DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
This communication is in response to an RCE filed on 12/30/2025. Claims 1-20 are currently pending in the application.
Continued Examination Under 37 CFR 1.114
A request for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, including the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e), was filed in this application after final rejection. Since this application is eligible for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, and fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e) has been timely paid, the finality of the previous Office action has been withdrawn pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114, Applicant’s submission filed on 06/30/2025 has been entered.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed on 12/30/2025 regarding claim 1 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Applicant argued that Mildh et al. (US 20200120491) does not disclose “performing an integrity check by using the first information to determine the degree of reliability of a target system, citing paragraph 0009 of Mildh. The examiner does not agree with this argument based on the teachings of Mildh in paragraphs 0009 and 0062, wherein SecurityModeCommand message passing the integrity protection check as disclosed in paragraph 0009 and message being encrypted and integrity protected as disclosed in paragraph 0062 are indication of level of reliability of the system.
Applicant argument regarding wherein the first information is calculated according to target risk tolerance as amended is moot in view of another reference that addresses applicant’s concern.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claims 1-3, 10-15, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US PGPub. No. 20200120491 to Mildh (hereinafter Mildh) in view of US PGPub. No. 20140274365 to RIAHEI et al. (hereinafter RIAHEI).
Regarding claim 1, Mildh discloses an integrity protection method (¶0062, “…This message is encrypted and integrity protected…”) comprising:
calculating, by an integrity protection system, first information (¶0056, “…The message includes a security token calculated by the UE (so the network can verify the UE)…”); and
performing an integrity check by using the first information to determine the degree of reliability of a target system (¶0009, “…The 3GPP LTE RRC specification TS 36.331 v15.0.0 specifies how the UE on the RRC level verifies the integrity of these messages. In all of these cases, the UE RRC, upon reception of the message, asks lower layers (e.g., Packet Data Convergence Protocol, or PDCP) to verify the integrity of the message. If the message is verified, the UE RRC layer configures the lower layers to apply ciphering and integrity production of all subsequent messages. For example, upon receiving the SecurityModeCommand, the UE shall request lower layers to verify the integrity protection of the SecurityModeCommand message, using the algorithm indicated by the integrityProtAlgorithm as included in the SecurityModeCommand message and the KRRC.sub.int key. If the SecurityModeCommand message passes the integrity protection check, the lower layers are configured to apply integrity protection using the indicated algorithm and the KRRC.sub.int key immediately to all subsequent messages…”, wherein SecurityModeCommand message passing the integrity protection check is an indication of the reliability level of the system), (¶0062, “The network may, however, perform corresponding functions in support, including: receiving the RRCResumeRequest; locating the UE context related to the Resume ID or I-RNTI provided by the UE in the RRCResumeRequest message; calculating/deriving the UE security Keys; verifying the security token of the RRCResumeRequest message; starting encryption/integrity protection; and/or sending the RRCResume message to the UE (or any other message that could be sent in response to an RRCResumeRequest such as RRCReject, RRCRelease or RRCSuspend). This message is encrypted and integrity protected…, wherein the message being encrypted and integrity protected is also an indication of the degree of reliability of the system), (¶0135, “…the teachings of these embodiments may help the network to encrypt the RRCResume/RRCConnectionResume (or any other message transmitted in response to an RRCConnectionRequest), which increases security and privacy while speeding up the RRC connection resumption, since no additional encrypted message is needed. These embodiments will result in improved performance, such as better and more consistent throughput, and/or reduced delays for users of the RAN, including during idle/connection transitions.”),
wherein the target system comprises the first communication device and the second communication device (¶0137, “FIG. 9 is a flowchart illustrating a method implemented in a communication system, in accordance with one embodiment. The communication system includes a host computer, a base station and a UE which may be those described with reference to FIGS. 7 and 8…”).
However, Mildh does not explicitly disclose the limitation of:
wherein the first information is calculated according to target risk tolerance,
RIAHEI discloses wherein the first information is calculated according to target risk tolerance (¶0038, “The user risk profile information may include a risk tolerance, which indicates a level of risk that the user is willing to take with respect to real-world wagers…”), (¶0091, “…The risk tolerance may be expressly indicated by the user, obtained from a user profile, identified by a type of token that is used to place a wager, and/or otherwise obtained to identify the risk tolerance of the user…”), (¶0095, “wager processing instructions 123 may determine one or more types of wagers to place based on a user specification when a token is purchased, through a user profile that indicate a risk tolerance, the type of token that was purchased, and/or other information that may be used to determine the types of wagers to make.”).
Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious before the effective filing date of applicant’s claimed invention to modify the method of Mildh to include calculating first information according to target risk tolerance as disclosed by RIAHEI and be motivated in doing so in order to align the network performance with business objectives and optimize productivity.
