DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Response to Amendment
Amendment received on 11/05/2025 is acknowledged and entered. Claims 1-9 are currently pending in the application.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1-9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter.
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, the Examiner is guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217-18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75-77 (2012)); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010); 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019); the October 2019 Update of the 2019 Revised Guidance (Oct. 17, 2019); 2024 Guidance Update on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, Including on Artificial Intelligence (July 17, 2024), and the USPTO’s Paten Subject Matter Eligibility Memorandums of August 4, 2025 and December 5, 2025.
Step 1
Claims are eligible for patent protection under § 101 if they are in one of the four statutory categories and not directed to a judicial exception to patentability (i.e., laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas). Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U. S. ____ (2014).
Claim 1 is directed to a statutory category, because a series of steps for early warning for a lithium battery satisfies the requirements of a process (a series of acts).
Next, the claim is analyzed to determine whether it is directed to a judicial exception.
Step 2A – Prong 1
Claim 1 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more of early warning for a lithium battery. The claim recites:
1. A method for early warning for a lithium battery, comprising:
establishing a three-dimensional (3D) electrochemical model for the lithium battery, and dividing the lithium battery into three portions respectively including a positive electrode, a negative electrode and a separator;
performing spatial discretization on the 3D electrochemical model according to a preset accuracy to establish the four-dimensional (4D) spatial coordinates of the lithium battery;
obtaining a current lithium ion concentration in each position of the lithium battery by simulation based on the 4D space coordinates, a historical lithium ion concentration and a historical diffusion coefficient in each position of the lithium battery; and
performing early warning for the lithium battery according to the current lithium ion concentration in each position, comprising: calculating state information of the lithium battery according to the current lithium ion concentration in each position, wherein the state information of the lithium battery includes one or more of a battery volumetric charge state, a battery surface charge state, an active particle volumetric charge state, and an active particle surface charge state,
wherein the battery volumetric charge state is
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The limitations of establishing a model; performing spatial discretization; simulating lithium ion concentration data; and calculating state information of the lithium battery, as drafted, is a process that, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance of the limitation in the mind and mathematical concepts, which may be practically performed in the human mind using observation, evaluation, judgment, and opinion (MPEP 2106.04(a)(2), subsection III). (Note: Examiner’s language (e.g. “establishing a model”; “performing spatial discretization”; etc.) is an abbreviated reference to the detailed claim steps and is not an oversimplification of the claim language; the Examiner employing such shortcuts (that refer to more specific steps) when attempting to explain the rejection). That is, other than reciting “by a processor,” nothing in the claim element precludes the step from practically being performed in the mind, and/or performed as organized human activity. Aside from the general technological environment (addressed below), it covers purely mental concepts and/or certain methods of organizing human activity processes, and the mere nominal recitation of a generic network appliance (e.g. an interface for inputting or outputting data, or generic network-based storage devices and displays) does not take the claim limitation out of the mental processes and/or certain methods of organizing human activity grouping.
Specifically, the utilizing mathematical tools to process data and to output the estimated values - said functions could be performed by a human using mental steps or basic critical thinking, which are types of activities that have been found by the courts to represent abstract ideas (e.g., mental comparison regarding a sample or test subject to a control or target data in Ambry, Myriad CAFC, or the diagnosing an abnormal condition by performing clinical tests and thinking about the results in In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (Grams)). In Grams, the recited functions require obtaining data or patient information (from sensors), and analyze that data to ascertain the existence and identity of an abnormality or estimated responses, and possible causes thereof. While said functions are performed by a computer, they are in essence a mathematical algorithm, in that they represent "[a] procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem." Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65, 93 S.Ct. 253, 254, 34 L.Ed.2d 273 (1972). Moreover, the Federal Circuit has held, “without additional limitations, a process that employs mathematical algorithms to manipulate existing information to generate additional information is not patent eligible.” Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Further, “analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, [are] essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category.” Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354; see also Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “[T]he fact that the required calculations could be performed more efficiently via a computer does not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Similar to Synopsys v. Mentor Graphics Corp. 839 F.3d 1138, 120 U.S.P.Q.2d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 2016) – “Generating a logic circuit/network from a hardware independent description" – claim 1 does not call for any form of computer implementation of the claimed method. Because the claim 1 makes no mention of employing a computer or any other physical device, the claim is so broad as to read on an individual performing the claimed steps mentally or with pencil and paper. So as the Court has held that complex details from the specification cannot save a claim directed to an abstract idea that recites generic computer parts, the claim’ recitation of establishing a model cannot save the claim that lacks any computer implementation at all. See Accenture, 728 F.3d at 1345 ("[T]he complexity of the implementing software or the level of detail in the specification does not transform a claim reciting only an abstract concept into a patent-eligible system or method.").
