DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Continued Examination Under 37 CFR 1.114
A request for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, including the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e), was filed in this application after final rejection. Since this application is eligible for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, and the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e) has been timely paid, the finality of the previous Office action has been withdrawn pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114. Applicant's submission filed on 19 May 2026 has been entered. Applicant amended claims 1, 5, 9, 13, 16, 20; cancelled claims 4, 6, 12, 14, and 19. Accordingly, claims 1-3, 5, 7-11, 13, 15-18, and 20 remain pending.
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s remarks
Applicant respectfully submits that the cited references do not disclose or suggest at least "application in an operation system; instantiating a second object recompiled based on a first object of the application; extracting data on a physical interface signal corresponding to a valid event," "generating the pseudo-event while traversing a reaction list; calling back a pseudo-event handler in order to process the pseudo-event for the second object compiled to process only a graphic reaction part in the first object; requesting allocation of an event-indexed secure buffer queue from a trusted kernel; rendering a graphic reaction of the second object to a dummy frame buffer; mirroring the rendered graphic reaction to a secure buffer;" and "copying the operation of the application in the trusted kernel based on the inferred event," as recited by claim 1.
Examiner’s remarks
The examiner agrees that the prior art does not teach “requesting allocation of an event-indexed secure buffer queue from a trusted kernel”. Therefore, Applicant remarks related to said limitation is moot based on the updated prior art applied in the current rejection.
For the remaining limitations, the claims are written at a high level of generality that the prior art teaches the limitations of “application in an operation system; instantiating a second object recompiled based on a first object of the application; extracting data on a physical interface signal corresponding to a valid event," "generating the pseudo-event while traversing a reaction list; calling back a pseudo-event handler in order to process the pseudo-event for the second object compiled to process only a graphic reaction part in the first object, mirroring the rendered graphic reaction to a secure buffer;" and "copying the operation of the application in the trusted kernel based on the inferred event” as disclosed in the current office action.
For example, Pappachan teaches the claimed “application in an operation system “ via paragraph 12 recitation of an operating system interface and a secure processing environment and paragraph 12 disclosure of the secure processing environment includes an application. An operating system interface is the medium through which a user interacts with the operating system. An operating system is system software that manages hardware and provides services for applications. Therefore, the operating system interface is a medium between the operating system and the application in the secure processing environment. Figure 2 of Pappachan further reveals a client application, an operating system, a trusted application, and a trusted operating system.
Pappachan further teaches “instantiating a second object recompiled based on a first object of the application”. Instantiate is merely to represent an object by a concrete instance (Merriam Webster Dictionary). Paragraphs 12 and 27-29 of Pappachan disclose a first object which involves user input from an interface/first object of the application. The information is encrypted/becomes a second object and provided/recompiled to the OS input interface. Therefore, there is an instantiating of the encrypted object to the OS input interface, and the encrypted input object is based on the first object provided to the application.
Pappachan further reaches “extracting data on a physical interface signal corresponding to a valid event”. Extracting data on a physical interface signal can be interpreted as merely receiving input data from a user input interface equipment. Furthermore a valid event can merely be receiving input data from an interface. Pappachan discloses in paragraph 11 that interactions with a user interface may result in input information being generated/extracted.
Regarding the limitation of “generating the pseudo-event while traversing a reaction list”, The specification failed to provide closed definition of pseudo-event. Pseudo-event can pertain to the potential exposure of sensitive information, which leads to the interpretation applied in Pappachan. Paragraph 18 of Pappachan discloses information may be entered via user interface in a banking application. Inputting this type of private or confidential information may be a vulnerability (pseudo-event) in existing systems as malware software may be able to log keystrokes, intercept pointer selections, etc., and thus, gain access to sensitive information. Therefore, the receiving and processing of sensitive input data can be a pseudo-event. Paragraphs 2, 11, and 39 of Pappachan further disclose a user interaction with a user interface or control component, results in the user interface interaction generating new input information for the model component that may possibly cause processing logic in the model component to make changes (traversing a reaction list, list can have just one object). Changes made in the model component may result in corresponding changes that need to be made to the view, and in this regard the model component may send notifications that cause the view component to be updated.
Pappachan further teaches calling back a pseudo-event handler in order to process the pseudo-event for the second object compiled to process only a graphic reaction part in the first object. Paragraph 13 of Pappachan discloses calling back the pseudo-event handler (calling a decryption protocol for decrypting the encrypting output information. Decrypting of the data can be a pseudo-event handler) for the second object (encrypted data ) compiled in the secure processing environment to process only a graphic reaction part (decryption) in the first object (received input data). Paragraph 13 of Pappachan discloses a user output interface to decrypt the encrypted output information using the second encryption protocol and to present the decrypted output information. An example user output interface may include at least output processing resources to decrypt the encrypted output information using the second encryption protocol, process the decrypted output information into presentation information and encrypt the presentation information using a third encryption algorithm. The user output interface may further include output equipment to decrypt the encrypted presentation information using the third encryption protocol and present the decrypted presentation information.
For the remaining limitations taught by the prior art, see the prior art of rejection below.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
Claims 1-3, 5, 7-11, 13, 15-18, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
Claim 1 recites “instantiating a second object recompiled…”, but fails to particularly point out and disclose the step when the second object was first compiled. It is unclear whether the first object was previously compiled and becomes the second object, that is then recompiled. The examiner interpreted the claims as best understood.
Claim 1 recites “a valid event” but fail to particularly point out the requirements that constitute a valid event. The claims nor specification provide a metric for one to determine an event to be valid. The examiner interpreted the claims as best understood.
Claim 1 recites the limitation "the instantiated object". There is insufficient antecedent basis for this limitation in the claim. It is unclear whether the claim is referring to an instantiated second object or another instantiated object. The examiner interpreted the claims as best understood.
Claims 2-5, 5 and 7-8 are rejected as being dependent on, and failing to cure the deficiencies of, rejected independent claim 1.
Claim 9 recites “instantiate a second object recompiled…”, but fails to particularly point out and disclose the step when the second object was first compiled. It is unclear whether the first object was previously compiled and becomes the second object, that is then recompiled. The examiner interpreted the claims as best understood.
Claim 9 recites “a valid event” but fail to particularly point out the requirements that constitute a valid event. The claims nor specification provide a metric for one to determine an event to be valid. The examiner interpreted the claims as best understood.
Claim 9 recites the limitation "the instantiated object". There is insufficient antecedent basis for this limitation in the claim. It is unclear whether the claim is referring to an instantiated second object or another instantiated object. The examiner interpreted the claims as best understood.
Claims 10-11, 13, and 15 are rejected as being dependent on, and failing to cure the deficiencies of, rejected independent claim 9.
Claim 16 recites “instantiate a second object recompiled…”, but fails to particularly point out and disclose the step when the second object was first compiled. It is unclear whether the first object was previously compiled and becomes the second object, that is then recompiled. The examiner interpreted the claims as best understood.
Claim 16 recites “a valid event” but fail to particularly point out the requirements that constitute a valid event. The claims nor specification provide a metric for one to determine an event to be valid. The examiner interpreted the claims as best understood.
Claim 16 recites the limitation "the instantiated object". There is insufficient antecedent basis for this limitation in the claim. It is unclear whether the claim is referring to an instantiated second object or another instantiated object. The examiner interpreted the claims as best understood.
Claims 17-18 and 20 are rejected as being dependent on, and failing to cure the deficiencies of, rejected independent claim 16.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claim(s) 1-2, 8-10, and 16-17 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Pappachan et al US 20140359305 (hereinafter Pappachan), in view of Zhang et al US 20200234275 (hereinafter Zhang), in further view of Kanaujia et al US 20170123971 (hereinafter Kanaujia), and in further view of Tiwari et al US 20210166227 (hereinafter Tiwari).