Regarding claim 13, Mildh discloses a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing computer programs or instructions that (¶0048, “The processing circuitry 52 also includes a memory 64. The memory 64, in some embodiments, stores one or more computer programs 66 and, optionally, configuration data 68. The memory 64 provides non-transitory storage for the computer program 66 and it may comprise one or more types of computer-readable media, such as disk storage, solid-state memory storage, or any mix thereof.”), executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform an integrity protection method comprising (¶0150, “the techniques described herein, e.g., as illustrated in the process flow diagrams of FIGS. 3 and 5, may be implemented, in whole or in part, using computer program instructions executed by one or more processors…”):
calculating, by an integrity protection system, first information (¶0056, “…The message includes a security token calculated by the UE (so the network can verify the UE)…”); and
performing an integrity check by using the first information to determine the degree of reliability of a target system (¶0009, “…The 3GPP LTE RRC specification TS 36.331 v15.0.0 specifies how the UE on the RRC level verifies the integrity of these messages. In all of these cases, the UE RRC, upon reception of the message, asks lower layers (e.g., Packet Data Convergence Protocol, or PDCP) to verify the integrity of the message. If the message is verified, the UE RRC layer configures the lower layers to apply ciphering and integrity production of all subsequent messages. For example, upon receiving the SecurityModeCommand, the UE shall request lower layers to verify the integrity protection of the SecurityModeCommand message, using the algorithm indicated by the integrityProtAlgorithm as included in the SecurityModeCommand message and the KRRC.sub.int key. If the SecurityModeCommand message passes the integrity protection check, the lower layers are configured to apply integrity protection using the indicated algorithm and the KRRC.sub.int key immediately to all subsequent messages…”, wherein SecurityModeCommand message passing the integrity protection check is an indication of the reliability level of the system), (¶0062, “The network may, however, perform corresponding functions in support, including: receiving the RRCResumeRequest; locating the UE context related to the Resume ID or I-RNTI provided by the UE in the RRCResumeRequest message; calculating/deriving the UE security Keys; verifying the security token of the RRCResumeRequest message; starting encryption/integrity protection; and/or sending the RRCResume message to the UE (or any other message that could be sent in response to an RRCResumeRequest such as RRCReject, RRCRelease or RRCSuspend). This message is encrypted and integrity protected…, wherein the message being encrypted and integrity protected is also an indication of the degree of reliability of the system), (¶0135, “…the teachings of these embodiments may help the network to encrypt the RRCResume/RRCConnectionResume (or any other message transmitted in response to an RRCConnectionRequest), which increases security and privacy while speeding up the RRC connection resumption, since no additional encrypted message is needed. These embodiments will result in improved performance, such as better and more consistent throughput, and/or reduced delays for users of the RAN, including during idle/connection transitions.”),
wherein the target system comprises the first communication device and the second communication device (¶0137, “FIG. 9 is a flowchart illustrating a method implemented in a communication system, in accordance with one embodiment. The communication system includes a host computer, a base station and a UE which may be those described with reference to FIGS. 7 and 8…”).
However, Mildh does not explicitly disclose the limitation of:
wherein the first information is calculated according to target risk tolerance,
RIAHEI discloses wherein the first information is calculated according to target risk tolerance (¶0038, “The user risk profile information may include a risk tolerance, which indicates a level of risk that the user is willing to take with respect to real-world wagers…”), (¶0091, “…The risk tolerance may be expressly indicated by the user, obtained from a user profile, identified by a type of token that is used to place a wager, and/or otherwise obtained to identify the risk tolerance of the user…”), (¶0095, “wager processing instructions 123 may determine one or more types of wagers to place based on a user specification when a token is purchased, through a user profile that indicate a risk tolerance, the type of token that was purchased, and/or other information that may be used to determine the types of wagers to make.”).
Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious before the effective filing date of applicant’s claimed invention to modify the method of Mildh to include calculating first information according to target risk tolerance as disclosed by RIAHEI and be motivated in doing so in order to align the network performance with business objectives and optimize productivity.
Regarding claim 20, Mildh discloses a chip, comprising a processor (¶0040, “…The processing circuitry 32 comprises one or more digital processors 42, e.g., one or more microprocessors, microcontrollers, Digital Signal Processors (DSPs), Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), Complex Programmable Logic Devices (CPLDs), Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs), or any combination thereof…”);
a communications interface coupled with the processor (¶0040, “The network node 30 also includes one or more processing circuits 32 that are operatively associated with and configured to control the communication interface circuitry 38 and/or the transceiver circuitry 36. The processing circuitry 32 comprises one or more digital processors 42,…”); and
a memory storing having a computer program storing thereon (¶0048, “The processing circuitry 52 also includes a memory 64. The memory 64, in some embodiments, stores one or more computer programs 66 and, optionally, configuration data 68. The memory 64 provides non-transitory storage for the computer program 66 and it may comprise one or more types of computer-readable media, such as disk storage, solid-state memory storage, or any mix thereof.”), wherein the computer program, when executed by the processor, causes the processor to implement an integrity protection method comprising (¶0150, “the techniques described herein, e.g., as illustrated in the process flow diagrams of FIGS. 3 and 5, may be implemented, in whole or in part, using computer program instructions executed by one or more processors…”):
calculating, by an integrity protection system, first information (¶0056, “…The message includes a security token calculated by the UE (so the network can verify the UE)…”); and
performing an integrity check by using the first information to determine the degree of reliability of a target system (¶0009, “…The 3GPP LTE RRC specification TS 36.331 v15.0.0 specifies how the UE on the RRC level verifies the integrity of these messages. In all of these cases, the UE RRC, upon reception of the message, asks lower layers (e.g., Packet Data Convergence Protocol, or PDCP) to verify the integrity of the message. If the message is verified, the UE RRC layer configures the lower layers to apply ciphering and integrity production of all subsequent messages. For example, upon receiving the SecurityModeCommand, the UE shall request lower layers to verify the integrity protection of the SecurityModeCommand message, using the algorithm indicated by the integrityProtAlgorithm as included in the SecurityModeCommand message and the KRRC.sub.int key. If the SecurityModeCommand message passes the integrity protection check, the lower layers are configured to apply integrity protection using the indicated algorithm and the KRRC.sub.int key immediately to all subsequent messages…”, wherein SecurityModeCommand message passing the integrity protection check is an indication of the reliability level of the system), (¶0062, “The network may, however, perform corresponding functions in support, including: receiving the RRCResumeRequest; locating the UE context related to the Resume ID or I-RNTI provided by the UE in the RRCResumeRequest message; calculating/deriving the UE security Keys; verifying the security token of the RRCResumeRequest message; starting encryption/integrity protection; and/or sending the RRCResume message to the UE (or any other message that could be sent in response to an RRCResumeRequest such as RRCReject, RRCRelease or RRCSuspend). This message is encrypted and integrity protected…, wherein the message being encrypted and integrity protected is also an indication of the degree of reliability of the system), (¶0135, “…the teachings of these embodiments may help the network to encrypt the RRCResume/RRCConnectionResume (or any other message transmitted in response to an RRCConnectionRequest), which increases security and privacy while speeding up the RRC connection resumption, since no additional encrypted message is needed. These embodiments will result in improved performance, such as better and more consistent throughput, and/or reduced delays for users of the RAN, including during idle/connection transitions.”),
wherein the target system comprises the first communication device and the second communication device (¶0137, “FIG. 9 is a flowchart illustrating a method implemented in a communication system, in accordance with one embodiment. The communication system includes a host computer, a base station and a UE which may be those described with reference to FIGS. 7 and 8…”).
