DETAILED ACTION
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, anycorrection of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground ofrejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would bethe same under either status.
Response to Amendment
The proposed reply filed on March 4th, 2026 has been entered. Claims 2-17 have been amended. Claims 1-17 and 39-40 are pending in the application.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or non-obviousness.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
Claim(s) 1, 7, 12, 39 and 40 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Wang et al. (US 2017/0055302 A1) in view of disclosed NPL, Procedure for the 5G system (3GPP TS 23.502 V16.7.1) (NPL-5GS hereinafter).
Wang et al. disclose an apparatus and method for an enhanced hotspot 2.0 management object for trusted Non-3GPP access discovery with the following features: regarding claim 1, a method for providing service continuity in a handover of a communications device from an untrusted access point to a trusted access point in a wireless communications network, the method comprising: transmitting, by transceiver circuitry of the communications device to the untrusted access point, a request to receive a service from a core network of the wireless communications network via the untrusted access point, the communications device being in an inactive state in which it retains a context from a previous communications session with the core network via the trusted access point; receiving, by the transceiver circuitry of the communications device from the untrusted access point, the requested service from the core network via the untrusted access point using a current communications session; determining, by the communications device, that a handover procedure should be performed for the communications device from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point; arranging, by the communications device, for the trusted access point to receive information regarding the current communications session used for providing the requested service from the core network to the communications device via the untrusted access point in advance of the handover, the information regarding the current communications session including at least an indication that the communications device is currently receiving the requested service via the untrusted access point; receiving, by the transceiver circuitry of the communications device, the requested service from the core network via the trusted access point after the handover of the communications device from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point (Fig. 4, illustrates architecture of trusted and untrusted Wi-Fi offload according to this disclosure, see teachings in [0047-0048, 0056, 0058, 0068-0069, 0073-0076-0078, 0085-0090] summarized as “a method for providing service continuity in a handover of a communications device from an untrusted access point to a trusted access point in a wireless communications network, the method comprising (i.e. the architecture 400 of trusted and untrusted Wi-Fi offload includes a Home Public Land Mobile Network (HPLMN) 402 and non-3GPP networks 404. The non-3GPP networks 404 include one or more trusted non-3GPP internet protocol (IP) access points 406 (for example, a WiFi access point), which, together with the HPLMN 402, forms architecture of a trusted Wi-Fi offload. The non-3GPP networks 404 include one or more untrusted non-3GPP internet protocol (IP) access points 408, which, together with the HPLMN 402, form architecture of an untrusted Wi-Fi offload. During initial attach or handover attach, a UE 116 needs to discover the trust relationship (whether the AP 520 (fig. 5) is a Trusted or Untrusted) of the non-3GPP access network 510 in order to know which non-3GPP IP access procedure to initiate. For untrusted access, the UE 116 needs to set up an IPsec tunnel with the ePDG. For trusted access, the UE 116 needs to send a L3 attach trigger [0047-0048, 0085]), transmitting, by transceiver circuitry of the communications device to the untrusted access point, a request to receive a service from a core network of the wireless communications network via the untrusted access point (i.e. Each service provider network 510, 515 (fig. 5) includes a service provider (SP) Core Network 545a-545b that is connected to the internet 570. The UE 116 scans for Wi-Fi Networks by transmitting a query list to the access point 520 in a request according to Generic Advertisement Service (GAS) with Access Network Query Protocol (ANQP). (Note: the UE 116 sent request via untrusted access point 408 to receive service from the core network 420, see fig. 4A). The query list includes a 3GPP Cellular Network ANQP element and NAI realm list element, and the like. The access point 520 transmits a response to the UE 116 according to the GAS ANQP, wherein the contents of the response depend upon the query list of the UE. [0058, 0068, 0077]), the communications device being in an inactive state in which it retains a context from a previous communications session with the core network via the trusted access point (i.e. the UE 116 and Sub Rem server 560 release the TLS session that was previously established. The Sub Rem server 560 includes a database of all trusted access points, along with identification and credential information related to each trusted access point, which can be stored in a tree map as shown in fig. 6 [0058, 0078]), receiving, by the transceiver circuitry of the communications device from the untrusted access point, the requested service from the core network via the untrusted access point using a current communications session (i.e. the access point 520 transmits a WNM-notification to the UE 116. The WNM-notification includes a remediation URL received from the AAA server 550a (core network). The UE 116 and Sub Rem server 560 establish a TLS session. In response to determining that the WiFi access point 520 is not trusted, the UE 116 discovers a Evolved Packet Data Gateway (ePDG) (block 935), then establishes an Internet Protocol security (IPsec) tunnel that connects the untrusted WiFi access point to the discovered ePDG [0073-0074, 0089]), determining, by the communications device, that a handover procedure should be performed for the communications device from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point (i.e. the UE 116 determines whether the WiFi AP 520 is trusted based on the trust field 605 in the MO 600. In response to determining that the WiFi access point is trusted, the UE sends an L3 attach trigger (block 925), and then connects to the EPC PDN GW through a direct connection (block 930). Note that in block 930, communications between the UE 116 and EPC PDN GW are trusted and thus not required to be encrypted [0089]), arranging, by the communications device, for the trusted access point to receive information regarding the current communications session used for providing the requested service from the core network to the communications device via the untrusted access point in advance of the handover, the information regarding the current communications session including at least an indication that the communications device is currently receiving the requested service via the untrusted access point (i.e. the access point 520 associates with a UE 116 to form a connection 525 (fig. 5). The access point 520 can represent the trusted access point 406 or the non-trusted access point 408, depending whether the access point 520 is trusted or not trusted by the 3GPP operator's EPC network 545a-545b. in response to determining that the WiFi access point 520 is not trusted, the UE 116 discovers a Evolved Packet Data Gateway (ePDG) (block 935), then establishes an Internet Protocol security (IPsec) tunnel that connects the untrusted WiFi access point to the discovered ePDG (block 940), and then connects to the EPC PDN GW through the IPsec tunnel that connects the untrusted WiFi access point to an Evolved Packet Data Gateway (ePDG) and connects the EPC PDN GW to the ePDG (block 945). Note that in block 945, the UE 116 and ePDG share an encryption/decryption secret for communications through the IPsec tunnel, which are encrypted because the WiFi access point is untrusted [0056, 0089]), receiving, by the transceiver circuitry of the communications device, the requested service from the core network via the trusted access point after the handover of the communications device from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point (i.e. the UE 116 determines whether the WiFi AP 520 is trusted based on the trust field 605 in the MO 600. In response to determining that the WiFi access point is trusted, the UE sends an L3 attach trigger (block 925), and then connects to the EPC PDN GW through a direct connection (block 930). Note that in block 930, communications between the UE 116 and EPC PDN GW are trusted and thus not required to be encrypted. This disclosure provide an effective way for discovering (with specificity) whether a WLAN access is trusted or not. The MO 600 allows the UE 116 to discover whether a WiFi AP 520 is trusted or not via a HS 2.0 Per Provider Subscription type MO 600 that includes a trust field for each trusted AP [0089-0090])’).
Wang et al. also disclose the following features: regarding claim 7, wherein the arranging, by the communications device, for the trusted access point to receive information regarding the current communications session used for providing the requested service from the core network to the communications device via the untrusted access point in advance of the handover, comprises transmitting, by the transceiver circuitry in the communications device to the trusted access point, a request that the communications device remains in the inactive state including the indication that the communications device is currently receiving the request service from the core network via the untrusted access point; receiving, by the transceiver circuitry in the communications device from the trusted access point, an instruction to remain in the inactive state (Fig. 4, illustrates architecture of trusted and untrusted Wi-Fi offload according to this disclosure, see teachings in [0056, 0058, 0068-0069] summarized as “the access point 520 associates with a UE 116 to form a connection 525. The access point 520 can represent the trusted access point 406 or the non-trusted access point 408, depending whether the access point 520 is trusted or not trusted by the 3GPP operator's EPC network 545a-545b. Each service provider network 510, 515 (fig. 5) includes a service provider (SP) Core Network 545a-545b that is connected to the internet 570, an AAA server 550a-550b, an OSU server 555a-555b, a Policy Server, a Subscription Remediation (Sub Rem) Server, and a certificate authority (CA) database 565a-565b core networks. The UE 116 scans for Wi-Fi Networks by transmitting a query list to the access point 520 in a request according to Generic Advertisement Service (GAS) with Access Network Query Protocol (ANQP). The query list includes a 3GPP Cellular Network ANQP element and NAI realm list element, and the like. the access point 520 transmits a response to the UE 116 according to the GAS ANQP, wherein the contents of the response depend upon the query list of the UE. The contents of the response can include: service provider's cellular information (e.g., network code and country codes), a list of NAI realm, and a list of one or more EAP methods (e.g. EAP-SIM, EAP-AKA, EAP-TTLS, or EAP_TLS) optionally included for NAI realm to use for authentication”); regarding claim 12, wherein the determining, by the communications device, that the handover procedure should be performed for the communications device from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point comprises receiving an indication from the core network via the trusted access point that the handover procedure should be performed for the communications device from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point (Fig. 4, illustrates architecture of trusted and untrusted Wi-Fi offload according to this disclosure, see teachings in [0078, 0086-0087] summarized as “the UE 116 and Sub Rem server 560 release the TLS session that was previously established (for example as established in operation 716). In operation 730, the UE 116 transmits a disassociate message to the access point 520. In operation 732, if the subscription was established successfully in operation 716, the UE 116 and access point 520 perform an 802.11 authentication, association, EAP authentication, and 4-Way Hand Shake using the new initial MO 600 provisioned in the DM Package 2. During initial attach or handover attach, a UE 116 needs to discover the trust relationship (whether the AP 520 is a Trusted or Untrusted) of the non-3GPP access network 510 in order to know which non-3GPP IP access procedure to initiate. For untrusted access, the UE 116 needs to set up an IPsec tunnel with the ePDG. For trusted access, the UE 116 needs to send a L3 attach trigger. The Sub Rem server 560 of the service provider network 510 generates a management object 600 specifying trusted WiFi access points”).
