DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Response to Amendment
Applicant's arguments and remarks filed on 02/25/2025 have been fully considered.
Claims 1 and 10-13 have been amended.
Applicant's amendments overcome the objections to the drawings.
Applicant's amendments overcome the previous U.S.C. 112(a) rejection.
Applicant's amendments overcome the previous U.S.C. 112(b) rejection.
Applicant's amendments overcome the previous U.S.C. 101 rejection of claims 1-10.
Applicant’s amendments do not overcome the previous U.S.C. 101 rejection of claims 11-12.
Claims 1-13 are pending.
The Examiner notes that Claim 1 now recites “identical” design level while Claim 13 retains “equivalent” design level for the second sensor. Applicant is advised to confirm whether this distinction is intentional.
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s arguments, see remarks pages 7-14, filed 02/25/2026, with respect to the rejection(s) of claim(s) 1-13 under 35 U.S.C. 103 have been fully considered and are persuasive. Therefore, the rejection has been withdrawn. However, upon further consideration, a new ground(s) of rejection is made in view of Kana et al. (US 2015/0145724 A1) in view of Stevens (US 9,182,495 B2) and further in view of Lupash et al. (US 6,281,836 B1).
Examiner Suggested Corrections
The Examiner suggests making corrections to claims 11 and 12 to overcome the 112(b) rejections of those claims:
Claim 11. (Currently amended) A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing a computer program product, said computer program product comprising code instructions for carrying out the steps of the method as claimed in claim 1, when said program is executed on a computer.
Claim 12. (Currently amended) A non-transitory processor-readable recording medium on which is recorded a program comprising code instructions for executing the method as claimed in claim 1, when the program is executed by the processor.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 11 and 12 rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention. The term “non-transitory code instructions” has no established meaning in the art and renders the scope of the claim unclear. See Examiner Suggested Corrections above.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claim 11 rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter. The claim does not fall within at least one of the four categories of patent eligible subject matter because the claim recites: “A computer program product, said computer program product comprising non-transitory code instructions for carrying out the steps of the method as claimed in claim 1, when said program is executed on a computer.”, which appears to be directed to software per se. The recitation of "non-transitory code" does not cure the deficiency but further raises question as to what is a "non-transitory code". See Examiner Suggested Corrections above. See Microsoft Corp. V. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 449, 82 USPQ2d 1400, 1407 (2007); see also Benson, 409 U.S. 67, 175 USPQ2d 675 (An "idea" is not patent eligible). See MPEP 2106.03.
Claim 12 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter. The claim does not fall within at least one of the four categories of patent eligible subject matter because the claims recite a processor-readable recording medium on which is recorded a program comprising non-transitory code instructions and does not specify that the processor-readable recording medium is a non-transitory computer readable medium. According to the MPEP 2106.03, section II, “For example, the BRI of machine readable media can encompass non-statutory transitory forms of signal transmission, such as a propagating electrical or electromagnetic signal per se. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 84 USPQ2d 1495 (Fed. Cir. 2007). When the BRI encompasses transitory forms of signal transmission, a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 101 as failing to claim statutory subject matter would be appropriate." See Examiner Suggested Corrections above.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claims 1-13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kana et al. (US 2015/0145724 A1) in view of Stevens (US 9,182,495 B2) and further in view of Lupash et al. (US 6,281,836 B1).
Regarding Claim 1, Kana et al. (‘724) in view of Stevens (‘495), and further in view of Lupash et al. (‘836) teaches:
Kana et al. (‘724) teaches: A method for consolidating a satellite navigation solution for an aircraft implementing: Kana et al. (‘724) teaches a method for monitoring and consolidating a satellite navigation solution implemented in a navigation device for high integrity aircraft applications. Kana et al. (‘724) ([0013]: “The navigation device 108 is configured to monitor the integrity of the navigation solution and to process signals from the plurality of constellations 102 in order to meet demands of high integrity systems such as the attitude and heading reference system (AHRS) for certain classes of aircraft.”)
Kana et al. (‘724) teaches: a first sensor, comprising an augmentation system, adapted to determine a computed position
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𝑥̂(1) of the aircraft, a characterization of a positioning error of the computed position 𝑥̂(1) and a horizontal protection level HPL(1) of the computed position 𝑥̂(1), Kana et al. (‘724) teaches that receiver 106 and processing unit 112 compute the full-solution position x̂₀ with covariance matrix P₀ and protection levels including HPL. Kana et al. (‘724) ([0020]: “During operation, receiver 106 receives satellite signals such as GNSS signals, extracts the satellite position and time data from the signals, and provides pseudorange measurements to processing unit 112. From the pseudorange measurements and the optional inertial or other measurements, the processing unit 112 derives a position, and optionally velocity, and attitude solution, such as by using a Kalman filter. The processing unit 112 can also use the pseudorange measurements to detect satellite transmitter failures and to determine a worst-case error, or protection level. In particular, a horizontal protection level (HPL) for position, a vertical protection level (VPL) for position…”). Kana et al. (‘724) further teaches the protection level is computed as ([0025], Eq. 3: “PL = max n { PL n } = max n { a n + D n }”), where the a_n-term is the integrity buffer computed from the sub-solution covariance matrix and the allocated probability of missed detection, directly characterizing the positioning error of x̂(1) as HPL(1).