However, Mildh does not explicitly disclose the limitation of:
wherein the first information is calculated according to target risk tolerance,
RIAHEI discloses wherein the first information is calculated according to target risk tolerance (¶0038, “The user risk profile information may include a risk tolerance, which indicates a level of risk that the user is willing to take with respect to real-world wagers…”), (¶0091, “…The risk tolerance may be expressly indicated by the user, obtained from a user profile, identified by a type of token that is used to place a wager, and/or otherwise obtained to identify the risk tolerance of the user…”), (¶0095, “wager processing instructions 123 may determine one or more types of wagers to place based on a user specification when a token is purchased, through a user profile that indicate a risk tolerance, the type of token that was purchased, and/or other information that may be used to determine the types of wagers to make.”).
Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious before the effective filing date of applicant’s claimed invention to modify the method of Mildh to include calculating first information according to target risk tolerance as disclosed by RIAHEI and be motivated in doing so in order to align the network performance with business objectives and optimize productivity.
Regarding claim 2, Mildh in view of RIAHEI discloses the integrity protection method according to claim 1.
Mildh further discloses wherein the first information is further used to indicate at least one of the following:
whether the first communication device fails; whether the second communication device fails; or whether the target system fails (¶0035, “… If the timer expires (times out), the RRC layer will inform upper layer (e.g., NAS) that the UE failed to resume the RRC connection. Additionally, the RRC layer could discard the stored UE AS context (or other RRC related information)”), (¶0045, “FIG. 4 illustrates an example of the corresponding wireless device 50 that is configured to perform the techniques described herein for the wireless device for providing security of messages. The wireless device 50 may also be referred to, in various contexts, as a radio communication device, a UE, a target device, a device-to-device (D2D) UE, a machine-type UE or UE capable of machine to machine (M2M) communication, a sensor-equipped UE,…”).
Regarding claim 14, Mildh in view of RIAHEI discloses the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium according to claim 13.
Mildh further discloses wherein the first information is further used to indicate at least one of the following:
whether the first communication device fails; whether the second communication device fails; or whether the target system fails (¶0035, “… If the timer expires (times out), the RRC layer will inform upper layer (e.g., NAS) that the UE failed to resume the RRC connection. Additionally, the RRC layer could discard the stored UE AS context (or other RRC related information)”), (¶0045, “FIG. 4 illustrates an example of the corresponding wireless device 50 that is configured to perform the techniques described herein for the wireless device for providing security of messages. The wireless device 50 may also be referred to, in various contexts, as a radio communication device, a UE, a target device, a device-to-device (D2D) UE, a machine-type UE or UE capable of machine to machine (M2M) communication, a sensor-equipped UE,…”).
Regarding claim 3, Mildh in view of RIAHEI discloses the integrity protection method according to claim 1.
Mildh further discloses wherein the first information is used for integrity protection of at least one of: location information, speed information, or clock information of the first communication device (¶0049, “…The processing circuitry 52 is configured to send, while in an RRC inactive state, a message requesting resumption of an RRC connected state. The processing circuitry 52 is configured to, upon sending the message, start a timer according to a predetermined value, and while the timer is running, attempt decryption and integrity check handling for packets subsequently received from the wireless network”), (¶0035, “The solution is associated with the UE starting a timer at the beginning of the RRC resume procedure (e.g., when the UE sends an RRCResumeRequest message). This timer is stopped when the UE receives a valid (verified) response message such as an RRCResume/RRCConnectionResume message (or any other response message that is expected by the UE in response to an RRCResumeRequest such as RRCReject, RRCRelease or RRCSuspend). If the timer expires (times out), the RRC layer will inform upper layer (e.g., NAS) that the UE failed to resume the RRC connection. Additionally, the RRC layer could discard the stored UE AS context (or other RRC related information)”).
Regarding claim 15, Mildh in view of RIAHEI discloses the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium according to claim 13.