Wang et al. is teaching a service continuity of a communication device by transferring link from an untrusted access point to a trusted access point in a wireless network. Wang et al., however, fail to disclose of method for providing handover of communication device, and receiving the requested service after handover.
NPL-5GS disclose methods and system for network function services to the 5G system architecture with the following features: regarding claim 1, a method for providing service continuity in a handover of a communications device from an untrusted access point to a trusted access point in a wireless communications network; and receiving, by the transceiver circuitry of the communications device, the requested service from the core network via the trusted access point after the handover of the communications device from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point (Fig. 4.9.2.1-1, handover of a PDU session procedure from untrusted non-3GPP access to 3GPP access (non-roaming and roaming with local breakout), see teachings in [section 4.9.2 clause 4.9.2.0-4.9.2.1, section 4.9.2.3 clause 4.9.2.3.1-1] summarized as “a method for providing service continuity in a handover of a communications device from an untrusted access point to a trusted access point in a wireless communications network (i.e. the procedures in this clause are used to hand over a PDU Session between 3GPP (trusted access point) access and non-3GPP access (untrusted access point). This can be triggered, for example, due to radio conditions, user interaction, etc. When the UE triggers handover of a PDU Session between 3GPP access and non-3GPP access and the procedure fails due to e.g. not allowed by policy or AN rejected resource setup, etc., the network should not release the PDU Session. It specifies how to hand over a UE from a source Untrusted non-3GPP access to a target 3GPP access and how a UE can handover a PDU Session from untrusted non-3GPP access to 3GPP access. It is based on the PDU Session Establishment procedure for 3GPP access as specified in clause 4.3.2 with the following 1, 2, and 3 steps (given below). The steps 2 and 3 shall be repeated for all PDU Sessions to be moved from to untrusted non-3GPP access to 3GPP access (trusted excess point) [section 4.9.2 clause 4.9.2.0-4.9.2.1]), receiving, by the transceiver circuitry of the communications device, the requested service from the core network via the trusted access point after the handover of the communications device from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point (i.e. the UE performs a PDU Session Establishment procedure with the PDU Session ID of the PDU Session to be moved as specified clause 4.3.2.2.2. In the Nsmf (Network Slice Management Function) PDU Session Update Response the H-SMF (Home Session Management Function) shall include all QoS information for the QoS Flow(s) applicable to the PDU Session for the target access so that when sending the PDU Session Establishment Accept, within the N1 SM container and in the N2 SM information, the V-SMF (Visited Session Management Function) can include all QoS information (e.g. QoS Rule(s) in N1 SM container, QFI(s) and QoS Profile(s) in N2 SM information) for the QoS Flow(s) acceptable according to VPLMN policies. (Note: V-SMF is a key component in 5G core networks that handles user sessions for a mobile device that is "roaming" in a foreign network. While the device is visiting another network, the V-SMF manages its data sessions, ensuring seamless connectivity and mobility by interacting with both the visited network's functions and the device's home network). In case of Handover for a PDU Session eligible to EPS (Evolved Packet System) Interworking, the Nsmf_PDUSession_Update Response should also contain: EPS bearer context(s), linked EBI [section 4.9.2.3 clause 4.9.2.3.1-1])”).
It would have been obvious to one of the ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the system of Wang et al. by incorporating the features as taught by NPL-5GS in order to provide a more effective and efficient system that is capable of providing service continuity in a handover of a communications device from an untrusted access point to a trusted access point in a wireless communications network; and receiving, by the transceiver circuitry of the communications device, the requested service from the core network via the trusted access point after the handover of the communications device from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point. The motivation is to support an improved method for connection management to establish and release the control plane signaling connection between the UE and the AMF (see [section 4.2.1]).
Regarding claim 39:
Wang et al. disclose an apparatus and method for an enhanced hotspot 2.0 management object for trusted Non-3GPP access discovery with the following features: regarding claim 39, a communications device for providing service continuity in a handover of the communications device from an untrusted access point to a trusted access point in a wireless communications network, the communications device comprising: transceiver circuitry configured to transmit and receive signals; control circuitry configured in combination with the transceiver circuitry to transmit to the untrusted access point, a request to receive a service from a core network of the wireless communications network via the untrusted access point, the communications device being in an inactive state in which it retains a context from a previous communications session with the core network via the trusted access point; receive, from the untrusted access point, the requested service from the core network via the untrusted access point using a current communications session; determine that a handover procedure should be performed for the communications device from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point; arrange for the trusted access point to receive information regarding the current communications session used for providing the requested service from the core network to the communications device via the untrusted access point in advance of the handover, the information regarding the current communications session including at least an indication that the communications device is currently receiving the requested service via the untrusted access point; receive the requested service from the core network via the trusted access point after the handover of the communications device from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point (Fig. 4, illustrates architecture of trusted and untrusted Wi-Fi offload according to this disclosure, see teachings in [0047-0048, 0056, 0058, 0068-0069, 0073-0076-0078, 0085-0090] summarized as “a communications device for providing service continuity in a handover of the communications device from an untrusted access point to a trusted access point in a wireless communications network, the communications device comprising (i.e. the architecture 400 of trusted and untrusted Wi-Fi offload includes a Home Public Land Mobile Network (HPLMN) 402 and non-3GPP networks 404. The non-3GPP networks 404 include one or more trusted non-3GPP internet protocol (IP) access points 406 (for example, a WiFi access point), which, together with the HPLMN 402, forms architecture of a trusted Wi-Fi offload. The non-3GPP networks 404 include one or more untrusted non-3GPP internet protocol (IP) access points 408, which, together with the HPLMN 402, form architecture of an untrusted Wi-Fi offload. During initial attach or handover attach, a UE 116 needs to discover the trust relationship (whether the AP 520 (fig. 5) is a Trusted or Untrusted) of the non-3GPP access network 510 in order to know which non-3GPP IP access procedure to initiate. For untrusted access, the UE 116 needs to set up an IPsec tunnel with the ePDG. For trusted access, the UE 116 needs to send a L3 attach trigger [0047-0048, 0085]), transceiver circuitry configured to transmit and receive signals; control circuitry configured in combination with the transceiver circuitry to transmit to the untrusted access point, a request to receive a service from a core network of the wireless communications network via the untrusted access point (i.e. Each service provider network 510, 515 (fig. 5) includes a service provider (SP) Core Network 545a-545b that is connected to the internet 570. The UE 116 scans for Wi-Fi Networks by transmitting a query list to the access point 520 in a request according to Generic Advertisement Service (GAS) with Access Network Query Protocol (ANQP). (Note: the UE 116 sent request via untrusted access point 408 to receive service from the core network 420, see fig. 4A). The query list includes a 3GPP Cellular Network ANQP element and NAI realm list element, and the like. The access point 520 transmits a response to the UE 116 according to the GAS ANQP, wherein the contents of the response depend upon the query list of the UE. [0058, 0068, 0077]), the communications device being in an inactive state in which it retains a context from a previous communications session with the core network via the trusted access point (i.e. the UE 116 and Sub Rem server 560 release the TLS session that was previously established. The Sub Rem server 560 includes a database of all trusted access points, along with identification and credential information related to each trusted access point, which can be stored in a tree map as shown in fig. 6 [0058, 0078]), the communications device being in an inactive state in which it retains a context from a previous communications session with the core network via the trusted access point (i.e. the UE 116 and Sub Rem server 560 release the TLS session that was previously established. The Sub Rem server 560 includes a database of all trusted access points, along with identification and credential information related to each trusted access point, which can be stored in a tree map as shown in fig. 6 [0058, 0078]), receive, from the untrusted access point, the requested service from the core network via the untrusted access point using a current communications session (i.e. the access point 520 transmits a WNM-notification to the UE 116. The WNM-notification includes a remediation URL received from the AAA server 550a (core network). The UE 116 and Sub Rem server 560 establish a TLS session. In response to determining that the WiFi access point 520 is not trusted, the UE 116 discovers a Evolved Packet Data Gateway (ePDG) (block 935), then establishes an Internet Protocol security (IPsec) tunnel that connects the untrusted WiFi access point to the discovered ePDG [0073-0074, 0089]), determine that a handover procedure should be performed for the communications device from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point (i.e. the UE 116 determines whether the WiFi AP 520 is trusted based on the trust field 605 in the MO 600. In response to determining that the WiFi access point is trusted, the UE sends an L3 attach trigger (block 925), and then connects to the EPC PDN GW through a direct connection (block 930). Note that in block 930, communications between the UE 116 and EPC PDN GW are trusted and thus not required to be encrypted [0089]), arrange for the trusted access point to receive information regarding the current communications session used for providing the requested service from the core network to the communications device via the untrusted access point in advance of the handover, the information regarding the current communications session including at least an indication that the communications device is currently receiving the requested service via the untrusted access point (i.e. the access point 520 associates with a UE 116 to form a connection 525 (fig. 5). The access point 520 can represent the trusted access point 406 or the non-trusted access point 408, depending whether the access point 520 is trusted or not trusted by the 3GPP operator's EPC network 545a-545b. in response to determining that the WiFi access point 520 is not trusted, the UE 116 discovers a Evolved Packet Data Gateway (ePDG) (block 935), then establishes an Internet Protocol security (IPsec) tunnel that connects the untrusted WiFi access point to the discovered ePDG (block 940), and then connects to the EPC PDN GW through the IPsec tunnel that connects the untrusted WiFi access point to an Evolved Packet Data Gateway (ePDG) and connects the EPC PDN GW to the ePDG (block 945). Note that in block 945, the UE 116 and ePDG share an encryption/decryption secret for communications through the IPsec tunnel, which are encrypted because the WiFi access point is untrusted [0056, 0089]), receive the requested service from the core network via the trusted access point after the handover of the communications device from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point (i.e. the UE 116 determines whether the WiFi AP 520 is trusted based on the trust field 605 in the MO 600. In response to determining that the WiFi access point is trusted, the UE sends an L3 attach trigger (block 925), and then connects to the EPC PDN GW through a direct connection (block 930). Note that in block 930, communications between the UE 116 and EPC PDN GW are trusted and thus not required to be encrypted. This disclosure provide an effective way for discovering (with specificity) whether a WLAN access is trusted or not. The MO 600 allows the UE 116 to discover whether a WiFi AP 520 is trusted or not via a HS 2.0 Per Provider Subscription type MO 600 that includes a trust field for each trusted AP [0089-0090])’).
