DETAILED ACTION Status of the Claims Claims 20-39 are currently pending and are the subject of this Office Action. The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA. Priority Applicant’s claim for the benefit of a prior-filed application under 35 U.S.C. 119(e) or under 35 U.S .C. 120, 121, 365(c), or 386(c) is acknowledged. Applicant has not complied with one or more conditions for receiving the benefit of an earlier filing date under 35 U.S.C. 120 as follows: The later-filed application must be an application for a patent for an invention which is also disclosed in the prior application (the parent or original nonprovisional application or provisional application). The disclosure of the invention in the parent application and in the later-filed application must be sufficient to comply with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, except for the best mode requirement. See Transco Products, Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc. , 38 F.3d 551, 32 USPQ2d 1077 (Fed. Cir. 1994) The disclosure of the prior-filed application, Application No. 63 /111,927 filed 11/10/2020 fail to provide adequate support or enablement in the manner provided by 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph for claims 3 2-39 of this application. Specifically, the provisional application does not support the breadth of the instant claims, since it does not provide sufficient written description support fo r a method of marking an organism with the comprising a crosslinked porous protein crystal storing a library of unique barcode DNA sequences. Therefore 09/27/2021 (i.e., the filing date of U.S. provisional application 63/248,764) is the earliest possible effective filing date for the purposes of prior art concerning claims 32-39 . Drawings Specific deficiency - Sequences appearing in Fig. 15 and Fig. 21 are not identified by sequence identifiers in accordance with 37 CFR 1.831(c). Sequence identifiers for sequences (i.e., “SEQ ID NO:X” or the like) must appear either in the drawings or in the Brief Description of the Drawings. Required response – Applicant must provide: Amended drawings in accordance with 37 CFR 1.121(d) inserting the required sequence identifiers; AND/OR A substitute specification in compliance with 37 CFR 1.52, 1.121(b)(3), and 1.125 inserting the required sequence identifiers (i.e., “SEQ ID NO:X” or the like) into the Brief Description of the Drawings, consisting of: • A copy of the previously-submitted specification, with deletions shown with strikethrough or brackets and insertions shown with underlining (marked-up version); • A copy of the amended specification without markings (clean version); and • A statement that the substitute specification contains no new matter. The corrected drawings are required in reply to the Office action to avoid abandonment of the application. The requirement for corrected drawings will not be held in abeyance. Claim Interpretation As per MPEP § 2111 and § 2111.01 , during patent examination, the pending claims must be interpreted as broadly as their terms reasonably allow while being consistent with the specification . T he words of a claim must be given their ‘plain meaning’ unless such meaning is inconsistent with the specification , wherein ‘plain meaning’ of a term means the ordinary and customary meaning given to the term by those of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time . The ordinary and customary meaning of a term may be evidenced by a variety of sources, including the words of the claims themselves, the specification, drawings, and prior art. Because applicant has the opportunity to amend the claims during prosecution, giving a claim its broadest reasonable interpretation will reduce the possibility that the claim, once issued, will be interpreted more broadly than is justified. In re Yamamoto , 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984) Below are notes made by the examiner regarding claim interpretation of the most recent set of claims. Applicant is respectfully invited to comment on or dispute any of these statements. Claim 20 is a product claim reciting a “tracking system for organisms” in the preamble and comprising a crosslinked porous protein crystal storing a library of unique barcode DNA sequences. As per MPEP § 2111.02, the determination of whether a preamble limits a claim is made on a case-by-case basis in light of the facts in each case . When read in the context of the entire claim, the preamble of claim 20 reciting being a “tracking system for organisms” is a recitation of intended use of the instant claimed product and a recitation of the intended use of the claimed invention must result in a structural difference between the claimed invention and the prior art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it meets the claim. See MPEP § 2111.02, citing In re Sinex , 309 F.2d 488, 492, 135 USPQ 302, 305 (CCPA 1962) (statement of intended use in an apparatus claim did not distinguish over the prior art apparatus) , and MPEP 2112.01 citing In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709, 15 USPQ 2d 1655, 1658 (Fed. Cir. 1990) stating that “ discovery of an unobvious property and use does not overcome the statutory restraint of section 102 when the claimed composition is known ”. Claims 21-25 do not add anything to the claims that would change this analysis at least because these claims merely further define and describe properties of the synthetic library. Claim 26 recites in the body of the claim that “the organism is an insect”, which at most might limit the size of