DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s arguments and amendments, see pp. 2-9 of the response, filed January 6, 2026, with respect to the rejection(s) of claim(s) 1-16, 20, 23, and 25-26 under § 102 have been fully considered but are not persuasive. Please see the rejection for details.
Regarding claim 1, Applicant alleges that “the relay UE 100b directly sends a key request to the AUSF 400” without traversing through the recited “target network element.” Remarks at 4. This allegation is based on the unbroken arrow of Fig. 7b depicted in step 8 (reproduced below).
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Fig. 7B of US20230300613A1
This is allegation does not consider the rest of the publication. For example, Fig. 2 indicates that all communications from the Relay UE 100b traverse the NG-RAN and AMF/UPF.
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Fig. 2 of US20230300613A1
This interpretation is further supported by the newly-cited, background reference to 3GPP TS 33.503 V17.0.1 (p. 34/54 “5. The AMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall select an AUSF based on the SUCI or 5GPRUK ID . . . ”).
Therefore, RAJENDRAN anticipates this clause of the claim.
Regarding the clause “generating, by the AUSF, a first random number . . .” Applicant did not properly file an attestation of the translation at the time the application was filed, but is now attempting to overcome the teachings published in Rajendran by relying on the “certified copy of the foreign priority application” to overcome the rejection. The Office Action stated that this would be improper at the outset. See Non-final Office Action at 2.
Although Applicant has now provided the proper attestation of the translation, Applicant is required to file an RCE in order to have the effective filing date based on the non-English priority documents considered.
Regardless, Rajendran taught, “generating, by the AUSF, a first random number . . . ” before the effective filing date of this application (See e.g., [0098] of the provided Indian provisional application).
Therefore, the rejection is maintained.
Claim Interpretation
Claims 2, 3, 7, 8, 11, 12, and claims dependent thereof, recite contingent limitations (i.e., “in case that”) and are method claims. Therefore, these claims do “not include steps that are not required to be performed because the condition(s) precedent are not met.” See MPEP § 2111.04(II). In some instances, prior art may address these limitations to promote compact prosecution.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1-16, 20, 23, and 25-26 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by U.S. Publication No. 2023/0300613 (hereinafter “Rajendran”).
Regarding claim 1, Rajendran teaches: A PC5 root key processing method, comprising: receiving, at an authentication server function (AUSF) (400) of a remote terminal, a relay key request message ([0103] In step 8, on receiving the direct communication request, the UE-to-Network relay sends a key request message including the REAR ID obtained from AUSF (400), Relay Service Code or ServiceID, 5G-GUTI of the Remote UE (100a) and Message Authentication Code MAC.sub.REAR received from the remote UE (100a).) transmitted by a relay terminal (100b) through a target network element (e.g., 500, 600) of the relay terminal; obtaining, by the AUSF, a PC5 root key of the remote terminal ([0108] In step 11, the AUSF (400) sends the K.sub.NR_ProSe freshness parameter in the key response message to the UE-to-Network relay.), according to the relay key request message; generating, by the AUSF, a first random number ([0107] K.sub.NR_ProSe freshness parameter can be any nonce or counter or random number.), and generating a relay key for secure communication between the relay terminal and the remote terminal according to the first random number and the PC5 root key ([0078] Further, the secure communication controller (410) is configured to generate a second ProSe key for a remote access via the relay based on the REAR key, the 5G-GUTI, the freshness parameter, the relay service code and the service identifier. The second ProSe key is used as a root key for ProSe UE-to-network relay communication.); and transmitting, by the AUSF, a relay key response message to the relay terminal through the target network element of the relay terminal; wherein the relay key response message includes: the relay key and the first random number ([0150] In step 11, the AUSF (400) sends the K.sub.NR_ProSe freshness parameter in the key response message to the UE-to-Network relay.).