It is similar to other abstract ideas held to be non-statutory by the courts. See, also, Recentive Analytics, Inc. v. Fox Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2025), wherein the court noted that "iterative training," a claimed feature, was inherent to all machine learning models and thus did not confer eligibility. Additionally, applying machine learning to event scheduling, an activity predating computers, did not transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
As per receiving, storing and outputting data limitations, it has been held that “As many cases make clear, even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract.” SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citation omitted); see also In re Jobin, 811 F. App’x 633, 637 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (claims to collecting, organizing, grouping, and storing data using techniques such as conducting a survey or crowdsourcing recited a method of organizing human activity, which is a hallmark of abstract ideas).
Therefore, if a claim limitation, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance of the limitation in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer components, then it falls within the “Mental Processes” and/or “Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity” grouping of abstract ideas. Accordingly, the claim recites an abstract idea. (Step 2A – Prong 1: Yes).
Step 2A – Prong 2
I n Prong Two, the Examiner determines whether claim 1, as a whole, recites additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application of the exception, i.e., whether the additional elements apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is no more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54-55. If the additional elements do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, then the claim is directed to the judicial exception. See id., 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. “An additional element [that] reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field” is indicative of integrating a judicial exception into a practical application. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
The Examiner determined that this judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application, because there are no meaningful limitations that transform the exception into a patent eligible application. (For the purposes of examination, the Examiner assumes that the method is performed by a computer). In particular, the claim implies additional elements – using a processor to perform the steps of establishing a model; performing spatial discretization; simulating lithium ion concentration data; and calculating state information of the lithium battery. However, the processor in each step is implied at a high level of generality, i.e., as a generic processor performing a generic computer functions of processing data, including receiving, storing, comparing, and outputting data. This generic processor limitation is no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component. See MPEP 2106.05(f). The processor that performs the recited steps merely automates these steps which can be done mentally or manually. Thus, while the additional elements have and execute instructions to perform the abstract idea itself, this also does not serve to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application as it merely amounts to instructions to "apply it." The claim only manipulates abstract data elements into another form, and does not set forth improvements to another technological field or the functioning of the computer itself and, instead, uses computer elements as tools in a conventional way to improve the functioning of the abstract idea identified above.
Further, looking at the limitations as an ordered combination adds nothing that is not already present when looking at the elements taken individually; there is no indication that the combination of elements improves the functioning of a computer or improves any other technology, - their collective functions merely provide conventional computer implementation. None of the additional elements "offers a meaningful limitation beyond generally linking 'the use of the [method] to a particular technological environment,' that is, implementation via computers." Alice Corp., slip op. at 16 (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 610, 611 (U.S. 2010)).
The recited steps do not control or improve operation of a machine (MPEP 2106.05(a)), do not effect a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing (MPEP 2106.05(c)), and do not apply the judicial exception with, or by use a particular machine (MPEP 2106.05(b)), but, instead, require receiving, storing, comparing and outputting data.
As per receiving, storing and/or outputting data limitations, these recitations amount to mere data gathering and/or outputting, is insignificant post-solution or extra-solution component and represents nominal recitation of technology. Insignificant "post-solution” or “extra-solution" activity means activity that is not central to the purpose of the method invented by the applicant. However, “(c) Whether its involvement is extra-solution activity or a field-of-use, i.e., the extent to which (or how) the machine or apparatus imposes meaningful limits on the execution of the claimed method steps. Use of a machine or apparatus that contributes only nominally or insignificantly to the execution of the claimed method (e.g., in a data gathering step or in a field-of-use limitation) would weigh against eligibility”. See Bilski, 138 S. Ct. at 3230 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590, 198 USPQ 193, ___ (1978)). Thus, claim drafting strategies that attempt to circumvent the basic exceptions to § 101 using, for example, highly stylized language, hollow field-of-use limitations, or the recitation of token post-solution activity should not be credited. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230.
