DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Response to Amendment
Applicant’s amendment filed 09 October 2025 amends claim 5. Applicant’s amendment has been fully considered and entered.
Response to Arguments
Applicant argues on page 7 of the response, “Applicant hereby amends pending claim 5 to overcome this rejection.” This argument has been fully considered and is persuasive. The previous §112 rejections have been withdrawn.
Applicant argues on page 8 of the response, “However, Applicants maintain that Mathieu teaches using Fourier Transforms to identify the feature of the biometric measurement data for use in generating the hashes that are most likely to be consistent from one biometric measurement to another and are thus most likely to result in hashes that are identical-but the Fourier Transforms themselves do not form input to a hashing algorithm as recited in the pending claims.” In response, Applicant has failed to fully consider the proposed modification to Mathieu as set forth in the Non-Final dated 11 April 2025 (“Non-Final”). Specifically, the Non-Final (pages 6-7) makes clear that Mathieu teaches user biometric data being captured ([0044] & [0199]) utilizing biometric sensors ([0152]) such that the biometric data is processed by a hash algorithm to generate a biometric hash ([0199]). Mathieu does not specify that the biometric data captured in paragraph [0199] is processed by applying an error correcting code to the captured biometric data. Different embodiments of Mathieu describe the utilize of Fourier transforms to extract feature vectors from captured biometric data ([0107] & [0109] & [0115]). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have utilized the Fourier Transform to extract feature vectors from the biometric data and applied the feature vectors to the hash algorithm in Mathieu in order to provide biometrics that are resilient to error sources as suggested by Mathieu ([0115]).
Applicant has not addressed the proposed modification to Mathieu as proposed in the Non-Final.
Applicant argues on page 8 of the response, “Therefore, Applicant respectfully submits that the teaching in Mathieu of Fourier Transforms fails to teach or suggest a code word as recited in the pending claims.” This argument is not persuasive because Applicant’s specification discloses that the code words are generated using error correcting codes ([0058]). Mathieu discloses that Fourier Transform creates results that are resilient to errors ([0115]). Therefore, the Fourier Transform of Mathieu can be considered error correction such that the results of the Fourier Transform would be considered the claimed “code words”.
Applicant argues on page 9 of the response, “Mathieu does not teach or suggest that a code word in a set of code words selected through an application of an error correcting code to a biometric measurement should be provided as input to a hashing algorithm to generate a hash and that the hash generated in that way should then be used in the generation of a public/private key pair.” This argument is not persuasive because Mathieu discloses that the biometric hash is then used as input to a key generation program that creates a private key 3124 and a public key 3122 ([0199]). As detailed above, Mathieu does not specify that the biometric data captured in paragraph [0199] is processed by applying an error correcting code to the captured biometric data. Different embodiments of Mathieu describe the utilize of Fourier transforms to extract feature vectors from captured biometric data ([0107] & [0109] & [0115]). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have utilized the Fourier Transform to extract feature vectors from the biometric data and applied the feature vectors to the hash algorithm in Mathieu in order to provide biometrics that are resilient to error sources as suggested by Mathieu ([0115]).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claim 1, 3-5 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Mathieu, U.S. Publication No. 2020/0252217, in view of Holloran, U.S. Publication No. 2006/0034494. Referring to claim 1, Mathieu discloses a cryptographic system wherein user biometric data is captured ([0044] & [0199]) utilizing biometric sensors ([0152]: biometric sensor reads on the claimed biometric reader device), which meets the limitation of generating, by a biometrics reader device, a first biometric measurement using a physical characteristic of a user. The biometric data is processed by a hash algorithm to generate a biometric hash ([0199]: biometric hash 3118 reads on the claimed first hash) such that the functionality is performed by software executed by a processor ([0206]: software reads on the claimed noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module), which meets the limitation of generating, by the at least one noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module, a first hash, wherein generating further comprises executing a hashing algorithm [and using the code word selected from the set of code words] as input to the hashing algorithm. The biometric hash is then used as input to a key generation program that creates a private key 3124 and a public key 3122 ([0199]) such that the functionality is performed by software executed by a processor ([0206]: software reads on the claimed noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module), which meets the limitation of generating, by the at least one noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module, a first public key and a first private key, using the first hash.