Regarding claim 2, Rajendran teaches: wherein in case that the relay key request message includes an identifier of the PC5 root key, the obtaining, by the AUSF, a PC5 root key of the remote terminal, according to the relay key request message, includes: transmitting, by the AUSF, a first request message to a unified data management (UDM) ([0159] In step 2, in order to authorize the UE requesting for keys for remote access, the AUSF (400) sends Nudm_UEAuthentication request to the UDM (800) and retrieves the UE details or subscription data. In this message, the AUSF (400) includes ProSe Remote access indication and 5G-GUTI or SUCI.); wherein the first request message includes: a subscription permanent identifier (SUPI) of the remote terminal and the identifier of the PC5 root key ([0074] The key request message includes a ProSe remote access indication and at least one of a 5G-GUTI and a SUCI.); receiving, by the AUSF, a first response message transmitted by the UDM; wherein the first response message includes: the PC5 root key corresponding to the identifier of the PC5 root key ([0094] In step 3, on receiving the Nudm_UEAuthentication request, the UDM (800) verifies the 5G-GUTI or SUCI and sends the corresponding SUPI and the REAR ID bound to SUPI, to the AUSF (400) in a Nudm_UEAuthentication response message. The REAR ID and REAR Key ID are two different identifiers. The REAR ID is an identifier which is associated or bound to the SUPI of the UEs and is stored in the UDM (800) in a UE subscription data which needs remote access. The REAR IDs are unique for all UEs. The REAR Key ID is a 128-bit key stream obtained when deriving the REAR Key, from which MSB of 256 bits are taken as REAR key and the remaining bits are considered as the REAR Key ID (which can be used for identifying the REAR Keys). In an embodiment, the format of the REAR ID can be used to identify the AUSF instance. The format of the REAR ID can be as follows: [0095] A. REAR ID=<Routing Indicator>|<Home network Identifier>; or [0096] B. REAR ID=<NF Instance ID>∥<Home network Identifier>, where NF Instance ID represents an identifier, provided by the NF service provider, in this case AUSF (400), that should be globally unique inside the PLMN. The format of the NF Instance ID can be as Universally Unique Identifier (UUID).).
Regarding claim 3, Rajendran teaches: wherein in case that the relay key request message does not include an identifier of the PC5 root key, or, the AUSF determines to update the PC5 root key of the remote terminal, the obtaining, by the AUSF, a PC5 root key of the remote terminal, according to the relay key request message, includes: generating, by the AUSF, the PC5 root key and an identifier of the PC5 root key, based on an AUSF key of the remote terminal; wherein the relay key response message further includes the identifier of the PC5root key ([0094] In step 3, on receiving the Nudm_UEAuthentication request, the UDM (800) verifies the 5G-GUTI or SUCI and sends the corresponding SUPI and the REAR ID bound to SUPI, to the AUSF (400) in a Nudm_UEAuthentication response message. The REAR ID and REAR Key ID are two different identifiers. The REAR ID is an identifier which is associated or bound to the SUPI of the UEs and is stored in the UDM (800) in a UE subscription data which needs remote access. The REAR IDs are unique for all UEs. The REAR Key ID is a 128-bit key stream obtained when deriving the REAR Key, from which MSB of 256 bits are taken as REAR key and the remaining bits are considered as the REAR Key ID (which can be used for identifying the REAR Keys). In an embodiment, the format of the REAR ID can be used to identify the AUSF instance. The format of the REAR ID can be as follows: [0095] A. REAR ID=<Routing Indicator>|<Home network Identifier>; or [0096] B. REAR ID=<NF Instance ID>∥<Home network Identifier>, where NF Instance ID represents an identifier, provided by the NF service provider, in this case AUSF (400), that should be globally unique inside the PLMN. The format of the NF Instance ID can be as Universally Unique Identifier (UUID).).