Therefore, claim 1 as a whole, outputs only data structure, - everything remains in the form of a code stored in the computer memory. Accordingly, even in combination, these additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because they do not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. Therefore, the claim is directed to an abstract idea. (Step 2A – Prong 2: No).
Step 2B
If a claim has been determined to be directed to a judicial exception under revised Step 2A, examiners should then evaluate the additional elements individually and in combination under Step 2B to determine whether the provide an inventive concept (i.e., whether the additional elements amount to significantly more than the exception itself).
The Examiner determined that the claim does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. As discussed above with respect to integration of the abstract idea into a practical application, the additional element of using a processor to perform the steps of establishing a model; performing spatial discretization; simulating lithium ion concentration data; and calculating state information of the lithium battery amount to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component. The claim is now re-evaluated in Step 2B to determine if it is more than what is well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field.
The method would require a processor and memory in order to perform basic computer functions of receiving information, storing the information in a database, retrieving information from the database, comparing data, and outputting said information. These components are not explicitly recited and therefore must be construed at the highest level of generality. Based on the Specification, the invention utilizes existing, conventional communication networks, and generic processors, which can be found in mobile devices or desktop computers, conventional memory and display devices, and the functions performed by said generic computer elements are basic functions of a computer - performing a mathematical operation, receiving, storing, comparing and outputting data - have recognized by the courts as routine and conventional activity. Specifically, regarding the recited functions, MPEP 2106.05(d)(II) defines said functions as routine and conventional, or as insignificant extra-solution activity:
i. Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network); but see DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1258, 113 USPQ2d 1097, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Unlike the claims in Ultramercial, the claims at issue here specify how interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a desired result‐‐a result that overrides the routine and conventional sequence of events ordinarily triggered by the click of a hyperlink.” (emphasis added));
ii. Performing repetitive calculations, Flook, 437 U.S. at 594, 198 USPQ2d at 199 (recomputing or readjusting alarm limit values); Bancorp Services v. Sun Life, 687 F.3d 1266, 1278, 103 USPQ2d 1425, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The computer required by some of Bancorp’s claims is employed only for its most basic function, the performance of repetitive calculations, and as such does not impose meaningful limits on the scope of those claims.”); collecting and comparing known information in Classen 659 F.3d 1057, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d 1492 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
iii. Electronic recordkeeping, Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2359, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (creating and maintaining “shadow accounts”); Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716, 112 USPQ2d at 1755 (updating an activity log);
iv. Storing and retrieving information in memory, Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1681, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 2015); OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363, 115 USPQ2d at 1092-93;
v. Electronically scanning or extracting data from a physical document, Content Extraction and Transmission, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, 776 F.3d 1343, 1348, 113 USPQ2d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (optical character recognition); and
vi. A web browser’s back and forward button functionality, Internet Patent Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348, 115 USPQ2d 1414, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Below are examples of other types of activity that the courts have found to be well-understood, routine, conventional activity when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity:
i. Recording a customer’s order, Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1244, 120 USPQ2d 1844, 1856 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
iii. Restricting public access to media by requiring a consumer to view an advertisement, Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716-17, 112 USPQ2d 1750, 1755-56 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
iv. Presenting offers and gathering statistics, OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1362-63, 115 USPQ2d at 1092-93;
v. Determining an estimated outcome and setting a price, OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1362-63, 115 USPQ2d at 1092-93; and
vi. Arranging a hierarchy of groups, sorting information, eliminating less restrictive pricing information and determining the price, Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1331, 115 USPQ2d 1681, 1699 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Thus, the background of the current application does not provide any indication that the processor is anything other than a generic, off-the-shelf computer component, and the Symantec, TLI, and OIP Techs. court decisions cited in MPEP 2106.05(d)(II) indicate that mere collection or receipt of data over a network is a well‐understood, routine, and conventional function when it is claimed in a merely generic manner (as it is here).
Also, the claim does not involve a non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces, as asserted, by receiving information from an external source of data. The receiving of data from an external source over a network, such as via the Internet, can fairly be characterized as insignificant extra-solution activity that does not receive patentable weight. See Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (characterizing data gathering steps as insignificant extra-solution activity). Similar to Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347; Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014): “And we have recognized that merely presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information, without more (such as identifying a particular tool for presentation), is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis.” Here, the claims are clearly focused on the combination of those abstract-idea processes. The advance they purport to make is a process of gathering and analyzing information of a specified content, then displaying the results, and not any particular asserted inventive technology for performing those functions. They are therefore directed to an abstract idea. As such, the additional elements, considered individually and in combination with the other claim elements, do not make the claim as a whole significantly more than the abstract idea itself.