Kana et al. (‘724) does not explicitly teach that the first sensor comprises an augmentation system, but Stevens (‘495) teaches: a first sensor, comprising an augmentation system, adapted to determine a computed position 𝑥̂(1) of the aircraft. Stevens (‘495) teaches that (Col. 3, lines 15–32: “A GNSS location service such as the United States’ Global Positioning System (GPS) may include an integrity function to monitor for reliable location information (for example, information related to a geographic location). The system may include one or more sensors for monitoring GNSS (e.g., GPS) signals and other information associated with the GNSS. The system assesses integrity of a GNSS location based on a comparison of the GNSS location with locations received from at least one other GNSS. Examples of GNSSs that the system may use include European Galileo, GLObal’naya NAvigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema (Global Navigation Satellite System or GLONASS), and China’s Compass or Beidou. A GNSS may be augmented by a Satellite-Based Augmentation System (SBAS) (e.g., to improve accuracy, reliability, and availability). Examples of SBASs may include Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), and European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS), etc.”).
It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the multi-constellation navigation integrity method of Kana et al. (‘724) with the augmentation system configuration of Stevens (‘495). One would have been motivated to do so in order to improve the accuracy, reliability, and availability of the primary GNSS position solution used as the first sensor input, which is a standard and well-known design choice in aircraft navigation systems as Stevens (‘495) explicitly teaches (Col. 3, lines 15–32). The POSITA would have reasonable expectation of success because SBAS-augmented GNSS receivers are a standard, commercially available technology and both references operate in the same field of aircraft GNSS integrity monitoring.
Kana et al. (‘724) in view of Stevens (‘495) teaches: a second sensor, with a different design to the first sensor and with a design level identical to the first sensor, the architecture and the operation of the second sensor being different from the architecture and the operation of the first sensor and data detected by the second sensor being different from the data detected by the first sensor, the second sensor being adapted to determine a second position {circumflex over 𝑥̂(2) of the aircraft and a characterization of the positioning error of the second position {circumflex over 𝑥̂(2), Kana et al. (‘724) teaches the second sensor as a second GNSS receiver operating on an independent constellation. Kana et al. (‘724) ([0045]: “The weighted architecture is based on the independent integrity monitoring of several independent constellations. For purposes of explanation, only two independent constellations, e.g. GPS and Galileo, are shown in FIG. 7. However, it is to be understood that more than two independent constellations can be used. Each constellation is independently monitored for the integrity of the provided navigation information.”). Kana et al. (‘724) further teaches ([0012]: “Each space-based satellite 104 transmits signals to the receiver 106 in the navigation device 108 according to the specific configuration of the respective GNSS technology. For example, GPS signals are transmitted at a different frequency than GLONASS signals.”). Because each constellation receiver processes signals of a different frequency, using a different satellite geometry, and different PRN codes, both the architecture and the data detected by the second sensor differ from those of the first sensor, while both sensors are GNSS receivers of identical design level. Kana et al. (‘724) further teaches that the second constellation full-solution 703b constitutes x̂(2), expressed as x̂_n, P_n per Kana et al. (‘724) ([0023], Eq. 2: “{circumflex over (x)}.sub.n,P.sub.n,n=1,2, . . . ,M,”), where P_n is the covariance matrix characterizing the positioning error of x̂(2).
Stevens (‘495) further teaches (Col. 4, lines 6–27: “The user equipment receiver also receives signals from other GNSS 107 (e.g., the Galileo System, Global Navigation Satellite System, the Beidou System, etc.) and compares locations based upon received signals from other GNSS 107 with locations based upon signals received from GNSS 101.”), directly teaching a second sensor, a second GNSS receiver processing different constellation signals and different data, that determines a second aircraft position.
