[AltContent: rect] DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
This communication is in response to the amendments filed on 05/15/2026. Claims 1-20 are currently pending in the application.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed on 05/15/2026 regarding claim 1 have been fully considered but they are moot in view of another reference that addresses applicant’s concern.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claims 1-6, 9-18, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US PGPub. No. 20220417887 to LI et al. (hereinafter LI) in view of US PGPub. No. 20200120491 to Mildh (hereinafter Mildh).
Regarding claim 1, LI discloses an integrity protection method (¶0006, “The present disclosure provides a method, an apparatus and a device for location service processing, and a medium, to solve the problem of how to set and feedback to meet the integrity QoS index requirement”), (¶0175, “… the network finally calculates and obtains the integrity protection value based on the measurement value reported by the terminal and the monitoring result of the network itself”), comprising:
calculating, by an integrity protection system (¶0107-¶110, FIG. 1, the terminal and LMF), first information according to target risk tolerance (¶0043, “in a case that the terminal supports a UE-Assisted capability, the terminal performs auxiliary measurement function and integrity auxiliary monitoring according to one or a combination of the integrity risk requirement, the horizontal location alert limit, the vertical location alert limit, the reliability requirement indication, the horizontal location alert valid time, and the vertical location alert valid time in the QoS index requirement containing integrity, and then acquires a measurement value”), (¶0119, “the integrity risk refers to a probability that a location error exceeds a tolerance limit.”), wherein the first information comprises a positioning integrity protection level corresponding to positioning information of a first communication device or a second communication device (¶0220, “When the LMF receives the measurement value, it performs weighted calculation in combination with other GNSS integrity components to obtain the integrity PL (protection level) value of the terminal, and compares it with the AL to obtain the result of whether the GNSS system positioning is reliable.”), (¶0106, “The QoS requirement of the location service is defined in the LPP protocol, which is notified to the terminal by the LMF (Location Management Function) location server. The QoS contains the requirement for positioning accuracy, including the accuracy requirement for the horizontal location within a certain confidence interval (confidence) and the accuracy requirement for the vertical location within a certain confidence interval.”), wherein the positioning information is obtained by performing positioning measurement by the first communication device or the second communication device based on positioning assistance data sent from a network side device comprising a Location Management Function (LMF) (¶0109-¶0110, “…the UE-Assisted terminal provides the network with the measurement amount through the providelocationinformation in the auxiliary positioning measurement, so as to help the location server LMF to perform the location calculation.”), (¶0216-¶0220, “When the UE supporting only the UE-Assisted capability performs the GNSS positioning method under the request of RequestLocationInformation, and completes the related integrity function monitoring and auxiliary measurement, it provides the integrity-related auxiliary measurement values to the network through the LPP protocol ProvideLocationInformation, which include one or a combination of the following information:…”) ; and
wherein the target system comprises the first communication device and the second communication device (¶0106-¶0110, FIG. 1, Terminal, and LMF server).
LI discloses determination of reliability of the system (¶0177, “… the terminal supporting UE-based capability also needs to calculate the PL according to the QoS value, decide whether the system is reliable, and then send the result to the network.”)
However, LI does not explicitly disclose the limitation of:
performing an integrity check by using the first information to determine the degree of reliability of a target system,
Mildh discloses performing an integrity check by using the first information to determine the degree of reliability of a target system (¶0009, “…The 3GPP LTE RRC specification TS 36.331 v15.0.0 specifies how the UE on the RRC level verifies the integrity of these messages. In all of these cases, the UE RRC, upon reception of the message, asks lower layers (e.g., Packet Data Convergence Protocol, or PDCP) to verify the integrity of the message. If the message is verified, the UE RRC layer configures the lower layers to apply ciphering and integrity production of all subsequent messages. For example, upon receiving the SecurityModeCommand, the UE shall request lower layers to verify the integrity protection of the SecurityModeCommand message, using the algorithm indicated by the integrityProtAlgorithm as included in the SecurityModeCommand message and the KRRC.sub.int key. If the SecurityModeCommand message passes the integrity protection check, the lower layers are configured to apply integrity protection using the indicated algorithm and the KRRC.sub.int key immediately to all subsequent messages…”, wherein SecurityModeCommand message passing the integrity protection check is an indication of the reliability level of the system), (¶0062, “The network may, however, perform corresponding functions in support, including: receiving the RRCResumeRequest; locating the UE context related to the Resume ID or I-RNTI provided by the UE in the RRCResumeRequest message; calculating/deriving the UE security Keys; verifying the security token of the RRCResumeRequest message; starting encryption/integrity protection; and/or sending the RRCResume message to the UE (or any other message that could be sent in response to an RRCResumeRequest such as RRCReject, RRCRelease or RRCSuspend). This message is encrypted and integrity protected…, wherein the message being encrypted and integrity protected is also an indication of the degree of reliability of the system), (¶0135, “…the teachings of these embodiments may help the network to encrypt the RRCResume/RRCConnectionResume (or any other message transmitted in response to an RRCConnectionRequest), which increases security and privacy while speeding up the RRC connection resumption, since no additional encrypted message is needed. These embodiments will result in improved performance, such as better and more consistent throughput, and/or reduced delays for users of the RAN, including during idle/connection transitions.”),
Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious before the effective filing date of applicant’s claimed invention to modify the method of LI to include determination of degree of reliability of the system as disclosed by Mildh and be motivated in doing so in order to prevent system failures and optimizes maintenance costs.