Accordingly, a conclusion that the recited steps are well-understood, routine, conventional activity is supported under Berkheimer Option 2. Mere instructions to apply an exception using a generic computer component cannot provide an inventive concept.
Further, similar to Electric Power Group v Alstom S.A. (Fed Cir, 2015-1778, 8/1/2016) (Power Group), claim’ invocation of computers, networks, and displays does not transform the claimed subject matter into patent-eligible applications. Claim 1 does not require any nonconventional computer, network, or display components, or even a “non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces,” but merely call for performance of the claimed information collection, analysis, and display functions on a set of generic computer components and display devices. Nothing in the claim, understood in light of the specification, requires anything other than off-the-shelf, conventional computer, network, and display technology for gathering, sending, and presenting the desired information. Analogous to Power Group, claim 1 does not even require a new source or type of information, or new techniques for analyzing it. As a result, the claim does not require an arguably inventive set of components or methods, such as measurement devices or techniques that would generate new data. The claim does not invoke any assertedly inventive programming. Merely requiring the selection and manipulation of information - to provide a “humanly comprehensible” amount of information useful for users - by itself does not transform the otherwise-abstract processes of information collection and analysis into patent eligible subject matter. Merely obtaining and selecting information, by content or source, for collection, analysis, and display does nothing significant to differentiate a process from ordinary mental processes, whose implicit exclusion from § 101 undergirds the information-based category of abstract ideas. Therefore, the recited steps represent implementing the abstract idea on a generic computer, or “reciting a commonplace business method aimed at processing business information despite being applied on a general purpose computer” Versata, p. 53; Ultramerical, pp. 11-12.
Furthermore, the recited functions do not improve the functioning of computers itself, including of the processor(s) or the network elements. There are no physical improvements in the claim, like a faster processor or more efficient memory, and there is no operational improvement, like mathematical computation that improve the functioning of the computer. Applicant did not invent a new type of computer; Applicant like everyone else programs their computer to perform functions. The Supreme Court in Alice indicated that an abstract claim might be statutory if it improved another technology or the computer processing itself. Using a (programmed) computer to implement a common business practice does neither. The Federal Circuit has recognized that "an invocation of already-available computers that are not themselves plausibly asserted to be an advance, for use in carrying out improved mathematical calculations, amounts to a recitation of what is 'well-understood, routine, [and] conventional.'" SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (citing Mayo v. Prometheus, 566 U.S. 66, 73 (2012)). Apart from the instructions to implement the abstract idea, they only serve to perform well-understood functions (e.g., receiving, storing, comparing and transmitting data—see the Specification as well as Alice Corp.; Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2016); and Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015) covering the well-known nature of these computer functions). Looking at the limitations as an ordered combination adds nothing that is not already present when looking at the elements taken individually; there is no indication that the combination of elements improves the functioning of a computer or improves any other technology. Their collective functions merely provide conventional computer implementation. “However, it is not apparent how appellant’s programmed digital computer can produce any synergistic result. Instead, the computer will simply do the job it is instructed to do. Where is there any surprising or unexpected result? The unlikelihood of any such result is merely one more reason why patents should not be granted in situations where the only novelty is in the programming of general purpose digital computers”. See Sakraida v. Ag. Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 [ 96 S.Ct. 1532, 47 L.Ed.2d 784], 189 USPQ 449 (1976) and A P Tea Co. V. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 [ 71 S.Ct. 127, 95 L.Ed. 162], 87 USPQ 303 (1950).
Similar to Synopsys v. Mentor Graphics Corp. 839 F.3d 1138, 120 U.S.P.Q.2d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 2016) claim 1 does not contain a technical solution. Given that the claim is for a mental process, the recited functions, which merely aid in mental translation as opposed to computer efficacy, are not an inventive concept that takes claim 1 beyond its abstract idea. Unlike the claims at issue in DDR Holdings, wherein the claims at issue involved a technological solution that overcame a specific challenge unique to the Internet. Id. at 1259, and BASCOM, wherein "an inventive concept can be found in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces." Id. at 1350, (the ability of Internet service providers to associate a search request with a particular individual account), claim 1 does not introduce a technical advance or improvement. The claim contains nothing that "amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [abstract idea] itself.'" Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2355.
