Detailed Action
This office action is in response to applicant’s submission filed on March 25, 2026. Claims 1-12 are pending and rejected.
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Response to Amendment
This communication is in response to the amendment filed on March 25, 2026. The Examiner has acknowledged the amended claims 1, 6, 10, and 11. Claims 1-12 are pending and are rejected.
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s Arguments (Remarks) filed March 25, 2026 have been fully considered, but are moot. Note that this action is made FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a).
Applicant’s arguments with respect to claims 1-12 have been considered but are moot because the new ground of rejection does not rely on any reference applied in the prior rejection of record for any teaching or matter specifically challenged in the argument.
Applicant argues that the combination of the references are improper. Examiner respectfully disagrees as it would have been obvious to a POSITA to hash the meter serial number and combine the resulting value with the meter-generated random key material using XOR within the KDF to derive the private key, such that cryptographic manipulation constitutes predictable variations for enhancing key derivation security. Therefore, the combination is proper.
Applicant amended claims 1, 6, 10, and 11, and therefore the Claim Objections and 112(b) rejections have been withdrawn.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1-12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US 2017/0364909 A1 to Le Buhan et al. (hereinafter, “Le Buhan”) in view of US 8423789 B1 to Poo et al. (hereinafter, “Poo”).
Regarding claim 1, Le Buhan discloses: A method for transmitting meter data by a meter to a mobile device, wherein the method causes the meter to perform (“a detachable metering monitoring device to be connected with a utility meter for controlling at least one utility consumption metered by said utility meter” [0017] [Examiner notes that the steps disclosed are performed by the meter connected to the detachable metering monitoring device]):
- receiving a request demanding meter data; - obtaining meter data (“a usage reading interface to acquire a utility consumption value metered by said utility meter” [0017] [Examiner notes that the act of trying to acquire something becomes a request of the data itself in order to obtain the meter data]);
- generating a hashcode from at least one data pair comprising a serial number of the meter and the meter data obtained (“a crypto processor to generate a cryptogram from information data comprising at least the utility consumption value, said cryptogram being encrypted with said personal key” [0017]; “The information data used as input for generating the cryptogram may further comprise a predefined complementary data, for instance a constant. Information data may further comprise the unique identifier ID of the detachable metering monitoring device” [0038]; “The above-mentioned cryptogram could be a result of a hash function (or an XOR function) on the information data. In this case, the information message further includes the utility consumption value” [0039] [Examiner notes that the cryptogram is a result of a hash function, therefore is interpreted as the hashcode especially because it comprises of a serial number (unique identifier ID of the meter) and the data obtained]);
- encrypting the hashcode with a private key (“said cryptogram being encrypted with said personal key” [0017]; “The personal key pertaining to the device of the present invention may further be an asymmetric key in a public/private encryption scheme, the remote management center having the corresponding asymmetric key” [0040]),
the private key having been a crypto processor to generate a cryptogram from information data comprising at least the utility consumption value, said cryptogram being encrypted with said personal key” [0017]; “The information data used as input for generating the cryptogram may further comprise a predefined complementary data, for instance a constant. Information data may further comprise the unique identifier ID of the detachable metering monitoring device” [0038]; “The above-mentioned cryptogram could be a result of a hash function (or an XOR function) on the information data. In this case, the information message further includes the utility consumption value” [0039] [Examiner notes that the cryptogram is a result of a hash function, therefore is interpreted as the hashcode especially because it comprises of a serial number (unique identifier ID of the meter) and the data obtained. Examiner also notes that this text specifically applies a hash function to information including a unique identifier of the device]),