Regarding claim 13, Li discloses a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing computer programs or instructions that, executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform an integrity protection method comprising (¶0324-¶0325, “…These program instructions may also be stored in a computer readable storage capable of guiding a computer or other programmable data processing devices to work in a specific manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer readable storage produce a manufactured article including the instruction means which implements the functions specified in one or more of the processes in the flowcharts and/or one or more of the blocks in the block diagrams.”), (¶0006, “The present disclosure provides a method, an apparatus and a device for location service processing, and a medium, to solve the problem of how to set and feedback to meet the integrity QoS index requirement”), (¶0175, “… the network finally calculates and obtains the integrity protection value based on the measurement value reported by the terminal and the monitoring result of the network itself”):
calculating, first information according to target risk tolerance (¶0043, “in a case that the terminal supports a UE-Assisted capability, the terminal performs auxiliary measurement function and integrity auxiliary monitoring according to one or a combination of the integrity risk requirement, the horizontal location alert limit, the vertical location alert limit, the reliability requirement indication, the horizontal location alert valid time, and the vertical location alert valid time in the QoS index requirement containing integrity, and then acquires a measurement value”), (¶0119, “the integrity risk refers to a probability that a location error exceeds a tolerance limit.”), wherein the first information comprises a positioning integrity protection level corresponding to positioning information of a first communication device or a second communication device (¶0220, “When the LMF receives the measurement value, it performs weighted calculation in combination with other GNSS integrity components to obtain the integrity PL (protection level) value of the terminal, and compares it with the AL to obtain the result of whether the GNSS system positioning is reliable.”), (¶0106, “The QoS requirement of the location service is defined in the LPP protocol, which is notified to the terminal by the LMF (Location Management Function) location server. The QoS contains the requirement for positioning accuracy, including the accuracy requirement for the horizontal location within a certain confidence interval (confidence) and the accuracy requirement for the vertical location within a certain confidence interval.”), wherein the positioning information is obtained by performing positioning measurement by the first communication device or the second communication device based on positioning assistance data sent from a network side device comprising a Location Management Function (LMF) (¶0109-¶0110, “…the UE-Assisted terminal provides the network with the measurement amount through the providelocationinformation in the auxiliary positioning measurement, so as to help the location server LMF to perform the location calculation.”), (¶0216-¶0220, “When the UE supporting only the UE-Assisted capability performs the GNSS positioning method under the request of RequestLocationInformation, and completes the related integrity function monitoring and auxiliary measurement, it provides the integrity-related auxiliary measurement values to the network through the LPP protocol ProvideLocationInformation, which include one or a combination of the following information:…”) ; and
wherein the target system comprises the first communication device and the second communication device (¶0106-¶0110, FIG. 1, Terminal, and LMF server).
LI discloses determination of reliability of the system (¶0177, “… the terminal supporting UE-based capability also needs to calculate the PL according to the QoS value, decide whether the system is reliable, and then send the result to the network.”)
However, LI does not explicitly disclose the limitation of:
performing an integrity check by using the first information to determine the degree of reliability of a target system,
Mildh discloses performing an integrity check by using the first information to determine the degree of reliability of a target system (¶0009, “…The 3GPP LTE RRC specification TS 36.331 v15.0.0 specifies how the UE on the RRC level verifies the integrity of these messages. In all of these cases, the UE RRC, upon reception of the message, asks lower layers (e.g., Packet Data Convergence Protocol, or PDCP) to verify the integrity of the message. If the message is verified, the UE RRC layer configures the lower layers to apply ciphering and integrity production of all subsequent messages. For example, upon receiving the SecurityModeCommand, the UE shall request lower layers to verify the integrity protection of the SecurityModeCommand message, using the algorithm indicated by the integrityProtAlgorithm as included in the SecurityModeCommand message and the KRRC.sub.int key. If the SecurityModeCommand message passes the integrity protection check, the lower layers are configured to apply integrity protection using the indicated algorithm and the KRRC.sub.int key immediately to all subsequent messages…”, wherein SecurityModeCommand message passing the integrity protection check is an indication of the reliability level of the system), (¶0062, “The network may, however, perform corresponding functions in support, including: receiving the RRCResumeRequest; locating the UE context related to the Resume ID or I-RNTI provided by the UE in the RRCResumeRequest message; calculating/deriving the UE security Keys; verifying the security token of the RRCResumeRequest message; starting encryption/integrity protection; and/or sending the RRCResume message to the UE (or any other message that could be sent in response to an RRCResumeRequest such as RRCReject, RRCRelease or RRCSuspend). This message is encrypted and integrity protected…, wherein the message being encrypted and integrity protected is also an indication of the degree of reliability of the system), (¶0135, “…the teachings of these embodiments may help the network to encrypt the RRCResume/RRCConnectionResume (or any other message transmitted in response to an RRCConnectionRequest), which increases security and privacy while speeding up the RRC connection resumption, since no additional encrypted message is needed. These embodiments will result in improved performance, such as better and more consistent throughput, and/or reduced delays for users of the RAN, including during idle/connection transitions.”),
Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious before the effective filing date of applicant’s claimed invention to modify the method of LI to include determination of degree of reliability of the system as disclosed by Mildh and be motivated in doing so in order to prevent system failures and optimizes maintenance costs.