Mathieu does not specify that the biometric data captured in paragraph [0199] is processed by applying an error correcting code to the captured biometric data. Different embodiments of Mathieu describe the utilize of Fourier transforms to extract feature vectors from captured biometric data ([0107] & [0109] & [0115]: extraction of feature vectors from the Fourier transform space removes sources of error and would be considered an error correcting code as claimed) such that the functionality is performed by software executed by a processor ([0206]: software reads on the claimed noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module), which meets the limitation of selecting, by at least one noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module executing on a processor of a computer device, a code word in a set of code words, wherein selecting further comprises applying an error correcting code to the first biometric measurement. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have utilized the Fourier Transform to extract feature vectors from the biometric data and applied the feature vectors to the hash algorithm in Mathieu in order to provide biometrics that are resilient to error sources as suggested by Mathieu ([0115]).
Mathieu does not specify that private key 3124 is utilized to digitally sign a data item. A different embodiment of Mathieu discloses the use of a private key to digitally sign a compact code and validity mask ([0173]: encryption of data utilizing public key is a digital signature), which meets the limitation of electronically signing, with the first private key, a data item associated with the user. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention for the private key (3124) of paragraph [0199] to have been utilized to digitally sign data items in order to provide the ability to verify and authenticate data items as suggested by Mathieu ([0174]).
Mathieu discloses a cryptographic system wherein user biometric data is captured ([0044] & [0199]) utilizing biometric sensors ([0152]: biometric sensor reads on the claimed biometric reader device), which meets the limitation of generating, by a biometrics reader device, a [second] biometric measurement using the physical characteristic of a user. The biometric data is processed by a hash algorithm to generate a biometric hash ([0199]: biometric hash 3118 reads on the claimed hash) such that the functionality is performed by software executed by a processor ([0206]: software reads on the claimed noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module), which meets the limitation of generating, by the at least one noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module, a [second] hash, wherein generating the [second] hash further comprises executing a hashing algorithm [and using the selected code word] as input to the hashing algorithm. The biometric hash is then used as input to a key generation program that creates a private key 3124 and a public key 3122 ([0199]) such that the functionality is performed by software executed by a processor ([0206]: software reads on the claimed noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module), which meets the limitation of generating, by the at least one noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module, a [second] private key, using the [second] hash.
Mathieu does not specify that private key 3124 is utilized to digitally sign a data item. A different embodiment of Mathieu discloses the use of a private key to digitally sign a compact code and validity mask ([0173]: encryption of data utilizing public key is a digital signature), which meets the limitation of electronically signing, with the [second] private key, the second data item. Mathieu discloses that the digital signature is decrypted using the public key as a form of verification that compares the biometric hashes ([0174]), which meets the limitation of verifying the authenticity of the signed second data item using the first public key, determining that the second hash is substantially similar to the first hash. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention for the private key (3124) of paragraph [0199] to have been utilized to digitally sign data items in order to provide the ability to verify and authenticate data items as suggested by Mathieu ([0174]).
Mathieu does not specify that the biometric data captured in paragraph [0199] is processed by applying an error correcting code to the captured biometric data. Different embodiments of Mathieu describe the utilize of Fourier transforms to extract feature vectors from captured biometric data ([0107] & [0109] & [0115]: extraction of feature vectors from the Fourier transform space removes sources of error and would be considered an error correcting code as claimed) such that the functionality is performed by software executed by a processor ([0206]: software reads on the claimed noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module), which meets the limitation of using the selected code word. The feature vectors are selected such that entropy is at the maximum theoretical limit providing a low probability of false matching ([0186]-[0187]), which meets the limitation of the selected code word having a dimension that results in a threshold level of entropy and that allows the second biometric measurement to decode to the selected code word. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have utilized the Fourier Transform to extract feature vectors from the biometric data and applied the feature vectors to the hash algorithm in Mathieu in order to provide biometrics that are resilient to error sources as suggested by Mathieu ([0115]).