the crosslinked porous protein crystal storing the synthetic library to some size reasonably accessible to insects. Claims 27-28 recite that the insect is “marked with unique barcode DNA after ingestion of the crosslinked protein crystal” wherein “the insect is a larva, pupa, adult, or any combination thereof”. Here, it should be noted that as per MPEP § 211 5 , “[ i ] nclusion of material or article worked upon by a structure being claimed does not impart patentability to the claims.” In re Young , 75 F.2d 996 , 25 USPQ 69 (CCPA 1935) (as restated in In re Otto , 312 F.2d 937, 136 USPQ 458, 459 (CCPA 1963)), and that t he manner or method in which a product is to be utilized is not germane to the issue of patentability of the product itself. Therefore, for the purposes of applying prior art, the claims are being interpreted as though the marking of at least one insect with the crystal is a recitation of intended use, and therefore not further limiting the crosslinked porous protein crystal storing the synthetic library as per claim 20. Claim 29 recites that “the synthetic library is recovered from the crosslinked porous protein crystal with less than 10% degradation” which is similarly being interpreted as intended use that the synthetic library is capable of being recovered from the crystal with less than 10% degradation under at least one circumstance. Claim 30 recites that “ the synthetic library recovered from the crosslinked porous protein crystal is subjected to PCR, qPCR, ddPCR , rtPCR , next-generation sequencing, or any combination thereof ”, however, it is again noted that the claim is drawn to a product rather than a method, so this recitation of steps to be applied to the product is being interpreted as an intended use of the synthetic library, and if a corresponding prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it meets the claim . Claim 31 recites that “the synthetic library comprises about 10 million to about 20 million reads of the unique barcode DNA”. Because this is a product claim and there is no recited step of sequencing, then the claim limitation is being interpreted again as intended use, and so long as a corresponding prior art structure is capable of being sequenced to yield the recited number of reads , then it will meet the claim . Claim Objections Claim 36 is objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be free from the prior art if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims. Appropriate correction is required. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112(a) – Written Description The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(a): (a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA), first paragraph: The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. Claims 32-3 5 and 37-39 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claims contain subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for pre-AIA the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention. To satisfy the written description requirement, a patent specification must describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention. See, e.g., Moba , B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1319, 66 USPQ2d 1429, 1438 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar , 935 F.2d at 1563, 19 USPQ2d at 1116. As per MPEP 2163.02, t he courts have described the essential question to be addressed in a description requirement issue in a variety of ways. An objective standard for determining compliance with the written description requirement is, "does the description clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that he or she invented what is claimed." In re Gosteli , 872 F.2d 1008, 1012, 10 USPQ2d 1614, 1618 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Under Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar , 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64, 19 USPQ2d 1111, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1991), to satisfy the written description requirement, an applicant must convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention, and that the invention, in that context, is whatever is now claimed. The test for sufficiency of support in a parent application is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon "reasonably conveys to the artisan that the inventor had possession at that time of the later claimed subject matter." Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co., Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1575, 227 USPQ 177, 179 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting In re Kaslow , 707 F.2d 1366, 1375, 217 USPQ 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Whenever the issue arises, the fundamental factual inquiry is whether the specification conveys with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, applicant was in possession of the invention as now claimed. See, e.g., Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar , 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64, 19 USPQ2d 1111, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1991). An applicant shows possession of the claimed invention by describing the claimed invention with all of its limitations using such descriptive means as words, structures, figures, diagrams, and formulas that fully set forth the claimed invention. Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572, 41 USPQ2d 1961, 1966 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Possession may be shown in a variety of ways including description of an actual reduction to practice, or by showing that the invention was "ready for patenting" such as by the disclosure of drawings or structural chemical formulas that show that the invention was complete, or by describing distinguishing identifying characteristics sufficient to show that the applicant was in possession of the claimed invention . See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 68, 119 S.Ct . 304, 312, 48 USPQ2d 1641, 1647 (1998); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d 1559, 1568, 43 USPQ2d 1398, 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206, 18 USPQ2d 1016, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (one must define a compound by "whatever characteristics sufficiently distinguish it"). Finally, MPEP 2163.04 describes the burden on the examiner with regard to the Written Description requirement, stating that i n rejecting a claim, the examiner must set forth express findings of fact which support the lack of written description conclusion. These findings should: (A) Identify the claim limitation(s) at issue; and (B) Establish a prima facie case by providing reasons why a person skilled in the art at the time the application was filed would not have recognized that the inventor was in possession of the invention as claimed in view of the disclosure of the application as filed. In the present case, the claim limitation at issue is the breadth of the genus “organism” in the claims. C laims 32-3 3 and 37-39 are generic to any species of “organism”, while claims 34-35 are limited to “insects” and claim 36 is limited to “mosquitos”. Note that i n para [0022] of the present specification, the disclosure states “[ i ]n some embodiments, tracking systems herein may be used in an organism wherein the organism may be algae, bacteria, plants, insects, fish, a mphibians, reptiles, birds, and/or mammals. ” Despite this recitation of organisms contemplated by Applicant, the mere listing of possibilities is not always sufficient to show adequate w ritten description support to show possession thereof as of the effective filing date , particularly when the subject matter is new and not conventional . As discussed in MPEP § 2163, Applicant may show possession in a number of ways, including an actual reduction to practice . In the present case, Applicant has clearly shown an actual reduction to practice for the single species of mosquitos as the organism to be marked and tracked via unique DNA barcode recovery and detection. For example, the figures and data from examples reveal that feeding of DNA-laden porous protein crystals to mosquitos does not negatively affect larval development or growth and that DNA barcodes can be recovered and detected at a later time, such as at maturation into adulthood. Thus, it has been shown, at least for mosquitos (e.g., claim 36 ) , that Applicant had possession and that the invention will work for its intended purpose . No other actual reduction to practice was presented for any species other than mosquitos. Possession of the genus as claimed may also be evidenced by a showing that the invention was "ready for patenting" such as by the disclosure of drawings or data showing that the invention was complete, or by describing distinguishing identifying characteristics sufficient to show that the A pplicant was in possession of the claimed invention . However, no evidence beyond mere contemplation has been presented in the disclosure as originally filed to show that the invention was “ready for patenting” for any other organism. As per MPEP § 2163, t he Federal Circuit has explained that a specification cannot always support expansive claim language and satisfy the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 112 "merely by clearly describing one embodiment of the thing claimed" , citing LizardTech v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc. , 424 F.3d 1336, 1346, 76 USPQ2d 1731, 1733 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The issue is whether a person skilled in the art would understand inventor to have invented, and been in possession of, the invention as broadly claimed. The same MPEP section explains that a patentee of a biotechnological invention cannot necessarily claim a genus after only describing a limited number of species because there may be unpredictability in the results obtained from species other than those specifically enumerated . Also discussed therein is that s atisfactory disclosure of a "representative number" depends on whether one of skill in the art would recognize that the inventor was in possession of the necessary common attributes or features possessed by the members of the genus in view of the species disclosed. For inventions in an unpredictable art, adequate written description of a genus which embraces widely variant species cannot be achieved by disclosing only one species within the genus. See, e.g., Eli Lilly , 119 F.3d at 1568, 43 USPQ2d at 1406. Instead, the disclosure must adequately reflect the structural diversity of the claimed genus, either through the disclosure of sufficient species that are "representative of the full variety or scope of the genus," or by the establishment of "a reasonable structure-function correlation." Such correlations may be established "by the inventor as described in the specification," or they may be "known in the art at the time of the filing date." See AbbVie , 759 F.3d at 1300-01, 111 USPQ2d 1780, 1790-91 (Fed. Cir. 2014) . In the present case, a n obvious source of unpredictability of the invention is the survival of sufficient amounts of DNA