Wang et al. is teaching a service continuity of a communication device by transferring link from an untrusted access point to a trusted access point in a wireless network. Wang et al., however, fail to disclose of method for providing handover of communication device, and receiving the requested service after handover.
NPL-5GS disclose methods and system for network function services to the 5G system architecture with the following features: regarding claim 39, a communications device for providing service continuity in a handover of the communications device from an untrusted access point to a trusted access point in a wireless communications network; and receive the requested service from the core network via the trusted access point after the handover of the communications device from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point (Fig. 4.9.2.1-1, handover of a PDU session procedure from untrusted non-3GPP access to 3GPP access (non-roaming and roaming with local breakout), see teachings in [section 4.9.2 clause 4.9.2.0-4.9.2.1, section 4.9.2.3 clause 4.9.2.3.1-1] summarized as “a communications device for providing service continuity in a handover of the communications device from an untrusted access point to a trusted access point in a wireless communications network (i.e. the procedures in this clause are used to hand over a PDU Session between 3GPP (trusted access point) access and non-3GPP access (untrusted access point). This can be triggered, for example, due to radio conditions, user interaction, etc. When the UE triggers handover of a PDU Session between 3GPP access and non-3GPP access and the procedure fails due to e.g. not allowed by policy or AN rejected resource setup, etc., the network should not release the PDU Session. It specifies how to hand over a UE from a source Untrusted non-3GPP access to a target 3GPP access and how a UE can handover a PDU Session from untrusted non-3GPP access to 3GPP access. It is based on the PDU Session Establishment procedure for 3GPP access as specified in clause 4.3.2 with the following 1, 2, and 3 steps (given below). The steps 2 and 3 shall be repeated for all PDU Sessions to be moved from to untrusted non-3GPP access to 3GPP access (trusted excess point) [section 4.9.2 clause 4.9.2.0-4.9.2.1]), receive the requested service from the core network via the trusted access point after the handover of the communications device from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point (i.e. the UE performs a PDU Session Establishment procedure with the PDU Session ID of the PDU Session to be moved as specified clause 4.3.2.2.2. In the Nsmf (Network Slice Management Function) PDU Session Update Response the H-SMF (Home Session Management Function) shall include all QoS information for the QoS Flow(s) applicable to the PDU Session for the target access so that when sending the PDU Session Establishment Accept, within the N1 SM container and in the N2 SM information, the V-SMF (Visited Session Management Function) can include all QoS information (e.g. QoS Rule(s) in N1 SM container, QFI(s) and QoS Profile(s) in N2 SM information) for the QoS Flow(s) acceptable according to VPLMN policies. (Note: V-SMF is a key component in 5G core networks that handles user sessions for a mobile device that is "roaming" in a foreign network. While the device is visiting another network, the V-SMF manages its data sessions, ensuring seamless connectivity and mobility by interacting with both the visited network's functions and the device's home network). In case of Handover for a PDU Session eligible to EPS (Evolved Packet System) Interworking, the Nsmf_PDUSession_Update Response should also contain: EPS bearer context(s), linked EBI [section 4.9.2.3 clause 4.9.2.3.1-1])”).
It would have been obvious to one of the ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the system of Wang et al. by incorporating the features as taught by NPL-5GS in order to provide a more effective and efficient system that is capable of providing service continuity in a handover of a communications device from an untrusted access point to a trusted access point in a wireless communications network; and receiving, by the transceiver circuitry of the communications device, the requested service from the core network via the trusted access point after the handover of the communications device from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point. The motivation is to support an improved method for connection management to establish and release the control plane signaling connection between the UE and the AMF (see [section 4.2.1]).
Regarding claim 40:
Wang et al. disclose an apparatus and method for an enhanced hotspot 2.0 management object for trusted Non-3GPP access discovery with the following features: regarding claim 39, circuitry in a core network for providing service continuity in a handover of a communications device from an untrusted access point to a trusted access point in a wireless communications network, the circuitry comprising: transceiver circuitry configured to transmit and receive signals; control circuitry configured in combination with the transceiver circuitry to receive, from the communications device via the untrusted access point, a request to receive a service from the core network via the untrusted access point, the communications device being in an inactive state in which it retains a context from a previous communications session with the core network via the trusted access point; provide, to the communications device via the untrusted access point, the requested service using a current communications session; determine that a handover procedure should be performed for the communications device from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point; arrange for the trusted access point to receive information regarding the current communications session used for providing the requested service from the core network to the communications device via the untrusted access point in advance of the handover, the information regarding the current communications session including at least an indication that the communications device is currently receiving the requested service via the untrusted access point; provide the requested service to the communications device via the trusted access point after the handover of the communications device from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point (Fig. 4, illustrates architecture of trusted and untrusted Wi-Fi offload according to this disclosure, see teachings in [0047-0048, 0056, 0058, 0068-0069, 0073-0076-0078, 0085-0090] summarized as “circuitry in a core network for providing service continuity in a handover of a communications device from an untrusted access point to a trusted access point in a wireless communications network, the circuitry comprising (i.e. the architecture 400 of trusted and untrusted Wi-Fi offload includes a Home Public Land Mobile Network (HPLMN) 402 and non-3GPP networks 404. The non-3GPP networks 404 include one or more trusted non-3GPP internet protocol (IP) access points 406 (for example, a WiFi access point), which, together with the HPLMN 402, forms architecture of a trusted Wi-Fi offload. The non-3GPP networks 404 include one or more untrusted non-3GPP internet protocol (IP) access points 408, which, together with the HPLMN 402, form architecture of an untrusted Wi-Fi offload. During initial attach or handover attach, a UE 116 needs to discover the trust relationship (whether the AP 520 (fig. 5) is a Trusted or Untrusted) of the non-3GPP access network 510 in order to know which non-3GPP IP access procedure to initiate. For untrusted access, the UE 116 needs to set up an IPsec tunnel with the ePDG. For trusted access, the UE 116 needs to send a L3 attach trigger [0047-0048, 0085]), transceiver circuitry configured to transmit and receive signals; control circuitry configured in combination with the transceiver circuitry to receive, from the communications device via the untrusted access point, a request to receive a service from the core network via the untrusted access point (i.e. each service provider network 510, 515 (fig. 5) includes a service provider (SP) Core Network 545a-545b that is connected to the internet 570. The UE 116 scans for Wi-Fi Networks by transmitting a query list to the access point 520 in a request according to Generic Advertisement Service (GAS) with Access Network Query Protocol (ANQP). (Note: the UE 116 sent request via untrusted access point 408 to receive service from the core network 420, see fig. 4A). The query list includes a 3GPP Cellular Network ANQP element and NAI realm list element, and the like. The access point 520 transmits a response to the UE 116 according to the GAS ANQP, wherein the contents of the response depend upon the query list of the UE. [0058, 0068, 0077]), the communications device being in an inactive state in which it retains a context from a previous communications session with the core network via the trusted access point (i.e. the UE 116 and Sub Rem server 560 release the TLS session that was previously established. The Sub Rem server 560 includes a database of all trusted access points, along with identification and credential information related to each trusted access point, which can be stored in a tree map as shown in fig. 6 [0058, 0078]), provide, to the communications device via the untrusted access point, the requested service using a current communications session (i.e. the access point 520 transmits a WNM-notification to the UE 116. The WNM-notification includes a remediation URL received from the AAA server 550a (core network). The UE 116 and Sub Rem server 560 establish a TLS session. In response to determining that the WiFi access point 520 is not trusted, the UE 116 discovers a Evolved Packet Data Gateway (ePDG) (block 935), then establishes an Internet Protocol security (IPsec) tunnel that connects the untrusted WiFi access point to the discovered ePDG [0073-0074, 0089]), determine that a handover procedure should be performed for the communications device from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point (i.e. the UE 116 determines whether the WiFi AP 520 is trusted based on the trust field 605 in the MO 600. In response to determining that the WiFi access point is trusted, the UE sends an L3 attach trigger (block 925), and then connects to the EPC PDN GW through a direct connection (block 930). Note that in block 930, communications between the UE 116 and EPC PDN GW are trusted and thus not required to be encrypted [0089]), arrange for the trusted access point to receive information regarding the current communications session used for providing the requested service from the core network to the communications device via the untrusted access point in advance of the handover, the information regarding the current communications session including at least an indication that the communications device is currently receiving the requested service via the untrusted access point (i.e. the access point 520 associates with a UE 116 to form a connection 525 (fig. 5). The access point 520 can represent the trusted access point 406 or the non-trusted access point 408, depending whether the access point 520 is trusted or not trusted by the 3GPP operator's EPC network 545a-545b. in response to determining that the WiFi access point 520 is not trusted, the UE 116 discovers a Evolved Packet Data Gateway (ePDG) (block 935), then establishes an Internet Protocol security (IPsec) tunnel that connects the untrusted WiFi access point to the discovered ePDG (block 940), and then connects to the EPC PDN GW through the IPsec tunnel that connects the untrusted WiFi access point to an Evolved Packet Data Gateway (ePDG) and connects the EPC PDN GW to the ePDG (block 945). Note that in block 945, the UE 116 and ePDG share an encryption/decryption secret for communications through the IPsec tunnel, which are encrypted because the WiFi access point is untrusted [0056, 0089]), provide the requested service to the communications device via the trusted access point after the handover of the communications device from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point (i.e. the UE performs a PDU Session Establishment procedure with the PDU Session ID of the PDU Session to be moved as specified clause 4.3.2.2.2. In the Nsmf (Network Slice Management Function) PDU Session Update Response the H-SMF (Home Session Management Function) shall include all QoS information for the QoS Flow(s) applicable to the PDU Session for the target access so that when sending the PDU Session Establishment Accept, within the N1 SM container and in the N2 SM information, the V-SMF (Visited Session Management Function) can include all QoS information (e.g. QoS Rule(s) in N1 SM container, QFI(s) and QoS Profile(s) in N2 SM information) for the QoS Flow(s) acceptable according to VPLMN policies. (Note: V-SMF is a key component in 5G core networks that handles user sessions for a mobile device that is "roaming" in a foreign network. While the device is visiting another network, the V-SMF manages its data sessions, ensuring seamless connectivity and mobility by interacting with both the visited network's functions and the device's home network). In case of Handover for a PDU Session eligible to EPS (Evolved Packet System) Interworking, the Nsmf_PDUSession_Update Response should also contain: EPS bearer context(s), linked EBI [section 4.9.2.3 clause 4.9.2.3.1-1])”).
Wang et al. is teaching a service continuity of a communication device by transferring link from an untrusted access point to a trusted access point in a wireless network. Wang et al., however, fail to disclose of method for providing handover of communication device, and receiving the requested service after handover.
NPL-5GS disclose methods and system for network function services to the 5G system architecture with the following features: regarding claim 40, circuitry in a core network for providing service continuity in a handover of a communications device from an untrusted access point to a trusted access point in a wireless communications network; and provide the requested service to the communications device via the trusted access point after the handover of the communications device from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point (Fig. 4.9.2.1-1, handover of a PDU session procedure from untrusted non-3GPP access to 3GPP access (non-roaming and roaming with local breakout), see teachings in [section 4.9.2 clause 4.9.2.0-4.9.2.1, section 4.9.2.3 clause 4.9.2.3.1-1] summarized as “circuitry in a core network for providing service continuity in a handover of a communications device from an untrusted access point to a trusted access point in a wireless communications network (i.e. the procedures in this clause are used to hand over a PDU Session between 3GPP (trusted access point) access and non-3GPP access (untrusted access point). This can be triggered, for example, due to radio conditions, user interaction, etc. When the UE triggers handover of a PDU Session between 3GPP access and non-3GPP access and the procedure fails due to e.g. not allowed by policy or AN rejected resource setup, etc., the network should not release the PDU Session. It specifies how to hand over a UE from a source Untrusted non-3GPP access to a target 3GPP access and how a UE can handover a PDU Session from untrusted non-3GPP access to 3GPP access. It is based on the PDU Session Establishment procedure for 3GPP access as specified in clause 4.3.2 with the following 1, 2, and 3 steps (given below). The steps 2 and 3 shall be repeated for all PDU Sessions to be moved from to untrusted non-3GPP access to 3GPP access (trusted excess point) [section 4.9.2 clause 4.9.2.0-4.9.2.1]), provide the requested service to the communications device via the trusted access point after the handover of the communications device from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point (i.e. the UE performs a PDU Session Establishment procedure with the PDU Session ID of the PDU Session to be moved as specified clause 4.3.2.2.2. In the Nsmf (Network Slice Management Function) PDU Session Update Response the H-SMF (Home Session Management Function) shall include all QoS information for the QoS Flow(s) applicable to the PDU Session for the target access so that when sending the PDU Session Establishment Accept, within the N1 SM container and in the N2 SM information, the V-SMF (Visited Session Management Function) can include all QoS information (e.g. QoS Rule(s) in N1 SM container, QFI(s) and QoS Profile(s) in N2 SM information) for the QoS Flow(s) acceptable according to VPLMN policies. (Note: V-SMF is a key component in 5G core networks that handles user sessions for a mobile device that is "roaming" in a foreign network. While the device is visiting another network, the V-SMF manages its data sessions, ensuring seamless connectivity and mobility by interacting with both the visited network's functions and the device's home network). In case of Handover for a PDU Session eligible to EPS (Evolved Packet System) Interworking, the Nsmf_PDUSession_Update Response should also contain: EPS bearer context(s), linked EBI [section 4.9.2.3 clause 4.9.2.3.1-1])”).
It would have been obvious to one of the ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the system of Wang et al. by incorporating the features as taught by NPL-5GS in order to provide a more effective and efficient system that is capable of providing service continuity in a handover of a communications device from an untrusted access point to a trusted access point in a wireless communications network; and receiving, by the transceiver circuitry of the communications device, the requested service from the core network via the trusted access point after the handover of the communications device from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point. The motivation is to support an improved method for connection management to establish and release the control plane signaling connection between the UE and the AMF (see [section 4.2.1]).
Claim(s) 2 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Wang et al. (US 2017/0055302 A1) in view of disclosed NPL, Procedure for the 5G system (3GPP TS 23.502 V16.7.1) (NPL-5GS hereinafter) as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of Wong et al. (US 2019/0281522 A1).
Wang et al. and NPL-5GS disclose the claimed limitations as described in paragraph 5 above. Wang et al. and NPL-5GS do not expressly disclose the following features: regarding claim 2, wherein the arranging, by the communications device, for the trusted access point to receive information regarding the current communications session used for providing the requested service from the core network to the communications device via the untrusted access point in advance of the handover, comprises measuring, by control circuitry in the communications device, a quality of radio and transport conditions between the communications device and the untrusted access point when the communications device is receiving the requested service from the untrusted access point; transmitting, by the transceiver circuitry in the communications device to the core network, an indication of the measured quality of the radio and transport conditions and, in response to receiving the measurements, the core network performs a Quality of Service (QoS) set-up procedure with the trusted access point in which the trusted access point receives the indication that the communications device is currently receiving the requested service from the core network via the untrusted access point.