Mathieu does not disclose the ability to recover the generated public/private key pair. Holloran discloses that the user can access archive servers in order to recover their public/private key pair ([0043] & [0058]) using biometric input (Figure 13, steps 1B-1C & [0058]) and verifying digital signatures ([0038]: key recovery process is initiated by the user and would represent the claimed user input while the key recovery would be considered the claimed condition satisfying a threshold to the extent that the user is required to resubmit biometrics in order to perform the key recovery process the will eventually provide the user with ability to verify digital signatures), which meets the limitation of receiving, by the processor, user input identifying a condition satisfying a threshold requirement for use of the first biometric measurement to verify authenticity of a second data item associated with the user. The user provides the biometric input in the form of fingerprint (Figure 13, step 1B & [0059]) and retina scan (Figure 13, step 1C & [0059]), which meets the limitation of generating, by the biometrics reader device, a second biometric measurement using the physical characteristic of the user. The user’s private key and public key is recovered ([0059]: as applied to the Mathieu reference, the recovery of the public/private key pair would include the recreation of the hash which would be considered the second hash), which meets the limitation of generating a second hash, generating, a second private key.
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention for the cryptographic system of Mathieu to have provided a key pair recovery system in order to allow for the user with the ability to recover their public/private key pair when lost as suggested by Holloran ([0043] & [0058]).
Referring to claim 3, Mathieu discloses a cryptographic system wherein user biometric data is captured ([0044] & [0199]) utilizing biometric sensors ([0152]: biometric sensor reads on the claimed biometric reader device), which meets the limitation of generating, by a biometrics reader device, a first biometric measurement using a physical characteristic of a user. The biometric data is processed by a hash algorithm to generate a biometric hash ([0199]: biometric hash 3118 reads on the claimed first hash) such that the functionality is performed by software executed by a processor ([0206]: software reads on the claimed noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module), which meets the limitation of generating, by the at least one noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module, a first hash, wherein generating further comprises executing a hashing algorithm [and using the code word selected from the set of code words] as input to the hashing algorithm. The biometric hash is then used as input to a key generation program that creates a private key 3124 and a public key 3122 ([0199]) such that the functionality is performed by software executed by a processor ([0206]: software reads on the claimed noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module), which meets the limitation of generating, by the at least one noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module, a public key and a private key, using the first hash.
Mathieu does not specify that the biometric data captured in paragraph [0199] is processed by applying an error correcting code to the captured biometric data. Different embodiments of Mathieu describe the utilize of Fourier transforms to extract feature vectors from captured biometric data ([0107] & [0109] & [0115]: extraction of feature vectors from the Fourier transform space removes sources of error and would be considered an error correcting code as claimed) such that the functionality is performed by software executed by a processor ([0206]: software reads on the claimed noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module), which meets the limitation of selecting, by at least one noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module executing on a processor of a computer device, a code word in a set of code words, wherein selecting further comprises applying an error correcting code to the first biometric measurement. The feature vectors are selected such that entropy is at the maximum theoretical limit providing a low probability of false matching ([0186]-[0187]), which meets the limitation of the selected code word having a dimension that results in a threshold level of entropy and that allows the second biometric measurement to decode to the selected code word. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have utilized the Fourier Transform to extract feature vectors from the biometric data and applied the feature vectors to the hash algorithm in Mathieu in order to provide biometrics that are resilient to error sources as suggested by Mathieu ([0115]).
Mathieu does not specify that public key 3122 is utilized to encrypt a data item. Holloran discloses the use of public keys to encrypt user data ([0043]), which meets the limitation of encrypt data associated with the user with the public key. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention for the public key (3122) of Mathieu to have been utilized to encrypt data items in order to protect access to the user data as suggested by Holloran ([0043]).
Referring to claim 4, Mathieu discloses a cryptographic system wherein user biometric data is captured ([0044] & [0199]) utilizing biometric sensors ([0152]: biometric sensor reads on the claimed biometric reader device), which meets the limitation of generating, by a biometrics reader device, a [second] biometric measurement using the physical characteristic of a user. The biometric data is processed by a hash algorithm to generate a biometric hash ([0199]: biometric hash 3118 reads on the claimed hash) such that the functionality is performed by software executed by a processor ([0206]: software reads on the claimed noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module), which meets the limitation of generating, by the at least one noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module, a [second] hash, wherein generating the [second] hash further comprises executing a hashing algorithm [and using the selected code word] as input to the hashing algorithm. The biometric hash is then used as input to a key generation program that creates a private key 3124 and a public key 3122 ([0199]) such that the functionality is performed by software executed by a processor ([0206]: software reads on the claimed noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module), which meets the limitation of generating, by the at least one noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module, a [second] public key and a [second] private key, using the first hash.