Mildh further discloses wherein the first information is used for integrity protection of at least one of: location information, speed information, or clock information of the first communication device (¶0049, “…The processing circuitry 52 is configured to send, while in an RRC inactive state, a message requesting resumption of an RRC connected state. The processing circuitry 52 is configured to, upon sending the message, start a timer according to a predetermined value, and while the timer is running, attempt decryption and integrity check handling for packets subsequently received from the wireless network”), (¶0035, “The solution is associated with the UE starting a timer at the beginning of the RRC resume procedure (e.g., when the UE sends an RRCResumeRequest message). This timer is stopped when the UE receives a valid (verified) response message such as an RRCResume/RRCConnectionResume message (or any other response message that is expected by the UE in response to an RRCResumeRequest such as RRCReject, RRCRelease or RRCSuspend). If the timer expires (times out), the RRC layer will inform upper layer (e.g., NAS) that the UE failed to resume the RRC connection. Additionally, the RRC layer could discard the stored UE AS context (or other RRC related information)”).
Regarding claim 9, Mildh in view of RIAHEI discloses the integrity protection method according to claim 1.
Mildh further discloses wherein the first communication device and the second communication device meet one of the following requirements: the first communication device is a terminal, and the second communication device is a network side device; the first communication device is a network side device, and the second communication device is a terminal; the first communication device is a terminal, and the second communication device is a terminal; or the first communication device is a network side device, and the second communication device is a network side device (FIGs, 7-9, wherein the host computer 730 which is a device that is communicating on the network and has an IP address is considered a network side device and the UE such as UE 791 and UE 792 are terminal devices, base stations 712a and 712b or 820 are also network side devices. Either of these devices can be labelled fir or second communication devices, see also ¶0127-¶0128, and ¶0137).
Regarding claim 10, Mildh in view of RIAHEI discloses the integrity protection method according to claim 9.
Mildh further discloses wherein the network side device comprises at least one of the following: a radio access network side (¶0006, “… the core network (CN)/radio access network (RAN) connection (NG or N2 interface) is kept for RRC_INACTIVE state,…”), (¶0046, “The wireless device 50 communicates with one or more radio nodes or base stations, such as one or more network nodes 30, via antennas 54 and a transceiver circuitry 56. The transceiver circuitry 56 may include transmitter circuits, receiver circuits, and associated control circuits that are collectively configured to transmit and receive signals according to a radio access technology, for the purposes of providing cellular communication services”), (¶0135, “…These embodiments will result in improved performance, such as better and more consistent throughput, and/or reduced delays for users of the RAN, including during idle/connection transitions”); an Authentication Management Function (AMF); Location Management Function (LMF); positioning server; positioning application; satellite positioning system correction system; or integrity correction system, wherein intercommunication of integrity capabilities can be realized between at least two network side devices, and the intercommunication method comprises at least one of the following: interface signaling intercommunication (¶0149, “a communication system including a host computer comprises a communication interface configured to receive user data originating from a transmission from a UE to a base station…The communication system may include the base station, where the base station comprises a radio interface configured to communicate with the UE and a communication interface configured to forward to the host computer the user data carried by a transmission from the UE to the base station…”, wherein the UE and base station are both network side devices); or data server sharing.
Regarding claim 11, Mildh in view of RIAHEI discloses the integrity protection method according to claim 9.
Mildh further discloses wherein the terminal is further configured to report the integrity capability of the terminal to the network side device in at least one of the following ways: (¶0030, “…For the purpose of understanding the scope of the presently disclosed techniques and apparatuses, a wireless device may be a UE. However, these terms should be understood more generally, as referring to wireless devices configured to operate as access terminals in a wireless communication network…”), (¶0045, “…The wireless device 50 may also be referred to, in various contexts, as a radio communication device, a UE, a target device, a device-to-device (D2D) UE, a machine-type UE or UE capable of machine to machine (M2M) communication, a sensor-equipped UE, a PDA (personal digital assistant), a wireless tablet, a mobile terminal, a smart phone, laptop-embedded equipment (LEE), laptop-mounted equipment (LME), a wireless USB dongle, a Customer Premises Equipment (CPE), etc.”), (¶0056, “…The UE starts timer T and the UE starts encryption and integrity protection. This could involve the RRC layer instructing lower layer (e.g., PDCP) to start encryption and integrity protection using the keys K.sub.RRCint and K.sub.RRCenc, as described above for the transmission of the RRCResumeRequest. The configuration could also include configuration of the lower layer to discard packets (PDUs or Messages) for which integrity verification fails and also configure the lower layer to report the failures to RRC layer”, wherein the Radio Resource Control layer (RRC layer) used in cellular networks is a network side protocol ), (¶0060, “…If the RRC layer, while timer T is running, receives arm indication from a lower layer that a packet has failed RRC integrity protection verification, the UE can discard the connection, discard the stored UE context, and inform an upper layer of the failure to resume the RRC connection. The UE may also create a failure report to be later provided to the network containing information about the failure, such as the verification result and location information such as cell identifiers, etc.”):
reporting the integrity capability through signaling (¶0136, “…measurements may involve proprietary UE signaling facilitating the host computer's 810 measurements of throughput, propagation times, latency and the like. The measurements may be implemented in that the software 811, 831 causes messages to be transmitted, in particular empty or ‘dummy’ messages, using the OTT connection 850 while it monitors propagation times, errors etc.”);
reporting the integrity capability through IP packets; or
reporting the integrity capability through the positioning protocol (¶0051, “attempting decryption and integrity check handling may include a RRC layer requesting decryption and integrity check handling from a PDCP layer. The method 500 may further include, while the timer is running, determining that decryption or integrity checking has failed for a packet and discarding the packet for which decryption or integrity checking has failed. The determining may be performed in a first protocol layer and the method further comprises the first protocol layer notifying a higher protocol layer of the failure.”), (¶0036, “The PDCP layer (or other lower layer) in the UE will, during the resume procedure (starting from after the UE sent the resume request message), perform both decryption and integrity verification of PDCP PDUs received from the network. If the PDCP receives a PDU that fails the integrity verification, it will discard the packet. Additionally, it may, in some embodiments, inform the RRC layer that it has received a message (or PDU) failing integrity verification.”).