Regarding claim 4, Rajendran teaches: wherein after generating, by the AUSF, the PC5 root key and an identifier of the PC5 root key, based on an AUSF key of the remote terminal, the method further includes: transmitting, by the AUSF, the PC5 root key and the identifier of the PC5 root key to a unified data management (UDM) of the remote terminal for storage by the UDM of the remote terminal ([0093] In step 2, in order to authorize the UE requesting for keys for remote access, the AUSF (400) sends a Nudm_UEAuthentication request to the UDM (800) and retrieves the UE details or subscription data. In this message, the AUSF (400) includes ProSe Remote access indication and 5G-GUTI or SUCI.).
Regarding claim 5, Rajendran teaches: wherein the generating, by the AUSF, the PC5 root key and an identifier of the PC5 root key, based on an AUSF key of the remote terminal, includes: generating, by the AUSF, a second random number ([0037] In an embodiment, the freshness parameter comprises at least one of a nonce, a counter and a random number.), and generating the PC5 root key and the identifier of the PC5 root key according to the second random number and the AUSF key of the remote terminal ([0077] Further, the secure communication controller (410) is configured to acquire the REAR key, a freshness parameter, one of a 5G-GUTI and a SUPI, and at least one of a relay service code and a service identifier. In an embodiment, the freshness parameter comprises a nonce, a counter and a random number. [0078] Further, the secure communication controller (410) is configured to generate a second ProSe key for a remote access via the relay based on the REAR key, the 5G-GUTI, the freshness parameter, the relay service code and the service identifier. The second ProSe key is used as a root key for ProSe UE-to-network relay communication. Further, the secure communication controller (410) is configured to send the freshness parameter in a key response message to a relay UE (100 b) in response to the AUSF entity (400) receives a key request message from the relay UE (100 b). In an embodiment, the AUSF entity (400) sends the key response message to the remote UE (100 a) in response to receiving a key request message from the remote UE (100 a) through an Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) entity (500).); or, generating, by the AUSF, a second random number, and generating the PC5 root key and the identifier of the PC5 root key according to the second random number, the AUSF key of the remote terminal and a third random number generated by the remote terminal.
Regarding claim 6, Rajendran teaches: wherein the method further includes: generating a message authentication code (MAC) for integrity protection of PC5 root key generation information, by using the PC5 root key or a derived key of the PC5 root key; wherein the relay key response message further includes: the message authentication code; or, the relay key response message further includes: the message authentication code and a parameter required for generating the message authentication code ([0022] B. The transmission of configuration data between the ProSe Function and the ProSe-enabled UE shall be integrity protected; See also, 5G Security White Paper – Verizon p. 18/35 “Furthermore, traffic has integrity, which means it is protected by Message Authentication Code (MAC) using derived keys so that recipients know that it has not been altered or tampered with.”).
Regarding claim 7, Rajendran teaches: wherein in case that the relay key request message includes the identifier of the PC5 rootkey, before receiving, at an authentication server function (AUSF) of a remote terminal, a relay key request message transmitted by a relay terminal through a target network element of the relay terminal, the method further includes: receiving, by the AUSF, a PC5 root key request message transmitted by the remote terminal through a network element which the remote terminal accesses; performing, by the AUSF, an authorization check on the remote terminal according to the PC5 root key request message; in case of determining that the remote terminal is an authorized remote terminal, generating, by the AUSF, a PC5 root key and an identifier of the PC5 root key based on an AUSF key of the remote terminal; transmitting, by the AUSF, a PC5rootkey response message to the remote terminal through the network element which the remote terminal accesses; wherein the PC5 root key response message includes the PC5 root key generation information, and the PC5rootkey generation information includes a parameter required for generating the PC5 root key and the identifier of the PC5 root key ([0017] In Long Term Evolution (LTE) ProSe, the ProSe Key Management Function supports the key derivation required to support the UE-to-network relay communication, whereas in the 5GS, the existing entity (for example, the Authentication Server Function (AUSF)) can support key derivation, authentication and authorization of the remote UE and UE-to-Network relay. [0018] Apart from that there is a need to authenticate and authorize the UE to be a 5G UE-to-Network Relay and to authenticate and authorize a Remote UE to access 5GC via a 5G UE-to-Network Relay.).