the encrypted hashcode being a signature (“According to another embodiment, the device DM of the present invention, in particular the communication network interface GRID, further comprises a reception unit RECEIV or any means for receiving at least one message sent by the remote management center and an authenticating unit AUTH or any means to authenticate this message by using the personal key of this device DM. In case of successful authentication, these means may be able to execute commands included in this message. If authentication failed, the message could be merely dismissed or another action could be triggered. For instance, the message received by the reception unit RECEIV of the device DM from the management center could be a command message ordering means for defining the use of the current predetermined tariff to use a higher tariff than the current one, e.g. the highest available tariff” [0058]; “Besides, the personal key used by means to authenticate the renewal message could be a private key pertaining to the detachable metering monitoring device and, in this case, the renewal message would be encrypted with a corresponding public key of this device” [0062] [Examiner notes that this text describes a process where the cryptogram functions as a signature in a cryptographic sense. This is because after the cryptogram is generated, which ensures that the message content is tied to the device and its data, it is included in the message transmitted for the purpose of acting like a signature in order to prove that the message came from a trusted source and it has not been tampered with. Lastly, the personal key used is to encrypt the hashcode (cryptogram) which is an act of "signing" the message. The cryptogram acts as a form of a digital signature because it is a secure device-generated proof of authentication and integrity used to validate communications between the device and the management center]); and
- transmitting, to the mobile device, a frame comprising the meter data obtained and the signature (“a message generator to generate an information message including at least said cryptogram and the unique identifier ID, a sending unit to send the information message to a remote management center” [0017] [Examiner notes that this text shows a remote management center acting as a mobile device as it can be functionally implemented on or via a mobile device]; “In practice, today's security designs for smart grids and smart meters are largely inspired by the telecommunication industry and a large part of them is subject to emerging standardization by international committees such as ANSI or IEC. However the requirements are very different, as telecommunication end devices such as mobile phones, set-top-boxes or even television receivers seldom exceed an operational lifetime of 10 to 20 years. In contrast, metering equipment is typically installed at the time of a house building and meant to last at least 20 years, if not 50 to 100 years” [0006] [Examiner notes that this text explicitly mentions mobile phones as telecommunication end devices. It states that smart meter’s communication designs are inspired by the telecommunication industry, where mobile devices are typical endpoints. This show how meters are designed to communicate with device such as mobile phones (data can be transmitted to mobile devices). The message being transmitted to a mobile device is a standard way of communication between metering devices and the endpoint whether it’s one (just a mobile device) or a center of mobile devices]),
Le Buhan does not explicitly disclose: the private key having been
However, Poo discloses: the private key having been The serial number 328 in the one-time programmable memory 326 may be configured in a variety of ways as previously described in relation to FIG. 2, such as by being burned during a manufacturing phase of the integrated circuit 302. This may be beneficial in that the serial number 328 may be considered a random string (e.g., 128 bits) that is generated within a system-on-chip (SoC), knowledge of which is not provided to a device manufacturer (e.g., media drive 306 manufacturer) or even SoC manufacturer. Thus, the serial number may provide a one-time pad for encryption purposes. A variety of other techniques may also be performed, such as through use of a 32 bit serial number that may be "XORed" to the partial root key 320, a NIST approved key derivation function using a concatenated serial number 328 and the partial root key 320 to derive the root key 308, and so on” [0042] [Examiner notes that the root key here is used for encryption and is therefore interpreted as the encryption key. Every operation occurs within the hardware and the serial number is internally generated and used so later a recognized CKDF is applied. The encryption root key is derived from its internally generated serial number by applying a NIST-approved cryptographic key derivation function, satisfying the claim limitation. Examiner notes that this text shows a meter/SoC serial number, XORing the serial number with a partial root key, and employing a NIST-approved key derivation function to derive a root key. Therefore, it would have been obvious to a POSITA to hash the meter serial number and combine the resulting value with the meter-generated random key material using XOR within the KDF to derive the private key, such that cryptographic manipulation constitutes predictable variations for enhancing key derivation security]),
Thus, it would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains, to combine the method of Le Buhan with the added structure of Poo so the private key can be unique to the device and enhancing key derivation security.
Claim 12 recites substantially the same limitation as claim 1, in the form of a non-transitory computer readable medium comprising computer readable program code for implementing the corresponding method, therefore it is rejected under the same rationale.