Mathieu does not specify that the biometric data captured in paragraph [0199] is processed by applying an error correcting code to the captured biometric data. Different embodiments of Mathieu describe the utilize of Fourier transforms to extract feature vectors from captured biometric data ([0107] & [0109] & [0115]: extraction of feature vectors from the Fourier transform space removes sources of error and would be considered an error correcting code as claimed) such that the functionality is performed by software executed by a processor ([0206]: software reads on the claimed noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module), which meets the limitation of using the selected code word. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have utilized the Fourier Transform to extract feature vectors from the biometric data and applied the feature vectors to the hash algorithm in Mathieu in order to provide biometrics that are resilient to error sources as suggested by Mathieu ([0115]).
Mathieu does not disclose the ability to recover the generated public/private key pair. Holloran discloses that the user can access archive servers in order to recover their public/private key pair ([0043] & [0058]) using biometric input (Figure 13, steps 1B-1C & [0058]) and access encrypted data ([0043]: key recovery process is initiated by the user and would represent the claimed user input while the key recovery would be considered the claimed condition satisfying a threshold to the extent that the user is required to resubmit biometrics in order to perform the key recovery process the will eventually provide the user with encrypted data), which meets the limitation of receiving, by the processor, user input identifying a condition satisfying a threshold requirement for use of the first biometric measurement to retrieve encrypted data. The user provides the biometric input in the form of fingerprint (Figure 13, step 1B & [0059]) and retina scan (Figure 13, step 1C & [0059]), which meets the limitation of generating, by the biometrics reader device, a second biometric measurement using the physical characteristic of the user. The user’s private key and public key is recovered ([0059]: as applied to the Mathieu reference, the recovery of the public/private key pair would include the recreation of the hash which would be considered the second hash), which meets the limitation of generating a second hash, generating, a second public key and a second private key. The private key is utilized to decrypt the received encrypted user data ([0043]), which meets the limitation of decrypting, by the processor, the encrypted data with the second private key. Once decrypted, the user data is in readable form and would be accessible to the user ([0051]), which meets the limitation providing, by an encryption module of the at least one noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module, the user with access to the decrypted data.
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention for the cryptographic system of Mathieu to have provided a key pair recovery system in order to allow for the user with the ability to recover their public/private key pair when lost as suggested by Holloran ([0043] & [0058]).
Referring to claim 5, Mathieu discloses a cryptographic system wherein user biometric data is captured ([0044] & [0199]) utilizing biometric sensors ([0152]: biometric sensor reads on the claimed biometric reader device), which meets the limitation of generating, by a biometrics reader device, a first biometric measurement using a physical characteristic of a user. The biometric data is processed by a hash algorithm to generate a biometric hash ([0199]: biometric hash 3118 reads on the claimed first hash) such that the functionality is performed by software executed by a processor ([0206]: software reads on the claimed noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module), which meets the limitation of generating, by the at least one noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module, a first hash [of the code word]. The biometric hash is then used as input to a key generation program that creates a private key 3124 and a public key 3122 ([0199]) such that the functionality is performed by software executed by a processor ([0206]: software reads on the claimed noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module).
Mathieu does not specify that the biometric data captured in paragraph [0199] is processed by applying an error correcting code to the captured biometric data. Different embodiments of Mathieu describe the utilize of Fourier transforms to extract feature vectors from captured biometric data ([0107] & [0109] & [0115]: extraction of feature vectors from the Fourier transform space removes sources of error and would be considered an error correcting code as claimed) such that the functionality is performed by software executed by a processor ([0206]: software reads on the claimed noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module), which meets the limitation of selecting, by at least one noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module executing on a processor of a computer device, a code word in a set of code words, wherein selecting further comprises applying an error correcting code to the first biometric measurement. The feature vectors are selected such that entropy is at the maximum theoretical limit providing a low probability of false matching ([0186]-[0187]), which meets the limitation of the selected code word having a dimension that results in a threshold level of entropy and that allows a subsequent biometric measurement to decode to the selected code word. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have utilized the Fourier Transform to extract feature vectors from the biometric data and applied the feature vectors to the hash algorithm in Mathieu in order to provide biometrics that are resilient to error sources as suggested by Mathieu ([0115]).
