Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
A request for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, including the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e), was filed in this application after final rejection. Since this application is eligible for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, and the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e) has been timely paid, the finality of the previous Office action has been withdrawn pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114. Applicant's submission filed on 11/14/2025 has been entered.
Response to Applicant’s Amendments / Arguments Regarding 35 U.S.C. § 103
The applicant’s remarks, on pages 11-16 of the response / amendment, the applicant argues the features which allegedly distinguish over the previously cited references cited in the 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejections.
Applicant’s arguments have been considered but are moot in view of the new ground(s) of rejection.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1-10 and 12-15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US 20220005046 to Kim et al. (hereinafter Kim), in view of US 20160381003 to Caceres et al. (hereinafter Caceres), in view of US 20200252217 to Mathieu (hereinafter Mathieu).
Regarding claim 1, Kim teaches,
A face authentication terminal comprising a sensor including a camera, the face authentication terminal configured to: (Kim, Abstract teaches biometric authentication. [0032] and fig. 1 teach camera module 180, and sensor module 176 that perform iris scanning. Examiner notes the iris is part of a face. Additionally, it is well known in the art of security that different biometrics may be switched with other biometrics.) (Caceres, discussed further below in the rejection of claim 1, [0021] teaches face recognition.)
execute a registration process of registering a biometric (Kim, Abstract, teaches a registration process of biometrics.)
generate (Kim, [0070] teaches performing biometric authentication using stored biometric information and biometric information input by the user (“first face image” and “second face image”), and [0071] also teaches generating biometric public (cbioPUK) and private (cbioPRV) keys. [0068] teaches that these keys are biometric authentication public/private keys.)
(Kim, [0070-71] teaches performing biometric authentication stored biometric information and biometric information input by the user (“first face image” and “second face image”), and also teaches generating biometric public (cbioPUK) and private (cbioPRV) keys. [0068] teaches that these keys are biometric authentication public/private keys.)
generate a biometric public key based on the second biometric secret key; (Kim, [0070-71] teaches performing biometric authentication using stored biometric information and biometric information input by the user (“first face image” and “second face image”), and also teaches generating biometric public (cbioPUK) and private (cbioPRV) keys. [0068] teaches that these keys are biometric authentication public/private keys.)
verify whether authentication is successful using the first biometric before registering the biometric public key in the key database present inside or outside the face authentication terminal; and (Kim, [0073] teaches when registering for a first time use, generating the parameter for biometric authentication (see also [0071], and transmitting the generated parameter for biometric authentication to the server, in order to register, with the server, biometric authentication information for biometric authentication verification. Then, use at least one of the biometric authentication and the password authentication to authenticate a user. [0078] teaches that the parameter for biometric authentication includes the biometric authentication public key. See also discussion of fig. 5 included below.
complete registration of the biometric public key in the key database upon determining the authentication can be verified to be successful. (Kim, [0073] teaches when registering for a first time use, generating the parameter for biometric authentication, and transmitting the generated parameter for biometric authentication to the server, in order to register, with the server, biometric authentication information for biometric authentication verification. Additionally, fig. 5 describes [0092-93] describing transfer of information to sensors from payment app for generating biometric authentication parameter 515, and transfer biometric authentication parameter 516 from sensor to payment app in user device. Then, [0096] describes 516 information being used to, add biometric payment method 527 and 528 transferred from user device app to servers 440 and 450.)
Kim fails to explicitly teach using two different sets of biometric public/private keys to perform the authentication of figs. 4 and 5, and fig. 8, 806,
However, Caceres teaches generating the public / private keys based on two different scans of the same user biometric and using a biometric public key and second biometric private key for verification,
execute a registration process of registering a biometric public key, the registration process including: (Caceres, Abstract teaches enrollment of public / private keys that are generated from biometrics.)
generate a first biometric secret key from a first face image, the first face image being one of two face images acquired by capturing a face of a person by the camera at each of a first timing when the person is detected by the sensor and a second timing when the person is detected by the sensor, the second timing being different from the first timing; (Caceres, Abstract teaches generating two different public / private keys based on the same biometric that is presented at different times. [0014] teaches the generation of the public / private key pair based on a user’s biometric scanned in fig. 1A, where the public key may be stored on a server. [0019] teaches generation of a second private key generated based on the user’s biometric scanned in fig. 1C, and then matching the public key (on the server) from the user biometric scan of fig. 1A, with the second private key generated from the biometric scan of fig. 1C. [0021] teaches face recognition.)