It would have been obvious to a POSITA before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the multi-constellation integrity monitoring architecture of Kana et al. (‘724) with the second GNSS sensor teaching of Stevens (‘495). One would have been motivated to do so because Stevens (‘495) explicitly confirms that a second GNSS receiver operating on a different constellation, such as Galileo, GLONASS, or Beidou, is a well-known and established means of independently determining a second aircraft position for integrity monitoring purposes, which directly corroborates and reinforces Kana et al. (‘724)’s weighted architecture teaching. Specially while Kana et al. (‘724) teaches the use of two independent GNSS constellations for the weighted architecture, Stevens (‘495) provides additional explicit teaching that the second GNSS receiver independently processes signals from a different constellation and compares the resulting position against the primary GNSS position, confirming that a POSITA would have understood the second sensor to be independently operating, equivalently capable GNSS receiver determining its own position solution. The POSITA would have reasonable expectation of success because both Kana et al. (‘724) and Stevens (‘495) operate in the same field of aircraft GNSS integrity monitoring, both teach using a second GNSS receiver from an independent constellation to cross validate a primary GNSS position, and the combination requires only applying the well-known multi-constellation receiver architecture that Stevens (‘495) confirms is standard practice to the weighted integrity monitoring framework that Kana et al. (‘724) teaches.
Kana et al. (‘724) teaches: the consolidation method implemented by a processor and the consolidation method comprising the following steps: Kana et al. (‘724) explicitly teaches the processing unit 112 as the structural processor implementing the consolidation method. Kana et al. (‘724) ([0015]: “The processing unit 112 is configured to separate sub-sets of the received signals into two different domains for calculation of corresponding navigation sub-solutions. Based on the sub-solutions in the two domains and, in some embodiments, on the full-solution, the processing unit 112 determines if there is satellite(s) failure in the navigation system, e.g. a failed satellite 104, etc.”). Kana et al. (‘724) further teaches ([0018]: “The processing unit 112 includes or functions with software programs, firmware or other computer readable instructions for carrying out various methods, process tasks, calculations, and control functions, used in the integrity monitoring described herein.”).
Kana et al. (‘724) teaches: a. estimating a horizontal deviation between the computed position 𝑥̂(1) of the aircraft and the second position 𝑥̂(2) of the aircraft with a consolidation device, Kana et al. (‘724) teaches that the processing unit 112 (consolidation device) computes the statistical difference between the full-solution and constellation sub-solutions. Kana et al. (‘724) ([0036]: “A processing unit, such as processing unit 112 then compares the difference between the full-solution 301, 401 and all constellation sub-solutions 303, 403 and the difference between the full-solution 301, 401 and the satellite sub-solutions 307, 407 with a pre-determined threshold.”). In the weighted architecture of FIG. 7, the processing unit compares x̂(1) (full-solution 703a from the first constellation) and x̂(2) (full-solution 703b from the second constellation) to estimate the horizontal deviation between the two positions.
Kana et al. (‘724) teaches: b. comparing the horizontal deviation with a previously defined detection threshold with the consolidation device, Kana et al. (‘724) teaches ([0036]: “As stated above, the threshold can be selected based on statistical analysis, such as an acceptable standard deviation, probability of False Alert (PFA), probability of Missed Detection (PMD), biases, etc. If the difference exceeds the threshold, the processing unit determines that an error or fault has occurred.”). The processing unit 112 (consolidation device) performs this comparison. The detection threshold D_n is defined in Kana et al. (‘724) ([0025]–[0026], Eq. 4: “dP.sub.n=P.sub.n-P.sub.0.”), computed from the separation covariance matrix between the sub-solutions and the full-solution.
Kana et al. (‘724) teaches: c. if the horizontal deviation is below the detection threshold, computing an additional horizontal protection level HPL(MON) of the computed position 𝑥̂(1) from the second position {circumflex over 𝑥̂(2), Kana et al. (‘724) teaches that the processing unit determines per-constellation protection levels from the sub-solutions. Kana et al. (‘724) ([0053]: “Additionally, in some embodiments, the processing unit determines if an error is present by determining a protection level for a first constellation based on the sub-solutions in the first plurality of sub-solutions and a protection level for a second constellation based on the sub-solutions in the second plurality of sub-solutions. The processing unit then combines the respective protection levels for the plurality of constellations to obtain a total protection level used to identify errors.”). Kana et al. (‘724) ([0046]) describes that the HPL for the second constellation (HPL_B 806 in FIG. 8) is computed from the second constellation’s sub-solutions (707b-1–707b-j), which are derived from the second constellation position 703b (x̂(2)). This is the HPL(MON) of x̂(1) computed from x̂(2). The computation occurs when the horizontal deviation is below the detection threshold — i.e., when no fault is found by the comparison of step (b) — as Kana et al. (‘724) proceeds to protection level computation in the absence of detected errors.