Wong et al. disclose methods and apparatus for supporting and/or providing desired levels of quality of service for PDU sessions with the following features: regarding claim 2, wherein the arranging, by the communications device, for the trusted access point to receive information regarding the current communications session used for providing the requested service from the core network to the communications device via the untrusted access point in advance of the handover, comprises measuring, by control circuitry in the communications device, a quality of radio and transport conditions between the communications device and the untrusted access point when the communications device is receiving the requested service from the untrusted access point; transmitting, by the transceiver circuitry in the communications device to the core network, an indication of the measured quality of the radio and transport conditions and, in response to receiving the measurements, the core network performs a Quality of Service (QoS) set-up procedure with the trusted access point in which the trusted access point receives the indication that the communications device is currently receiving the requested service from the core network via the untrusted access point (Fig. 3, is a drawing illustrating 3GPP 5G architecture in accordance with TS 23.501 for non 3GGP access, see teachings in [0026, 0030, 0032, 0034, 0049, 0054] summarized as “3GPP 5G architecture 300 includes a VPLMN 302 and a non-3GPP network(s) 304. Visited Public Land Mobile Network (VPLMN) 302 includes a 3GPP access component 306, e.g., a Long Term Evolution (LTE) or New Radio (NR) wireless access point, e.g. , base station, a AMF 308, a SMF 310, a Non-3GPP Interworking Function (N3IWF) 312, a UPF 314 and a DN 316. The non-3GPP network 304 includes an untrusted non-3GPP access component 320, e.g., an untrusted WiFi access point, e.g., base station. UE 318 may, and sometimes does, belong to both the VPLMN 302 and the non-3GPP network 304. A UE accessing 5G over Data Over Cable Service Interface Specification (Docis) can use the architecture shown in FIG. 3, via the untrusted 3GPP access. Ideally, it would be desirable if the same quality of experience (QoE) could be provided to the UE 318 regardless of which radio access, e.g., cellular or WiFi, is being used to access the same network e.g., data network 316, assuming radio link bandwidth is not the bottle neck. UE 1 450 (fig. 4) or UE 2 452 are able to experience the same QoE regardless of which radio access is used, provided the QoS request is granted. The system 400 of fig. 4, UE1 450 and UE 2 452 can be connected to the same server 432 via Docis or 3GPP radio access, using a common 5G core network 404. Exemplary communications system 400 includes a plurality of UEs including UE 1 450 and UE 2 452, a 3GPP radio access network 402′, e.g., a LTE/NR network, including a 3GPP LTE/NR radio node 402, e.g., LTE/NR base station or access point, a non-3GPP radio access network 408′, e.g., a WiFi radio access network, including a non-3GPP access point 408, e.g., a WiFi base station, a 5G core network 404 including N3IWF 406, AMF 407, PCF 418, and UPF 409, a CM#1 410, a voice telephone line 412, a CMTS 414 including a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) 416, a coaxial cable 420, a connection 422, a connection 424, a connection 426, a data network 430 and a server 432, coupled together as shown in FIG. 4. In various embodiments, connections 422, 424 and 426 are part of coaxial cable 420. Each UE (450, 452) includes a wireless receiver, a wireless transmitter, a processor, memory, an assembly of hardware components, e.g., circuits, an input device and an output device, coupled together via a bus over which the various elements may interchange data and information. UE 450 includes processor 451. The N3IWF 406 generates and sends QoS request signal 575 to CMTS 414. QoS request signal 575 includes a QoS request information indicating a desired level of QoS for a PDU session for UE 450. In step 588 UE 450 receives the PDU session establishment accept signal 587 and recovers the communicated information indicating accept. As an alternative to including QoS expectation information in step 586, in step 589, assuming the request has been granted, AMF 407 of 5GC 404 generates and sends a NAS message 590, e.g., QoS grant message, via CMTS 414 and CM 410 to UE 450 communicating QoS expectation information. In step 5891 CMTS 414 is operated to communicate QoS expectation information message 590, being sent by the AMF 407 of the 5G wireless core 404 to the UE 450 via the cable modem 410. In step 5892 CM 404 is operated to communicate QoS expectation information message 590, being sent by the AMF 407 of the 5G wireless core 404 to the UE 450 along the path including the CMTS 414 and CM 410”).
It would have been obvious to one of the ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the system of Wang et al. with NPL-5GS by incorporating the features as taught by Wong et al. in order to provide a more effective and efficient system that is capable of arranging, by the communications device, for the trusted access point to receive information regarding the current communications session used for providing the requested service from the core network to the communications device via the untrusted access point in advance of the handover, comprises measuring, by control circuitry in the communications device, a quality of radio and transport conditions between the communications device and the untrusted access point when the communications device is receiving the requested service from the untrusted access point; transmitting, by the transceiver circuitry in the communications device to the core network, an indication of the measured quality of the radio and transport conditions and, in response to receiving the measurements, the core network performs a Quality of Service (QoS) set-up procedure with the trusted access point in which the trusted access point receives the indication that the communications device is currently receiving the requested service from the core network via the untrusted access point.
The motivation is to support an improved method for supporting and/or providing desired levels of quality of service for PDU sessions (see [0001]).
Claim(s) 3-4 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Wang et al. (US 2017/0055302 A1) in view of disclosed NPL, Procedure for the 5G system (3GPP TS 23.502 V16.7.1) (NPL-5GS hereinafter) and Wong et al. (US 2019/0281522 A1) as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of Allanki et al. (US 10,499,328 B2).
Wang et al., NPL-5GS and Wong et al. disclose the claimed limitations as described in paragraph 5 above. Wang et al., NPL-5GS and Wong et al. do not expressly disclose the following features: regarding claim 3, wherein the transmitting, by the transceiver circuitry in the communications device, the indication of the measured quality of the radio and transport conditions to the trusted access point comprises, including, by control circuitry in the communications device, the indication of the measured quality of the radio and transport conditions in a Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Status indication message; transmitting, by the transceiver circuitry in the communications device, the WLAN to the trusted access point for forwarding onto the core network; regarding claim 4, wherein the transmitting, by the transceiver circuitry in the communications device, the indication of the measured quality of the radio and transport conditions to the trusted access point comprises, including, by control circuitry in the communications device, the indication of the measured quality of the radio and transport conditions in an RRC Resume message; transmitting, by the transceiver circuitry in the communications device, the RRC Resume message to the trusted access point for forwarding onto the core network.
Canpolat et al. disclose methods, systems and devices for enhanced QoS for 5G wireless communications with the following features: regarding claim 3, wherein the transmitting, by the transceiver circuitry in the communications device, the indication of the measured quality of the radio and transport conditions to the trusted access point comprises, including, by control circuitry in the communications device, the indication of the measured quality of the radio and transport conditions in a Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Status indication message; transmitting, by the transceiver circuitry in the communications device, the WLAN to the trusted access point for forwarding onto the core network (Fig. 3, is a drawing illustrating 3GPP 5G architecture in accordance with TS 23.501 for non 3GGP access, see teachings in [0059, 0061] summarized as “enable QoS differentiation within Wi-Fi access for the 5G user data and the 5G signaling carried over the Wi-Fi access in 5G systems. This can ensure end-to-end Quality of Service for 5G services/applications carried over Wi-Fi access, enabling seamless usage of 3GPP and Wi-Fi radios, thus providing improved user experience. In addition, the proposed scheme enables providing 5G QoS characteristics and parameters to WLAN AP which can enable better resource allocation/reservation for 5G flows within Wi-Fi, leading to overall improved resource usage and operation of the WLAN network. The proposed QoS differentiation mechanism can be used for both untrusted as well as trusted WLAN integration model with 5G. As part of the Multi-Access (MA) PDU session establishment procedures as defined in 3GPP TS 23.502, if the UE is registered over both NR and Wi-Fi access, two separate N3/N9 tunnels are established between the 5G Core and 3GPP access and Wi-Fi access for the PDU data transfer. The gateway functions N3IWF or TNGF create IPsec child SAs (security associations) in a tunnel mode with the UE to carry 5G user plane traffic over the Wi-Fi access. Also, during a single access PDU session establishment over Wi-Fi access, the gateway functions N3IWF or TNGF create IPsec child SAs with the UE to carry 5G traffic over Wi-Fi”); regarding claim 4, wherein the transmitting, by the transceiver circuitry in the communications device, the indication of the measured quality of the radio and transport conditions to the trusted access point comprises, including, by control circuitry in the communications device, the indication of the measured quality of the radio and transport conditions in an RRC Resume message; transmitting, by the transceiver circuitry in the communications device, the RRC Resume message to the trusted access point for forwarding onto the core network (Fig. 2, illustrates an example end-to-end quality of service (QoS) model for Wi-Fi communications in fifth-generation (5G) systems, in accordance with one or more example embodiments of the present disclosure, see teachings in [0100-0101, 0106] summarized as “the UE 102 (fig. 2), RAN 104, and AP 106 may utilize cellular-WLAN aggregation (for example, LWA/LWIP). Cellular-WLAN aggregation may involve the UE 102 being configured by the RAN 104 to utilize both cellular radio resources and WLAN resources. The RAN 104 may include one or more access nodes, for example, AN 108. AN 108 may terminate air-interface protocols for the UE 102 by providing access stratum protocols including RRC, PDCP, RLC, MAC, and L1 protocols. In this manner, the AN 108 may enable data/voice connectivity between CN 120 and the UE 102. In some embodiments, the AN 108 may be implemented in a discrete device or as one or more software entities running on server computers as part of, for example, a virtual network, which may be referred to as a CRAN or virtual baseband unit pool. The AN 108 be referred to as a BS, gNB, RAN node, eNB, ng-eNB, NodeB, RSU, TRxP, TRP, etc. The AN 108 may be a macrocell base station or a low power base station for providing femtocells, picocells or other like cells having smaller coverage areas, smaller user capacity, or higher bandwidth compared to macrocells. The RAN 104 may be an LTE RAN 110 with eNB s, for example, eNB 112. The LTE RAN 110 may provide an LTE air interface with the following characteristics: SCS of 15 kHz; CP-OFDM waveform for DL and SC-FDMA waveform for UL; turbo codes for data and TBCC for control; etc. The LTE air interface may rely on CSI-RS for CSI acquisition and beam management; PDSCH/PDCCH DMRS for PDSCH/PDCCH demodulation; and CRS for cell search and initial acquisition, channel quality measurements, and channel estimation for coherent demodulation/detection at the UE. The LTE air interface may operating on sub-6 GHz bands”).