Regarding claim 12, Mildh in view of RIAHEI discloses the integrity protection method according to claim 9.
Mildh further discloses wherein the network side device is further configured to notify the terminal of the integrity capability of the network side device in at least one of the following ways (¶0142-¶0144, “…The base station performs a method that includes receiving, from the UE operating in an RRC inactive state, a message requesting resumption of an RRC connected state for the UE, and in response to said message, encrypting and integrity protecting one or more response messages. The method includes sending the encrypted and integrity protected one or more response messages to the UE. The method at the base station may include receiving the user data from the UE. The method at the base station may include initiate a transmission of the received user data to the host computer….”, wherein the base station that send the encrypted and integrity protected response messages to the user equipment (UE) is a network side device and the UE is the terminal device and message requesting resumption of an RRC connected state for the UE is as a result of the failure of integrity protection verification as disclosed in ¶0052, ¶0056, ¶0060, to mention a few.):
notifying the integrity capability by paging signaling (¶0006-¶0007, “… For RRC_IDLE state: a UE-specific discontinuous reception (DRX) may be configured by upper layers; UE controlled mobility may be based on network configuration; the UE monitors a paging channel for CN paging using 5G-S-TMSI; the UE performs neighboring cell measurements and cell (re)selection; and the UE acquires system information…”);
notifying the integrity capability through IP packets;
notifying the integrity capability through location protocol; or
notifying the integrity capability through broadcast, wherein the network side device is further configured to notify the terminal of the error information of the network side device through signaling or broadcasting (¶0136, “…In certain embodiments, measurements may involve proprietary UE signaling facilitating the host computer's 810 measurements of throughput, propagation times, latency and the like. The measurements may be implemented in that the software 811, 831 causes messages to be transmitted, in particular empty or ‘dummy’ messages, using the OTT connection 850 while it monitors propagation times, errors etc.”, wherein the host computer is a network side device).
Claims 4-7, and 16-19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US PGPub. No. 20200120491 to Mildh (hereinafter Mildh) in view of US PGPub. No. 20140274365 to RIAHEI et al. (hereinafter RIAHEI) further in view of US PGPub. No. 20230152469 to LIU et al. (hereinafter LIU).
Regarding claim 4, Mildh in view of RIAHEI discloses the integrity protection method according to claim 3.
Mildh further discloses wherein the first information is used for integrity protection of the location information (¶0060, “…If the RRC layer, while timer T is running, receives arm indication from a lower layer that a packet has failed RRC integrity protection verification, the UE can discard the connection, discard the stored UE context, and inform an upper layer of the failure to resume the RRC connection. The UE may also create a failure report to be later provided to the network containing information about the failure, such as the verification result and location information such as cell identifiers, etc.”), and
However, Mildh in view of RIAHEI does not explicitly disclose the following limitations:
the method further comprises: receiving second information, wherein the second information comprises at least the following one:
positioning assistance data;
positioning integrity risks;
positioning integrity protection level;
positioning integrity risk alarm level;
reporting time of positioning integrity risk events;
positioning integrity protection threshold;
positioning accuracy requirements; or
integrity indicator requirements.
LIU discloses the method further comprises: receiving second information, wherein the second information comprises:
positioning assistance data (¶0016, “The positioning device sends a request assistance data message to the access network device where the request assistance data message is used to request assistance data required for positioning the terminal device; and the positioning device receives provide positioning assistance data message from the access network device, where the provide assistance data message carries the positioning integrity information”), (¶0258, “The RAN sends a provide assistance information message to the LMF, where the provide assistance information message includes the positioning assistance data and further includes positioning integrity information of the UE.”);
positioning integrity risks; positioning integrity protection level; positioning integrity risk alarm level (¶0124-¶0126, “a related indicator representing the positioning integrity may be input, and may include, for example, an alert limit (alert limit, AL), a time to alert (time to alert, TTA), an integrity risk (integrity level, IR), a protection level (protection level, PL), and an error bound (error bounding, EB)…”);
Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious before the effective filing date of applicant claimed invention to modify the method of Mildh and RIAHEI to include positioning assistance data in the received integrity protection message as disclosed by LIU and be motivated in doing so in order to perform an operation for positioning the terminal device, to meet the positioning integrity requirement of the terminal device-LIU abstract in parts.
Regarding claim 16, Mildh in view of RIAHEI discloses the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium according to claim 15.
Mildh further discloses wherein the first information is used for integrity protection of the location information (¶0060, “…If the RRC layer, while timer T is running, receives an indication from a lower layer that a packet has failed RRC integrity protection verification, the UE can discard the connection, discard the stored UE context, and inform an upper layer of the failure to resume the RRC connection. The UE may also create a failure report to be later provided to the network containing information about the failure, such as the verification result and location information such as cell identifiers, etc.”), and
However, Mildh in view of RIAHEI does not explicitly disclose the following limitations:
the method further comprises: receiving second information, wherein the second information comprises at least the following one:
positioning assistance data;
positioning integrity risks;
positioning integrity protection level;
positioning integrity risk alarm level;
reporting time of positioning integrity risk events;
positioning integrity protection threshold;
positioning accuracy requirements; or integrity indicator requirements.