Kana et al. (‘724) teaches: d. estimating a consolidated horizontal protection level HPL(CON) as a function of a maximum of the additional horizontal protection level HPL(MON) and of the horizontal protection level HPL(1) with the consolidation device, this limitation is explicitly taught by Kana et al. (‘724). ([0046]: “The outputs of the integrity monitoring method for both constellations are subsequently fused together as illustrated in FIG. 8 for the horizontal protection level. In FIG. 8, the computed HPL for the first constellation is denoted as HPL.sub.A 804 and the computed HPL for the second constellation as HPL.sub.B 806. The HPL.sub.A is provided with the probability of hazardous misleading information P.sub.HMIA and HPL.sub.B with P.sub.HMIB. Then, their exemplary combination results in the total horizontal protection level HPL.sub.total 802 (which is larger than both respective HPL.sub.A and HPL.sub.B) with the overall probability of misleading information P.sub.HMItotal.ltoreq.P.sub.HMIA.times.P.sub.HMIB”). Figure 8 of Kana et al. (‘724) graphically illustrates HPL_total (802) as the outer circle encompassing and larger than both HPL_A (804) and HPL_B (806). Kana et al. (‘724)’s protection level formula ([0025], Eq. 3: “PL = max n { PL n } = max n { a n + D n }”) defines the total protection level as the maximum over all sub-solution protection levels. Kana et al. (‘724) further explicitly recites this operation in ([0056]: “the method further comprising: determining a protection level for each sub-solution in the first plurality of sub-solutions and in the second plurality of sub-solutions; and selecting one of the determined protection levels as a total protection level.”). The processing unit 112 (consolidation device) performs this maximum-based consolidation.
Kana et al. (‘724) in view of Lupash et al. (‘836) teaches: e. comparing the consolidated horizontal protection level HPL(CON) and a previously defined horizontal alert limit HAL with the consolidation device, Kana et al. (‘724) teaches ([0021]: “The processing unit 112 can compare the horizontal and/or vertical protection levels to an alarm limit corresponding to a particular aircraft flight phase, in some embodiments.”). Lupash et al. (‘836) further explicitly teaches (Col. 9, lines 25–34: “The horizontal alert limit (HAL) requirement in the position determination of an airplane for different phases of flight is given above in Table I. The GPS receiver computes the horizontal protection level (HPL) in order to compare HPL with the horizontal alert limit (HAL). The step of computation the horizontal protection level (HPL), and the step of comparing HPL with the horizontal alert limit (HAL), comprise the RAIM detection availability test”).
Kana et al. (‘724) in view of Lupash et al. (‘836) teaches: f. if the consolidated horizontal protection level HPL(CON) is less than the horizontal alert limit HAL, horizontally confirming the computed position 𝑥̂(1) of the aircraft by at least one avionics component. Kana et al. (‘724) teaches that when the protection level is below the alarm limit, the navigation device outputs the confirmed position information to avionics systems. Kana et al. (‘724) ([0021]: “In other embodiments, the processing unit 112 outputs the protection levels to another system such as a flight management system for further analysis.”). Kana et al. (‘724) further teaches ([0016]: “After identifying an error in the navigation system 100, the navigation device 108 outputs a signal to an output device 114 in order to communicate the identified error to a user, such as a pilot of an aircraft, via visual and/or aural cues.”). By implication, when no error is identified (i.e., HPL(CON) < HAL), the output device 114 — an avionics component — confirms the position. Lupash et al. (‘836) explicitly teaches the horizontal position confirmation step in aircraft avionics. Lupash et al. (‘836) (Col. 12, lines 14–19: “(c3) if said horizontal protection level (HPL) is less than or equal to said horizontal alert limit (HAL), declaring a receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) function available and declaring said satellite data obtained by using said satellite receiver as substantially sufficient for obtaining position fixes of said moving platform”). This is the formal avionics-level position confirmation by the avionics component of the aircraft navigation system.
It would have been obvious to a POSITA before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the protection level computation and alert limit comparison of Kana et al. (‘724) with the RAIM availability declaration framework of Lupash et al. (‘836). One would have been motivated to do so because Lupash et al. (‘836) provides the established aviation standard framework for formally confirming aircraft position via a RAIM availability declaration — a step that a POSITA implementing Kana et al. (‘724)’s HIMCSS method in an aviation context would apply in order to comply with required navigation performance (RNP) standards and to formally declare the computed position as substantially sufficient for aircraft navigation. The POSITA would have reasonable expectation of success because is because Kana et al. (‘724) and Lupash et al. (‘836) are both directed to GNSS integrity monitoring for aircraft navigation and use the same HPL-vs-HAL comparison framework; combining Lupash et al. (‘836)’s RAIM confirmation declaration with Kana et al. (‘724)’s protection level output requires only applying a standard aviation procedure to a known result.