Furthermore, there is no transformation recited in the claim as understood in view of 35 USC 101. The recited steps merely represent abstract ideas which cannot meet the transformation test because they are not physical objects or substances. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963. Said steps are nothing more than mere manipulation or reorganization of data, which does not satisfy the transformation prong. It is further noted that the underlying idea of the recited steps could be performed via pen and paper or in a person's mind. Moreover, “We agree with the district court that the claimed process manipulates data to organize it in a logical way such that additional fraud tests may be performed. The mere manipulation or reorganization of data, however, does not satisfy the transformation prong.” and “Abele made clear that the basic character of a process claim drawn to an abstract idea is not changed by claiming only its performance by computers, or by claiming the process embodied in program instructions on a computer readable medium. Thus, merely claiming a software implementation of a purely mental process that could otherwise be performed without the use of a computer does not satisfy the machine prong of the machine-or-transformation test”. CyberSource, 659 F.3d 1057, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d 1492 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
Therefore, the claim does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception, because, when considered separately and in combination, the claim elements do not add significantly more to the exception. Considered separately and as an ordered combination, the claim elements do not provide an improvement to another technology or technical field; do not provide an improvement to the functioning of the computer itself; do not apply the judicial exception by use of a particular machine; do not effect a transformation or reduce a particular article to a different state or thing; and do not add a specific limitation other than what is well-understood, routine and conventional in the operation of a generic computer. None of the hardware recited "offers a meaningful limitation beyond generally linking 'the use of the [method] to a particular technological environment,' that is, implementation via computers." Id., slip op. at 16 (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 610, 611 (U.S. 2010)). As per “A method for early warning for a lithium battery” recitations, these limitations do not add significantly more because they are simply an attempt to limit the abstract idea to a particular technological environment, e.g., implementation via computers." Id., slip op. at 16 (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 610, 611 (U.S. 2010)). Limiting the claims to the particular technological environment is, without more, insufficient to transform the claim into patent-eligible applications of the abstract idea at their core.
Accordingly, claim 1 is not directed to significantly more than the exception itself, and is not eligible subject matter under § 101. (Step 2B: No).
Further, although the Examiner takes the steps recited in the independent claim as exemplary, the Examiner points out that limitations recited in dependent claims 2-9 further narrow the abstract idea but do not make the claims any less abstract. For instance, there is no indication that the steps of “cutting off the operation of the lithium battery” in in claims 6-9 are performed on a real, physical battery; it appears these recitations merely represent logical operations. Thus, dependent claims 2-9 each merely add further details of the abstract steps recited in claim 1 without including an improvement to another technology or technical field, an improvement to the functioning of the computer itself, or meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of an abstract idea to a particular technological environment. These claims "add nothing of practical significance to the underlying idea," and thus do not transform the claimed abstract idea into patentable subject matter. Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716. Therefore, dependent claims 2-9 are also directed to non-statutory subject matter.
Allowable Subject Matter
Claims 1 have been examined with respect to the prior art, and may be allowable if amended to overcome the rejection under 35 U.S.C 101.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed 11/05/2025 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
Applicant argues that claim 1 does not recite a mental process, but provide a technical solution to a technical problem. Applicant further argues that the claims are integrated into a practical application, contain significantly more than the abstract idea and, similar to McRO, Thales Visionix and BASCOM, are patent eligible.
The Examiner respectfully disagrees, and maintains that the recited steps are a process that, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance of the limitation in the mind and mathematical concepts, which may be practically performed in the human mind using observation, evaluation, judgment, and opinion (MPEP 2106.04(a)(2), subsection III). Said mental processes, as recited in the claims, remain
unpatentable even when automated to reduce the burden on the user of what once could have been done with pen and paper. CyberSource Corp. at 1375 (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalkv. Benson, [409 U.S. 63 (1972)].”). In Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, National Ass’n, Nos. 13-1588,-1589, 14-1112, -1687 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 23, 2014) the Federal Circuit affirmed that such limitations (parsing and extracting data) were generally directed to “the abstract idea of 1) collecting data, 2) recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and 3) storing that recognized data in a memory.” The Court explained that ”[t]he concept of data collection, recognition, and storage is undisputedly well-known,” and noted that “humans have always performed these functions.” Id. The Court then rejected CET’s argument that the claims were patent eligible because they required hardware to perform functions that humans cannot, such as processing and recognizing the stream of bits output by the scanner. Comparing the asserted claims to “the computer-implemented claims in Alice,” the Court concluded that the claims were “drawn to the basic concept of data recognition and storage,” even though they recited a scanner. Id. at 8. Mental processes, as recited in the claims, remain unpatentable even when automated to reduce the burden on the user of what once could have been done with pen and paper. CyberSource Corp. at 1375 (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalkv. Benson, [409 U.S. 63 (1972)].”).