As to claim 1, Pappachan teaches a method for processing user interaction information by an electronic device (Abstract and Figures 1 and 3, wherein Figure 3 discloses modular implementation and communication flow of the system shown in Figure 1, see paragraph 5 and 7; abstract discloses an application integrity protection via secure interaction and processing), the method comprising:
executing an application (Paragraph 15 discloses a computing device that executes applications. Paragraph 18 reveals a banking application is executed, an application with which a user may be able to get information about their personal banking bank accounts);
preparing to execute a user interface element for an operation of the application (Paragraph 28 discloses an OS input interface that represents OS features for routing (preparing) information between different areas of the device. The OS interface process and prepares the encrypted data to pass to secure model of the secure processing environment) in an operating system (Paragraph 12 discloses an operating system interface and a secure processing environment. Paragraph 12 further discloses the secure processing environment include an application. An operating system interface is the medium through which users interacts with the operating system. An operating system is system software that manages hardware and provides services for applications. Therefore, the operating system interface is a medium between the operating system and the application in the secure processing environment. Figure 2 further reveals a client application, an operating system, a trusted application, and a trusted operating system);
instantiating a second object recompiled based on the first object of the application (Instantiate is merely to represent an object by a concrete instance (Merriam Webster Dictionary). Paragraph 12 and 27-29 disclose a first object which involves user input from an interface/first object of the application. The information is encrypted/becomes a second object and provided/recompiled to the OS input interface. Therefore, there is an instantiating of the encrypted object to the OS input interface, and the encrypted input object is based on the first object provided to the application);
extracting data on a physical interface signal corresponding to a valid event (Extracting data on a physical interface signal can be interpreted as merely receiving input data from a user input interface equipment. Furthermore a valid event can merely be receiving input data from an interface. Paragraph 11 discloses that interactions with a user interface may result in input information being generated/extracted);
recognizing a user interface of the application, converting a user reaction between a pseudo-event and the instantiated object into the data (Paragraph 18 reveals the system 100 shown in Figures 1 and 3 receives/recognize the sensitive input information via the user interface of the banking application and converts/encrypts as it is entered via user interface. The input information from the user interacting with text field box(instantiated object) is encrypted using keystroke encryption/pseudo-event. This encryption algorithm uses pseudo-random key) , and transmitting the data to a secure area of the electronic device (paragraphs 18 and 27-28 disclose the converted/encrypted input information is provided to OS input interface 108/304. The encrypted information is transmitted to secure processing environment 112 which comprises [mirror] application 114 in Figures 1);
transmitting the data to a secure area of the electronic device (Paragraph 28 discloses the OS input interface may pass encrypted communication/information to secure processing environment of the device);
generating the pseudo-event while traversing a reaction list (Pseudo-event can pertain to the potential exposure of sensitive information. Paragraph 18 discloses information may be entered via user interface in a banking application. Inputting this type of private or confidential information may be a vulnerability (pseudo-event) in existing systems as malware may be able to log keystrokes, intercept pointer selections, etc., and thus, gain access to sensitive information. Therefore, the receiving and processing of sensitive input data can be a pseudo-event. Paragraphs 2, 11, and 39 further disclose a user interaction with a user interface or control component, results in the user interface interaction generating new input information for the model component that may possibly cause processing logic in the model component to make changes (traversing a reaction list). Changes made in the model component may result in corresponding changes that need to be made to the view, and in this regard the model component may send notifications that cause the view component to be updated);
calling back a pseudo-event handler in order to process the pseudo-event for the second object compiled to process only a graphic reaction part in the first object (Paragraph 13 discloses calling back the pseudo-event handler (calling a decryption protocol for decrypting the encrypting output information) for the second object (encrypted data ) compiled in the Secure processing environment to process only a graphic reaction part (decryption) in the first object. Paragraph 13 discloses a user output interface to decrypt the encrypted output information using the second encryption protocol and to present the decrypted output information. An example user output interface may include at least output processing resources to decrypt the encrypted output information using the second encryption protocol, process the decrypted output information into presentation information and encrypt the presentation information using a third encryption algorithm. The user output interface may further include output equipment to decrypt the encrypted presentation information using the third encryption protocol and present the decrypted presentation information);
rendering a graphic reaction of the second object (Paragraph 28 discloses the secure view component may receive update notifications from secure model and may generate output information (e.g., text/images/video to display, sound to be generated, etc.) based on the encrypted information in secure model (the encrypted data is the second object, that is decrypted to obtain the input information/first object). The output information may be generated based on a variety of views (e.g., different modes of output such as display, speech, printing, etc., different configurations of output displays, etc.) that area available in secure view. Secure view component may then encrypt the output information (encrypted data is the second object) (e.g., using PAVP encryption as shown at) prior to transmitting the output information to OS output interface);
mirroring the rendered graphic reaction (Paragraphs 18 and 27-28 disclose [mirror] application 114 that is in the secure processing environment 112 in Figures 1 that receives the encrypted information. Figure 3 shows a more detailed view of the application which includes secure controller 306, secure model 308, and secure view 310 and PAVP 312 );
upon completion of the reaction list traversal (Paragraphs 2, 11, and 39 further disclose a user interaction with a user interface or control component, results in the user interface interaction generating new input information for the model component that may possibly cause processing logic in the model component to make changes (traversing a reaction list). Changes made in the model component may result in corresponding changes that need to be made to the view, and in this regard the model component may send notifications that cause the view component to be updated), based on a user input being detected, inferring an event to be recognized by a graphical user interface (GUI) framework of the electronic device using the data (Paragraph 28 discloses the secure view component may receive update notifications from secure model (recall, paragraphs 2, 11, and 39 further disclose a user interaction with a user interface or control component, results in the user interface interaction generating new input information for the model component that may possibly cause processing logic in the model component to make changes (traversing a reaction list)) and may generate output information (e.g., text/images/video to display, sound to be generated, etc.) based on the encrypted information in secure model (the encrypted data is the second object, that is decrypted to obtain the input information/first object). The output information may be generated based on a variety of views (e.g., different modes of output such as display, speech, printing, etc., different configurations of output displays, etc.) that area available in secure view. Secure view component may then encrypt the output information (encrypted data is the second object) (e.g., using PAVP encryption as shown at) prior to transmitting the output information to OS output interface); and
interpreting, in the secure area, the user reaction to the instantiated object corresponding to the inferred event (Paragraph 18 discloses the encrypted input information may only be decrypted/interpreted once received within secure processing environment 112, providing protection for its content and also the execution of application 114 which may access to databases to find account balances, process financial transactions (e.g., pay bills, transfer funds, etc.)).
Pappachan does not teach requesting allocation of an event-indexed secure buffer queue from a trusted kernel; rendering a graphic reaction of the second object to a dummy frame buffer; mirroring a rendered image of the application to a secure buffer; copying the operation of the application in the trusted kernel based on the inferred event.