LIU discloses the method further comprises: receiving second information, wherein the second information comprises:
positioning assistance data (¶0016, “The positioning device sends a request assistance data message to the access network device where the request assistance data message is used to request assistance data required for positioning the terminal device; and the positioning device receives provide positioning assistance data message from the access network device, where the provide assistance data message carries the positioning integrity information”), (¶0258, “The RAN sends a provide assistance information message to the LMF, where the provide assistance information message includes the positioning assistance data and further includes positioning integrity information of the UE.”);
positioning integrity risks; positioning integrity protection level; positioning integrity risk alarm level (¶0124-¶0126, “a related indicator representing the positioning integrity may be input, and may include, for example, an alert limit (alert limit, AL), a time to alert (time to alert, TTA), an integrity risk (integrity level, IR), a protection level (protection level, PL), and an error bound (error bounding, EB)…”);
Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious before the effective filing date of applicant claimed invention to modify the method of Mildh and RIAHEI to include positioning assistance data in the received integrity protection message as disclosed by LIU and be motivated in doing so in order to perform an operation for positioning the terminal device, to meet the positioning integrity requirement of the terminal device-LIU abstract in parts.
Regarding claim 5, Mildh in view of RIAHEI and further in view of LIU discloses the integrity protection method according to claim 4.
Mildh further discloses wherein the receiving second information comprises: receiving the second information in at least one of the following ways: receiving second information through paging signaling (¶0006, “…UE controlled mobility may be based on network configuration; the UE monitors a paging channel for CN paging using 5G-S-TMSI; the UE performs neighboring cell measurements and cell (re)selection; and the UE acquires system information.”); receiving second information through IP packets; receiving second information through positioning protocol, (see LIU ¶0093) ; or receiving second information through broadcast.
Regarding claim 17, Mildh in view of RIAHEI and further in view of LIU discloses the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium according to claim 16.
Mildh further discloses wherein the receiving second information comprises: receiving the second information in at least one of the following ways: receiving second information through paging signaling (¶0006, “…UE controlled mobility may be based on network configuration; the UE monitors a paging channel for CN paging using 5G-S-TMSI; the UE performs neighboring cell measurements and cell (re)selection; and the UE acquires system information.”); receiving second information through IP packets; receiving second information through positioning protocol, (see LIU ¶0093) ; or receiving second information through broadcast.
Regarding claim 6, Mildh in view of RIAHEI and further in view of LIU discloses the integrity protection method according to claim 4.
LIU further discloses wherein the method further comprises: issuing an alarm when the obtained positioning integrity protection level is greater than the positioning integrity risk alarm level (¶0127-¶0130, “…The time to alert is a maximum allowed time from a time at which the positioning system exceeds an allowed error range to a time at which the positioning system generates an alarm. A value of this indicator may be preset, and is related to a specific positioning service. The integrity risk is a probability that a positioning error exceeds the alarm limit, namely, a probability that a system integrity is risky. A value of this indicator may be preset, and is related to a specific positioning service…”), wherein the positioning integrity protection level is provided by the first communication device (¶0007, “…A positioning device obtains positioning integrity information of a terminal device from an access network device or the terminal device, where the positioning integrity information indicates a positioning integrity requirement that is predicted by the access network device or the terminal device…”), (¶0019-¶0020, “in some implementations of the first aspect, the positioning integrity information includes one or more pieces of the following information: a positioning integrity level”), and the positioning integrity risk alarm level is provided by the second communication device (¶0019-¶0021, “With reference to the first aspect, in some implementations of the first aspect, the positioning integrity information includes one or more pieces of the following information: a positioning integrity level; the positioning integrity requirement;”), (¶0123-¶0129, “…For example, a related indicator representing the positioning integrity may be input, and may include, for example, an alert limit (alert limit, AL), a time to alert (time to alert, TTA), an integrity risk (integrity level, IR), a protection level (protection level, PL), and an error bound (error bounding, EB)… Optionally, a related indicator representing integrity may also be considered as integrity requirement information. Alternatively, positioning integrity requirement information includes one or more of the following: …the alert limit, the time to alert, the integrity risk, and the protection level…The alert limit may include a horizontal alert limit and a vertical alert limit that respectively represent a maximum allowed horizontal location error or a maximum allowed vertical location error. If the horizontal error is exceeded, it indicates that the positioning system is not applicable to an expected application. A value of this indicator may be preset, and is related to a specific positioning service”)…The time to alert is a maximum allowed time from a time at which the positioning system exceeds an allowed error range to a time at which the positioning system generates an alarm. A value of this indicator may be preset, and is related to a specific positioning service… The integrity risk is a probability that a positioning error exceeds the alarm limit, namely, a probability that a system integrity is risky. A value of this indicator may be preset, and is related to a specific positioning service”), (FIG. 5, steps 510-530, and FIG. 6, steps 610-660, wherein positioning integrity requirement (information) which is an indicator representing integrity is provided by access network device or terminal device.); or the positioning integrity protection level is provided by the second communication device, and the positioning integrity risk alarm level is provided by the first communication device; or the positioning integrity protection level is provided by the first communication device, and the positioning integrity risk alarm level is provided by the first communication device; or the positioning integrity protection level is provided by the second communication device, and the positioning integrity risk alarm level is provided by the second communication device.
Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious before the effective filing date of applicant claimed invention to modify the method of Mildh, RIAHEI, and LIU to include issuing an alarm in a case that the obtained positioning integrity protection level is greater than the positioning integrity risk alarm level as disclosed by LIU and be motivated in doing so in order to have a feedback the deviation that occurs and implement a correction on the predicted method and process-LIU ¶0132.