It would have been obvious to one of the ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the system of Wang et al. with NPL-5GS and Wong et al. by incorporating the features as taught by Canpolat et al. in order to provide a more effective and efficient system that is capable of including, by control circuitry in the communications device, the indication of the measured quality of the radio and transport conditions in a Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Status indication message; transmitting, by the transceiver circuitry in the communications device, the WLAN to the trusted access point for forwarding onto the core network, and including, by control circuitry in the communications device, the indication of the measured quality of the radio and transport conditions in an RRC Resume message; transmitting, by the transceiver circuitry in the communications device, the RRC Resume message to the trusted access point for forwarding onto the core network. The motivation is to support an improved method for enhanced QoS for 5G wireless communications (see [0034]).
Claim(s) 5 and 9 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Wang et al. (US 2017/0055302 A1) in view of disclosed NPL, Procedure for the 5G system (3GPP TS 23.502 V16.7.1) (NPL-5GS hereinafter) as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of Allanki et al. (US 10,499,328 B2).
Wang et al. and NPL-5GS disclose the claimed limitations as described in paragraph 5 above. Wang et al. and NPL-5GS do not expressly disclose the following features: regarding claim 5, wherein the measuring, by the control circuitry in the communications device, the quality of radio and transport conditions between the communications device and the untrusted access point when the communications device is receiving the requested service from the untrusted access point comprises measuring jitter and packet loss between the communications device and the untrusted access point when the communications device is receiving the requested service from the untrusted access point; and the transmitting, by the transceiver circuitry in the communications device to the core network, the indication of the measured quality of the radio and transport conditions comprises transmitting an indication of the measured jitter and packet loss; regarding claim 9, comprising measuring, by the control circuitry in the communications device, a quality of radio conditions between the communications device and the untrusted access point when the communications device is receiving the requested service from the untrusted access point; and wherein the determining, by the communications device, that the handover procedure should be performed for the communications device from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point comprises: detecting, by the control circuitry in the communications device, based on the measurements of the quality of the radio conditions, that the quality of the radio conditions are below a pre-defined threshold and, in response, transmitting, by the transceiver circuitry in the communications device, an indication to the trusted access point that the communications device should be handed over from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point.
Allanki et al. disclose a method and system for self-organizing networks with fast link setup with the following features: regarding claim 5, wherein the measuring, by the control circuitry in the communications device, the quality of radio and transport conditions between the communications device and the untrusted access point when the communications device is receiving the requested service from the untrusted access point comprises measuring jitter and packet loss between the communications device and the untrusted access point when the communications device is receiving the requested service from the untrusted access point; and the transmitting, by the transceiver circuitry in the communications device to the core network, the indication of the measured quality of the radio and transport conditions comprises transmitting an indication of the measured jitter and packet loss (Fig. 2, illustrates an access point in accordance with one non-limiting aspect of the present invention, see teachings in col 5 ln 37-67, col 6 ln 1-27, col 7 ln 11-44] summarized as “access point 12 may include interfaces for exchanging signaling with a backbone or long-haul network over a connection and for exchanging wireless signals with clients within a corresponding signaling range. The access points and clients may optionally be configured to facilitate Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) communications. Link measurement: The link measurement request/report exchange provides measurements of the RF characteristics of a STA to STA link. This measurement indicates the instantaneous quality of a link. The Transmit Stream/Category measurement is a request/report pair that enables a QoS STA to inquire of a peer QoS STA the condition of an ongoing traffic stream link between them. The Transmit Stream/Category Measurement Report provides the transmit-side performance metrics for the measured traffic stream. Trigger conditions included in the Transmit Stream/Category Measurement Request may initiate triggered Transmit Stream/Category Measurement Reports upon detection of the trigger condition. The access point in an example of Wi-Fi Management on a device within the context of the Wi-Fi GW management interfaces specified within the noted Wi-Fi Provisioning Framework Specification (WR-SP-WiFi-MGMT-I06-160111), which for exemplary purpose is described with respect to a router having a cable modem (CM). The CM may be configured to support Wi-Fi as part of its LAN facing CPE interfaces and/or according to the Wi-Fi interfaces. Received signal strength from devices Noise and interference levels Packet error rates and packet loss rates Throughput of uplink and downlink per device location Load threshold indicators Channel utilization Band utilization Rogue access point detection Neighbor access point detection Delays, latencies and jitter for traffic uplink and downlink”); regarding claim 9, comprising measuring, by the control circuitry in the communications device, a quality of radio conditions between the communications device and the untrusted access point when the communications device is receiving the requested service from the untrusted access point; and wherein the determining, by the communications device, that the handover procedure should be performed for the communications device from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point comprises: detecting, by the control circuitry in the communications device, based on the measurements of the quality of the radio conditions, that the quality of the radio conditions are below a pre-defined threshold and, in response, transmitting, by the transceiver circuitry in the communications device, an indication to the trusted access point that the communications device should be handed over from the untrusted access point to the trusted access point (Fig. 2, illustrates an access point in accordance with one non-limiting aspect of the present invention, see teachings in col 5 ln 37-50333, col 6 ln 1-27, col 7 ln 11-44, col 7 ln 11-44] summarized as “the link measurement request/report exchange provides measurements of the RF characteristics of a STA to STA link. This measurement indicates the instantaneous quality of a link. Transmit stream/category measurement: The Transmit Stream/Category measurement is a request/report pair that enables a QoS STA to inquire of a peer QoS STA the condition of an ongoing traffic stream link between them. The Transmit Stream/Category Measurement Report provides the transmit-side performance metrics for the measured traffic stream. Trigger conditions included in the Transmit Stream/Category Measurement Request may initiate triggered Transmit Stream/Category Measurement Reports upon detection of the trigger condition. WBA Carrier Guidelines or Carrier Wi-Fi LAN (CWLAN) may be defined as the carrier operated public Wi-Fi network, which may be different from the consumer and enterprise networks, meaning operators may have the means to manage radio resources, including the ability to, but not limited to, manage the following list of parameters below: Transmit power MCS rates MIMO and MU-MIMO configurations Beam forming configurations Channel bandwidth Maximum throughput per device Carrier sense thresholds Multi Band configuration and steering of devices, which can include dynamic traffic load sharing across bands Subscriber and service-driven dynamic load balancing among access points, bands and channels Channel assignments Interference avoidance and mitigation for higher density deployments The CWLAN will support the operator's ability to collect and monitor the KPIs listed below. (Note that KPI value ranges may need to be targeted to certain services): Received signal strength from devices Noise and interference levels Packet error rates and packet loss rates Throughput of uplink and downlink per device location Load threshold indicators Channel utilization Band utilization Rogue access point detection Neighbor access point detection Delays, latencies and jitter for traffic uplink and downlink”).
It would have been obvious to one of the ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the system of Wang et al. with NPL-5GS by incorporating the features as taught by Allanki et al. in order to provide a more effective and efficient system that is capable of measuring, by the control circuitry in the communications device, the quality of radio and transport conditions between the communications device and the untrusted access point when the communications device is receiving the requested service from the untrusted access point comprises measuring jitter and packet loss between the communications device and the untrusted access point when the communications device is receiving the requested service from the untrusted access point; and the transmitting, by the transceiver circuitry in the communications device to the core network, the indication of the measured quality of the radio and transport conditions comprises transmitting an indication of the measured jitter and packet loss; and measuring a quality of radio conditions between the communications device and the untrusted access point, and the indication of the measured quality of the radio and transport conditions comprises transmitting an indication of the measured jitter and packet loss. The motivation is to support an improved method for limiting initial link setup in manage networks, self-organizing networks systems, etc. (see [col 1 ln 14-15]).
Claim(s) 6 and 16-17 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Wang et al. (US 2017/0055302 A1) in view of disclosed NPL, Procedure for the 5G system (3GPP TS 23.502 V16.7.1) (NPL-5GS hereinafter) as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of Canpolat et al. (US 2021/0329499 A1).