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Figure 1 of Zhang
Zhang teaches rendering a graphic reaction of the second object to a dummy frame buffer (Paragraph 12 discloses rich operating system sends the first surface (non-secure surface) /rendered graphic reaction in the frame buffer to the trusted operating system. Paragraph 63 further discloses a non-secure surface (excluding the secure control)/second object obtained after the rendering processing is buffered in the frame buffer of the rich operating system, and is synchronized to the frame buffer of the trusted operating system based on a communication channel between the TEE and the REE. Further, the rich operating system transfers identified information about the secure control in the user interface to the trusted operating system. The trusted operating system performs rendering processing on the secure control based on the information about the secure control and a customized method (measure, layout, or draw) corresponding to the secure control. A secure surface (including only the secure control) obtained after the rendering processing is buffered in the frame buffer of the trusted operating system); and mirroring of the rendered graphic reaction to a secure buffer (Paragraph 5 and Figure 1 disclose when a user enters for transfer request input and verifies a PIN code (reaction), the rich execution environment (REE) application invokes the secure display/input on a trusted execution environment (TEE). The secure display based on the input of the trusted user interface is the rendered graphic. Paragraph 11 discloses the display position of the secure control, wherein the second surface (of the display) is in a [secure] frame buffer of the trusted operating system. Paragraph 63 further discloses a non-secure surface (excluding the secure control)/second object obtained after the rendering processing is buffered in the frame buffer of the rich operating system, and is synchronized/mirrored to the frame buffer of the trusted operating system based on a communication channel between the TEE and the REE. Further, the rich operating system transfers identified information about the secure control in the user interface to the trusted operating system. The trusted operating system performs rendering processing on the secure control based on the information about the secure control and a customized method (measure, layout, or draw) corresponding to the secure control. A secure surface (including only the secure control) obtained after the rendering processing is buffered in the frame buffer of the trusted operating system).
It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Pappachan’s teaching of processing user interaction with Zhang’s further teachings of mirroring of the rendered graphic reaction to prevent information leakage and malware transmission while satisfying requirement of the mobile payment security (Paragraph 3 of Zhang).
The combination of Pappachan in view of Zhang does not teach requesting allocation of an event-indexed secure buffer queue from a trusted kernel; copying the operation of the application in the trusted kernel based on the inferred event.
Kanaujia teaches requesting allocation of an event-indexed secure buffer queue from a trusted kernel (Paragraph 86 discloses during processing of the logical memory request, the data is retained in a queue (e.g., a queue of pending requests, such as request queue, or a queue for hold the data for pending requests, such as I/O wait buffer queue ) by the kernel space memory management module. Paragraph 87 discloses the physical memory request is generated by the storage engine and the physical memory request includes a piggybacked request that includes the indication of the location in the non-volatile memory for the data. In some embodiments, the kernel space memory management module (e.g., redirector response handler of block driver redirector) processes the piggybacked request of the physical memory request. The kernel space memory management module (e.g., redirector response handler of block driver redirector) processes the piggybacked request by accessing the physical memory location, indicated by the physical memory request, in non-volatile memory ).
It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Pappachan’s teaching of processing user interaction in view of Zhang’s further teachings of mirroring of the rendered graphic reaction with Kanaujia’s teachings of requesting allocation of an event-index secure buffer queue from a trusted kernel to provide more efficient memory operations (Paragraph 3 of Kanaujia).
The combination of Pappachan in view of Zhang and Kanaujia does not teach but Tiwari teaches copying the operation of the application in the trusted kernel based on the inferred event (Paragraphs 74-75 disclose the function implemented by the secure application may produce an output of elements to present via the user interface to the secure user interface service, which may map/copy the elements to the presentation of the user interface and determine how a user may interact with the elements via the user interface. The mapping and interactions of the elements may be transmitted/copied from the secure user interface service to the secure kernel which may compose a secure user interface display for presentation via a display device, such as a touchscreen or speaker (based on the secure user listener recognize receipt of the secure user interface display from the secure execution environment per paragraph 76. This can be the inferred event. Another interpretation of the inferred event) . The secure kernel may also control the transmission of the secure user interface display to the normal execution environment for presentation of the secure user interface display via the display device).
It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Pappachan’s teaching of processing user interaction in view of Zhang’s further teachings of mirroring of the rendered graphic reaction and Kanaujia’s teachings of requesting allocation of an event-index secure buffer queue from a trusted kernel with Tiwari’s teachings of copying the operation of the application in the trusted kernel to prevent presentation of the vulnerable first data input element by the client application in response to determining that the first data input element is a vulnerable data input element (Paragraph 4 of Tiwari).
As to claim 2, the combination of Pappachan in view of Zhang, Kanaujia, and Tiwari teaches further comprising:
generating input data based on the interpreted user reaction (Pappachan: Paragraphs 18 and 28 disclose output information is generated (e.g., financial reports, transaction confirmations, etc.), the output may be encrypted prior to transmission back as input data to OS interface 108 as shown at 110 of Figure 1); and
encrypting the input data in the secure area (Pappachan: Paragraphs 18 and 28 disclose output information is generated (e.g., financial reports, transaction confirmations, etc.), the output may be encrypted prior to transmission back as input data to OS interface 108 as shown at 110 of Figure 1).
As to claim 8, the combination of Pappachan in view of Zhang, Kanaujia, and Tiwari teaches wherein the application is developed by using a software development kit (SDK) comprising an oblivious event receipt (OER) function (Pappachan: Paragraph 25 discloses the application in the secure processing environment can be a trusted executed environment/secure enclave technology. TEE SDK are specifically designed for developing application such as application 114 within a TEE. TEE utilizes an SDK to create applications that run in the secure processing environment. Paragraphs 46-47 reveal the output information for presentation is encrypted using third encryption protocol. This third encryption protocol is the OER function. Third encryption protocol can include homomorphic encryption).
As to claim 9, Pappachan teaches an electronic device (Paragraph 19 and Figure 2 disclose a configuration for electronic device 102) comprising:
a display (Paragraph 23 and Figure 2 reference number 208 discloses user interface module that include equipment and software, and include a display);
memory, including one or more storage media, configured to store instructions, an application, and an operating system (Paragraph 37 discloses non-transitory computer readable storage medium, wherein instructions sets of a software package are stored on the non-transitory computer readable storage medium. Paragraphs 20 and 22 disclose the device 102 includes memory module that store instructions and information relating to performing activities related to reading data, writing data, processing data, formulating data, converting data, transforming data. Claim 40 recites the storage medium include storing instructions involving OS interface); and
at least one processor, including processing circuitry, configured to execute the application and the operating system stored in the memory and operate while distinguishing between a secure area and a normal area (paragraphs 20-21 and 22 disclose the electronic device includes processing module that comprise one or more processors. Processing module is configured to execute/perform various instructions such as reading data, writing data, processing data, formulating data, converting data, transforming data. Paragraph 15 discloses computing/electronic device that executes applications. Paragraph 18 reveals a banking application is executed, an application with which a user may be able to get information about their personal banking bank accounts ),
wherein the instructions, when executed by the at least one processor individually or collectively, cause the electronic device to (paragraphs 20-21 and 22 disclose the electronic device includes processing module that comprise one or more processors. Processing module is configured to execute/perform various instructions such as reading data, writing data, processing data, formulating data, converting data, transforming data ) configured to:
control to execute the application (paragraphs 20-21 and 22 disclose the electronic device includes processing module that comprise one or more processors. Processing module is configured to execute/perform various instructions such as reading data, writing data, processing data, formulating data, converting data, transforming data. Paragraph 15 discloses computing/electronic device that executes applications. Paragraph 18 reveals a banking application is executed, an application with which a user may be able to get information about their personal banking bank accounts. Paragraph 28 further reveal secure processing environment contains secure controller);