(Caceres, Abstract teaches generating two different public / private keys based on the same biometric that is presented at different times. [0014] teaches the generation of the public / private key pair based on a user’s biometric scanned in fig. 1A, where the public key may be stored on a server. [0019] teaches generation of a second private key generated based on the user’s biometric scanned in fig. 1C, and then matching the public key (on the server) from the user biometric scan of fig. 1A, with the second private key generated from the biometric scan of fig. 1C)
generate a biometric public key based on the second biometric secret key; (Caceres, Abstract teaches generating two different public / private keys based on the same biometric that is presented at different times. [0014] teaches the generation of the public / private key pair based on a user’s biometric scanned in fig. 1A, where the public key may be stored on a server. [0019] teaches generation of a second private key generated based on the user’s biometric scanned in fig. 1C, and then matching the public key (on the server) from the user biometric scan of fig. 1A, with the second private key generated from the biometric scan of fig. 1C)
verify whether authentication is successful using the first biometric secret key and the biometric public key (Caceres, Abstract teaches generating two different public / private keys based on the same biometric that is presented at different times. [0014] teaches the generation of the public / private key pair based on a user’s biometric scanned in fig. 1A, where the public key may be stored on a server. [0019] teaches generation of a second private key generated based on the user’s biometric scanned in fig. 1C, and then matching the public key (on the server) from the user biometric scan of fig. 1A, with the second private key generated from the biometric scan of fig. 1C.)
complete (Caceres, [0019] teaches generation of a second private key generated based on the user’s biometric scanned in fig. 1C, and then matching the public key (on the server) from the user biometric scan of fig. 1A, with the second private key generated from the biometric scan of fig. 1C, the verification server device may provide access to the service (e.g., the user may access the user's bank account) when the second private key matches the public key.)
Before the effective filing date of the invention, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Kim, which teaches the generation of biometric public/private keys that are generated based on biometrics, where the keys are verified during registration and used for authentication ([0071-73] & [0078]), with Caceres, which also teaches the generation of biometric private/public keys (Abstract), and additionally teaches generating a public / private key using a first biometric scan of the user, and generating a second private key using a second biometric scan of the user, and matching the public key with the second private key ([0057]). One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to perform such an addition to provide Kim with the added ability to use Caceres’s generation of asymmetric keys using two different scans of a user, as taught by Caceres, to modify Kim’s authentication process of figs. 4 and 5 with the ability of using a stored public key and a recently generated private key to match / authenticate a user, and thus increase security by not having to store raw biometrics or biometric vectors of a user in a server but instead storing the biometrically generated public key of the user, which reduces the server owner’s liability.
Kim and Caceres fail to explicitly teach using multiple biometric images during the enrollment to generate biometric codes / keys, and comparing different keys during enrollment / registration of biometric keys,
However, Mathieu teaches,
generate a first biometric secret key from a first face image, the first face image being one of two face images acquired by capturing a face of a person by the camera at each of a first timing when the person is detected by the sensor and a second timing when the person is detected by the sensor, the second timing being different from the first timing; (Mathieu, [0099-101] teaches using multiple biometric samples during registration to generate biometric codes, and [0098] teaches the images are taken at different times. [0200-201] teach using the biometric codes to generate biometric public key and private / secret key. Fig. 21 & [0159-160] teaching registration including loop biometric capture 2108 & 2110, where multiple (biometric) images are captured, and analyzed to create biometric based codes. At least [0045] teaches face or fingerprint data being used.)