Regarding claim 20, LI discloses a chip, comprising a processor (¶0327, “the embodiments described in the embodiments of the present disclosure may be implemented by hardware, software, firmware, middleware, microcode, or a combination thereof. For hardware implementation, each module, unit, sub-unit or sub-module, etc. can be implemented in one or more Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs), Digital Signal Processings (DSPs), DSP Devices (DSPDs), Programmable Logic Devices (PLDs), Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), general-purpose processors, controllers, microcontrollers, microprocessors, other electronic units or combinations thereof that perform the functions described in this disclosure”)
a communications interface coupled with the processor (FIGs. 4 and 6); and
a memory storing having a computer program storing thereon, wherein the computer program, when executed by the processor, causes the processor to implement an integrity protection method comprising (¶0324-¶0325, “…These program instructions may also be stored in a computer readable storage capable of guiding a computer or other programmable data processing devices to work in a specific manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer readable storage produce a manufactured article including the instruction means which implements the functions specified in one or more of the processes in the flowcharts and/or one or more of the blocks in the block diagrams.”), (¶0006, “The present disclosure provides a method, an apparatus and a device for location service processing, and a medium, to solve the problem of how to set and feedback to meet the integrity QoS index requirement”), (¶0175, “… the network finally calculates and obtains the integrity protection value based on the measurement value reported by the terminal and the monitoring result of the network itself”):
calculating, first information according to target risk tolerance (¶0043, “in a case that the terminal supports a UE-Assisted capability, the terminal performs auxiliary measurement function and integrity auxiliary monitoring according to one or a combination of the integrity risk requirement, the horizontal location alert limit, the vertical location alert limit, the reliability requirement indication, the horizontal location alert valid time, and the vertical location alert valid time in the QoS index requirement containing integrity, and then acquires a measurement value”), (¶0119, “the integrity risk refers to a probability that a location error exceeds a tolerance limit.”), wherein the first information comprises a positioning integrity protection level corresponding to positioning information of a first communication device or a second communication device (¶0220, “When the LMF receives the measurement value, it performs weighted calculation in combination with other GNSS integrity components to obtain the integrity PL (protection level) value of the terminal, and compares it with the AL to obtain the result of whether the GNSS system positioning is reliable.”), (¶0106, “The QoS requirement of the location service is defined in the LPP protocol, which is notified to the terminal by the LMF (Location Management Function) location server. The QoS contains the requirement for positioning accuracy, including the accuracy requirement for the horizontal location within a certain confidence interval (confidence) and the accuracy requirement for the vertical location within a certain confidence interval.”), wherein the positioning information is obtained by performing positioning measurement by the first communication device or the second communication device based on positioning assistance data sent from a network side device comprising a Location Management Function (LMF) (¶0109-¶0110, “…the UE-Assisted terminal provides the network with the measurement amount through the providelocationinformation in the auxiliary positioning measurement, so as to help the location server LMF to perform the location calculation.”), (¶0216-¶0220, “When the UE supporting only the UE-Assisted capability performs the GNSS positioning method under the request of RequestLocationInformation, and completes the related integrity function monitoring and auxiliary measurement, it provides the integrity-related auxiliary measurement values to the network through the LPP protocol ProvideLocationInformation, which include one or a combination of the following information:…”) ; and
wherein the target system comprises the first communication device and the second communication device (¶0106-¶0110, FIG. 1, Terminal, and LMF server).
LI discloses determination of reliability of the system (¶0177, “… the terminal supporting UE-based capability also needs to calculate the PL according to the QoS value, decide whether the system is reliable, and then send the result to the network.”)
However, LI does not explicitly disclose the limitation of:
performing an integrity check by using the first information to determine the degree of reliability of a target system,
Mildh discloses performing an integrity check by using the first information to determine the degree of reliability of a target system (¶0009, “…The 3GPP LTE RRC specification TS 36.331 v15.0.0 specifies how the UE on the RRC level verifies the integrity of these messages. In all of these cases, the UE RRC, upon reception of the message, asks lower layers (e.g., Packet Data Convergence Protocol, or PDCP) to verify the integrity of the message. If the message is verified, the UE RRC layer configures the lower layers to apply ciphering and integrity production of all subsequent messages. For example, upon receiving the SecurityModeCommand, the UE shall request lower layers to verify the integrity protection of the SecurityModeCommand message, using the algorithm indicated by the integrityProtAlgorithm as included in the SecurityModeCommand message and the KRRC.sub.int key. If the SecurityModeCommand message passes the integrity protection check, the lower layers are configured to apply integrity protection using the indicated algorithm and the KRRC.sub.int key immediately to all subsequent messages…”, wherein SecurityModeCommand message passing the integrity protection check is an indication of the reliability level of the system), (¶0062, “The network may, however, perform corresponding functions in support, including: receiving the RRCResumeRequest; locating the UE context related to the Resume ID or I-RNTI provided by the UE in the RRCResumeRequest message; calculating/deriving the UE security Keys; verifying the security token of the RRCResumeRequest message; starting encryption/integrity protection; and/or sending the RRCResume message to the UE (or any other message that could be sent in response to an RRCResumeRequest such as RRCReject, RRCRelease or RRCSuspend). This message is encrypted and integrity protected…, wherein the message being encrypted and integrity protected is also an indication of the degree of reliability of the system), (¶0135, “…the teachings of these embodiments may help the network to encrypt the RRCResume/RRCConnectionResume (or any other message transmitted in response to an RRCConnectionRequest), which increases security and privacy while speeding up the RRC connection resumption, since no additional encrypted message is needed. These embodiments will result in improved performance, such as better and more consistent throughput, and/or reduced delays for users of the RAN, including during idle/connection transitions.”),
Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious before the effective filing date of applicant’s claimed invention to modify the method of LI to include determination of degree of reliability of the system as disclosed by Mildh and be motivated in doing so in order to prevent system failures and optimizes maintenance costs.
Regarding claim 2, LI in view of Mildh discloses the integrity protection method according to claim 1.
LI further discloses wherein the first information is further used to indicate at least one of the following:
whether the first communication device fails; whether the second communication device fails; or whether the target system fails (¶0203, “… For example, the calculated horizontal location error exceeds the horizontal location alert limit by 0.16 meters within the TTA time, or the vertical location error exceeds the alert limit by 0.08 meters within the TTA time, it means that the system has reached the critical point, and the terminal will notify the server in this message that this calculated location estimation is not reliable. Then the UE will send the calculated location information to the LMF through the ProvideLocationInformation message in the LPP signaling, and at the same time feed back the integrity satisfaction feedback in this message to indicate that the integrity horizontal and vertical location protection values corresponding to the calculated location this time exceed the specified limits, and indicate that the current terminal positioning system is no longer reliable, and report the calculated integrity protection value PL.”).