prepare to execute a user interface element for an operation of the application (Paragraph 28 discloses an OS input interface that represents OS features for routing (preparing) information between different areas of the device. The OS interface process and prepares the encrypted data to pass to secure model of the secure processing environment) in an operating system (Paragraph 12 discloses an operating system interface and a secure processing environment. Paragraph 12 further discloses the secure processing environment include an application. An operating system interface is the medium through which users interacts with the operating system. An operating system is system software that manages hardware and provides services for applications. Therefore, the operating system interface is a medium between the operating system and the application in the secure processing environment. Figure 2 further reveals a client application, an operating system, a trusted application, and a trusted operating system);
instantiate a second object recompiled based on the first object of the application (Instantiate is merely to represent an object by a concrete instance (Merriam Webster Dictionary). Paragraph 12 and 27-29 disclose first object which is user input/first object of the application. The information is encrypted/becomes a second object and provided to the OS input interface. Therefore, there is an instantiating of the encrypted object recompile in the secure processing environment);
extract data on a physical interface signal corresponding to a valid event (Extracting data on a physical interface signal can be interpreted as merely receiving input data from a user input interface equipment. Furthermore a valid event can merely be receiving input data from an interface. Paragraph 11 discloses that interactions with a user interface may result in input information being generated/extracted);
recognize a user interface of the application, converting a user reaction between a pseudo-event and the instantiated object into the data (Paragraph 18 reveals the system 100 shown in Figures 1 and 3 receives/recognize the sensitive input information via the user interface of the banking application and converts/encrypts as it is entered via user interface. The input information from the user interacting with text field box(instantiated object) is encrypted using keystroke encryption/pseudo-event. This encryption algorithm uses pseudo-random key) , and transmitting the data to a secure area of the electronic device (paragraphs 18 and 27-28 disclose the converted/encrypted input information is provided to OS input interface 108/304. The encrypted information is transmitted to secure processing environment 112 which comprises [mirror] application 114 in Figures 1);
transmit the data to a secure area of the electronic device (Paragraph 28 discloses the OS input interface may pass encrypted communication/information to secure processing environment of the device);
generate the pseudo-event while traversing a reaction list (Pseudo-event can pertain to the potential exposure of sensitive information. Paragraph 18 discloses information may be entered via user interface in a banking application. Inputting this type of private or confidential information may be a vulnerability (pseudo-event) in existing systems as malware may be able to log keystrokes, intercept pointer selections, etc., and thus, gain access to sensitive information. Therefore, the receiving and processing of sensitive input data can be a pseudo-event. Paragraphs 2, 11, and 39 further disclose a user interaction with a user interface or control component, results in the user interface interaction generating new input information for the model component that may possibly cause processing logic in the model component to make changes (traversing a reaction list). Changes made in the model component may result in corresponding changes that need to be made to the view, and in this regard the model component may send notifications that cause the view component to be updated);
call back a pseudo-event handler in order to process the pseudo-event for the second object compiled to process only a graphic reaction part in the first object (Paragraph 13 discloses calling back the pseudo-event handler (calling a decryption protocol for decrypting the encrypting output information ) for the second object (encrypted data ) compiled in the Secure processing environment to process only a graphic reaction part (decryption) in the first object. Paragraph 13 discloses a user output interface to decrypt the encrypted output information using the second encryption protocol and to present the decrypted output information. An example user output interface may include at least output processing resources to decrypt the encrypted output information using the second encryption protocol, process the decrypted output information into presentation information and encrypt the presentation information using a third encryption algorithm. The user output interface may further include output equipment to decrypt the encrypted presentation information using the third encryption protocol and present the decrypted presentation information);
render a graphic reaction of the second object (Paragraph 28 discloses the secure view component may receive update notifications from secure model and may generate output information (e.g., text/images/video to display, sound to be generated, etc.) based on the encrypted information in secure model (the encrypted data is the second object, that is decrypted to obtain the input information/first object). The output information may be generated based on a variety of views (e.g., different modes of output such as display, speech, printing, etc., different configurations of output displays, etc.) that area available in secure view. Secure view component may then encrypt the output information (encrypted data is the second object) (e.g., using PAVP encryption as shown at) prior to transmitting the output information to OS output interface);
mirror the rendered graphic reaction (Paragraphs 18 and 27-28 disclose [mirror] application 114 that is in the secure processing environment 112 in Figures 1 that receives the encrypted information. Figure 3 shows a more detailed view of the application which includes secure controller 306, secure model 308, and secure view 310 and PAVP 312 );
upon completion of the reaction list traversal (Paragraphs 2, 11, and 39 further disclose a user interaction with a user interface or control component, results in the user interface interaction generating new input information for the model component that may possibly cause processing logic in the model component to make changes (traversing a reaction list). Changes made in the model component may result in corresponding changes that need to be made to the view, and in this regard the model component may send notifications that cause the view component to be updated), based on a user input being detected, infer an event to be recognized by a graphical user interface (GUI) framework of the electronic device using the data (Paragraph 28 discloses the secure view component may receive update notifications from secure model (recall, paragraphs 2, 11, and 39 further disclose a user interaction with a user interface or control component, results in the user interface interaction generating new input information for the model component that may possibly cause processing logic in the model component to make changes (traversing a reaction list)) and may generate output information (e.g., text/images/video to display, sound to be generated, etc.) based on the encrypted information in secure model (the encrypted data is the second object, that is decrypted to obtain the input information/first object). The output information may be generated based on a variety of views (e.g., different modes of output such as display, speech, printing, etc., different configurations of output displays, etc.) that area available in secure view. Secure view component may then encrypt the output information (encrypted data is the second object) (e.g., using PAVP encryption as shown at) prior to transmitting the output information to OS output interface); and
interpret, in the secure area, the user reaction to the instantiated object corresponding to the inferred event (Paragraph 18 discloses the encrypted input information may only be decrypted/interpreted once received within secure processing environment 112, providing protection for its content and also the execution of application 114 which may access to databases to find account balances, process financial transactions (e.g., pay bills, transfer funds, etc.)).
Pappachan does not teach requesting allocation of an event-indexed secure buffer queue from a trusted kernel; rendering a graphic reaction of the second object to a dummy frame buffer; mirroring a rendered image of the application to a secure buffer; copying the operation of the application in the trusted kernel based on the inferred event.
Zhang teaches rendering a graphic reaction of the second object to a dummy frame buffer (Paragraph 12 discloses rich operating system sends the first surface (non-secure surface) /rendered graphic reaction in the frame buffer to the trusted operating system. Paragraph 63 further discloses a non-secure surface (excluding the secure control)/second object obtained after the rendering processing is buffered in the frame buffer of the rich operating system, and is synchronized to the frame buffer of the trusted operating system based on a communication channel between the TEE and the REE. Further, the rich operating system transfers identified information about the secure control in the user interface to the trusted operating system. The trusted operating system performs rendering processing on the secure control based on the information about the secure control and a customized method (measure, layout, or draw) corresponding to the secure control. A secure surface (including only the secure control) obtained after the rendering processing is buffered in the frame buffer of the trusted operating system); and mirroring of the rendered graphic reaction to a secure buffer (Paragraph 5 and Figure 1 disclose when a user enters for transfer request input and verifies a PIN code (reaction), the rich execution environment (REE) application invokes the secure display/input on a trusted execution environment (TEE). The secure display based on the input of the trusted user interface is the rendered graphic. Paragraph 11 discloses the display position of the secure control, wherein the second surface (of the display) is in a [secure] frame buffer of the trusted operating system. Paragraph 63 further discloses a non-secure surface (excluding the secure control)/second object obtained after the rendering processing is buffered in the frame buffer of the rich operating system, and is synchronized/mirrored to the frame buffer of the trusted operating system based on a communication channel between the TEE and the REE. Further, the rich operating system transfers identified information about the secure control in the user interface to the trusted operating system. The trusted operating system performs rendering processing on the secure control based on the information about the secure control and a customized method (measure, layout, or draw) corresponding to the secure control. A secure surface (including only the secure control) obtained after the rendering processing is buffered in the frame buffer of the trusted operating system).