Regarding Claim 2, Kana et al. (‘724) in view of Stevens (‘495), and further in view of Lupash et al. (‘836) teaches the method for consolidating a satellite navigation solution as claimed in claim 1.
Kana et al. (‘724) teaches: comprising an additional step, following the step of horizontally confirming the first position 𝑥̂(1), of validating the computed position 𝑥̂(1) of the aircraft as a consolidated position of the aircraft. Kana et al. (‘724) teaches that the navigation device provides position information to downstream avionics systems when integrity is confirmed. Kana et al. (‘724) ([0021]: “the processing unit 112 outputs the protection levels to another system such as a flight management system for further analysis.”). Lupash et al. (‘836) explicitly teaches validating and declaring the position as sufficient for navigation. Lupash et al. (‘836) (Col. 12, lines 14–19: “(c3) if said horizontal protection level (HPL) is less than or equal to said horizontal alert limit (HAL), declaring a receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) function available and declaring said satellite data obtained by using said satellite receiver as substantially sufficient for obtaining position fixes of said moving platform”). This constitutes validating the computed position x̂(1) as the consolidated position of the aircraft following horizontal confirmation.
Regarding Claim 3, Kana et al. (‘724) in view of Stevens (‘495), and further in view of Lupash et al. (‘836) teaches the method for consolidating a satellite navigation solution as claimed in claim 1.
Kana et al. (‘724) teaches: wherein the additional horizontal protection level HPL(MON) is computed from the horizontal deviation between the computed position 𝑥̂(1) of the aircraft and the second position 𝑥̂(2) of the aircraft and/or from the detection threshold of a positioning anomaly in the horizontal plane, and from the characterization of the positioning error of the second position 𝑥̂(2).
Note: Claim 3 contains an “and/or” statement; the art therefore need only teach the limitation before or after the “and/or.” The art teaches both branches.
Kana et al. (‘724) teaches that HPL(MON) (the per-constellation protection level HPL_B) is computed from the sub-solutions of the second constellation using the protection level formula. Kana et al. (‘724) ([0025]–[0026]: “In some embodiments, a protection level (e.g. the HPL, VPL, VHPL, VVPL, RPL, PPL, or the YPL) is computed according to the following relation PL = max n { PL n } = max n { a n + D n } (Eq. 3) where PL.sub.n=a.sub.n+D.sub.n is the protection level of the n-th sub-solution. The "D.sub.n-term" is the decision threshold computed on the basis of the allocated probability of false alert (P.sub.FA) and the separation covariance matrix which can be computed as dP.sub.n=P.sub.n-P.sub.0. (Eq. 4).”). The separation covariance matrix dP_n = P_n – P₀ captures the horizontal deviation between x̂(2) (the n-th sub-solution) and x̂(1) (the full-solution P₀), and P_n is the covariance matrix characterizing the positioning error of x̂(2). Accordingly, HPL(MON) is computed from both the horizontal deviation between x̂(1) and x̂(2) and from the characterization of the positioning error of x̂(2). The detection threshold D_n derived from dP_n also captures the detection threshold of a positioning anomaly in the horizontal plane.
Regarding Claim 4, Kana et al. (‘724) in view of Stevens (‘495), and further in view of Lupash et al. (‘836) teaches the method for consolidating a satellite navigation solution as claimed in claim 1.
Kana et al. (‘724) teaches: wherein the augmentation system of the first sensor is an Airborne Based Augmentation System (ABAS). Kana et al. (‘724)’s HIMCSS method implements receiver autonomous integrity monitoring using on-board multi-constellation processing, which is a form of ABAS. Kana et al. (‘724) ([0013]: “The navigation device 108 is configured to monitor the integrity of the navigation solution and to process signals from the plurality of constellations 102 in order to meet demands of high integrity systems such as the attitude and heading reference system (AHRS) for certain classes of aircraft.”).
Kana et al. (‘724) does not explicitly teach, but Stevens (‘495) teaches that GNSS integrity monitoring as disclosed constitutes an aircraft-based augmentation. Stevens (‘495) (Col. 3, lines 15–32: “A GNSS location service such as the United States’ Global Positioning System (GPS) may include an integrity function to monitor for reliable location information… The system may include one or more sensors for monitoring GNSS (e.g., GPS) signals and other information associated with the GNSS.”). RAIM, as implemented by Kana et al. (‘724), is recognized as a class of ABAS (Aircraft Based Augmentation System).
It would have been obvious to a POSITA to implement the first sensor of Kana et al. (‘724)’s navigation device with ABAS (specifically RAIM) augmentation as this is the exact integrity augmentation architecture disclosed in Kana et al. (‘724), and it would provide the on-board, autonomous integrity monitoring required for aircraft navigation.