Mathieu discloses that the biometric hash is then used as input to a key generation program that creates a private key 3124 and a public key 3122 ([0199]). Mathieu does not specify that public key 3122 is utilized to encrypt a data item. Holloran discloses the use of public keys to encrypt user data ([0043]: as applied within the Mathieu system, the public key is generated using a biometric hash. Therefore, encryption of the data item would be performed, in part, using the biometric hash.), which meets the limitation of encrypting, by an encryption module of the computing device, a data item, using the first hash as an input to an encryption algorithm. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention for the public key (3122) of Mathieu to have been utilized to encrypt data items in order to protect access to the user data as suggested by Holloran ([0043]).
Mathieu discloses a cryptographic system wherein user biometric data is captured ([0044] & [0199]) utilizing biometric sensors ([0152]: biometric sensor reads on the claimed biometric reader device), which meets the limitation of generating, by a biometrics reader device, a [second] biometric measurement using the physical characteristic of a user. The biometric data is processed by a hash algorithm to generate a biometric hash ([0199]: biometric hash 3118 reads on the claimed hash) such that the functionality is performed by software executed by a processor ([0206]: software reads on the claimed noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module), which meets the limitation of generating a [second] hash [using an output of applying the error corrected code to the second biometric measurement]. The biometric hash is then used as input to a key generation program that creates a private key 3124 and a public key 3122 ([0199]) such that the functionality is performed by software executed by a processor ([0206]: software reads on the claimed noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module).
Mathieu does not disclose the ability to recover the generated public/private key pair. Holloran discloses that the user can access archive servers in order to recover their public/private key pair ([0043] & [0058]) using biometric input (Figure 13, steps 1B-1C & [0058]) and access encrypted data ([0043]: key recovery process is initiated by the user and would represent the claimed user input while the key recovery would be considered the claimed condition satisfying a threshold to the extent that the user is required to resubmit biometrics in order to perform the key recovery process the will eventually provide the user with encrypted data), which meets the limitation of receiving, by the processor, user input identifying a condition satisfying a threshold requirement for use of the first biometric measurement to retrieve the data item. The user provides the biometric input in the form of fingerprint (Figure 13, step 1B & [0059]) and retina scan (Figure 13, step 1C & [0059]), which meets the limitation of generating, by the biometrics reader device, a second biometric measurement using the physical characteristic of the user. The user’s private key and public key is recovered ([0059]: as applied to the Mathieu reference, the recovery of the public/private key pair would include the recreation of the hash which would be considered the second hash), which meets the limitation of generating a second hash [using an output of applying the error correcting code to the second biometric measurement]. The private key is utilized to decrypt the received encrypted user data ([0043]: as applied within the Mathieu system, the private key is generated using a biometric hash. Therefore, decryption of the data item would be performed, in part, using the biometric hash.), which meets the limitation of decrypting, by the processor, the data item using the second generated hash as input to the decryption algorithm. Once decrypted, the user data is in readable form and would be accessible to the user ([0051]), which meets the limitation providing, by an encryption module, the user with access to the data item.
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention for the cryptographic system of Mathieu to have provided a key pair recovery system in order to allow for the user with the ability to recover their public/private key pair when lost as suggested by Holloran ([0043] & [0058]).
Mathieu does not specify that the biometric data captured in paragraph [0199] is processed by applying an error correcting code to the captured biometric data. Different embodiments of Mathieu describe the utilize of Fourier transforms to extract feature vectors from captured biometric data ([0107] & [0109] & [0115]: extraction of feature vectors from the Fourier transform space removes sources of error and would be considered an error correcting code as claimed) such that the functionality is performed by software executed by a processor ([0206]: software reads on the claimed noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module), which meets the limitation of applying, by the at least one noise-resistant feature transformation and hashing module, the error correcting code to the second biometric measurement, using an output of applying the error correcting code to the second biometric measurement. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have utilized the Fourier Transform to extract feature vectors from the biometric data and applied the feature vectors to the hash algorithm in Mathieu in order to provide biometrics that are resilient to error sources as suggested by Mathieu ([0115]).
Conclusion
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to BENJAMIN E LANIER whose telephone number is (571)272-3805. The examiner can normally be reached M-Th: 6:20-4:50.
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/BENJAMIN E LANIER/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2437