the determined order to one or more of a user interface and a computing terminal to collect the missing data to generate a complete data set..."
Claim 17's "...traversing the knowledge graph via a computer-implemented inference engine based on the input data and the received missing data..."
Only to the extent that these limitations (specifically as defined above) are not found in the prior art of record is the present case not rejected over the prior art.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed 29 JUN 2026 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Specifically, Applicant argues:
Argument 1
As discussed above, the Examiner appears to allege that the claims are directed to the
abstract groupings for "Mathematical Concepts" and "Mental Processes." [Office Action, P. 4.] Applicant notes, as discussed in the 2019 Guidance, the subject matter grouping for "Mathematical Concepts" is intended to include "mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical calculations". 2019 Guidance, page 9, lines 11-12. The subject matter grouping for "Mental Processes" is intended to include "concepts performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion)". 2019 Guidance, page 11, lines 1-2.
The present claims cannot be seen to even remotely correspond to the examples of the Mathematical Concepts or Mental Processes subject matter groupings. The present claims are directed to, inter alia, a computing system comprising: (a) a storage configured to store a knowledge graph with a semantic model of a plurality of rules embodied therein, wherein the semantic model embodied within the knowledge graph comprises nodes that represent entities within a particular rule of the rules, edges between the nodes that represent relationships between the entities, and identifiers of a data set used by the particular rule; and (b) a processor configured to perform an automated process comprising: (i) receiving first input data comprising one or more text-based rules; (ii) translating the text-based rules into a machine-readable format; (iii) generating the knowledge graph based on the translating of the text-based rules into the machine- readable format; (iv) receiving input data corresponding to the data set; (v) determining that the received input data is missing at least a portion of data necessary to apply the particular rule based on the semantic model of the particular rule embodied in the knowledge graph, determining an order in which the missing data should be collected and one or more entities from whom the missing data is to be collected, and generating and transmitting data requests for the one or more entities in the determined order to one or more of a user interface and a computing terminal to collect the missing data to generate a complete data set; (vi) in response to receiving the missing data, traversing the knowledge graph via a computer-implemented inference engine based on the input data and the received missing data to identify one or more patterns that fit the particular rule, and apply the semantic model of the particular rule stored within the knowledge graph to the input data to generate a determination; (vii) displaying a notification of the determination via a user interface; and (viii) updating the knowledge graph to incorporate new knowledge based on the determination.
Applicant notes that if a claim under evaluation is determined at Prong One to recite one of the enumerated abstract ideas, the Examiner is to evaluate, at Prong Two, whether the claim recites additional elements which integrate the exception into a practical application of that exception. If the recited exception is integrated into a practical application of the exception, then the claim is deemed eligible at Prong Two.
Numerous mental steps were found during examination and may be pointed out here. An example of one of them is the argued:
determining an order in which the missing data should be collected and one or more entities from whom the missing data is to be collected
Determining the entities from which to collect missing data is easily performed in the mind, especially when applicant doesn't even specify a criterion by which the determination is to be made. Any criterion of which the mind is capable is well within the broadest reasonable interpretation of the limitation.
Further, determining the order in which the missing data should be collected from those entities is equally capable of being performed in the mind. There are more limitations that are capable of being performed in the mind but these suffice to refute applicants argument.
Applicant’s argument is unpersuasive.
The rejections stand.
Argument 2
Applicant further submits that the present claims are clearly directed to a practical application under Prong Two, at least because the claims are directed to a technical improvement. As noted in the 2019 Guidance, integration of the exception in a practical application may include "an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to another technology or technical field". 2019 Guidance, page 19, lines 14-18.
Applicant respectfully notes MPEP § 2106.04(a), which unequivocally states "CLAIMS THAT ARE DIRECTED TO IMPROVEMENTS IN COMPUTER FUNCTIONALITY OR OTHER TECHNOLOGY ARE NOT ABSTRACT". Such improvements are described at, e.g., paragraphs 14, 15, 18, 26-27, and 30-31 of the specification of the present application as reproduced below (with emphasis added):
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Applicant argues that the claims are drawn to a “technical improvement.” The actual requirement is that the claims should be drawn to improving a technology. Applicant has not specified any technology that is being improved. No such improvements are limited in the claim.
Applicant’s argument is unpersuasive.
The rejections stand.
Argument 3
In view of the foregoing, Applicant respectfully submits that the claims do not recite an abstract idea and, even if determined to recite an abstract idea, clearly integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. Accordingly, the claims are not directed to an abstract idea and are eligible under § 101. It is therefore submitted that the rejection of claims 1, 3-9, 11-17, and 19-20 under 35 USC § 101 is traversed and should therefore be withdrawn.
Applicant’s arguments regarding claim one were unpersuasive. Regarding independent claims 9 and 17, similar arguments for similar claims are similarly unpersuasive. Regarding the claims that depend on these three independent claims, since there is no eligible matter in the independent claims themselves, there is no eligible matter that may be incorporated by reference to the dependent claims to cure them.
Applicant’s argument is unpersuasive.
The rejections stand.
Argument 4
Applicant's failure to comment directly upon any of the positions asserted by the Examiner in the Office Action does not indicate agreement or acquiescence with those asserted positions since the Examiner's other positions are believed to be moot in light of the foregoing.
Though applicant did not express any agreement or acquiescence with examiners asserted positions, applicant did not shift the burden of proof regarding these issues.
Applicants arguments on persuasive.
The rejections stand.
Conclusion
Any inquiries concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Wilbert L. Starks, Jr., who may be reached Monday through Friday, between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. EST. or via telephone at (571) 272-3691 or email: Wilbert.Starks@uspto.gov.
If you need to send an Official facsimile transmission, please send it to (571) 273-8300.
If attempts to reach the examiner are unsuccessful the Examiner’s Supervisor (SPE), Kakali Chaki, may be reached at (571) 272-3719.
Hand-delivered responses should be delivered to the Receptionist @ (Customer Service Window Randolph Building 401 Dulany Street, Alexandria, VA 22313), located on the first floor of the south side of the Randolph Building.
Finally, information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Moreover, status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see http://pair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have any questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) toll-free @ 1-866-217-9197.
/WILBERT L STARKS/
Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2122
WLS
18 SEP 2026
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