Regarding Claim 5, Kana et al. (‘724) in view of Stevens (‘495), and further in view of Lupash et al. (‘836) teaches the method for consolidating a satellite navigation solution as claimed in claim 1.
Kana et al. (‘724) does not explicitly teach that the augmentation system of the first sensor is a Space Based Augmentation System (SBAS) or a Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS), but Stevens (‘495) teaches: wherein the augmentation system of the first sensor is a Space Based Augmentation System (SBAS) or a Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS).
Note: Claim 5 contains an “or” statement; the art need only teach SBAS or GBAS. Stevens (‘495) teaches SBAS.
Stevens (‘495) teaches: (Col. 3, lines 15–32: “A GNSS may be augmented by a Satellite-Based Augmentation System (SBAS) (e.g., to improve accuracy, reliability, and availability). Examples of SBASs may include Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), and European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS), etc.”).
It would have been obvious to a POSITA before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the multi-constellation navigation integrity method of Kana et al. (‘724) with the SBAS augmentation of Stevens (‘495) for the first sensor. One would have been motivated to do so in order to improve the accuracy and availability of the primary GNSS position by incorporating SBAS corrections, which Stevens (‘495) explicitly teaches improves accuracy, reliability, and availability. The POSITA would have reasonable expectation of success because SBAS-augmented GNSS receivers are standard, commercially certified aviation navigation equipment and combining SBAS augmentation with RAIM-based integrity monitoring is a well-known approach in aircraft navigation.
Regarding Claim 6, Kana et al. (‘724) in view of Stevens (‘495), and further in view of Lupash et al. (‘836) teaches the method for consolidating a satellite navigation solution as claimed in claim 1.
Kana et al. (‘724) teaches: wherein the first sensor is adapted to determine a vertical protection level VPL(1). Kana et al. (‘724) explicitly teaches computing VPL in addition to HPL for the first sensor. Kana et al. (‘724) ([0020]–[0021]: “the processing unit 112 derives a position… In particular, a horizontal protection level (HPL) for position, a vertical protection level (VPL) for position, a horizontal protection level for velocity (VHPL), a vertical protection level for velocity (VVPL), and/or protection levels for roll, pitch, and yaw (heading) angles (RPL, PPL, YPL, respectively) can be computed.”).
Regarding Claim 7, Kana et al. (‘724) in view of Stevens (‘495), and further in view of Lupash et al. (‘836) teaches the method for consolidating a satellite navigation solution as claimed in claim 1.
Kana et al. (‘724) teaches: comprising an additional step of computing an additional vertical protection level VPL(MON) from a vertical deviation between the computed position 𝑥̂(1) of the aircraft and from the second position 𝑥̂(2) of the aircraft and/or from the detection threshold of a vertical positioning anomaly, and from the characterization of the positioning error of the second position 𝑥̂(2) following the step of computing the additional horizontal protection level HPL(MON).
Note: Claim 7 contains an “and/or” statement; the art need only teach the limitation before or after the “and/or.”
Kana et al. (‘724) teaches computing VPL protection levels for each constellation using the same general protection level formula that applies to HPL. Kana et al. (‘724) ([0021]: “With respect to aircraft, depending on the phase of flight, the VPL, VHPL, VVPL, and attitude and heading PLs (i.e., RPL, PPL, and YPL) may also be computed. PL computation is outlined below.”). The same protection level formula PL = max{PL_n} (Eq. 3) and separation covariance matrix dP_n = P_n – P₀ (Eq. 4) that Kana et al. (‘724) teaches for HPL apply identically to VPL computation, where dP_n captures the vertical deviation between x̂(2) and x̂(1) and P_n characterizes the positioning error of x̂(2) in the vertical domain. Kana et al. (‘724) ([0046]) confirms that both HPL and VPL are computed for the constellations and fused as illustrated in FIG. 8.
Regarding Claim 8, Kana et al. (‘724) in view of Stevens (‘495), and further in view of Lupash et al. (‘836) teaches the method for consolidating a satellite navigation solution as claimed in claim 7.