before registering the biometric public key in a key database, generate a second biometric secret key from a second face image, the second face image being the other of the two face images; (See discussion of [0098-101], fig. 21, [0159-160], & [0200-201] above regarding generating biometric keys using codes. Also, Claim 24, as discussed in detail below, also teaches another generating of private key, which uses a different biometric different than that used to generate public key.)
generate a biometric public key based on the second biometric secret key; (See discussion of [0200-201] with regards to codes generated in [0098-101], fig. 21, [0159-160])
verify whether authentication is successful using the first biometric secret key and the biometric public key before registering the biometric public key in the key database present inside or outside the face authentication terminal; and (Claim 24 teaches generating private and public key using “first repeatable code”, which is used during registration and is based on biometrics, and then discarding private key, then comparing the stored public key with the again generated private key. As clearly indicated in claim 1, the "first repeatable code" is generated during registration and the "second repeatable code" is generated for authentication. Thus, the examiner asserts that claim 24 is performed during registration. [0204] teaches public key registration in a database.)
Before the effective filing date of the invention, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Kim, which teaches the generation of biometric public/private keys that are generated based on biometrics, where the keys are verified during registration and used for authentication ([0071-73] & [0078]), with Caceres, which also teaches the generation of biometric private/public keys (Abstract), and additionally teaches generating a public / private key using a first biometric scan of the user, and generating a second private key using a second biometric scan of the user, and matching the public key with the second private key ([0057]), with Mathieu, which also teaches the generation of biometric public / private keys using codes ([0159-160] & [0200-201]), and additionally teaches the use of multiple biometric images during registration ([0098-101] & [0159-160]) and also teaches comparing a biometric public key to a biometric private key (Claim 24). One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to perform such an addition to provide Kim and Caceres with the added ability to utilize multiple biometric images during registration to generate an accurate biometric code used for biometric keys, as taught by Mathieu, for the purpose of increasing security by increasing the effectiveness and repeatability of the generation of biometric keys from the same user.
Regarding claim 2, Kim, Caceres, and Mathieu teach,
The face authentication terminal according to claim 1,
Kim teaches,
wherein the key database is in an authentication device that is present outside the face authentication terminal; (Kim, fig. 5 servers 440 and 450.) (Caceres, fig. 2, Certificate Authority and Verification Server.)
wherein the face authentication terminal is configured to:
send and receive information to and from each other with the authentication device including the key database; (Kim, fig. 5 servers 440 and 450 sending and receiving information from payment app 420.) (Regarding, “authentication device”, see also, fig. 1 and [0067] of the applicant’s printed publication which describes that the “key database” is part of the authentication server 200 / “authentication device.”)
register the biometric public key in the key database included in the authentication device; (Kim, fig. 5, 527 and 528 and Abstract teach registering with server the biometric information. [0084] & [0090] teach biometric information includes biometric public keys. [0072] teaching storing the biometric authentication information in server.)
send the biometric public key to the authentication device to request the authentication device to register the biometric public key in the key database; and (Kim, fig. 5, 527 and 528)
wherein the authentication device performs the authentication using the first biometric secret key and the biometric public key received from the face authentication terminal to verify whether the authentication is successful. (Mathieu, [0159-160] & [0200-201] teaches the generation of biometric public / private keys using codes and [0098-101] & [0159-160] teaches the use of multiple biometric images during registration.) (Caceres, in Abstract and [0019] teach verifying using the biometric public/private keys.)
Regarding claim 3, Kim, Caceres, and Mathieu teach,
The face authentication terminal according to claim 1,
wherein the key database is inside the face authentication terminal; and (Kim, [0071] teaches the biometric public key being stored in the user device 101.)
wherein the face authentication terminal further has a storage device in which the key database is stored. (Kim, [0071]. See also fig. 5, 515 and 516.)
Regarding claim 4, Kim, Caceres, and Mathieu teach,
The face authentication terminal according to claim 1,
wherein the sensor includes other sensors other than the camera; and (Kim, [0041] teaching multiple sensors.)
wherein the face authentication terminal is configured to use, as the first timing, a timing when the person is detected by at least one of the other sensors and the camera. (Kim, [0041] sensors detect the state of the user.)