Even accepting Applicant’s argument regarding the hardware used, it also is insufficient, without more, to establish patent eligibility that “[t]he human mind is not equipped to execute the claimed method”. Although “a method that can be performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under § 101,” CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011), it does not automatically follow, that methods requiring physical components, i.e., methods that arguably cannot be performed entirely in the human mind, are, therefore, not directed to abstract ideas. See, e.g., In re TLI Commc'ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[N]ot every claim that recites concrete, tangible components escapes the reach of the abstract-idea inquiry.”); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Latric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he inability for the human mind to perform each claim step does not alone confer patentability.”).
Regarding the practical application argument, the Examiner maintains that the additional elements – a processor - is implied at a high level of generality, i.e., as a generic processor performing a generic computer functions of processing data, including receiving, storing, comparing, and outputting data. This generic processor limitation is no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component. See MPEP 2106.05(f). The processor that performs the recited steps merely automates these steps which can be done mentally or manually. Thus, while the additional elements have and execute instructions to perform the abstract idea itself, this also does not serve to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application as it merely amounts to instructions to "apply it." The claim only manipulates abstract data elements into another form, and does not set forth improvements to another technological field or the functioning of the computer itself and, instead, uses computer elements as tools in a conventional way to improve the functioning of the abstract idea identified above. The recited steps do not control or improve operation of a machine (MPEP 2106.05(a)), do not effect a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing (MPEP 2106.05(c)), and do not apply the judicial exception with, or by use a particular machine (MPEP 2106.05(b)), but, instead, require receiving, storing, comparing and outputting data.
Regarding the significantly more argument, it is noted that the use of a generic processor to perform the recited steps of establishing a model; performing spatial discretization; simulating lithiu-ion concentration data; and calculating state information of the lithium battery amount to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component. Also, the claim does not involve a non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces, as asserted, by receiving information from an external source of data. The receiving of data from an external source over a network, such as via the Internet, is an insignificant extra-solution activity that does not receive patentable weight. See Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (characterizing data gathering steps as insignificant extra-solution activity). Also, the claims do not require an arguably inventive set of components or methods, such as measurement devices or techniques that would generate new data. The claim does not invoke any assertedly inventive programming. Merely requiring the selection and manipulation of information - to provide a “humanly comprehensible” amount of information useful for users - by itself does not transform the otherwise-abstract processes of information collection and analysis into patent eligible subject matter. Merely obtaining and selecting information, by content or source, for collection, analysis, and display does nothing significant to differentiate a process from ordinary mental processes, whose implicit exclusion from § 101 undergirds the information-based category of abstract ideas.
Further, the recited functions do not improve the functioning of computers itself, including of the processor(s) or the network elements. There are no physical improvements in the claim, like a faster processor or more efficient memory, and there is no operational improvement, like mathematical computation that improve the functioning of the computer. The Supreme Court in Alice indicated that an abstract claim might be statutory if it improved another technology or the computer processing itself. Using a (programmed) computer to implement a common business practice does neither. The Federal Circuit has recognized that "an invocation of already-available computers that are not themselves plausibly asserted to be an advance, for use in carrying out improved mathematical calculations, amounts to a recitation of what is 'well-understood, routine, [and] conventional.'" SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (citing Mayo v. Prometheus, 566 U.S. 66, 73 (2012)). Apart from the instructions to implement the abstract idea, they only serve to perform well-understood functions (e.g., receiving, storing, comparing and transmitting data—see the Specification as well as Alice Corp.; Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2016); and Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015) covering the well-known nature of these computer functions).