Kana et al. (‘724) teaches: comprising an additional step of estimating a consolidated vertical protection level VPL(CON) as a function of the additional vertical protection level VPL(MON) and of the vertical protection level VPL(1) following the step of estimating the consolidated horizontal protection level HPL(CON), the consolidation method comprising an additional step of comparing the consolidated vertical protection level VPL(CON) and a previously defined vertical alert limit VAL following the step of comparing the consolidated horizontal protection level HPL(CON) and the previously defined horizontal alert limit HAL. Kana et al. (‘724) teaches vertical protection level consolidation using the same maximum-based fusion framework as HPL. Kana et al. (‘724) ([0046]: “The outputs of the integrity monitoring method for both constellations are subsequently fused together as illustrated in FIG. 8 for the horizontal protection level.”). The same PL = max{PL_n} formula (Eq. 3, [0025]) applies to VPL_total = max(VPL_A, VPL_B), constituting VPL(CON) as a function of VPL(MON) and VPL(1). Kana et al. (‘724) further teaches comparing protection levels to alarm limits for both horizontal and vertical components. Kana et al. (‘724) ([0021]: “The processing unit 112 can compare the horizontal and/or vertical protection levels to an alarm limit corresponding to a particular aircraft flight phase, in some embodiments.”). The bold emphasized claim element is a contingent element that recites the HAL comparison solely as a temporal anchor to establish the ordering of steps. This is a non-independent limitation that is already addressed under step (e) of Claim 1. Because this claim depends from Claim 7 which depends from Claim 1, the HAL in comparison of step (e) is already part of the claimed method by dependency. The reference to HAL in this claim is therefor a contingent claim element. See MPEP 2111.04.
Regarding Claim 9, Kana et al. (‘724) in view of Stevens (‘495), and further in view of Lupash et al. (‘836) teaches the method for consolidating a satellite navigation solution as claimed in claim 8.
Kana et al. (‘724) teaches: comprising an additional step of vertically confirming the first position 𝑥̂(1) if the consolidated vertical protection level VPL(CON) is less than the vertical alert limit VAL following the horizontal confirmation step. Kana et al. (‘724) teaches comparing vertical protection levels to vertical alarm limits for aircraft. Kana et al. (‘724) ([0021]: “The processing unit 112 can compare the horizontal and/or vertical protection levels to an alarm limit corresponding to a particular aircraft flight phase.”).
Kana et al. (‘724) does not explicitly teach, but Lupash et al. (‘836) teaches the vertical confirmation step in the aircraft navigation system. (Cols. 12-13, lines 60–67, 1-4: “checking whether said adjusted vertical protection level (VPL_adj) is less than or equal to said vertical alert limit (VAL); and if said adjusted horizontal protection level (HPL_adj) is less than or equal to said horizontal alert limit (HAL), and if said adjusted vertical protection level (VPL_adj) is less than or equal to said vertical alert limit (VAL), declaring the receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) function available.”). This is the vertical confirmation step following the horizontal confirmation step.
It would have been obvious to a POSITA before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the vertical protection level comparison of Kana et al. (‘724) with the vertical confirmation declaration of Lupash et al. (‘836). One would have been motivated to do so because Kana et al. (‘724) teaches comparing both horizontal and vertical protection levels against alarm limits for aircraft flight phases but does not explicitly teach the formal step of vertically confirming the aircraft position following that comparison, whereas Lupash et al. (‘836) provides precisely that formal confirmation step. A POSITA implementing Kana et al. (‘724)’s multi-constellation protection level framework in an aircraft navigation context would have been motivated to apply Lupash et al. (‘836)’s established RAIM availability declaration framework to confirm the aircraft position in both the horizontal and vertical domains. The POSITA would have reasonable expectation of success because both Kana et al. (‘724) and Lupash et al. (‘836) operate in the same field of aircraft GNSS integrity monitoring, both use the same fundamental framework of comparing protection levels against alert limits, and extending Lupash et al. (‘836)’s RAIM declaration to the vertical domain following the horizontal confirmation step is a direct and predictable application of Lupash et al. (‘836)’s own two-condition declaration to Kana et al. (‘724)’s sequential horizontal then vertical confirmation architecture.
Regarding Claim 10, Kana et al. (‘724) in view of Stevens (‘495), and further in view of Lupash et al. (‘836) teaches the method for consolidating a satellite navigation solution as claimed in claim 1.
Kana et al. (‘724) teaches: wherein the detection threshold is computed as a function of at least a standard deviation of the first position 𝑥̂(1) and the second position 𝑥̂(2). Kana et al. (‘724) teaches that the detection threshold is based on the standard deviation of the positions. Kana et al. (‘724) ([0036]: “the threshold can be selected based on statistical analysis, such as an acceptable standard deviation, probability of False Alert (PFA), probability of Missed Detection (PMD), biases, etc.”). Kana et al. (‘724) further teaches that the separation covariance matrix dP_n = P_n – P₀ (Eq. 4, [0026]) captures the standard deviation of the deviation between x̂(2) (P_n) and x̂(1) (P₀).
Kana et al. (‘724) does not explicitly teach, but Lupash et al. (‘836) teaches the continuity allocation basis. (Col. 10, lines 44–57: “After the specified data (for instance, phase-of-flight, elevation mask angle, probability of false alarm, probability of missed detection, baro standard deviation) is input (step 32), the HPLNPL is computed without baro (step 36) and with baro (step 40). The adjustment of the HPL and VPL quantities computed with baro measurement to a level approximating the HPL and VPL quantities computed without baro measurement eliminates the conflict between the RAIM fault detection process computed with baro measurement and the position fixes measurement computed without baro data.”). The probability of false alarm and probability of missed detection are parameters of the continuity allocation budget.