Regarding claim 5, Kim, Caceres, and Mathieu teach,
The face authentication terminal according to claim 1,
wherein
the face authentication terminal is configured to:
acquire the first face image by capturing the face of the person at the first timing; and (Kim, [0070-71] as discussed above uses a stored and user input biometric image. Examiner states, the stored biometric must have been taken at an earlier time.) (Caceres, see discussion of fig. 1a & [0014] and fig. 1c & [0019]. [0001] teaches facial images and [0021] teaches face biometrics.)
acquire the second face image by capturing the face of the person at the second timing after the first timing. (See above limitation rejection.)
Regarding claim 6, Kim, Caceres, and Mathieu teach,
The face authentication terminal according to claim 5,
wherein the face authentication terminal has a display device capable of displaying images, and (Kim, 19A-F showing displays including biometric capture.) (Caceres, figs. 1a-1c showing the displays.)
wherein the face authentication terminal is configured to:
display a face capture instruction screen including information indicating an instruction to capture a face on the display device; and (Kim, fig. 19b) (Caceres, figs. 1a-1c teach capturing two biometrics.)
capture the face of the person at the second timing. (Caceres, figs. 1a-1c teach capturing two biometrics.)
Regarding claim 7, Kim, Caceres, and Mathieu teach,
The face authentication terminal according to claim 6,
wherein
the face authentication terminal is configured to:
start, after capturing the face of the person at the second timing, a process of generating the second biometric secret key from the second face image; and (Kim, [0070-71] teach generating biometric public private keys after user input of biometric.) (Caceres, figs. 1a-1c teach and [0019] teach generating biometric public\private keys after capturing second image.)
display a screen for having the person enter user information on the display device during a period between start of the process and completion of generation of the second biometric secret key. (Caceres, fig. 1b user enters other information than biometrics.)
Regarding claim 8, Kim, Caceres, and Mathieu teach,
The face authentication terminal according to claim 2,
wherein
the face authentication terminal is configured to:
acquire the first face image by capturing the face of the person at the first timing; (Kim, [0070-71] teach two different biometrics, a stored and user input biometric.) (Caceres, Abstract, and fig. 1A & [0014] and fig. 1C & [0019] teach acquiring two different biometrics)
acquire the second face image by capturing the face of the person at the second timing, the second timing being later than the first timing; (Kim, [0070-71] teach two different biometrics, a stored and user input biometric.) (Caceres, Abstract, and fig. 1A & [0014] and fig. 1C & [0019] teach acquiring two different biometrics)
store the first biometric secret key generated from the first face image captured at the first timing;
discard, after transmitting the biometric public key to the authentication device, the second biometric secret key and the biometric public key; and (Kim, [0067] teaches payment information being deleted by the user device., while fig. 7 [0111] and [0119] teach deleting biometric authentication information after authentication / registration, after a payment is processed. Fig. 8 and [0127] and [0132] teach performing authentication according to fig. 5 and then deleting the public key in 820, which requires the generation of a new public key for the next payment. [0057] teaching deleting components, which the examiner interprets as anything in memory.) (Caceres, [0085] and claim 14 teach discarding the public / private keys.)
discard the first biometric secret key after the authentication device performing the authentication. (Kim, [0067] teaches payment information being deleted by the user device., while fig. 7 [0111] and [0119] teach deleting biometric authentication information after authentication / registration, after a payment is processed. Fig. 8 and [0127] and [0132] teach performing authentication according to fig. 5 and then deleting the public key in 820, which requires the generation of a new public key for the next payment. [0057] teaching deleting components, which the examiner interprets as anything in memory.) (Caceres, [0085] and claim 14 teach discarding the public / private keys.)