It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Pappachan’s teaching of processing user interaction in with Zhang’s further teachings of mirroring of the rendered graphic reaction to prevent information leakage and malware transmission while satisfying requirement of the mobile payment security (Paragraph 3 of Zhang).
The combination of Pappachan in view of Zhang does not teach requesting allocation of an event-indexed secure buffer queue from a trusted kernel; copying the operation of the application in the trusted kernel based on the inferred event.
Kanaujia teaches requesting allocation of an event-indexed secure buffer queue from a trusted kernel (Paragraph 86 discloses during processing of the logical memory request, the data is retained in a queue (e.g., a queue of pending requests, such as request queue, or a queue for hold the data for pending requests, such as I/O wait buffer queue) by the kernel space memory management module. Paragraph 87 discloses the physical memory request is generated by the storage engine and the physical memory request includes a piggybacked request that includes the indication of the location in the non-volatile memory for the data. In some embodiments, the kernel space memory management module (e.g., redirector response handler of block driver redirector) processes the piggybacked request of the physical memory request. The kernel space memory management module (e.g., redirector response handler of block driver redirector) processes the piggybacked request by accessing the physical memory location, indicated by the physical memory request, in non-volatile memory ).
It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Pappachan’s teaching of processing user interaction in view of Zhang’s further teachings of mirroring of the rendered graphic reaction with Kanaujia’s teachings of requesting allocation of an event-index secure buffer queue from a trusted kernel to provide more efficient memory operations (Paragraph 3 of Kanaujia).
The combination of Pappachan in view of Zhang and Kanaujia does not teach but Tiwari teaches copying the operation of the application in the trusted kernel based on the inferred event (Paragraphs 74-75 disclose the function implemented by the secure application may produce an output of elements to present via the user interface to the secure user interface service, which may map/copy the elements to the presentation of the user interface and determine how a user may interact with the elements via the user interface. The mapping and interactions of the elements may be transmitted/copied from the secure user interface service to the secure kernel which may compose a secure user interface display for presentation via a display device, such as a touchscreen or speaker (based on the secure user listener recognize receipt of the secure user interface display from the secure execution environment per paragraph 76. This can be the inferred event. Another interpretation of the inferred event) . The secure kernel may also control the transmission of the secure user interface display to the normal execution environment for presentation of the secure user interface display via the display device).
It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Pappachan’s teaching of processing user interaction in view of Zhang’s further teachings of mirroring of the rendered graphic reaction and Kanaujia’s teachings of requesting allocation of an event-index secure buffer queue from a trusted kernel with Tiwari’s teachings of copying the operation of the application in the trusted kernel to prevent presentation of the vulnerable first data input element by the client application in response to determining that the first data input element is a vulnerable data input element (Paragraph 4 of Tiwari).
As to claim 10, the combination of Pappachan in view of Zhang, Kanaujia, and Tiwari teaches wherein the instructions, when executed by the at least one processor individually or collectively, further cause the electronic device to (Pappachan: paragraphs 20-21 and 22 disclose the electronic device includes processing module that comprise one or more processors. Processing module is configured to execute/perform various instructions such as reading data, writing data, processing data, formulating data, converting data, transforming data ):
generate input data based on the interpreted user reaction (Pappachan: paragraphs 18 and 28 disclose output information is generated (e.g., financial reports, transaction confirmations, etc.), the output may be encrypted prior to transmission back as input data to OS interface 108 as shown at 110 of Figure 1); and
encrypt the input data in the secure area (Pappachan: paragraphs 18 and 28 disclose output information is generated (e.g., financial reports, transaction confirmations, etc.), the output may be encrypted prior to transmission back as input data to OS interface 108 as shown at 110 of Figure 1).
As to claim 16, Pappachan teaches a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing computer- executable instructions (Paragraph 37 discloses non-transitory computer readable storage medium, wherein instructions sets of a software package are stored on the non-transitory computer readable storage medium ) for processing user interaction information that (Abstract and Figures 1 and 3 (wherein Figure 3 disclose modular implementation and communication flow of the system shown in Figure 1, see paragraph 5 and 7) discloses application integrity protection via secure interaction and processing), when executed by at least one processor of an electronic device, cause the electronic device (Paragraphs 20-21 and 22 disclose the electronic device includes processing module that comprise one or more processors. Processing module is configured to execute/perform various instructions such as reading data, writing data, processing data, formulating data, converting data, transforming data ) to:
execute an application (Paragraph 15 discloses a computing device that executes applications. Paragraph 18 reveals a banking application is executed, an application with which a user may be able to get information about their personal banking bank accounts);
prepare to execute a user interface element for an operation of the application in an operating system (Paragraph 28 discloses an OS input interface that represents OS features for routing (preparing) information between different areas of the device. The OS interface process and prepares the encrypted data to pass to secure model of the secure processing environment) in an operating system (Paragraph 12 discloses an operating system interface and a secure processing environment. Paragraph 12 further discloses the secure processing environment include an application. An operating system interface is the medium through which users interacts with the operating system. An operating system is system software that manages hardware and provides services for applications. Therefore, the operating system interface is a medium between the operating system and the application in the secure processing environment. Figure 2 further reveals a client application, an operating system, a trusted application, and a trusted operating system);
instantiate a second object recompiled based on the first object of the application (Instantiate is merely to represent an object by a concrete instance (Merriam Webster Dictionary). Paragraph 12 and 27-29 disclose first object which is user input/first object of the application. The information is encrypted/becomes a second object and provided to the OS input interface. Therefore, there is an instantiating of the encrypted object recompile in the secure processing environment);
extract data on a physical interface signal corresponding to a valid event (Extracting data on a physical interface signal can be interpreted as merely receiving input data from a user input interface equipment. Furthermore a valid event can merely be receiving input data from an interface. Paragraph 11 discloses that interactions with a user interface may result in input information being generated/extracted);
recognize a user interface of the application, converting a user reaction between a pseudo-event and the instantiated object into the data (Paragraph 18 reveals the system 100 shown in Figures 1 and 3 receives/recognize the sensitive input information via the user interface of the banking application and converts/encrypts as it is entered via user interface. The input information from the user interacting with text field box(instantiated object) is encrypted using keystroke encryption/pseudo-event. This encryption algorithm uses pseudo-random key) , and transmitting the data to a secure area of the electronic device (paragraphs 18 and 27-28 disclose the converted/encrypted input information is provided to OS input interface 108/304. The encrypted information is transmitted to secure processing environment 112 which comprises [mirror] application 114 in Figures 1);
transmit the data to a secure area of the electronic device (Paragraph 28 discloses the OS input interface may pass encrypted communication/information to secure processing environment of the device);
generate the pseudo-event while traversing a reaction list (Pseudo-event can pertain to the potential exposure of sensitive information. Paragraph 18 discloses information may be entered via user interface in a banking application. Inputting this type of private or confidential information may be a vulnerability (pseudo-event) in existing systems as malware may be able to log keystrokes, intercept pointer selections, etc., and thus, gain access to sensitive information. Therefore, the receiving and processing of sensitive input data can be a pseudo-event. Paragraphs 2, 11, and 39 further disclose a user interaction with a user interface or control component, results in the user interface interaction generating new input information for the model component that may possibly cause processing logic in the model component to make changes (traversing a reaction list). Changes made in the model component may result in corresponding changes that need to be made to the view, and in this regard the model component may send notifications that cause the view component to be updated);