Regarding claim 14, LI in view of Mildh discloses the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium according to claim 13.
LI further discloses wherein the first information is further used to indicate at least one of the following:
whether the first communication device fails; whether the second communication device fails; or whether the target system fails (¶0203, “… For example, the calculated horizontal location error exceeds the horizontal location alert limit by 0.16 meters within the TTA time, or the vertical location error exceeds the alert limit by 0.08 meters within the TTA time, it means that the system has reached the critical point, and the terminal will notify the server in this message that this calculated location estimation is not reliable. Then the UE will send the calculated location information to the LMF through the ProvideLocationInformation message in the LPP signaling, and at the same time feed back the integrity satisfaction feedback in this message to indicate that the integrity horizontal and vertical location protection values corresponding to the calculated location this time exceed the specified limits, and indicate that the current terminal positioning system is no longer reliable, and report the calculated integrity protection value PL.”).
Regarding claim 3, LI in view of Mildh discloses the integrity protection method according to claim 1.
LI further discloses wherein the first information is used for integrity protection of at least one of: location information, speed information, or clock information of the first communication device (¶0203, “… For example, the calculated horizontal location error exceeds the horizontal location alert limit by 0.16 meters within the TTA time, or the vertical location error exceeds the alert limit by 0.08 meters within the TTA time, it means that the system has reached the critical point, and the terminal will notify the server in this message that this calculated location estimation is not reliable. Then the UE will send the calculated location information to the LMF through the ProvideLocationInformation message in the LPP signaling, and at the same time feed back the integrity satisfaction feedback in this message to indicate that the integrity horizontal and vertical location protection values corresponding to the calculated location this time exceed the specified limits, and indicate that the current terminal positioning system is no longer reliable, and report the calculated integrity protection value PL.”).
Regarding claim 15, LI in view of Mildh discloses the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium according to claim 13.
LI further discloses wherein the first information is used for integrity protection of at least one of: location information, speed information, or clock information of the first communication device (¶0203, “… For example, the calculated horizontal location error exceeds the horizontal location alert limit by 0.16 meters within the TTA time, or the vertical location error exceeds the alert limit by 0.08 meters within the TTA time, it means that the system has reached the critical point, and the terminal will notify the server in this message that this calculated location estimation is not reliable. Then the UE will send the calculated location information to the LMF through the ProvideLocationInformation message in the LPP signaling, and at the same time feed back the integrity satisfaction feedback in this message to indicate that the integrity horizontal and vertical location protection values corresponding to the calculated location this time exceed the specified limits, and indicate that the current terminal positioning system is no longer reliable, and report the calculated integrity protection value PL”).
Regarding claim 4, LI in view of Mildh discloses the integrity protection method according to claim 3.
LI further discloses wherein the first information is used for integrity protection of the location information (¶0175, “… the terminal performs auxiliary measurement function and integrity auxiliary monitoring according to one or a combination of the integrity risk requirement, the horizontal location alert limit, the vertical location alert limit, the reliability requirement indication, the horizontal location alert valid time, and the vertical location alert valid time in the QoS index requirement containing integrity, and then acquires a measurement value; the network finally calculates and obtains the integrity protection value based on the measurement value reported by the terminal and the monitoring result of the network itself”), and
the method further comprises: receiving second information, wherein the second information comprises at least the following one:
positioning assistance data;
positioning integrity risks;
positioning integrity protection level (¶0190, “… Therefore, when reporting the measured value, it also carries the integrity alert indication component, prompting the system which test components enters an unreliable state, and assists the network server in the location calculation and the calculation of the integrity PL. (protection level)”);
positioning integrity risk alarm level (¶0204, “the terminal supports the UE-Assisted capability, and the terminal performs auxiliary measurement function and integrity auxiliary monitoring according to one or a combination of the integrity risk requirement Irisk, the horizontal location alert limit, the vertical location alert limit, the reliability requirement indication Authentication Flag, the horizontal location alert valid time…”);
reporting time of positioning integrity risk events;
positioning integrity protection threshold;
positioning accuracy requirements; or
integrity indicator requirements.
Regarding claim 16, LI in view of Mildh discloses the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium according to claim 15.
LI further discloses wherein the first information is used for integrity protection of the location information (¶0175, “… the terminal performs auxiliary measurement function and integrity auxiliary monitoring according to one or a combination of the integrity risk requirement, the horizontal location alert limit, the vertical location alert limit, the reliability requirement indication, the horizontal location alert valid time, and the vertical location alert valid time in the QoS index requirement containing integrity, and then acquires a measurement value; the network finally calculates and obtains the integrity protection value based on the measurement value reported by the terminal and the monitoring result of the network itself”), and
the method further comprises: receiving second information, wherein the second information comprises at least the following one:
positioning assistance data;
positioning integrity risks;
positioning integrity protection level (¶0190, “… Therefore, when reporting the measured value, it also carries the integrity alert indication component, prompting the system which test components enters an unreliable state, and assists the network server in the location calculation and the calculation of the integrity PL. (protection level)”);
positioning integrity risk alarm level (¶0204, “the terminal supports the UE-Assisted capability, and the terminal performs auxiliary measurement function and integrity auxiliary monitoring according to one or a combination of the integrity risk requirement Irisk, the horizontal location alert limit, the vertical location alert limit, the reliability requirement indication Authentication Flag, the horizontal location alert valid time,…”);
reporting time of positioning integrity risk events;
positioning integrity protection threshold;
positioning accuracy requirements; or
integrity indicator requirements.
Regarding claim 9, LI in view of Mildh discloses the integrity protection method according to claim 1.