Wang et al. and NPL-5GS disclose the claimed limitations as described in paragraph 5 above. Wang et al. and NPL-5GS do not expressly disclose the following features: regarding claim 6, wherein the transmitting, by the transceiver circuitry of the communications device to the untrusted access point, the request to receive the service from the core network of the wireless communications network via the untrusted access point comprises submitting, by a non-access stratum (NAS) protocol layer in the communications device, the request for receiving the service to an access (AS) protocol layer in the communications device and the transceiver circuitry of the communications device transmitting the request to receive the service in response; regarding claim 16, wherein the current communications session is a Multi-Access Protocol Data Unit (MA-PDU) session; regarding claim 17, wherein the requested service is a Guaranteed Bit Rate (GBR) service.
Canpolat et al. disclose methods, systems and devices for enhanced QoS for 5G wireless communications with the following features: regarding claim 6, wherein the transmitting, by the transceiver circuitry of the communications device to the untrusted access point, the request to receive the service from the core network of the wireless communications network via the untrusted access point comprises submitting, by a non-access stratum (NAS) protocol layer in the communications device, the request for receiving the service to an access (AS) protocol layer in the communications device and the transceiver circuitry of the communications device transmitting the request to receive the service in response (Fig. 2, illustrates an example end-to-end quality of service (QoS) model for Wi-Fi communications in fifth-generation (5G) systems, in accordance with one or more example embodiments of the present disclosure, see teachings in [0025, 0033, 0056] summarized as “current 3GPP 5G solution with in-band DSCP marking to provide QoS differentiation over WLAN access has following limitations: (1) The in-band DSCP marking based approach may not work for Wi-Fi integration where the path between N3IWF/TNGF and WLAN AP is unmanaged and might traverse the internet (e.g. for untrusted WLAN integration) and the in-band DSCP markings may get reset by the routers over that path, resulting in no QoS differentiation for the 5G flows in the WLAN access. (2) The mapping between 5G QoS (5QI) to DSCP markings at the gateway functions (N3IWF and TNGF) is implementation dependent and there is no recommendation provided by 3GPP to map 5G QoS characteristics to Wi-Fi QoS. This could result in inconsistent QoS experience across different 5G network deployments. (3) Current DSCP based solution does not provide detailed 5G QoS flow characteristics, parameters and flow identification/filtering information to WLAN STA on the device. The WLAN STA can use 5G QoS related information to trigger QoS negotiation and resource reservation for 5G flows within the WLAN domain. Enabling QoS differentiation for NAS signaling over WLAN can provide QoS benefits to meet requirements for different services and applications. For example, 5G non-access-stratum (NAS) signaling data can be prioritized with AC_VO or AC_VI on the Wi-Fi access, resulting in reduced control plane latency for 5G signaling over Wi-Fi, which can be useful for low-latency applications. The in-band DSCP marking for QoS differentiation does not provide any detailed 5G QoS characteristics and parameters to a WLAN AP that can be beneficial for WLAN AP to perform resource allocation/reservation for 5G flows within the WLAN access. Higher Layer Stream ID for 5G: The Higher Layer Stream ID element identifies a stream from the higher layer protocol. This element is used to bind messages that are exchanged to complete the AP-initiated TS setup procedure. Higher Layer Stream ID format is defined in IEEE 802.11-2016 FIG. 9-545 as shown in Tables 2 and 3. A new higher layer protocol ID value needs to be defined for 5G NAS protocol as shown Table 4 using one of the existing Reserved value. 5G_TSPEC Element: The 5G_TSPEC element is a new 802.11 element which specifies 5G QoS flow characteristics and parameters as defined in the 3GPP specs”); regarding claim 16, wherein the current communications session is a Multi-Access Protocol Data Unit (MA-PDU) session (Fig. 2, illustrates an example end-to-end quality of service (QoS) model for Wi-Fi communications in fifth-generation (5G) systems, in accordance with one or more example embodiments of the present disclosure, see teachings in [0023, 0134-0135] summarized as “the Third-Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) releases 15 and 16 define support for integrating untrusted and trusted Wi-Fi access networks with fifth generation (5G) systems through N3IWF (Non-3GPP Inter-Working Function) and TNGF (Trusted Non-3GPP Gateway Function) functions respectively as described in TS 23.501 of the technical standards. A user equipment (UE) can establish a protocol data unit (PDU) session over Wi-Fi access only, or it can establish Multi-Access PDU session (MA PDU session) which enables carrying user plane traffic over both 3GPP (NR, LTE) and Wi-Fi access simultaneously. The QoS model 300 uses an in-band DSCP marking to achieve QoS differentiation in a WLAN access. Because there are deployments in which the DSCP marking may not be preserved and reset by intermediate routers, there may be a need for QoS management that does not reply to in-band DSCP marking. During the multi-access PDU session establishment or the single access PDU session establishment involving Wi-Fi access, the UE can initiate QoS management with the WLAN AP for 5G flows to be carried over Wi-Fi access in 5G Systems, without the need for in-band DSCP marking for QoS differentiation”); regarding claim 17, wherein the requested service is a Guaranteed Bit Rate (GBR) service (Fig. 2, illustrates an example end-to-end quality of service (QoS) model for Wi-Fi communications in fifth-generation (5G) systems, in accordance with one or more example embodiments of the present disclosure, see teachings in [0056, table 1] summarized as “the 5G_TSPEC element is a new 802.11 element which specifies 5G QoS flow characteristics and parameters as defined in the 3GPP specs. The 5G_TSPEC element definition is captured in FIG. 6-4. The Max Flow Bit Rate for DL and UL fields, the Guaranteed Flow Bit Rate for DL and UL fields and the Max Packet Loss Rate for DL and UL fields are included only for the GBR and the Delay-Critical GBR resource type. Table 1 highlights Mapping 5G QoS Parameters to TSPEC Parameters TSPEC Parameter (for Admission Control) Mapped 5G QoS Parameter Minimum Data Rate GBR flow: Guaranteed Flow Bit Rate (GFBR) Non-GBR flow: not specified Mean Data Rate GBR flow: Guaranteed Flow Bit Rate (GFBR) Non-GBR flow: Session Aggregate Maximum Bit Rate (Session-AMBR) Note 1 Peak Data Rate GBR flow: Maximum Flow Bit Rate (MFBR) Non-GBR flow: Session Aggregate Maximum Bit Rate (Session-AMBR) Note 1 Burst Size (Optional) Max Data Burst Volume Note 1: For Non-GBR flow, Session Aggregate Maximum Bit Rate indicate aggregate bit rate for all the non- GBR flows for a PDU session. This Session-AMBR can be mapped to Mean Data Rate and Peak Data Rate in the TSPEC only when all the flows of a PDU session are mapped to the same IPsec child SA”).
It would have been obvious to one of the ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the system of Wang et al. with NPL-5GS by incorporating the features as taught by Canpolat et al. in order to provide a more effective and efficient system that is capable of transmitting, by the transceiver circuitry of the communications device to the untrusted access point, the request to receive the service from the core network of the wireless communications network via the untrusted access point comprises submitting, by a non-access stratum (NAS) protocol layer in the communications device, the request for receiving the service to an access (AS) protocol layer in the communications device and the transceiver circuitry of the communications device transmitting the request to receive the service in response, current communications session is a Multi-Access Protocol Data Unit (MA-PDU) session, and the requested service is a Guaranteed Bit Rate (GBR) service. The motivation is to support an improved method for enhanced QoS for 5G wireless communications (see [0034]).
Claim(s) 11 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Wang et al. (US 2017/0055302 A1) in view of disclosed NPL, Procedure for the 5G system (3GPP TS 23.502 V16.7.1) (NPL-5GS hereinafter) and Allanki et al. (US 10,499,328 B2) as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of Arumugam et al. (US 2018/0220329 A1).
Wang et al., NPL-5GS and Allanki et al. disclose the claimed limitations as described in paragraph 5 above. Wang et al., NPL-5GS and Allanki et al. do not expressly disclose the following features: regarding claim 11, wherein the measuring, by the control circuitry in the communications device, the quality of the radio conditions between the communications device and the untrusted access point when the communications device is receiving the requested service from the untrusted access point comprises measuring one or more of a signal to noise plus interference (SINR) ratio, reference signal received power (RSRP), reference signal received quality (RSRQ) or block error rate (BLER)and the detecting, by the control circuitry in the communications device, based on the measurements of the quality of the radio conditions, that the quality of the radio conditions are below a pre-defined threshold comprises detecting that the measured one or more of the measured SINR, RSRP, RSRQ or BLER is below a pre-defined threshold.