Regarding claim 6, Le Buhan discloses: A method for receiving meter data by a mobile device storing an application for reading a meter, wherein the method causes the mobile device to perform:
- sending, to the meter, a request demanding meter data (“a usage reading interface to acquire a utility consumption value metered by said utility meter” [0017]; “The detachable metering monitoring device can buffer the utility consumption and is able to report it to a utility usage monitoring infrastructure through a communication interface, in particular to a remote management center by means of a sending unit” [0023] [Examiner notes that the act of trying to acquire something becomes a request of the data itself in order to obtain the meter data]);
- receiving a frame comprising meter data and a signature (“a message generator to generate an information message including at least said cryptogram and the unique identifier ID, a sending unit to send the information message to a remote management center” [0017] [Examiner notes that the frame (message) is received after being sent]);
- decrypting the signature with a public key associated with the meter (“The personal key pertaining to the device of the present invention may further be an asymmetric key in a public/private encryption scheme, the remote management center having the corresponding asymmetric key. Thus, the private key and the public key forming together a pair of keys which are used to encrypt and to decrypt the exchanged messages” [0040]),
a hashed value of the meter's own serial number a crypto processor to generate a cryptogram from information data comprising at least the utility consumption value, said cryptogram being encrypted with said personal key” [0017]; “The information data used as input for generating the cryptogram may further comprise a predefined complementary data, for instance a constant. Information data may further comprise the unique identifier ID of the detachable metering monitoring device” [0038]; “The above-mentioned cryptogram could be a result of a hash function (or an XOR function) on the information data. In this case, the information message further includes the utility consumption value” [0039] [Examiner notes that the cryptogram is a result of a hash function, therefore is interpreted as the hashcode especially because it comprises of a serial number (unique identifier ID of the meter) and the data obtained. Examiner also notes that this text specifically applies a hash function to information including a unique identifier of the device]),
- generating a hashcode from a data pair comprising a serial number of the meter and the meter data received (“a crypto processor to generate a cryptogram from information data comprising at least the utility consumption value, said cryptogram being encrypted with said personal key” [0017]; “The information data used as input for generating the cryptogram may further comprise a predefined complementary data, for instance a constant. Information data may further comprise the unique identifier ID of the detachable metering monitoring device” [0038]; “The above-mentioned cryptogram could be a result of a hash function (or an XOR function) on the information data. In this case, the information message further includes the utility consumption value” [0039] [Examiner notes that the cryptogram is a result of a hash function, therefore is interpreted as the hashcode especially because it comprises of a serial number (unique identifier ID of the meter) and the data obtained]); and
- comparing the decrypted signature and the hashcode generated (“According to another embodiment, the device DM of the present invention, in particular the communication network interface GRID, further comprises a reception unit RECEIV or any means for receiving at least one message sent by the remote management center and an authenticating unit AUTH or any means to authenticate this message by using the personal key of this device DM. In case of successful authentication, these means may be able to execute commands included in this message. If authentication failed, the message could be merely dismissed or another action could be triggered. For instance, the message received by the reception unit RECEIV of the device DM from the management center could be a command message ordering means for defining the use of the current predetermined tariff to use a higher tariff than the current one, e.g. the highest available tariff” [0058]; “Besides, the personal key used by means to authenticate the renewal message could be a private key pertaining to the detachable metering monitoring device and, in this case, the renewal message would be encrypted with a corresponding public key of this device” [0062] [Examiner notes that these texts illustrate a signature verification process. It does this because the devices receives a message (which includes the cryptogram) and uses the personal key to verify by or authenticate it. This maps to a decryption of a signature using a key and the authentication which requires comparing the decrypted hash from the signature to the cryptogram from the received data]) and,
in the case of equality, displaying the meter data on a screen of the mobile device and otherwise displaying an error message (“If authentication failed, the message could be merely dismissed or another action could be triggered” [0058] [Examiner notes that another action here could mean logging the failure, displaying an error message, rejecting the comment, or triggering an alert. Examiner notes that because the system has the ability to display error messages from other actions, it can be an action here as well]).