LI further discloses wherein the first communication device and the second communication device meet one of the following requirements: the first communication device is a terminal, and the second communication device is a network side device; the first communication device is a network side device, and the second communication device is a terminal; the first communication device is a terminal, and the second communication device is a terminal; or the first communication device is a network side device, and the second communication device is a network side device (¶0106-¶0110, FIG. 1, Terminal, and LMF server, wherein the LMF server is a network side device).
Regarding claim 10, LI in view of Mildh discloses the integrity protection method according to claim 9.
LI further discloses wherein the network side device comprises at least one of the following: a radio access network side (¶0162, “integrity parameter values for the RAT-dependent (RAT: Radio Access Technology) measurement components…”); an Authentication Management Function (AMF); positioning server; positioning application; satellite positioning system correction system; or integrity correction system (¶0161, “… a carrier phase integrity correction parameter value”), wherein intercommunication of integrity capabilities can be realized between at least two network side devices (¶0234, LMF server and base station), and the intercommunication method comprises at least one of the following: interface signaling intercommunication (¶0297, FIG. 6, “…The bus interface provides interfaces. The transceiver 610 may be a plurality of elements, including a transmitter and a receiver, and provides units for communicating with various other devices on a transmission medium. For different user equipment, the user interface 630 may also be an interface capable of connecting the required devices externally and internally, and the connected devices includes but is not limited to a keypad, a display, a speaker, a microphone, a joystick, and the like.”); or data server sharing.
Regarding claim 11, LI in view of Mildh discloses the integrity protection method according to claim 9.
LI further discloses wherein the terminal is further configured to report the integrity capability of the terminal to the network side device in at least one of the following ways: (¶0175, “in a case that the terminal supports the UE-Assisted capability, the terminal performs auxiliary measurement function and integrity auxiliary monitoring according to one or a combination of the integrity risk requirement, the horizontal location alert limit, the vertical location alert limit, the reliability requirement indication, the horizontal location alert valid time, and the vertical location alert valid time in the QoS index requirement containing integrity, and then acquires a measurement value; the network finally calculates and obtains the integrity protection value based on the measurement value reported by the terminal and the monitoring result of the network itself”)
reporting the integrity capability through signaling (¶0156, “… the QoS index requirement containing integrity may be carried by the LPP signaling RequestLocationInformation or by another message; the measurement value returned by the terminal may be carried by the LPP signaling ProvideLocationInformation or by another message, which will not be limited in this application.”);
reporting the integrity capability through IP packets; or
reporting the integrity capability through the positioning protocol (¶0009, “the LMF sending a QoS index requirement containing integrity to a terminal through LPP (LTE positioning protocol”);
Regarding claim 12, LI in view of Mildh discloses the integrity protection method according to claim 9.
LI further discloses wherein the network side device is further configured to notify the terminal of the integrity capability of the network side device in at least one of the following ways (¶0322, “Since the terminal can be notified that the integrity is required to be satisfied, the NR terminal can obtain the location service integrity requirements provided (required) by the network side in time. The terminal will also feed back to the network whether the integrity requirements are met.”):
notifying the integrity capability by paging signaling;
notifying the integrity capability through IP packets;
notifying the integrity capability through location protocol (¶0009, “the LMF sending a QoS index requirement containing integrity to a terminal through LPP (LTE positioning protocol”); or
notifying the integrity capability through broadcast, wherein the network side device is further configured to notify the terminal of the error information of the network side device through signaling or broadcasting (¶0189, “When the UE supporting only the UE-Assisted capability receives the LPP signaling RequestLocationInformation from the server, it reads the integrity-related requirement in the QoS, and performs auxiliary measurement function and supports integrity auxiliary monitoring on the terminal side according to the parameters such as Irisk, AL, Authentication Flag, TTA, etc., in the QoS, combined with the auxiliary data and its integrity indication broadcasted by the network.”), (¶0129, “After the integrity function is introduced, the terminal can be informed of the tolerable range of location errors for the location service according to the requirements of different scenarios, and the extremely bad points of these location estimations will be limited to avoid the loss of life and property caused by positioning system errors, and to avoid legal liability caused by location errors; when the risk exceeds the control range, the system will accurately and timely alert the user to fully protect the user's safety…”);
Regarding claim 5, LI in view of Mildh discloses the integrity protection method according to claim 4.
LI further discloses receiving second information through broadcast (¶0189, “ When the UE supporting only the UE-Assisted capability receives the LPP signaling RequestLocationInformation from the server, it reads the integrity-related requirement in the QoS, and performs auxiliary measurement function and supports integrity auxiliary monitoring on the terminal side according to the parameters such as Irisk, AL, Authentication Flag, TTA, etc., in the QoS, combined with the auxiliary data and its integrity indication broadcasted by the network.”), (¶0202, “When the UE supporting the UE-based capability receives the LPP signaling RequestLocationInformation from the server in the connected state, it reads the integrity-related requirement in the QoS, including the parameters such as PL, Irisk, AL, Authentication Flag, etc., in the QoS, and further reads the auxiliary data broadcasted by the network…”), see also Mildh ¶0006 regarding paging.
Regarding claim 17, LI in view of Mildh discloses the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium according to claim 16.
LI further discloses receiving second information through broadcast (¶0189, “ When the UE supporting only the UE-Assisted capability receives the LPP signaling RequestLocationInformation from the server, it reads the integrity-related requirement in the QoS, and performs auxiliary measurement function and supports integrity auxiliary monitoring on the terminal side according to the parameters such as Irisk, AL, Authentication Flag, TTA, etc., in the QoS, combined with the auxiliary data and its integrity indication broadcasted by the network.”), (¶0202, “When the UE supporting the UE-based capability receives the LPP signaling RequestLocationInformation from the server in the connected state, it reads the integrity-related requirement in the QoS, including the parameters such as PL, Irisk, AL, Authentication Flag, etc., in the QoS, and further reads the auxiliary data broadcasted by the network…”), see also Mildh ¶0006 regarding paging.