Further, compare to McRO, Inc. dba Planet Blue v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 120 USPQ2d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (McRO), claim 1 does not recite any improvement of a technical field. The claims in McRO aim to automate a 3-D animator’s tasks, specifically, determining when to set keyframes and setting those keyframes, which is accomplished through rules that are applied to the timed transcript to determine the morph weight outputs, wherein said rules configured to produce more realistic speech by ‘taking into consideration the differences in mouth positions for similar phonemes based on context.’” Thus, the basis for the McRO Court’s decision was that the claims were directed to an improvement in computer-related technology (allowing computers to produce ‘accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in animated characters’ that previously could only be produced by human animators).” The specification in McRO underlined how the claimed rules enabled the automation of specific animation tasks that previously could not be automated.
Contrary to claims in McRO, claim 1 does not recite any improvement in computer-related technology; there is no improvements in the operation of a computer or a computer network per se, there is no improvements claimed as a set of ‘rules’ (basically mathematical relationships) that improve computer-related technology by allowing computer performance of a function not previously performable by a computer.” The claimed steps represent a collection of conventional steps performed by a computer - receiving data, manipulating data, and outputting manipulated data on a conventional display. Claim 1 does not require any nonconventional computer, network, or display components, or even a “non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces,” but merely call for performance of the claimed steps on a set of generic computer components and display devices. Nothing in the claim, understood in light of the specification, requires anything other than off-the-shelf, conventional computer, network, and display technology for gathering, calculating and presenting the desired information. Said computing elements are recited at a high level of generality and perform the basic functions of a computer, such as performing a mathematical operation and receiving and outputting data, that would be needed to apply the abstract idea via computer. Therefore, claim 1 does not include any recitation that improve computer-related technology by allowing computer performance of a function not previously performable by a computer.”
Furthermore, regarding Thales argument, the claims at issue remain ineligible. The court in Thales stated that “the claims specify a particular configuration of inertial sensors and a particular method of using the raw data from the sensors in order to more accurately calculate the position and orientation of an object on a moving platform. The mathematical equations are a consequence of the arrangement of the sensors and the unconventional choice of reference frame in order to calculate position and orientation. Far from claiming the equations themselves, the claims seek to protect only the application of physics to the unconventional configuration of sensors as disclosed. As such, these claims are not directed to an abstract idea and thus the claims survive Alice step one.”
Contrary to claims in Thales, the claims of the instant application do not specify a particular configuration of inertial sensors, and does not utilize a particular method of using the raw data from the sensors in order to more accurately calculate the position and orientation of an object on a moving platform. Claim 1 does not require any nonconventional computer, network, or interface components, or even a “non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces,” but merely call for performance of the claimed steps of establishing a model; performing spatial discretization; simulating lithium ion concentration data; and calculating state information of the lithium battery on a set of generic computer components and display devices. Nothing in the claim, understood in light of the specification, requires anything other than off-the-shelf, conventional computer, network, and display technology for gathering, sending, and presenting the desired information. Claim 1 does not even require a new source or type of information, or new techniques for analyzing it. As a result, the claim does not require an arguably inventive set of components or methods, such as novel detection devices or techniques that would generate new data. Merely requiring the collection and manipulation of information - to provide a “humanly comprehensible” amount of information useful for users - by itself does not transform the otherwise-abstract processes of information collection and analysis into patent eligible subject matter.
Moreover, in comparison to BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC (Fed. Cir. 2016)(BASCOM), the claim at issue remains ineligible. In BASCOM, the Federal Circuit seemed to focus on the "technical aspects" of the claimed invention and stated that while filtering content on the Internet was already a known concept, the patent describes how its particular arrangement of elements is a technical improvement over prior art ways of filtering such content (e.g., prior art filters were either susceptible to hacking and dependent on local hardware and software, or confined to an inflexible one size-fits-all scheme). “An inventive concept may be found in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of the additional elements, i.e., the installation of a filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the end-users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end user.”
Contrary to BASCOM, the claims at issue do not include any recitation directed to the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of the additional elements. The claims requires only generic computer elements like a processor, a memory, displays, for implementing the recited simulating steps, and an Internet connection for communicating data. These generic computer elements are recited at a high level of generality and perform the basic functions of a computer (in this case, performing a mathematical operation, receiving/transmitting and storing data) that would be needed to apply the abstract idea via a computer. Merely using generic computer components to perform the above identified basic computer functions (transmitting, generating and computing data) to practice or apply the judicial exception does not constitute a meaningful limitation that would amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. Therefore, claims 1-9 are directed to non-statutory subject matter.
Conclusion
The prior art search has been conducted, with no significant prior art found.
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
/IGOR N BORISSOV/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3685 1/9/2026