Regarding claim 8, Rajendran teaches: wherein the obtaining, by the AUSF, a PC5 root key of the remote terminal, according to the relay key request message, includes: performing, by the AUSF, an authorization check on the remote terminal according to the relay key request message ([0017] for example, the Authentication Server Function (AUSF)) can support key derivation, authentication and authorization of the remote UE and UE-to-Network relay.); in case of determining that the remote terminal is an authorized remote terminal, obtaining, by the AUSF, the PC5 root key of the remote terminal.
Regarding claim 9, Rajendran teaches: wherein the relay key request message includes: a subscription permanent identifier (SUPI) of the remote terminal (Further, the method includes acquiring one of the SUPI of the remote UE), or a subscription concealed identifier (SUCI) of the remote terminal ([0046] The key request message includes a ProSe remote access indication and at least one of a 5G-GUTI and a SUCI.).
Regarding claim 10, Rajendran teaches: transmitting, by a remote terminal (100a), a direct communication key request message to a relay terminal ([0123] In step 7, after the discovery of the UE-to-Network relay, the remote UE (100 a) sends the direct communication request to the discovered relay for establishing secure PC5 unicast link. The message can include the REAR ID obtained from AUSF (400), Relay Service Code or ServiceID, 5G-GUTI of the remote UE (100 a) and Message Authentication Code MACREAR.); receiving, by the remote terminal, a direct communication key response message fed back by the relay terminal ([0130] In step 12, the UE-to-Network relay sends the received KNR_ProSe freshness parameter to the remote UE (100 a) in direct security mode command message.); wherein the direct communication key response message includes a first random number ([0130] KNR_ProSe freshness parameter) used by an AUSF of the remote terminal to generate a relay key; and generating, by the remote terminal, the relay key for secure communication between the relay terminal and the remote terminal, according to the first random number and the PC5rootkey ([0131] In step 13, the remote UE (100 a) generates the ProSe key to be used for remote access via the relay same as the AUSF (400). The input to the KDF for generating ProSe key is as follows:).
Regarding claim 11, Rajendran teaches: wherein in case that the remote terminal stores the PC5root key and an identifier of the PC5root key, the direct communication key request message includes the identifier of the PC5 root key (([0022] E. The configuration data shall be stored in the UE in a protected way to prevent modification. F. Some configuration data may require to be stored in the UE in a protected way to prevent eavesdropping.); [0123] The message can include the REAR ID obtained from AUSF (400), Relay Service Code or ServiceID, 5G-GUTI of the remote UE (100 a) and Message Authentication Code MACREAR.).
Regarding claim 12, Rajendran teaches: wherein in case that the remote terminal does not store the PC5rootkey and an identifier of the PC5rootkey, the direct communication key response message further includes PC5rootkey generation information; the PC5 root key generation information includes a parameter required for generating the PC5 root key ([0108] In step 11, the AUSF (400) sends the KNR_ProSe freshness parameter in the key response message to the UE-to-Network relay.) and the identifier of the PC5 root key ([0035] Further, the method includes sending, by the AUSF entity, a key response message to a remote UE for establishing secure communication, where the key response message includes the generated REAR key, the REAR ID and at least one of a relay UE ID and a temporary ID of a relay.); the method further includes: generating, by the remote terminal, the PC5rootkey, according to an AUSF key of the remote terminal and the parameter required for generating the PC5root key ([0110] In step 13, the remote UE (100 a) generates the ProSe key to be used for Remote access via Relay same as AUSF (400). The input to the KDF for generating ProSe key is as follows:).