Regarding claim 6, LI in view of Mildh discloses the integrity protection method according to claim 4.
LI further discloses wherein the method further comprises: issuing an alarm when the obtained positioning integrity protection level is greater than the positioning integrity risk alarm level (¶0114-¶0122, “indicating a horizontal location estimation error, and requires that a probability of the horizontal location estimation error greater than PL (location protection value, ProtectionLevel) should be lower than a value of a risk requirement Irisk, P(ε>PL)<Irisk… The operation becomes dangerous if the location error exceeds the ProtectionLevel limit in any dimension or equivalent dimension. Therefore, when the system believes that the application becomes unavailable, it starts to alert, so as to protect the integrity from loss.”), wherein the positioning integrity protection level is provided by the first communication device (¶0191, “In some optional embodiments, the PL (protection level) is calculated by the UE or the LMF according to the measurement value, and does not need to be reflected in the QoS”) and the positioning integrity risk alarm level is provided by the second communication device (¶0189, “ When the UE supporting only the UE-Assisted capability receives the LPP signaling RequestLocationInformation from the server, it reads the integrity-related requirement in the QoS, and performs auxiliary measurement function and supports integrity auxiliary monitoring on the terminal side according to the parameters such as Irisk, AL, Authentication Flag, TTA, etc., in the QoS, combined with the auxiliary data and its integrity indication broadcasted by the network.”), (¶0192, “ the terminal supports the UE-based capability, and the terminal performs auxiliary measurement function and integrity auxiliary monitoring according to one or a combination of the location protection value PL, the integrity risk requirement Irisk, the horizontal location alert limit, the vertical location alert limit, the reliability requirement indication Authentication Flag in the QoS index requirement containing integrity, and then acquires a measurement value.”); or the positioning integrity protection level is provided by the second communication device, and the positioning integrity risk alarm level is provided by the first communication device; or the positioning integrity protection level is provided by the first communication device, and the positioning integrity risk alarm level is provided by the first communication device; or the positioning integrity protection level is provided by the second communication device, and the positioning integrity risk alarm level is provided by the second communication device.
Regarding claim 18, LI in view of Mildh discloses the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium according to claim 16.
LI further discloses wherein the method further comprises: issuing an alarm when the obtained positioning integrity protection level is greater than the positioning integrity risk alarm level (¶0114-¶0122, “indicating a horizontal location estimation error, and requires that a probability of the horizontal location estimation error greater than PL (location protection value, ProtectionLevel) should be lower than a value of a risk requirement Irisk, P(ε>PL)<Irisk… The operation becomes dangerous if the location error exceeds the ProtectionLevel limit in any dimension or equivalent dimension. Therefore, when the system believes that the application becomes unavailable, it starts to alert, so as to protect the integrity from loss.”), wherein the positioning integrity protection level is provided by the first communication device (¶0191, “In some optional embodiments, the PL (protection level) is calculated by the UE or the LMF according to the measurement value, and does not need to be reflected in the QoS”) and the positioning integrity risk alarm level is provided by the second communication device (¶0189, “ When the UE supporting only the UE-Assisted capability receives the LPP signaling RequestLocationInformation from the server, it reads the integrity-related requirement in the QoS, and performs auxiliary measurement function and supports integrity auxiliary monitoring on the terminal side according to the parameters such as Irisk, AL, Authentication Flag, TTA, etc., in the QoS, combined with the auxiliary data and its integrity indication broadcasted by the network.”), (¶0192, “ the terminal supports the UE-based capability, and the terminal performs auxiliary measurement function and integrity auxiliary monitoring according to one or a combination of the location protection value PL, the integrity risk requirement Irisk, the horizontal location alert limit, the vertical location alert limit, the reliability requirement indication Authentication Flag in the QoS index requirement containing integrity, and then acquires a measurement value.”); or the positioning integrity protection level is provided by the second communication device, and the positioning integrity risk alarm level is provided by the first communication device; or the positioning integrity protection level is provided by the first communication device, and the positioning integrity risk alarm level is provided by the first communication device; or the positioning integrity protection level is provided by the second communication device, and the positioning integrity risk alarm level is provided by the second communication device.
Claims 7, and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US PGPub. No. 20220417887 to LI et al. (hereinafter LI) in view of US PGPub. No. 20200120491 to Mildh (hereinafter Mildh) and further in view of US PGPub. No. 20230152469 to LIU et al. (hereinafter LIU).
Regarding claim 7, LI in view of Mildh discloses the integrity protection method according to claim 3.