Regarding claim 9, Kim, Caceres, and Mathieu teach,
The face authentication terminal according to claim 1,
wherein
the face authentication terminal includes a display device capable of displaying images; and (Kim, figs. 19a-f) (Caceres, figs. 1a-1c)
the face authentication terminal displays a screen on the display device according to verification results. (Kim, fig. 19e) (Caceres, fig.1c)
Regarding claim 10, Kim, Caceres, and Mathieu teach,
The face authentication terminal according to claim 4,
wherein
one of the other sensors is a thermal sensor that detects heat of the person. (Kim, [0041] teaches an IR sensor and a temperature sensor.)
Regarding claim 12, Kim, Caceres, and Mathieu teach,
The face authentication terminal according to claim 2,
wherein
the face authentication terminal is configured to:
when performing face authentication after completing the registration of the biometric public key,
generate the biometric secret key for authentication from the face image for authentication obtained by capturing the face of the person with the camera at a timing when the person is detected by the sensor; (Kim, [0041] teaches detecting state of user with biometric sensor. [0070-71] teach generating biometric public / private keys.)
cause the authentication device to perform authentication using the biometric secret key and the registered biometric public key; and (Kim, [0068] and [0070-71] teaches using the biometric public / private key pair and signatures.)
discard, after the authentication device performing the authentication, the biometric secret key for authentication. (Kim, [0067] teaches payment information being deleted by the user device., while fig. 7 [0111] and [0119] teach deleting biometric authentication information after authentication / registration, after a payment is processed. Fig. 8 and [0127] and [0132] teach performing authentication according to fig. 5 and then deleting the public key in 820, which requires the generation of a new public key for the next payment. [0057] teaching deleting components, which the examiner interprets as anything in memory.) (Caceres, [0085] and claim 14 teach discarding the public / private keys.)
Regarding claim 13, Kim, Caceres, and Mathieu teach,
The face authentication terminal according to claim 1,
wherein
the face authentication terminal is configured to capture the face of the person at the first timing and the second timing to thereby acquire the first face image and the second face image, facial expressions of the person in the first image and the second image being different from each other. (Kim, [0070-71] teaches capturing two biometrics for authentication before registration. Caceres in figs. 1a-1c teaches capturing two biometrics, both used to generate separate biometric public / private keys. The examiner asserts that any two images of a face, taken at different times, would have slightly different facial expressions.)
Regarding claim 14, Kim, Caceres, and Mathieu teach,
A face authentication system comprising a face authentication terminal comprising a sensor including a camera; and an authentication device, the face authentication system being a system in which the face authentication terminal and the authentication device are configured to send and receive information to and from each other, (see rejection of claim 1 above)
wherein,
the face authentication terminal is configured to:
generate a first biometric secret key from a first face image, the first face image being one of two face images acquired by capturing a face of a person by the camera at each of a first timing when the person is detected by the sensor and a second timing when the person is detected by the sensor, the second timing being different from the first timing; (see rejection of claim 1 above)
before transmitting the biometric public key out from the face authentication terminal, generate a second biometric secret key from a second face image, the second face image being the other of the two face images; (see rejection of claim 1 above)
generate a biometric public key based on the second biometric secret key; and (see rejection of claim 1 above)
transmit the biometric public key to the authentication device to request the authentication device to register the biometric public key; and (Kim, [0071-73] and fig. 5, 527-529 at [0096] teaching storage of biometric public key for registration.)
the authentication device is configured to:
perform authentication using the first biometric secret key and the biometric public key received from the face authentication terminal to thereby verify whether the authentication is successful; and (Caceres, [0019] teaches the server performing authentication.) (See discussion of Mathieu in rejection of claim 1)
complete registration of the biometric public key when it can be verified that the authentication is successful. (see rejection of claim 1 above)
Claim 14 is rejected using the same basis of arguments used to reject claim 1 above, with additional reasons as provided above.
Regarding claim 15, Kim, Caceres, and Mathieu teach,
A face authentication method using a face authentication terminal comprising a sensor including a camera, the face authentication method including: (Kim, fig. 1)
generating a first biometric secret key from a first face image, the first face image being one of two face images acquired by capturing a face of a person by the camera at each of a first timing when the person is detected by the sensor and a second timing when the person is detected by the sensor, the second timing being different from the first timing;
before registering the biometric public key in a key database, generating a second biometric secret key from a second face image, the second face image being the other of the two face images;
generating a biometric public key based on the second biometric secret key;
verifying whether authentication is successful using the first biometric secret key and the biometric public key before registering the biometric public key in the key database present inside or outside the face authentication terminal; and
completing registration of the biometric public key in the key database when the authentication can be verified to be successful.