call back a pseudo-event handler in order to process the pseudo-event for the second object compiled to process only a graphic reaction part in the first object (Paragraph 13 discloses calling back the pseudo-event handler (calling a decryption protocol for decrypting the encrypting output information ) for the second object (encrypted data ) compiled in the Secure processing environment to process only a graphic reaction part (decryption) in the first object. Paragraph 13 discloses a user output interface to decrypt the encrypted output information using the second encryption protocol and to present the decrypted output information. An example user output interface may include at least output processing resources to decrypt the encrypted output information using the second encryption protocol, process the decrypted output information into presentation information and encrypt the presentation information using a third encryption algorithm. The user output interface may further include output equipment to decrypt the encrypted presentation information using the third encryption protocol and present the decrypted presentation information);
render a graphic reaction of the second object (Paragraph 28 discloses the secure view component may receive update notifications from secure model and may generate output information (e.g., text/images/video to display, sound to be generated, etc.) based on the encrypted information in secure model (the encrypted data is the second object, that is decrypted to obtain the input information/first object). The output information may be generated based on a variety of views (e.g., different modes of output such as display, speech, printing, etc., different configurations of output displays, etc.) that area available in secure view. Secure view component may then encrypt the output information (encrypted data is the second object) (e.g., using PAVP encryption as shown at) prior to transmitting the output information to OS output interface);
mirror the rendered graphic reaction (Paragraphs 18 and 27-28 disclose [mirror] application 114 that is in the secure processing environment 112 in Figures 1 that receives the encrypted information. Figure 3 shows a more detailed view of the application which includes secure controller 306, secure model 308, and secure view 310 and PAVP 312 );
upon completion of the reaction list traversal (Paragraphs 2, 11, and 39 further disclose a user interaction with a user interface or control component, results in the user interface interaction generating new input information for the model component that may possibly cause processing logic in the model component to make changes (traversing a reaction list). Changes made in the model component may result in corresponding changes that need to be made to the view, and in this regard the model component may send notifications that cause the view component to be updated), based on a user input being detected, infer an event to be recognized by a graphical user interface (GUI) framework of the electronic device using the data (Paragraph 28 discloses the secure view component may receive update notifications from secure model (recall, paragraphs 2, 11, and 39 further disclose a user interaction with a user interface or control component, results in the user interface interaction generating new input information for the model component that may possibly cause processing logic in the model component to make changes (traversing a reaction list)) and may generate output information (e.g., text/images/video to display, sound to be generated, etc.) based on the encrypted information in secure model (the encrypted data is the second object, that is decrypted to obtain the input information/first object). The output information may be generated based on a variety of views (e.g., different modes of output such as display, speech, printing, etc., different configurations of output displays, etc.) that area available in secure view. Secure view component may then encrypt the output information (encrypted data is the second object) (e.g., using PAVP encryption as shown at) prior to transmitting the output information to OS output interface); and
interpret, in the secure area, the user reaction to the instantiated object corresponding to the inferred event (Paragraph 18 discloses the encrypted input information may only be decrypted/interpreted once received within secure processing environment 112, providing protection for its content and also the execution of application 114 which may access to databases to find account balances, process financial transactions (e.g., pay bills, transfer funds, etc.)).
Pappachan does not teach requesting allocation of an event-indexed secure buffer queue from a trusted kernel; rendering a graphic reaction of the second object to a dummy frame buffer; mirroring a rendered image of the application to a secure buffer; copying the operation of the application in the trusted kernel based on the inferred event.
Zhang teaches rendering a graphic reaction of the second object to a dummy frame buffer (Paragraph 12 discloses rich operating system sends the first surface (non-secure surface) /rendered graphic reaction in the frame buffer to the trusted operating system. Paragraph 63 further discloses a non-secure surface (excluding the secure control)/second object obtained after the rendering processing is buffered in the frame buffer of the rich operating system, and is synchronized to the frame buffer of the trusted operating system based on a communication channel between the TEE and the REE. Further, the rich operating system transfers identified information about the secure control in the user interface to the trusted operating system. The trusted operating system performs rendering processing on the secure control based on the information about the secure control and a customized method (measure, layout, or draw) corresponding to the secure control. A secure surface (including only the secure control) obtained after the rendering processing is buffered in the frame buffer of the trusted operating system); and mirroring of the rendered graphic reaction to a secure buffer (Paragraph 5 and Figure 1 disclose when a user enters for transfer request input and verifies a PIN code (reaction), the rich execution environment (REE) application invokes the secure display/input on a trusted execution environment (TEE). The secure display based on the input of the trusted user interface is the rendered graphic. Paragraph 11 discloses the display position of the secure control, wherein the second surface (of the display) is in a [secure] frame buffer of the trusted operating system. Paragraph 63 further discloses a non-secure surface (excluding the secure control)/second object obtained after the rendering processing is buffered in the frame buffer of the rich operating system, and is synchronized/mirrored to the frame buffer of the trusted operating system based on a communication channel between the TEE and the REE. Further, the rich operating system transfers identified information about the secure control in the user interface to the trusted operating system. The trusted operating system performs rendering processing on the secure control based on the information about the secure control and a customized method (measure, layout, or draw) corresponding to the secure control. A secure surface (including only the secure control) obtained after the rendering processing is buffered in the frame buffer of the trusted operating system).
It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Pappachan’s teaching of processing user interaction in with Zhang’s further teachings of mirroring of the rendered graphic reaction to prevent information leakage and malware transmission while satisfying requirement of the mobile payment security (Paragraph 3 of Zhang).
The combination of Pappachan in view of Zhang does not teach requesting allocation of an event-indexed secure buffer queue from a trusted kernel; copying the operation of the application in the trusted kernel based on the inferred event.
Kanaujia teaches requesting allocation of an event-indexed secure buffer queue from a trusted kernel (Paragraph 86 discloses during processing of the logical memory request, the data is retained in a queue (e.g., a queue of pending requests, such as request queue, or a queue for hold the data for pending requests, such as I/O wait buffer queue ) by the kernel space memory management module. Paragraph 87 discloses the physical memory request is generated by the storage engine and the physical memory request includes a piggybacked request that includes the indication of the location in the non-volatile memory for the data. In some embodiments, the kernel space memory management module (e.g., redirector response handler of block driver redirector) processes the piggybacked request of the physical memory request. The kernel space memory management module (e.g., redirector response handler of block driver redirector) processes the piggybacked request by accessing the physical memory location, indicated by the physical memory request, in non-volatile memory).
It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Pappachan’s teaching of processing user interaction in view of Zhang’s further teachings of mirroring of the rendered graphic reaction with Kanaujia’s teachings of requesting allocation of an event-index secure buffer queue from a trusted kernel to provide more efficient memory operations (Paragraph 3 of Kanaujia).
The combination of Pappachan in view of Zhang and Kanaujia does not teach but Tiwari teaches copying the operation of the application in the trusted kernel based on the inferred event (Paragraphs 74-75 discloses the function implemented by the secure application may produce an output of elements to present via the user interface to the secure user interface service, which may map/copy the elements to the presentation of the user interface and determine how a user may interact with the elements via the user interface. The mapping and interactions of the elements may be transmitted/copied from the secure user interface service to the secure kernel which may compose a secure user interface display for presentation via a display device, such as a touchscreen or speaker (based on the secure user listener recognize receipt of the secure user interface display from the secure execution environment per paragraph 76. This can be the inferred event. Another interpretation of the inferred event) . The secure kernel may also control the transmission of the secure user interface display to the normal execution environment for presentation of the secure user interface display via the display device).