LI further discloses wherein the first information is used for integrity protection of the location information (¶0175-¶0176, “… the terminal performs auxiliary measurement function and integrity auxiliary monitoring according to one or a combination of the integrity risk requirement, the horizontal location alert limit, the vertical location alert limit, and the reliability requirement indication in the QoS index requirement containing integrity, and then acquires a measurement value, so that the integrity protection value is calculated and obtained according to the measurement value.”), and
Mildh discloses the performing an integrity check by using the first information to determine the degree of reliability of the target system (¶0009, “…The 3GPP LTE RRC specification TS 36.331 v15.0.0 specifies how the UE on the RRC level verifies the integrity of these messages. In all of these cases, the UE RRC, upon reception of the message, asks lower layers (e.g., Packet Data Convergence Protocol, or PDCP) to verify the integrity of the message. If the message is verified, the UE RRC layer configures the lower layers to apply ciphering and integrity production of all subsequent messages. For example, upon receiving the SecurityModeCommand, the UE shall request lower layers to verify the integrity protection of the SecurityModeCommand message, using the algorithm indicated by the integrityProtAlgorithm as included in the SecurityModeCommand message and the KRRC.sub.int key. If the SecurityModeCommand message passes the integrity protection check, the lower layers are configured to apply integrity protection using the indicated algorithm and the KRRC.sub.int key immediately to all subsequent messages…”, wherein SecurityModeCommand message passing the integrity protection check is an indication of the reliability level of the system), (¶0062, “The network may, however, perform corresponding functions in support, including: receiving the RRCResumeRequest; locating the UE context related to the Resume ID or I-RNTI provided by the UE in the RRCResumeRequest message; calculating/deriving the UE security Keys; verifying the security token of the RRCResumeRequest message; starting encryption/integrity protection; and/or sending the RRCResume message to the UE (or any other message that could be sent in response to an RRCResumeRequest such as RRCReject, RRCRelease or RRCSuspend). This message is encrypted and integrity protected…, wherein the message being encrypted and integrity protected is also an indication of the degree of reliability of the system), (¶0135, “…the teachings of these embodiments may help the network to encrypt the RRCResume/RRCConnectionResume (or any other message transmitted in response to an RRCConnectionRequest), which increases security and privacy while speeding up the RRC connection resumption, since no additional encrypted message is needed. These embodiments will result in improved performance, such as better and more consistent throughput, and/or reduced delays for users of the RAN, including during idle/connection transitions.”),
Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious before the effective filing date of applicant’s claimed invention to modify the method of LI to include determination of degree of reliability of the system as disclosed by Mildh and be motivated in doing so in order to prevent system failures and optimizes maintenance costs.
However, LI in view of Mildh does not explicitly disclose the following limitation:
performing an integrity check by using the first information and at least one of the following to determine the degree of reliability of a target system: orbit information or map information of the first communication device.
LIU discloses wherein the first information is used for integrity protection of the location information, and the performing an integrity check through the first information to determine the degree of reliability of the target system comprises (¶0110, “integrity (integrity) in embodiments of this application may also have another name, for example, intactness or completeness. This is not limited in this application. Different names all express a same physical meaning, that is, refer to a trusted program or reliability of a measurement value of a measured parameter. For example, in the positioning system in this application, “positioning integrity” is reliability of a positioning result.”), (¶0017, “the positioning device sends a request location information message to the terminal device, where the request location information message is used to request location information of the terminal device or a measurement amount for location calculation; and the positioning device receives a provide location information message from the terminal device, where the provide location information (first information) message carries the positioning integrity information.”), (¶0157-¶0158, “the input data of the first scenario, where the input data of the first scenario includes one or more of the following: environment information, time information, and location information of the terminal device…The integrity result information includes one or more of the following items: information about whether the integrity risk occurs, a positioning error, or an integrity level.”):
performing an integrity check by using the first information and at least one of the following to determine the degree of reliability of a target system: orbit information or map information of the first communication device (¶0003, “integrity (integrity) may be used as an important indicator for measuring reliability of information provided by a system, to ensure that the system can make a correct decision in real time to avoid occurrence of a fault. In a positioning system, research on integrity is mainly focused on a satellite navigation positioning system. This is mainly because the satellite navigation positioning system has a high requirement for positioning accuracy, which is far higher than a radio access technology (radio access technology, RAT)-dependent positioning requirement in the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (the third generation partnership project, 3GPP)…”, wherein satellite navigation positioning system comprises of orbit information), (¶0100, “the terminal device includes an information sensing device such as a bar code reader, a radio frequency identification (radio frequency identification, RFID) device, a sensor, a global positioning system (global positioning system, GPS) (mapping information of communication device), and or a laser scanner. The terminal device may be fixed or movable”).
Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious before the effective filing date of applicant claimed invention to modify the method of LI and Mildh to include orbit information of communication device as disclosed by LIU and be motivated in doing so because the satellite navigation positioning system has a high requirement for positioning accuracy-LIU ¶0003.
Regarding claim 19, LI in view of Mildh discloses the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium according to claim 16.
LI further discloses wherein the first information is used for integrity protection of the location information (¶0175-¶0176, “… the terminal performs auxiliary measurement function and integrity auxiliary monitoring according to one or a combination of the integrity risk requirement, the horizontal location alert limit, the vertical location alert limit, and the reliability requirement indication in the QoS index requirement containing integrity, and then acquires a measurement value, so that the integrity protection value is calculated and obtained according to the measurement value.”), and
Mildh discloses the performing an integrity check by using the first information to determine the degree of reliability of the target system (¶0009, “…The 3GPP LTE RRC specification TS 36.331 v15.0.0 specifies how the UE on the RRC level verifies the integrity of these messages. In all of these cases, the UE RRC, upon reception of the message, asks lower layers (e.g., Packet Data Convergence Protocol, or PDCP) to verify the integrity of the message. If the message is verified, the UE RRC layer configures the lower layers to apply ciphering and integrity production of all subsequent messages. For example, upon receiving the SecurityModeCommand, the UE shall request lower layers to verify the integrity protection of the SecurityModeCommand message, using the algorithm indicated by the integrityProtAlgorithm as included in the SecurityModeCommand message and the KRRC.sub.int key. If the SecurityModeCommand message passes the integrity protection check, the lower layers are configured to apply integrity protection using the indicated algorithm and the KRRC.sub.int key immediately to all subsequent messages…”, wherein SecurityModeCommand message passing the integrity protection check is an indication of the reliability level of the system), (¶0062, “The network may, however, perform corresponding functions in support, including: receiving the RRCResumeRequest; locating the UE context related to the Resume ID or I-RNTI provided by the UE in the RRCResumeRequest message; calculating/deriving the UE security Keys; verifying the security token of the RRCResumeRequest message; starting encryption/integrity protection; and/or sending the RRCResume message to the UE (or any other message that could be sent in response to an RRCResumeRequest such as RRCReject, RRCRelease or RRCSuspend). This message is encrypted and integrity protected…, wherein the message being encrypted and integrity protected is also an indication of the degree of reliability of the system), (¶0135, “…the teachings of these embodiments may help the network to encrypt the RRCResume/RRCConnectionResume (or any other message transmitted in response to an RRCConnectionRequest), which increases security and privacy while speeding up the RRC connection resumption, since no additional encrypted message is needed. These embodiments will result in improved performance, such as better and more consistent throughput, and/or reduced delays for users of the RAN, including during idle/connection transitions.”),
Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious before the effective filing date of applicant’s claimed invention to modify the method of LI to include determination of degree of reliability of the system as disclosed by Mildh and be motivated in doing so in order to prevent system failures and optimizes maintenance costs.