Claim 15 is rejected using the same basis of arguments used to reject claim 1 above.
Claim 11 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kim, in view of Caceres, in view of Mathieu, in view of US 20200295934 to Diaz Vico (hereinafter Diaz Vico).
Regarding claim 11, Kim, Caceres, and Mathieu teach,
The face authentication terminal according to claim 1,
wherein the face authentication terminal is configured to:
when performing face authentication after completing the registration of the biometric public key,
generate the biometric secret key for authentication from the face image for authentication obtained by capturing the face of the person with the camera at a timing when the person is detected by the sensor; (Kim, [0070-71] teaches generating a secret key from biometric. Kim [0041] teaches sensor’s sensing state of user.) (Caceres [0014] and [0019] teach generating two asymmetric key pairs from two scans of the same biometric.)
obtain the registered biometric public key (as discussed above in the rejection of claim 1, Kim and Caceres both teach generating and transmitting / obtaining the biometric public keys.)
perform the authentication using the biometric secret key and the registered biometric public key; and (Kim [0070-71] teaches the user terminal performing the biometric authentication using a stored biometric and a biometric for a user input.) (Caceres Abstract, [0014] and [0019] teach generating the biometric public / private keys based on two scans of the same user’s same biometric, and [0019] teaches performing the authentication using a public key from one biometric scan and the private key of another biometric scan.)
discard, after performing the authentication, the biometric secret key for authentication. (Kim, [0067] teaches payment information being deleted by the user device., while fig. 7 [0111] and [0119] teach deleting biometric authentication information after authentication / registration, after a payment is processed. Fig. 8 and [0127] and [0132] teach performing authentication according to fig. 5 and then deleting the public key in 820, which requires the generation of a new public key for the next payment. [0057] teaching deleting components, which the examiner interprets as anything in memory.) (Caceres, [0085] and claim 14 teach discarding the public / private keys.)
Kim, Caceres, and Mathieu fail to teach having the server provide the public key to the user device,
However, Diaz Vico teaches,
obtain the registered ([0015] teaches receiving a public key from an external source, [0022] teaches using the public key for verification. Additionally, claim 12 teaches deleting secret keys.)
Before the effective filing date of the invention, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Kim, which teaches the generation of biometric public/private keys that are generated based on biometrics, where the keys are verified during registration and used for authentication ([0071-73] & [0078]), with Caceres, which also teaches the generation of biometric private/public keys (Abstract), and additionally teaches generating a public / private key using a first biometric scan of the user, and generating a second private key using a second biometric scan of the user, and matching the public key with the second private key ([0057]), with Mathieu, which also teaches the generation of biometric public / private keys ([0159-160], & [0200-201]), and additionally teaches the use of multiple biometric images during registration ([0098-101] & [0159-160]) and also teaches comparing a biometric public key to a biometric private key (Claim 24), with Diaz Vico, which also teaches the use of public / private keys for authentication (Abstract & [0022]), and further teaches the server providing a public key to a client device ([0015]). One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to perform such an addition to provide Kim, Caceres, and Mathieu with the added security afforded by storing one of the public / private keys externally, so that a hacker cannot obtain all of the information necessary to perform biometric public/private key authentication using signatures, as taught by Diaz Vico, to increase security by forcing a hacker to compromise two devices to gain access to the authentication keys.
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to BRIAN WILLIAM AVERY whose telephone number is (571) 272-3942. The examiner can normally be reached on 9AM-5PM.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Farid Homayounmehr can be reached on (571) 272-3739.
Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see https://ppair-my.uspto.gov/pair/PrivatePair. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
/B.W.A./
/FARID HOMAYOUNMEHR/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2495