It would have been obvious to a POSITA to compute the detection threshold as a function of the standard deviation of x̂(1) and x̂(2) and an allocation of continuity because Kana et al. (‘724) teaches standard deviation as the statistical basis for the threshold and Lupash et al. (‘836) teaches that continuity allocation (PFA, PMD) is the standard integrity budget parameter used to define detection thresholds in aircraft navigation systems. Combining these known techniques yields predictable results in an aircraft navigation integrity system.
Regarding Claims 11 and 12, Kana et al. (‘724) in view of Stevens (‘495), and further in view of Lupash et al. (‘836) teaches the method for consolidating a satellite navigation solution as claimed in claim 1.
Claims 11 and 12 are directed to a computer program product comprising non-transitory code instructions and a processor-readable recording medium comprising non-transitory code instructions, respectively. These claims are substantially the same save for the product/medium distinction and are treated together.
Kana et al. (‘724) teaches: a computer program product, said computer program product comprising non-transitory code instructions for carrying out the steps of the method as claimed in claim 1, when said program is executed on a computer; and a processor-readable recording medium on which is recorded a program comprising non-transitory code instructions for executing the method as claimed in claim 1, when the program is executed by the processor. Kana et al. (‘724) explicitly teaches ([0018]–[0019]: “The processing unit 112 includes or functions with software programs, firmware or other computer readable instructions for carrying out various methods, process tasks, calculations, and control functions, used in the integrity monitoring described herein. These instructions are typically stored on any appropriate computer readable medium used for storage of computer readable instructions or data structures. The computer readable medium can be implemented as any available media that can be accessed by a general purpose or special purpose computer or processor… Suitable processor-readable media may include storage or memory media such as magnetic or optical media. For example, storage or memory media may include conventional hard disks, Compact Disk-Read Only Memory (CD-ROM), volatile or non-volatile media such as Random Access Memory (RAM) (including, but not limited to, Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory (SDRAM), Double Data Rate (DDR) RAM, RAM-BUS Dynamic RAM (RDRAM), Static RAM (SRAM), etc.), Read Only Memory (ROM), Electrically Erasable Programmable ROM (EEPROM), and flash memory, etc.”).
Regarding Claim 13, Kana et al. (‘724) in view of Stevens (‘495), and further in view of Lupash et al. (‘836) teaches:
Kana et al. (‘724) teaches: A consolidation device for consolidating a satellite navigation solution suitable for implementing the consolidation method as claimed in claim 1, the consolidation device, comprising: Kana et al. (‘724) teaches Navigation Device 108 as the structural consolidation device. Kana et al. (‘724) ([0010-0011]: “The navigation system 100 includes a plurality of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) constellations 102-1…102-N, where N is the total number of GNSS constellations… Each GNSS constellation 102 includes a plurality of space-based satellites 104 which transmit signals to a receiver 106 in a navigation device 108.”).
Kana et al. (‘724) teaches: the first sensor comprising an augmentation system, able to determine a computed position 𝑥̂(1) of the aircraft, a characterization of the positioning error of the computed position 𝑥̂(1) and a horizontal protection level HPL(1), Kana et al. (‘724) and Stevens (‘495) teach this element as addressed in the Claim 1 analysis above. Kana et al. (‘724) ([0020]: “During operation, receiver 106 receives satellite signals such as GNSS signals, extracts the satellite position and time data from the signals, and provides pseudorange measurements to processing unit 112.”).
Kana et al. (‘724) teaches: the second sensor with a different design to the first sensor and with a design level equivalent to the first sensor, able to determine a second position 𝑥̂(2) of the aircraft and a characterization of the positioning error of the second position 𝑥̂(2).
Note: Claim 13 uses “equivalent” rather than “identical” for the design level, which is a broader term.
Kana et al. (‘724) and Stevens (‘495) teach this element as addressed in the Claim 1 analysis above. Kana et al. (‘724) ([0045]: “The weighted architecture is based on the independent integrity monitoring of several independent constellations, e.g. GPS and Galileo… Each constellation is independently monitored for the integrity of the provided navigation information.”). Both constellations use GNSS receivers of equivalent design level (same class of sensor) with different designs (different constellation architecture and different detected data), and the second constellation receiver determines x̂(2) with covariance P_n characterizing its positioning error.
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
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/REMASH R GUYAH/Examiner, Art Unit 3648
/RESHA DESAI/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3648
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