However, LI in view of Mildh does not explicitly disclose the following limitation:
performing an integrity check by using the first information and at least one of the following to determine the degree of reliability of a target system: orbit information or map information of the first communication device.
LIU discloses wherein the first information is used for integrity protection of the location information, and the performing an integrity check through the first information to determine the degree of reliability of the target system comprises (¶0110, “integrity (integrity) in embodiments of this application may also have another name, for example, intactness or completeness. This is not limited in this application. Different names all express a same physical meaning, that is, refer to a trusted program or reliability of a measurement value of a measured parameter. For example, in the positioning system in this application, “positioning integrity” is reliability of a positioning result.”), (¶0017, “the positioning device sends a request location information message to the terminal device, where the request location information message is used to request location information of the terminal device or a measurement amount for location calculation; and the positioning device receives a provide location information message from the terminal device, where the provide location information (first information) message carries the positioning integrity information.”), (¶0157-¶0158, “the input data of the first scenario, where the input data of the first scenario includes one or more of the following: environment information, time information, and location information of the terminal device…The integrity result information includes one or more of the following items: information about whether the integrity risk occurs, a positioning error, or an integrity level.”):
performing an integrity check by using the first information and at least one of the following to determine the degree of reliability of a target system: orbit information or map information of the first communication device (¶0003, “integrity (integrity) may be used as an important indicator for measuring reliability of information provided by a system, to ensure that the system can make a correct decision in real time to avoid occurrence of a fault. In a positioning system, research on integrity is mainly focused on a satellite navigation positioning system. This is mainly because the satellite navigation positioning system has a high requirement for positioning accuracy, which is far higher than a radio access technology (radio access technology, RAT)-dependent positioning requirement in the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (the third generation partnership project, 3GPP)…”, wherein satellite navigation positioning system comprises of orbit information), (¶0100, “the terminal device includes an information sensing device such as a bar code reader, a radio frequency identification (radio frequency identification, RFID) device, a sensor, a global positioning system (global positioning system, GPS) (mapping information of communication device), and or a laser scanner. The terminal device may be fixed or movable”).
Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious before the effective filing date of applicant claimed invention to modify the method of LI and Mildh to include orbit information of communication device as disclosed by LIU and be motivated in doing so because the satellite navigation positioning system has a high requirement for positioning accuracy-LIU ¶0003.
Claim 8 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US PGPub. No. 20220417887 to LI et al. (hereinafter LI) in view of US PGPub. No. 20200120491 to Mildh (hereinafter Mildh) and further in view of KR 101738384 to KIM et al. (hereinafter KIM).
NOTE: KIM reference was supplied by the applicant in the IDS of 02/08/2023. The PDF copy was attached to OC set as an NPL.
Regarding claim 8, LI in view of Mildh discloses the integrity protection method according to claim 1.
LI further discloses further comprising: sending third information to the second network side device, wherein the third information comprises at least one of the following: the first information (¶0109, “… Finally, the terminal sends the calculated location to the network through providelocationinformation (providing location information), and indicates a deviation that satisfies the QoS index.”, wherein the QoS index is interpreted as the third information); integrity protection information used by the integrity protection system (¶0175, “…the network finally calculates and obtains the integrity protection value based on the measurement value reported by the terminal and the monitoring result of the network itself;”); checked first information; alarm information (¶0195, “…The integrity indication information carried in this message may be one or a combination of the following information. Specifically, for example, the Authentication Flag indicates that integrity protection is required, the risk requirement is controlled within 99.9%, the horizontal alert limit is 0.16 meters, and the vertical alarm limit is 0.08 meters…”); or integrity check information used by the integrity protection system,
However, LI in view of Mildh does not explicitly disclose the following limitation:
wherein the check method used by the integrity protection system comprises at least one of the following: first-order Markov process; error model; two-dimensional reverse normal distribution; Bayesian Statistical method; least squares method; Kalman filter; or Neyman-Pearson theorem.
KIM discloses wherein the check method used by the integrity protection system comprises error model (page 12, ¶0004-¶0005, “Figure 9 is a flow chart for the process of determining the degree of protection of the integrity checking method using the integrity check of the system DGNSS measurement position according to the present invention.
In this case, the step (S50) of calculating the degree of protection is, the error model as shown in Figure 9 ([AltContent: rect] ) A formation step (S51), the unit vector constructing a matrix (G) (S52), obtaining a step of obtaining the weight matrix (W) (S53), the projection matrix (S) (S54), East distributed errors , obtaining the north dispersion error, northeast covariance error and the vertical dispersion error (S55) and horizontal protection level (HPL, horizontal protection level) and the vertical protection level (VPL, vertical protection level) to obtain from the equation 10 and the equation 11, a step (S56)”);
Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious before the effective filing date of applicant claimed invention to modify the method of LI and Mildh to include error model as a check method used by the integrity protection system as disclosed by KIM and be motivated in doing so in order to check the integrity of the measurement position by DGNSS receiver-KIM abstract in parts.
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to MUDASIRU K OLAEGBE whose telephone number is (571)272-2082. The examiner can normally be reached MON-FRI. 7.30AM-5.30PM.
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/MUDASIRU K OLAEGBE/Examiner, Art Unit 2495
/JEFFERY L WILLIAMS/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2495
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