Regarding claim 13, Rajendran teaches: wherein the parameter required for generating the PC5rootkey includes: a second random number used by the AUSF to generate the PC5rootkey; the generating, by the remote terminal, the PC5 root key, according to an AUSF key of the remote terminal and the parameter required for generating the PC5 root key, includes: generating the PC5rootkey according to the AUSF key of the remote terminal and the second random number ([0037] In an embodiment, the freshness parameter comprises at least one of a nonce, a counter and a random number.); or, generating the PC5 root key according to the AUSF key of the remote terminal, the second random number and a third random number generated by the remote terminal ([0110] In step 13, the remote UE (100 a) generates the ProSe key to be used for Remote access via Relay same as AUSF (400). The input to the KDF for generating ProSe key is as follows: A. KNR_ProSe or KD or KNRP=KDF (REAR key, 5G-GUTI, Relay Service Code or ServiceID, KNR_ProSe freshness parameter, other possible parameters).).
Regarding claim 14, Rajendran teaches: wherein the relay key response message further includes a message authentication code (MAC) ([0022] B. The transmission of configuration data between the ProSe Function and the ProSe-enabled UE shall be integrity protected; See also, 5G Security White Paper – Verizon p. 18/35 “Furthermore, traffic has integrity, which means it is protected by Message Authentication Code (MAC) using derived keys so that recipients know that it has not been altered or tampered with.”), or, the relay key response message further includes: the message authentication code and a parameter required for generating the message authentication code; the message authentication code is used for integrity protection of the PC5rootkey generation information.
Regarding claim 15, Rajendran teaches: in in case that the remote terminal stores the PC5root key and an identifier of the PC5 root key, before transmitting, by a remote terminal, a direct communication key request message to a relay terminal ([0022] E. The configuration data shall be stored in the UE in a protected way to prevent modification. F. Some configuration data may require to be stored in the UE in a protected way to prevent eavesdropping.), the method further includes: transmitting, by the remote terminal, a PC5rootkey request message, to an AUSF of the remote terminal, through a network element which the remote terminal accesses; receiving, by the remote terminal, a PC5 root key response message fed back by the AUSF through the network element which the remote terminal accesses; wherein the PC5rootkey response message includes PC5rootkey generation information, and the PC5root key generation information includes a parameter required for generating the PC5 root key and the identifier of the PC5 root key; generating, by the remote terminal, the PC5 root key according to the AUSF key of the remote terminal and the parameter required for generating the PC5rootkey ([0017] In Long Term Evolution (LTE) ProSe, the ProSe Key Management Function supports the key derivation required to support the UE-to-network relay communication, whereas in the 5GS, the existing entity (for example, the Authentication Server Function (AUSF)) can support key derivation, authentication and authorization of the remote UE and UE-to-Network relay. [0018] Apart from that there is a need to authenticate and authorize the UE to be a 5G UE-to-Network Relay and to authenticate and authorize a Remote UE to access 5GC via a 5G UE-to-Network Relay.).
Regarding claim 16, Rajendran teaches: wherein the direct communication key request message includes SUCI of the remote terminal, or a globally unique temporary UE identity (GUTI) of the remote terminal ([0102] In step 7, after the discovery of the UE-to-Network relay, the remote UE (100 a) sends the direct communication request to the discovered relay for establishing secure PC5 unicast link. The message can include the REAR ID obtained from AUSF (400), Relay Service Code or ServiceID, 5G-GUTI of the Remote UE (100 a), Message Authentication Code MACREAR and other possible parameters.).