barcode following ingestion such to allow for later recovery and detection. While the specification (e.g., as per para [00152] and/or Fig. 12) shows that for mosquitos, microcrystals ingested during larval development could persist into adulthood, no mention was made for any other species of organism. Given the harsh conditions of some digestive tracts, such as in mammals, it would not have been apparent that DNA barcode could have survived long enough, or in sufficient quantities, to be subsequently recovered and detected. For example, studies by Netherwood et al. ( Nat. Biotech. , 2004, 22(2):204-209) on DNA fed to humans “ did not survive passage through the intact gastrointestinal tract of human subjects ” (e.g., as per the Abstract). In conclusion, Applicant’s disclosure showing possession of the species of mosquitos for the claimed organism is not sufficient to show possession of the broader species/genera as claimed in claims 32-3 5 and 37-39 . Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112 (b) -- Indefiniteness The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b): (B) CONCLUSION.— The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA), second paragraph: The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention. Claim s 2 7 -31 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor, or for pre-AIA the applicant regards as the invention. Claims 27-31 each are drawn to a product, but include method steps in the claim, as detailed in the Claim Interpretation section supra . As per MPEP § 2173.05(p), “[a] single claim which claims both an apparatus and the method steps of using the apparatus is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph ” . See In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litigation , 639 F.3d 1303, 1318, 97 USPQ2d 1737, 1748-49 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Claim 30 recites the limitation "the synthetic library recovered from the crosslinked porous protein crystal". There is insufficient antecedent basis for this limitation in the claim. As per MPEP 2173 : It is of utmost importance that patents issue with definite claims that clearly and precisely inform persons skilled in the art of the boundaries of protected subject matter. Therefore, claims that do not meet this standard must be rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112 , second paragraph as indefinite. Further, as per MPEP 2173 .02: If the language of the claim is such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could not interpret the metes and bounds of the claim so as to understand how to avoid infringement, a rejection of the claim under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, would be appropriate. As currently written, the metes and bounds of the rejected claims are unascertainable for the reasons set forth above, thus the above claim(s) and all dependent claims are rejected under 35 USC 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA), second paragraph. Claim Rejections – 35 U.S.C. 102 In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status. The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action: A person shall be entitled to a patent unless – (a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention. (a)(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention. Snow et al. Claims 30-21 and 26-31 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102( a ) (1) and 102(a)(2) as being anticipated by Snow et al. (U.S. PGPub 2017/0362282 A1). Regarding claim 20 , Snow recites a system, the tracking system comprising a synthetic library encoded with unique barcode DNA sequences (e.g., the DNA sequence as a guest molecule as per para [0010], [0020], [0105], and/or the claims of Snow) , and a crosslinked porous protein crystal (e.g., as per para [0014], [0022[, [0023[, [0132]-[0149], and/or the Examples) , wherein the synthetic library is stored in the crosslinked porous protein crystal. The recitation of “ a tracking system for organisms ” of claim 20 is a recitation of intended use of the instant claimed crosslinked porous protein crystal with stored synthetic library and a recitation of the intended use of the claimed invention must result in a structural difference between the claimed invention and the prior art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it meets the claim. See also MPEP § 2111.02, citing In re Sinex , 309 F.2d 488, 492, 135 USPQ 302, 305 (CCPA 1962) (statement of intended use in an apparatus claim did not distinguish over the prior art apparatus) , and MPEP § 2112.01 citing In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709, 15 USPQ 2d 1655, 1658 (Fed. Cir. 1990) stating that “ discovery of an unobvious property and use does not overcome the statutory restraint of section 102 when the claimed composition is known ”. Regarding claim 21 , Snow recites the above system, wherein the synthetic library comprises a synthetic next-generation sequencing (NGS) library , since DNAs, including those taught by Snow, are reasonably able to be sequenced by next-generation sequencing. Regarding claims 26-31 , as detailed in the Claim Interpretation section, supra , the additional limitations recited in each of these claims is being interpreted as recitations of intended use, specifically: wherein the organism is an insect ( claim 26 ) wherein at least one insect is marked with unique barcode DNA after ingestion of the crosslinked porous protein crystal comprising the synthetic library ( claim 27 ) wherein the crosslinked porous protein crystal comprising the synthetic library is