It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Pappachan’s teaching of processing user interaction in view of Zhang’s further teachings of mirroring of the rendered graphic reaction and Kanaujia’s teachings of requesting allocation of an event-index secure buffer queue from a trusted kernel with Tiwari’s teachings of copying the operation of the application in the trusted kernel to prevent presentation of the vulnerable first data input element by the client application in response to determining that the first data input element is a vulnerable data input element (Paragraph 4 of Tiwari).
As to claim 17, the combination Pappachan in view of Zhang, Kanaujia, and Tiwari teaches wherein the computer-executable instructions, when executed by the at least one processor, further cause the electronic device (Pappachan: paragraphs 20-21 and 22 disclose the electronic device includes processing module that comprise one or more processors. Processing module is configured to execute/perform various instructions such as reading data, writing data, processing data, formulating data, converting data, transforming data ) to:
generate input data based on the interpreted user reaction ( Pappachan: paragraphs 18 and 28 disclose output information is generated (e.g., financial reports, transaction confirmations, etc.), the output may be encrypted prior to transmission back as input data to OS interface 108 as shown at 110 of Figure 1); and
encrypt the input data in the secure area (Pappachan: paragraphs 18 and 28 disclose output information is generated (e.g., financial reports, transaction confirmations, etc.), the output may be encrypted prior to transmission back as input data to OS interface 108 as shown at 110 of Figure 1).
Claim(s) 3, 7, 11, 15, and 18 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Pappachan et al US 20140359305 (hereinafter Pappachan), in view of Zhang et al US 20200234275 (hereinafter Zhang), in further view of Kanaujia et al US 20170123971 (hereinafter Kanaujia), in further view of Tiwari et al US 20210166227 (hereinafter Tiwari, and in further view of Smith et al US 20150170197 (hereinafter Smith).
As to claim 3, the combination of Pappachan in view of Zhang, Kanaujia, and Tiwari teaches all the limitations recited in claims 1-2 above, and further teaches wherein the encrypting the input data comprises encrypting the input data by using a [third encryption protocol] (Pappachan: paragraphs 46-47 reveal the output information from the secure processing environment for presentation which becomes input data to the OS interface is encrypted using third encryption protocol. Third encryption protocols include homomorphic encryption).
The combination of Pappachan in view of Zhang, Kanaujia, and Tiwari does not teach wherein the encrypting uses a homomorphic encryption system.
Smith teaches wherein the encrypting uses a homomorphic encryption system (abstract discloses secure processing environment that encrypt vector data using homomorphic encryption).
It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Pappachan’s third encryption protocol performed in a secure processing environment in view of Zhang’s further teachings of mirroring of the rendered graphic reaction, Kanaujia’s teachings of requesting allocation of an event-index secure buffer queue from a trusted kernel, and Tiwari’s teachings of copying the operation of the application in the trusted kernel with Smith’s homomorphic encryption performed in a secured processing environment such that information is protected from disclosure to unauthorized parties such as malware and hackers (Paragraph 30 of Smith).
As to claim 7, the combination of Pappachan in view of Zhang, Kanaujia, and Tiwari teaches all the limitations recited in claim 1 above and further teaches wherein the inferring the event to be recognized by the GUI framework comprises inferring the event to be recognized by the GUI framework by using a [key-data] in the secure area (Pappachan: paragraphs 16 and 18 reveal the system 100 shown in Figures 1 and 3 receives/recognize the sensitive input information via the user interface of the banking application and convert/encrypt as it is entered via user interface. The input information from the user interacting with text field box(instantiated object) is encrypted using keystroke encryption/pseudo-event. This encryption algorithm uses pseudo-random key. Therefore, based on the detected user input, the system infer an event of encryption using keystroke encryption that is to be recognized by the user interface. Paragraphs 46-47 reveal the output information from the secure processing environment for presentation which becomes input data to the OS interface is encrypted using third encryption protocol. Third encryption protocols include homomorphic encryption. Paragraphs 18 and 29 disclose the encrypted output information may then be sent to a user interface and decrypted for presentation [as an image] to the user. Paragraph 30 reveals secure module can be account information records stored on dedicated memory in the bank server on which the secure controller component may act in response to input from the user, and from which secure view component generate output information).
The combination of Pappachan in view of Zhang, Kanaujia, and Tiwari does not teach, but Smith teaches using a key-data pair in the secure area (abstract discloses secure processing environment that encrypt vector data using homomorphic encryption. Homomorphic encryption utilizes a key pair).
It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Pappachan’s third encryption protocol performed in a secure processing environment in view of Zhang’s further teachings of mirroring of the rendered graphic reaction, Kanaujia’s teachings of requesting allocation of an event-index secure buffer queue from a trusted kernel, and Tiwari’s teachings of copying the operation of the application in the trusted kernel with Smith’s homomorphic encryption performed in a secured processing environment such that information is protected from disclosure to unauthorized parties such as malware and hackers (Paragraph 30 of Smith).
As to claim 11, the combination of Pappachan in view of Zhang, Kanaujia, and Tiwari teaches all the limitations recited in claims 9-10 above, and further teaches wherein the instructions, when executed by the at least one processor individually or collectively, further cause the electronic device to (Pappachan: paragraphs 20-21 and 22 disclose the electronic device includes processing module that comprise one or more processors. Processing module is configured to execute/perform various instructions such as reading data, writing data, processing data, formulating data, converting data, transforming data. Paragraph 15 discloses computing/electronic device that executes applications).
The combination of Pappachan in view of Zhang, Kanaujia, and Tiwari does not teach wherein the encrypting uses a homomorphic encryption system.
Smith teaches wherein the encrypting uses a homomorphic encryption system (abstract discloses secure processing environment that encrypt vector data using homomorphic encryption).
It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Pappachan’s third encryption protocol performed in a secure processing environment in view of Zhang’s further teachings of mirroring of the rendered graphic reaction, Kanaujia’s teachings of requesting allocation of an event-index secure buffer queue from a trusted kernel, and Tiwari’s teachings of copying the operation of the application in the trusted kernel with Smith’s homomorphic encryption performed in a secured processing environment such that information is protected from disclosure to unauthorized parties such as malware and hackers (Paragraph 30 of Smith).
As to claim 15, the combination of Pappachan in view of Zhang, Kanaujia, and Tiwari teaches all the limitations recited in claim 9 above and further teaches wherein the application is developed by using a software development kit (SDK) comprising an oblivious event receipt (OER) function (Pappachan: paragraph 25 discloses the application in the secure processing environment can be a trusted executed environment/secure enclave technology. TEE SDK are specifically designed for developing application such as application 114 within a TEE. TEE utilizes an SDK to create applications that run in the secure processing environment. Paragraphs 46-47 reveal the output information for presentation is encrypted using third encryption protocol. This third encryption protocol is the OER function. Third encryption protocol can include homomorphic encryption) and wherein the instructions, when executed by the at least one processor individually or collectively, further cause the electronic device to (Pappachan: paragraphs 20-21 and 22 disclose the electronic device includes processing module that comprise one or more processors. Processing module is configured to execute/perform various instructions such as reading data, writing data, processing data, formulating data, converting data, transforming data. Paragraph 15 discloses computing/electronic device that executes applications) infer the event to be recognized by the GUI framework comprises inferring the event to be recognized by the GUI framework by using a [key-data] in the secure area (Pappachan: paragraphs 16 and 18 reveal the system 100 shown in Figures 1 and 3 receives/recognize the sensitive input information via the user interface of the banking application and convert/encrypt as it is entered via user interface. The input information from the user interacting with text field box(instantiated object) is encrypted using keystroke encryption/pseudo-event. This encryption algorithm uses pseudo-random key. Therefore, based on the detected user input, the system infer an event of encryption using keystroke encryption that is to be recognized by the user interface. Paragraphs 46-47 reveal the output information from the secure processing environment for presentation which becomes input data to the OS interface is encrypted using third encryption protocol. Third encryption protocols include homomorphic encryption. Paragraphs 18 and 29 disclose the encrypted output information may then be sent to a user interface and decrypted for presentation [as an image] to the user. Paragraph 30 reveals secure module can be account information records stored on dedicated memory in the bank server on which the secure controller component may act in response to input from the user, and from which secure view component generate output information).