Le Buhan does not explicitly disclose: said public key being a public key of a key pair whose private key has been generated by the meter, using a cryptographic key derivation function, wherein said cryptographic key derivation function applies an exclusive OR operator between a hashed value of the meter's own serial number and a random value generated by the meter
However, Poo discloses: said public key being a public key of a key pair whose private key has been generated by the meter, using a cryptographic key derivation function, wherein said cryptographic key derivation function applies an exclusive OR operator between a hashed value of the meter's own serial number and a random value generated by the meter The serial number 328 in the one-time programmable memory 326 may be configured in a variety of ways as previously described in relation to FIG. 2, such as by being burned during a manufacturing phase of the integrated circuit 302. This may be beneficial in that the serial number 328 may be considered a random string (e.g., 128 bits) that is generated within a system-on-chip (SoC), knowledge of which is not provided to a device manufacturer (e.g., media drive 306 manufacturer) or even SoC manufacturer. Thus, the serial number may provide a one-time pad for encryption purposes. A variety of other techniques may also be performed, such as through use of a 32 bit serial number that may be "XORed" to the partial root key 320, a NIST approved key derivation function using a concatenated serial number 328 and the partial root key 320 to derive the root key 308, and so on” [0042] [Examiner notes that the root key here is used for encryption and is therefore interpreted as the encryption key. Every operation occurs within the hardware and the serial number is internally generated and used so later a recognized CKDF is applied. The encryption root key is derived from its internally generated serial number by applying a NIST-approved cryptographic key derivation function, satisfying the claim limitation. Examiner notes that this text shows a meter/SoC serial number, XORing the serial number with a partial root key, and employing a NIST-approved key derivation function to derive a root key. Therefore, it would have been obvious to a POSITA to hash the meter serial number and combine the resulting value with the meter-generated random key material using XOR within the KDF to derive the private key, such that cryptographic manipulation constitutes predictable variations for enhancing key derivation security]);
Thus, it would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains, to combine the method of Le Buhan with the added structure of Poo so the private key can be unique to the device and enhancing key derivation security.
Claim 10 recites substantially the same limitation as claim 1, implementing the corresponding device (meter), therefore it is rejected under the same rationale.
Claim 11 recites substantially the same limitation as claim 6, implementing the corresponding mobile device, therefore it is rejected under the same rationale.
Regarding claims 2 and 7, a combination of Le Buhan-Poo discloses all limitations of claims 1/6.
Furthermore, Le Buhan discloses: wherein generating a hashcode comprises applying a hash function to the data pair (“The above-mentioned cryptogram could be a result of a hash function (or an XOR function) on the information data. In this case, the information message further includes the utility consumption value” [0039]).
Regarding claims 3 and 8, a combination of Le Buhan-Poo discloses all limitations of claims 2/7.
Furthermore, Le Buhan discloses: wherein the hash function belongs to the set of hash functions comprising: - SHA-224 of the SHA-3 family; - SHA-256 of the SHA-3 family; - SHA-384 of the SHA-3 family; - SHA-512 of the SHA-3 family; - SHA-224 of the SHA-2 family; - SHA-256 of the SHA-2 family; - SHA-384 of the SHA-2 family; - SHA-512 of the SHA-2 family; - MD-4; - MD-5; and - SHA-1 (“The crypto processor implements various cryptographic algorithms such as for instance, but not limited to, AES, IDEA-NXT, RSA, SHA-256, ECC, etc.” [0036]).
Regarding claim 4, a combination of Le Buhan-Poo discloses all limitations of claim 1.
Furthermore, Le Buhan discloses: wherein encrypting the hashcode with a private key known solely to the meter comprises applying an asymmetric elliptic curve encryption (“The crypto processor implements various cryptographic algorithms such as for instance, but not limited to, AES, IDEA-NXT, RSA, SHA-256, ECC, etc.” [0036] [Examiner notes ECC is elliptic curve cryptography which is a public key cryptography system which is a type of asymmetric encryption]).
Regarding claims 5 and 9, a combination of Le Buhan-Poo discloses all limitations of claims 1/6.
Furthermore, Le Buhan discloses: wherein the meter data is data of an electricity meter, of a gas meter, of a thermal-energy meter or of a water meter (“Referring to FIG. 1, a secure detachable utility monitoring device DM is shown as being connectable in a removable manner to a legacy meter LM, also referred to as utility meter, for controlling a utility usage consumption, such as electrical power consumption, water or gas consumptions” [0033] [Examiner notes that a utility meter is an umbrella for meter types including an electric/electricity meter, a gas meter, and a water meter]).
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the date of this final action.
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/SARON MATTHEWOS WORKU/Examiner, Art Unit 2408
/LINGLAN EDWARDS/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2408
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