Regarding claim 18, Mildh in view of RIAHEI and further in view of LIU discloses the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium according to claim 16.
LIU further discloses wherein the method further comprises: issuing an alarm when the obtained positioning integrity protection level is greater than the positioning integrity risk alarm level (¶0127-¶0130, “…The time to alert is a maximum allowed time from a time at which the positioning system exceeds an allowed error range to a time at which the positioning system generates an alarm. A value of this indicator may be preset, and is related to a specific positioning service. The integrity risk is a probability that a positioning error exceeds the alarm limit, namely, a probability that a system integrity is risky. A value of this indicator may be preset, and is related to a specific positioning service…”), wherein the positioning integrity protection level is provided by the first communication device (¶0007, “…A positioning device obtains positioning integrity information of a terminal device from an access network device or the terminal device, where the positioning integrity information indicates a positioning integrity requirement that is predicted by the access network device or the terminal device…”), (¶0019-¶0020, “in some implementations of the first aspect, the positioning integrity information includes one or more pieces of the following information: a positioning integrity level”), and the positioning integrity risk alarm level is provided by the second communication device (¶0019-¶0021, “With reference to the first aspect, in some implementations of the first aspect, the positioning integrity information includes one or more pieces of the following information: a positioning integrity level; the positioning integrity requirement;”), (¶0123-¶0129, “…For example, a related indicator representing the positioning integrity may be input, and may include, for example, an alert limit (alert limit, AL), a time to alert (time to alert, TTA), an integrity risk (integrity level, IR), a protection level (protection level, PL), and an error bound (error bounding, EB)… Optionally, a related indicator representing integrity may also be considered as integrity requirement information. Alternatively, positioning integrity requirement information includes one or more of the following: …the alert limit, the time to alert, the integrity risk, and the protection level…The alert limit may include a horizontal alert limit and a vertical alert limit that respectively represent a maximum allowed horizontal location error or a maximum allowed vertical location error. If the horizontal error is exceeded, it indicates that the positioning system is not applicable to an expected application. A value of this indicator may be preset, and is related to a specific positioning service”)…The time to alert is a maximum allowed time from a time at which the positioning system exceeds an allowed error range to a time at which the positioning system generates an alarm. A value of this indicator may be preset, and is related to a specific positioning service… The integrity risk is a probability that a positioning error exceeds the alarm limit, namely, a probability that a system integrity is risky. A value of this indicator may be preset, and is related to a specific positioning service”), (FIG. 5, steps 510-530, and FIG. 6, steps 610-660, wherein positioning integrity requirement (information) which is an indicator representing integrity is provided by access network device or terminal device.); or the positioning integrity protection level is provided by the second communication device, and the positioning integrity risk alarm level is provided by the first communication device; or the positioning integrity protection level is provided by the first communication device, and the positioning integrity risk alarm level is provided by the first communication device; or the positioning integrity protection level is provided by the second communication device, and the positioning integrity risk alarm level is provided by the second communication device.
Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious before the effective filing date of applicant claimed invention to modify the method of Mildh, RIAHEI, and LIU to include issuing an alarm in a case that the obtained positioning integrity protection level is greater than the positioning integrity risk alarm level as disclosed by LIU and be motivated in doing so in order to have a feedback the deviation that occurs and implement a correction on the predicted method and process-LIU ¶0132.
Regarding claim 7, Mildh in view of RIAHEI discloses the integrity protection method according to claim 3.
However, Mildh in view of RIAHEI does not explicitly disclose the following limitation:
wherein the first information is used for integrity protection of the location information, and the performing an integrity check through the first information to determine the degree of reliability of the target system comprises: performing an integrity check by using the first information and at least one of the following to determine the degree of reliability of a target system: orbit information or map information of the first communication device.
LIU discloses wherein the first information is used for integrity protection of the location information, and the performing an integrity check through the first information to determine the degree of reliability of the target system comprises (¶0110, “integrity (integrity) in embodiments of this application may also have another name, for example, intactness or completeness. This is not limited in this application. Different names all express a same physical meaning, that is, refer to a trusted program or reliability of a measurement value of a measured parameter. For example, in the positioning system in this application, “positioning integrity” is reliability of a positioning result.”), (¶0017, “the positioning device sends a request location information message to the terminal device, where the request location information message is used to request location information of the terminal device or a measurement amount for location calculation; and the positioning device receives a provide location information message from the terminal device, where the provide location information (first information) message carries the positioning integrity information.”), (¶0157-¶0158, “the input data of the first scenario, where the input data of the first scenario includes one or more of the following: environment information, time information, and location information of the terminal device…The integrity result information includes one or more of the following items: information about whether the integrity risk occurs, a positioning error, or an integrity level.”):
performing an integrity check by using the first information and at least one of the following to determine the degree of reliability of a target system: orbit information or map information of the first communication device (¶0003, “integrity (integrity) may be used as an important indicator for measuring reliability of information provided by a system, to ensure that the system can make a correct decision in real time to avoid occurrence of a fault. In a positioning system, research on integrity is mainly focused on a satellite navigation positioning system. This is mainly because the satellite navigation positioning system has a high requirement for positioning accuracy, which is far higher than a radio access technology (radio access technology, RAT)-dependent positioning requirement in the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (the third generation partnership project, 3GPP)…”, wherein satellite navigation positioning system comprises of orbit information), (¶0100, “the terminal device includes an information sensing device such as a bar code reader, a radio frequency identification (radio frequency identification, RFID) device, a sensor, a global positioning system (global positioning system, GPS) (mapping information of communication device), and or a laser scanner. The terminal device may be fixed or movable”).
Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious before the effective filing date of applicant claimed invention to modify the method of Mildh, RIAHEI, and LIU to include orbit information of communication device as disclosed by LIU and be motivated in doing so because the satellite navigation positioning system has a high requirement for positioning accuracy-LIU ¶0003.
Regarding claim 19, Mildh in view of RIAHEI and further in view of LIU discloses the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium according to claim 16.
LIU further discloses wherein the first information is used for integrity protection of the location information, and the performing an integrity check through the first information to determine the degree of reliability of the target system comprises (¶0110, “integrity (integrity) in embodiments of this application may also have another name, for example, intactness or completeness. This is not limited in this application. Different names all express a same physical meaning, that is, refer to a trusted program or reliability of a measurement value of a measured parameter. For example, in the positioning system in this application, “positioning integrity” is reliability of a positioning result.”), (¶0017, “the positioning device sends a request location information message to the terminal device, where the request location information message is used to request location information of the terminal device or a measurement amount for location calculation; and the positioning device receives a provide location information message from the terminal device, where the provide location information (first information) message carries the positioning integrity information.”), (¶0157-¶0158, “the input data of the first scenario, where the input data of the first scenario includes one or more of the following: environment information, time information, and location information of the terminal device…The integrity result information includes one or more of the following items: information about whether the integrity risk occurs, a positioning error, or an integrity level.”):
performing an integrity check by using the first information and at least one of the following to determine the degree of reliability of a target system: orbit information or map information of the first communication device (¶0003, “integrity (integrity) may be used as an important indicator for measuring reliability of information provided by a system, to ensure that the system can make a correct decision in real time to avoid occurrence of a fault. In a positioning system, research on integrity is mainly focused on a satellite navigation positioning system. This is mainly because the satellite navigation positioning system has a high requirement for positioning accuracy, which is far higher than a radio access technology (radio access technology, RAT)-dependent positioning requirement in the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (the third generation partnership project, 3GPP)…”, wherein satellite navigation positioning system comprises of orbit information), (¶0100, “the terminal device includes an information sensing device such as a bar code reader, a radio frequency identification (radio frequency identification, RFID) device, a sensor, a global positioning system (global positioning system, GPS) (mapping information of communication device), and or a laser scanner. The terminal device may be fixed or movable”).
Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious before the effective filing date of applicant claimed invention to modify the method of Mildh, RIAHEI, and LIU to include orbit information of communication device as disclosed by LIU and be motivated in doing so because the satellite navigation positioning system has a high requirement for positioning accuracy-LIU ¶0003.
Claim 8 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US PGPub. No. 20200120491 to Mildh (hereinafter Mildh) in viewUS PGPub. No. 20140274365 to RIAHEI et al. (hereinafter RIAHEI) and further in view of KR 101738384 to KIM et al. (hereinafter KIM).
NOTE: KIM reference was supplied by the applicant in the IDS of 02/08/2023. The PDF copy is attached to this OC set as an NPL.
Regarding claim 8, Mildh in view of RIAHEI discloses the integrity protection method according to claim 1.
Mildh further discloses further comprising: sending third information to the second network side device, wherein the third information comprises at least one of the following: the first information; integrity protection information used by the integrity protection system (¶0009, “upon receiving the SecurityModeCommand, the UE shall request lower layers to verify the integrity protection of the SecurityModeCommand message (third information), using the algorithm indicated by the integrityProtAlgorithm as included in the SecurityModeCommand message and the KRRC.sub.int key (integrity protection information used by the integrity protection system). If the SecurityModeCommand message passes the integrity protection check, the lower layers are configured to apply integrity protection using the indicated algorithm and the KRRC.sub.int key immediately to all subsequent messages. The lower layers are also configured to apply ciphering to subsequent messages using the indicated algorithm, the KRRC.sub.enc key and the KUP.sub.enc key after completing the procedure…”); checked first information; alarm information; or integrity check information used by the integrity protection system,
However, Mildh in view of RIAHEI does not explicitly disclose the following limitation:
wherein the check method used by the integrity protection system comprises at least one of the following: first-order Markov process; error model; two-dimensional reverse normal distribution; Bayesian Statistical method; least squares method; Kalman filter; or Neyman-Pearson theorem.
KIM discloses wherein the check method used by the integrity protection system comprises error model (page 12, ¶0004-¶0005, “Figure 9 is a flow chart for the process of determining the degree of protection of the integrity checking method using the integrity check of the system DGNSS measurement position according to the present invention.
In this case, the step (S50) of calculating the degree of protection is, the error model as shown in Figure 9 ([AltContent: rect] ) A formation step (S51), the unit vector constructing a matrix (G) (S52), obtaining a step of obtaining the weight matrix (W) (S53), the projection matrix (S) (S54), East distributed errors , obtaining the north dispersion error, northeast covariance error and the vertical dispersion error (S55) and horizontal protection level (HPL, horizontal protection level) and the vertical protection level (VPL, vertical protection level) to obtain from the equation 10 and the equation 11, a step (S56)”);
Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious before the effective filing date of applicant claimed invention to modify the method of Mildh and RIAHEI to include error model as a check method used by the integrity protection system as disclosed by KIM and be motivated in doing so in order to check the integrity of the measurement position by DGNSS receiver-KIM abstract in parts.
Conclusion
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/MUDASIRU K OLAEGBE/Examiner, Art Unit 2495
/FARID HOMAYOUNMEHR/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2495