The combination of Pappachan in view of Zhang, Kanaujia, and Tiwari does not teach, but Smith teaches using a key-data pair in the secure area (abstract discloses secure processing environment that encrypt vector data using homomorphic encryption. Homomorphic encryption utilizes a key pair).
It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Pappachan’s third encryption protocol performed in a secure processing environment in view of Zhang’s further teachings of mirroring of the rendered graphic reaction, Kanaujia’s teachings of requesting allocation of an event-index secure buffer queue from a trusted kernel, and Tiwari’s teachings of copying the operation of the application in the trusted kernel with Smith’s homomorphic encryption performed in a secured processing environment such that information is protected from disclosure to unauthorized parties such as malware and hackers (Paragraph 30 of Smith).
As to claim 18, the combination of Pappachan in view of Zhang, Kanaujia, and Tiwari teaches all the limitations recited in claims 16-17 above, and further teaches wherein to encrypt the input data comprises encrypting the input data by using a [third encryption protocol] (Pappachan: paragraphs 46-47 reveal the output information from the secure processing environment for presentation ) which becomes input data to the OS interface is encrypted using third encryption protocol. Third encryption protocols include homomorphic encryption).
The combination of Pappachan in view of Zhang, Kanaujia, and Tiwari does not teach wherein the encrypting uses a homomorphic encryption system.
Smith teaches wherein the encrypting uses a homomorphic encryption system (abstract discloses secure processing environment that encrypt vector data using homomorphic encryption).
It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Pappachan’s third encryption protocol performed in a secure processing environment in view of Zhang’s further teachings of mirroring of the rendered graphic reaction, Kanaujia’s teachings of requesting allocation of an event-index secure buffer queue from a trusted kernel, and Tiwari’s teachings of copying the operation of the application in the trusted kernel with Smith’s homomorphic encryption performed in a secured processing environment such that information is protected from disclosure to unauthorized parties such as malware and hackers (Paragraph 30 of Smith).
Claim(s) 5, 13, and 20 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Pappachan et al US 20140359305 (hereinafter Pappachan), in view of Zhang et al US 20200234275 (hereinafter Zhang), in further view of Kanaujia et al US 20170123971 (hereinafter Kanaujia), in further view of Tiwari et al US 20210166227 (hereinafter Tiwari, and in further view of Chuang et al US 20160191240 (hereinafter Chuang).
As to claim 5, the combination of Pappachan in view of Zhang, Kanaujia, and Tiwari teaches all the limitations recited in claims 1 and 4 above and further teaches wherein the transmitting the data to the secure area further comprises generating [key-data] of the physical interface corresponding to the user reaction corresponding to the instantiated object (Pappachan: paragraphs 18 and 27-28 disclose the converted/encrypted input information using keystroke encryption is provided to OS input interface 108/304. The encrypted information is transmitted to secure processing environment 112 which comprises [mirror] application 114 in Figures 1. The keystroke encryption is associated with the user password/access information. Keystroke encryption utilizes a key).
The combination of Pappachan in view of Zhang, Kanaujia, and Tiwari does not teach generating key-data pair data of the physical interface corresponding to the user reaction corresponding to the instantiated object.
Chuang teaches generating key-data pair data of the physical interface corresponding to the user reaction corresponding to the instantiated object (Abstract, claim 8, and paragraph 12 disclose data from user input/user reaction to an interface/key data field is generated and public and private key pair is also generated).
It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Pappachan’s teachings of keystroke encryption in view of Zhang’s further teachings of mirroring of the rendered graphic reaction, Kanaujia’s teachings of requesting allocation of an event-index secure buffer queue from a trusted kernel, and Tiwari’s teachings of copying the operation of the application in the trusted kernel and add Chuang’s teachings of generated key-data pair and further encrypting the keystroke encrypted data prior to transmission to enhance the security of the data during transmission of the data (Paragraph 3 of Chuang).
As to claim 13, the combination of Pappachan in view of Zhang, Kanaujia, and Tiwari teaches all the limitations recited in claims 9 and 12 above and further teaches wherein the instructions, when executed by the at least one processor individually or collectively, further cause the electronic device (Pappachan: paragraphs 20-21 and 22 disclose the electronic device includes processing module that comprise one or more processors. Processing module is configured to execute/perform various instructions such as reading data, writing data, processing data, formulating data, converting data, transforming data )to generate [key-data] of the physical interface corresponding to the user reaction corresponding to the instantiated object (paragraphs 18 and 27-28 disclose the converted/encrypted input information using keystroke encryption is provided to OS input interface 108/304. The encrypted information is transmitted to secure processing environment 112 which comprises [mirror] application 114 in Figures 1. The keystroke encryption is associated with the user password/access information. Keystroke encryption utilizes a key).
The combination of Pappachan in view of Zhang, Kanaujia, and Tiwari does not teach generating key-data pair data of the physical interface corresponding to the user reaction corresponding to the instantiated object.
Chuang teaches generating key-data pair data of the physical interface corresponding to the user reaction corresponding to the instantiated object (Abstract, claim 8, and paragraph 12 disclose data from user input/user reaction to an interface/key data field is generated and public and private key pair is also generated).
It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Pappachan’s teachings of keystroke encryption in view of Zhang’s further teachings of mirroring of the rendered graphic reaction, Kanaujia’s teachings of requesting allocation of an event-index secure buffer queue from a trusted kernel, and Tiwari’s teachings of copying the operation of the application in the trusted kernel and add Chuang’s teachings of generated key-data pair and further encrypting the keystroke encrypted data prior to transmission to enhance the security of the data during transmission of the data (Paragraph 3 of Chuang).
As to claim 20, the combination of Pappachan in view of Zhang, Kanaujia, and Tiwari teaches all the limitations recited in claims 16 and 19 above and further teaches wherein to transmit the data to the secure area further comprises generating [key-data] of the physical interface corresponding to the user reaction corresponding to the instantiated object (Pappachan: paragraphs 18 and 27-28 disclose the converted/encrypted input information using keystroke encryption is provided to OS input interface 108/304. The encrypted information is transmitted to secure processing environment 112 which comprises [mirror] application 114 in Figures 1. The keystroke encryption is associated with the user password/access information. Keystroke encryption utilizes a key).
The combination of Pappachan in view of Zhang, Kanaujia, and Tiwari does not teach generating key-data pair data of the physical interface corresponding to the user reaction corresponding to the instantiated object.
Chuang teaches generating key-data pair data of the physical interface corresponding to the user reaction corresponding to the instantiated object (Abstract, claim 8, and paragraph 12 disclose data from user input/user reaction to an interface/key data field is generated and public and private key pair is also generated).
It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Pappachan’s teachings of keystroke encryption in view of Zhang’s further teachings of mirroring of the rendered graphic reaction, Kanaujia’s teachings of requesting allocation of an event-index secure buffer queue from a trusted kernel, and Tiwari’s teachings of copying the operation of the application in the trusted kernel and add Chuang’s teachings of generated key-data pair and further encrypting the keystroke encrypted data prior to transmission to enhance the security of the data during transmission of the data (Paragraph 3 of Chuang).
Conclusion
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/F.F/Examiner, Art Unit 2437
/BENJAMIN E LANIER/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2437
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