ingested by the at least one insect when the insect is a larva, pupa, adult, or any combination thereof ( claim 28 ) wherein the synthetic library is recovered from the crosslinked porous protein crystal with less than 10% degradation ( claim 29 ) wherein the synthetic library recovered from the crosslinked porous protein crystal is subjected to PCR, qPCR, ddPCR , rtPCR , next-generation sequencing, or any combination thereof to determine the unique barcode DNA for the organism ( claim 30 ) wherein the synthetic library comprises about 10 million to about 20 million reads of the unique barcode DNA ( claim 31 ) In the present case, the product of Snow, as detailed herein, is reasonably able to perform the intended uses as recited in these claims and therefore anticipates the claims. Hartj e Claims 30-21 and 26-31 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102( a ) (1) as being anticipated by Hartj e ( “Characterizing Porous Protein Crystal Materials for Applications in Nanomedicine and Nanobiotechnology”, Dissertation, Colorado State University, Summer 2018). Regarding claim 20 , Hartje recites a system, the tracking system comprising a synthetic library encoded with unique barcode DNA sequences (e.g., the DNA sequence as a guest molecule , which may be used for “ barcoding ” , as per 5.2.1. DNA Guest Molecule Loading for Information Storage section on pp. 90-91 ) , and a crosslinked porous protein crystal (e.g., as per the 1.3 Protein Crystals section on pp. 4-24 ) , wherein the synthetic library is stored in the crosslinked porous protein crystal. The recitation of “ a tracking system for organisms ” of claim 20 is a recitation of intended use of the instant claimed crosslinked porous protein crystal with stored synthetic library and a recitation of the intended use of the claimed invention must result in a structural difference between the claimed invention and the prior art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it meets the claim. See also MPEP § 2111.02, citing In re Sinex , 309 F.2d 488, 492, 135 USPQ 302, 305 (CCPA 1962) (statement of intended use in an apparatus claim did not distinguish over the prior art apparatus) , and MPEP § 2112.01 citing In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709, 15 USPQ 2d 1655, 1658 (Fed. Cir. 1990) stating that “ discovery of an unobvious property and use does not overcome the statutory restraint of section 102 when the claimed composition is known ”. Regarding claim 21 , Hartje recites the above system, wherein the synthetic library comprises a synthetic next-generation sequencing (NGS) library , since DNAs, including those taught by Snow, are reasonably able to be sequenced by next-generation sequencing. Regarding claims 26-31 , as detailed in the Claim Interpretation section, supra , the additional limitations recited in each of these claims is being interpreted as recitations of intended use, specifically: wherein the organism is an insect ( claim 26 ) wherein at least one insect is marked with unique barcode DNA after ingestion of the crosslinked porous protein crystal comprising the synthetic library ( claim 27 ) wherein the crosslinked porous protein crystal comprising the synthetic library is ingested by the at least one insect when the insect is a larva, pupa, adult, or any combination thereof ( claim 28 ) wherein the synthetic library is recovered from the crosslinked porous protein crystal with less than 10% degradation ( claim 29 ) wherein the synthetic library recovered from the crosslinked porous protein crystal is subjected to PCR, qPCR, ddPCR , rtPCR , next- generation sequencing, or any combination thereof to determine the unique barcode DNA for the organism ( claim 30 ) wherein the synthetic library comprises about 10 million to about 20 million reads of the unique barcode DNA ( claim 31 ) In the present case, the product of Hartje , as detailed herein, is reasonably able to perform the intended uses as recited in these claims and therefore anticipates the claims. Claim Rejections – 35 U.S.C. 103 In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status. This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made. The factual inquiries set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co. , 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966), that are applied for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows: 1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art. 2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue. 3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. 4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness . This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention. Snow et al. and Soumillon et al. Claims 20-31 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Snow et al. (U.S. PGPub 2017/0362282 A1) in view of Soumillon et al. (U.S. PGPub 2019/0345488 A1) . Snow is relied on as above, however, it is noted that the reference is silent to the limitation wherein the synthetic library comprises at least one modular barcode library , as set forth in claim 22 , wherein the at least one modular barcode library comprises at least four oligonucleotide blocks, wherein an oligonucleotide block comprises a DNA overhang complementary to an adjacent oligonucleotide block , as set forth in claim 23 , wherein the at least one modular DNA barcode comprises about 5 base pairs (bp) to about 300 bp , as set forth in claim 24 , and wherein the at least one modular barcode library comprises about 50 to about 500 unique barcode sequences , as set forth in claim 25 . Soumillon discloses synthetic, modular barcode libraries made from unique barcode DNA sequences (e.g., “Barcode Sequences” as per para [0127] -[ 0136]), wherein the modular units are 6-16 nucleotides in length and may partially overlap (e.g., as per [0128]) selected from a set of 100 or more sequences (e.g., as per para [132]). It would have been prima facie obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art prior to the effective filing date of the application to utilize the cassetable barcode sequences as per Soumillon for the synthetic DNA library as per Snow. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to do so since Soumillon discloses that combinations thereof may lead to exceedingly large number of possible combinations for labeling and subsequently identifying items. Furthermore, i n accordance with MPEP 2141 citing KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. (KSR) , 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385,1395 (2007), "[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results ”, and as per MPEP 2143(I)(A), t he rationale to support a conclusion that the claim would have been obvious is that all the claimed elements were known in the prior art and one skilled in the art could have combined the elements as claimed by known methods with no change in their respective functions, and the combination yielded nothing more than predictable results to one of ordinary skill in the art. One of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success as of the application’s effective filing date in combining the teachings of the prior art references to arrive at the invention as presently claimed since the ability to form and combine said cassetable sequences requires minimal molecule biology skills and can reasonably use commercially available oligos. Double Patenting The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg , 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman , 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi , 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum , 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel , 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); and In re Thorington , 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969). A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on a nonstatutory double patenting ground provided the conflicting application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with this application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. Effective January 1, 1994, a registered attorney or agent of record may sign a terminal disclaimer. A terminal disclaimer signed by the assignee must fully comply with 37 CFR 3.73(b). U.S. 10,590,176 B2 Claim s 21- 3 0 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting a s being unpatentable over claim s 1 and 10 of U.S. Patent No. 10,590,176 B2 . Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the rejected claims of the present invention would be anticipated and/or rendered obvious by the subject matter in the claims of the reference patent. Relevant Prior Art The following prior art is noted: Faiman et al. ( bioRxiv 2020.08.23.262741; doi:10.1101/2020.08.23.262741 , available Aug. 23, 2020) Hamer et al. ( PLoS Negl Trop Dis , 8(3): e2768 , 2014, doi:10.1371/journal.pntd .0002768 ) Faiman discloses methods of mark-release-recapture by marking mosquitos via spraying with a solution of fluorescen t dye and DNA barcodes , releasing, then collecting samples at a later time for PCR-based DNA analysis. The reference notes “DNA and fluorescence had 100% retention up to 3 weeks (longest time point tested) with high intensity, indicating marks would persist longer”, as per p. 2. The reference does not discuss feeding or ingestion of markers to the mosquitos. Hamer discloses methods of mark-release-recapture by marking mosquitos via feeding stable isotopes (e.g., 15 N-potasium nitrate) , releasing, then collecting sample at a later time for mass spectrometry-based analysis. Hamer was able to detect adult females at up to 3 km distances from the labeling point. Hartje discloses crosslinked porous protein crystals with DNA biomacromolecules guest molecules within their interior void spaces. The reference reports that they “ will additionally evaluate the resulting host-guest crystals for information storage and barcoding applications—assessing the propensity of the host crystals to protect guest DNA under challenging conditions (i.e. from degradation in the environment)”, as per pp. 90-91 in the 5.2 FUTURE PROSPECTIVE section. Despite all of the elements being recited in the prior art, as discussed herein, there would have been no motivation to combine the elements to arrive at the method as presently claimed in claims 32-39 , absent the use of impermissible hindsight reasoning. Nor would there have been a reasonable expectation of success that the DNA barcodes in the microcrystals ingested during larval development w ould have persist ed into adulthood, as observed in the present invention. Conclusion No claims are allowed. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to FILLIN "Examiner name" \* MERGEFORMAT JEREMY FLINDERS whose telephone number is FILLIN "Phone number" \* MERGEFORMAT (571)270-1022 . The examiner can normally be reached FILLIN "Work Schedule?" \* MERGEFORMAT M-F 10-6:00 EST . Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. 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For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /JEREMY C FLINDERS/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 16 84