Regarding claim 20, Rajendran teaches: An authentication server function (AUSF), comprising: a memory, a transceiver and a processor; wherein the memory is used to store a computer program, the transceiver is used to transmit and receive data under the control of the processor, and the processor is used to read the computer program in the memory and perform the following operations: receiving a relay key request message ([0103] In step 8, on receiving the direct communication request, the UE-to-Network relay sends a key request message including the REAR ID obtained from AUSF (400), Relay Service Code or ServiceID, 5G-GUTI of the Remote UE (100a) and Message Authentication Code MAC.sub.REAR received from the remote UE (100a).) transmitted by a relay terminal (100b) through a target network element (e.g., 500, 600) of the relay terminal; obtaining a PC5 root key of the remote terminal ([0108] In step 11, the AUSF (400) sends the K.sub.NR_ProSe freshness parameter in the key response message to the UE-to-Network relay.), according to the relay key request message; generating, by the AUSF, a first random number ([0107] K.sub.NR_ProSe freshness parameter can be any nonce or counter or random number.), and generating a relay key for secure communication between the relay terminal and the remote terminal according to the first random number and the PC5 root key ([0078] Further, the secure communication controller (410) is configured to generate a second ProSe key for a remote access via the relay based on the REAR key, the 5G-GUTI, the freshness parameter, the relay service code and the service identifier. The second ProSe key is used as a root key for ProSe UE-to-network relay communication.); and transmitting, by the AUSF, a relay key response message to the relay terminal through the target network element of the relay terminal; wherein the relay key response message includes: the relay key and the first random number ([0150] In step 11, the AUSF (400) sends the K.sub.NR_ProSe freshness parameter in the key response message to the UE-to-Network relay.).
Regarding claim 23, Rajendran teaches: A remote terminal, comprising: a memory, a transceiver and a processor; wherein the memory is used to store a computer program, the transceiver is used to transmit and receive data under the control of the processor, and the processor is used to read the computer program in the memory and perform the following operations: transmitting a direct communication key request message to a relay terminal ([0123] In step 7, after the discovery of the UE-to-Network relay, the remote UE (100 a) sends the direct communication request to the discovered relay for establishing secure PC5 unicast link. The message can include the REAR ID obtained from AUSF (400), Relay Service Code or ServiceID, 5G-GUTI of the remote UE (100 a) and Message Authentication Code MACREAR.); receiving a direct communication key response message fed back by the relay terminal ([0130] In step 12, the UE-to-Network relay sends the received KNR_ProSe freshness parameter to the remote UE (100 a) in direct security mode command message.); wherein the direct communication key response message includes a first random number ([0130] KNR_ProSe freshness parameter) used by an AUSF of the remote terminal to generate a relay key; and generating the relay key for secure communication between the relay terminal and the remote terminal, according to the first random number and the PC5rootkey ([0131] In step 13, the remote UE (100 a) generates the ProSe key to be used for remote access via the relay same as the AUSF (400). The input to the KDF for generating ProSe key is as follows:).
Regarding claim 25, wherein the relay key request message includes: a subscription permanent identifier (SUPI) of the remote terminal, or a subscription concealed identifier (SUCI) of the remote terminal ([0074] The key request message includes a ProSe remote access indication and at least one of a 5G-GUTI and a SUCI.).
Regarding claim 26, wherein the direct communication key request message includes SUCI of the remote terminal, or a globally unique temporary UE identity (GUTI) of the remote terminal ([0102] In step 7, after the discovery of the UE-to-Network relay, the remote UE (100 a) sends the direct communication request to the discovered relay for establishing secure PC5 unicast link. The message can include the REAR ID obtained from AUSF (400), Relay Service Code or ServiceID, 5G-GUTI of the Remote UE (100 a), Message Authentication Code MACREAR and other possible parameters.).
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure.
U.S. Publication No. 2023/0370839 (Wifvesson) key management for UE-to-network relay access
U.S. Publication No. 2020/0059292 (Kim) method by which relay UE having connection with remote UE connects network in wireless communication system and apparatus therefor
U.S. Publication No. 2023/0354037 (Rohini) methods and systems for identifying AUSF and accessing related keys in 5G ProSe
Non-patent literature entitled, “5G Security White Paper” (Verizon) [retrieved 10-01-2025] <https://www.verizon.com/business/resources/whitepapers/first-principles-for-securing-5g/>
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
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/JAB/ Examiner, Art Unit 2643
/JINSONG HU/ Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2643