Arumugam et al. disclose systems, methods, and devices for improved operations of a wireless local area network with the following features: regarding claim 11, wherein the measuring, by the control circuitry in the communications device, the quality of the radio conditions between the communications device and the untrusted access point when the communications device is receiving the requested service from the untrusted access point comprises measuring one or more of a signal to noise plus interference (SINR) ratio, reference signal received power (RSRP), reference signal received quality (RSRQ) or block error rate (BLER)and the detecting, by the control circuitry in the communications device, based on the measurements of the quality of the radio conditions, that the quality of the radio conditions are below a pre-defined threshold comprises detecting that the measured one or more of the measured SINR, RSRP, RSRQ or BLER is below a pre-defined threshold (Fig. 1B, is system block diagram of a network architecture suitable for use with various embodiments, see teachings in [0049, 0097] summarized as “network architecture 150 may also include trusted and/or untrusted WLANs (e.g., Wi-Fi networks). The wireless communication device 102 may connect to a trusted WLAN 180 and/or an untrusted WLAN 182 by connecting to corresponding wireless access points (e.g., 122). In particular, the EPC 154 may include a Trusted Wireless Access Gateway (TWAG) 186 to which the trusted WLAN 180 may connect, and an Evolved Packet Data Gateway (ePDG) 188 to which the untrusted WLAN 182 may connect. Details about the inclusion of these entities are specified in the LTE standards, such as 3GPP Technical Specification 23.402 version 10.4.0 Release 10. The power saving scheme may be implemented when the signal strength of the WLAN network on which paging messages for mobile terminating calls to the first SIM are configured to be transmitted is above a WLAN threshold, and/or the signal strength of the network on which the first SIM is camped (i.e., serving network) is above a network signal threshold. In various embodiments, the strength of a signal received from the WLAN or the serving network may be measured, for example, using Received Channel Power Indicator (RCPI), Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI), Reference Signal Received Power (RSRP), or other parameter. As described, the power saving scheme may be performed by decoding the paging channel for only the last paging occasion prior to the modification boundary associated with the network, rather than decoding the paging channel during the active period of each DRX cycle. As such, the paging channel is only decoded during a subframe in which a change notification message, if sent by the network, will be included. In this manner, the power usage by the wireless communication device may be significantly reduced, while the change notification message is still received from the serving network in advance of the next modification period.
It would have been obvious to one of the ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the system of Wang et al. with NPL-5GS and Allanki et al. by incorporating the features as taught by Won in order to provide a more effective and efficient system that is capable of measuring, by the control circuitry in the communications device, the quality of the radio conditions between the communications device and the untrusted access point when the communications device is receiving the requested service from the untrusted access point comprises measuring one or more of reference signal received power (RSRP). The motivation is to support an improved method for improved operations of a wireless local area network (see [0005]).
Claim(s) 13 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Wang et al. (US 2017/0055302 A1) in view of disclosed NPL, Procedure for the 5G system (3GPP TS 23.502 V16.7.1) (NPL-5GS hereinafter) as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of Won (US 2021/0051577 A1).
Wang et al. and NPL-5GS disclose the claimed limitations as described in paragraph 5 above. Wang et al. and NPL-5GS do not expressly disclose the following features: regarding claim 13, wherein the non- trusted access point is a base station forming part of a stand-alone non-public network (SNPN);
Won discloses methods and apparatus, including computer program products, are provided for handling non-integrity protected reject messages in non-public networks with the following features: regarding claim 13, wherein the non- trusted access point is a base station forming part of a stand-alone non-public network (SNPN) (Fig. 1, depicts an example of a portion of a 5G wireless network, in accordance with some example embodiments, see teachings in [0049-0050, 0060] summarized as “5G wireless network 100 may include a user equipment (UE) 102 configured to wirelessly couple to a radio access network (RAN) 104 (also called a core network 104) being served by a wireless access point 106, such as a base station, wireless local area network access point, home base station, and/or other type of wireless access point. The network 100 may include the core network 104, which may include non-illustrated features such as an access and mobility management function (AMF), a visiting session management function (V-SMF), a visiting policy control function (v-PCF), a visiting network slice selection function (v-NSSF), and/or a visiting user plane function (V-UPF).
In some embodiments, these devices may be associated with a standalone non-public network (SNPN). Due to these and other differences between public networks (e.g., PLMNs) and non-public networks 104 (e.g., SNPNs 104), the current 3GPP standard and other currently available protocols and approaches are insufficient to reduce or prevent DoS attacks stemming from a UE 102 receiving a malicious REJECT MESSAGE 112, in response to sending a REGISTRATION REQUEST 110 to a non-public network 104, and re-attempting a REGISTRATION REQUEST 110 with a malicious network or fake access point 108, leading to repeated DoS or successful registration and/or connection of the UE 102 with a rogue access point 108”);
It would have been obvious to one of the ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the system of Wang et al. with NPL-5GS by incorporating the features as taught by Won in order to provide a more effective and efficient system that is capable of using non- trusted access point as a base station forming part of a stand-alone non-public network (SNPN). The motivation is to support an improved method for handling non-integrity protected reject messages in non-public networks (see [0005]).
Claim(s) 14 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Wang et al. (US 2017/0055302 A1) in view of disclosed NPL, Procedure for the 5G system (3GPP TS 23.502 V16.7.1) (NPL-5GS hereinafter) as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of Basavapatna et al. (US 2013/0097711 A1).
Wang et al. and NPL-5GS disclose the claimed limitations as described in paragraph 5 above. Wang et al. and NPL-5GS do not expressly disclose the following features: regarding claim 14, wherein the non- trusted access point is a residential gateway implementing WiFi protocols for radio communication (Fig. 5, is a schematic representation of assessments of multiple wireless access points in accordance with at least some embodiments, see teachings in [0053, 0060] summarized as “ network 500 includes mobile security tool 510 with one or more wireless-enabled endpoint computing devices 505 used to assess risk at one or more wireless access points 515, 520. One or more of the wireless access points (e.g., 515) can be a rogue wireless access point 515, for instance, used by a malicious device (e.g., 535) to phish or snoop data sent over the wireless access point. A user may attempt to connect to WiFi networks within an airport, or another public place, using a mobile smartphone. A number of available WiFi networks (or access points) may be detected and displayed to the user. In some instances, rogue mobile access points can lure unsuspecting users into utilizing their connection by adopting a name that suggests legitimacy. For instance, in the Dallas, Tex. DFW Airport, a rogue wireless access point might adopt a name "DFW WiFi," so as to (falsely) suggest to potential users that the access point is maintained by officials of the airport or some other legitimate source. Indeed in some instances, a rogue wireless access point may adopt (i.e., counterfeit) the exact name of an official access point or hot spot, so as to cause users to select (sometimes blindly) the rogue access point over the actual, sponsored access point. In instances where rogue access point detection and/or other access point risk assessment functionality is available to the endpoint devices, such as in some of the previously described examples, the wireless access points encountered by the endpoint device can be assessed for trustworthiness, according to the principles described above. Indeed, in an example where two different wireless access points are presented with the same SSID, it can be determined that there is a high likelihood that one of the two wireless access points is rogue and attempting to mimic the other, resulting in more diligent risk assessment of the wireless access points, as well as feedback data reporting the likely presence of at least one rogue access point at the particular location where the wireless access points were detected (e.g., the airport). Indeed, previous identification of rogue access points at a particular location can cause enhanced scrutiny of future detected wireless access points at that location”).
It would have been obvious to one of the ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the system of Wang et al. with NPL-5GS by incorporating the features as taught by Basavapatna et al. in order to provide a more effective and efficient system that is capable of using the non- trusted access point is a residential gateway implementing WiFi protocols for radio communication. The motivation is to support an improved method for identifying pre-existing risk assessment data for the identified particular wireless access point (see [0012]).
Claim(s) 15 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Wang et al. (US 2017/0055302 A1) in view of disclosed NPL, Procedure for the 5G system (3GPP TS 23.502 V16.7.1) (NPL-5GS hereinafter) as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of Durbin (US 9,521,116 B2).
Wang et al. and NPL-5GS disclose the claimed limitations as described in paragraph 5 above. Wang et al. and NPL-5GS do not expressly disclose the following features: regarding claim 15, wherein the trusted access point is infrastructure equipment forming part of the wireless communications network.
Durbin discloses a method and apparatus for providing a secure public wireless network to protect data transferred over the public wireless network with the following features: regarding claim 15, wherein the trusted access point is infrastructure equipment forming part of the wireless communications network (Fig. 6A, illustrates a secured local network, according to one embodiment, see teachings in [col 9 ln 64-67, col 10 ln 1-29] summarized as “system 100 includes mobile devices 601a-601b, herein after referred to as mobile device 601, a VPN data center 603, an information sensitive service center 605, WiFi enabled routers 611, trusted secured WiFi links, public wireless networks, etc. The application 105 installed on the mobile device 601, recognizes secured and/or unsecured wireless networks that are available at the time the mobile device 601 establishes a connection to the public wireless network. The application 105 may then enable the mobile device 601 to establish a secured connection to the wireless network to access data from the information sensitive service center 605. In an embodiment, the information sensitive service center 605 may include a bank, an insurance company, social networks, etc. When a user of the mobile device 601 desires to access sensitive information (e.g., bank account details, insurance policies data, passwords, etc.) from the information sensitive service center 605, through a secured local network (e.g., home network), the application 105 recognizes the local network as a secured local network based on wireless access identifiers associated with the local network. In an embodiment, the wireless access identifiers may include Service Set Identifiers (SSIDs), hardware identifiers, contextual identifiers, or combination thereof. When the application 105 recognizes the wireless access identifier as a secured wireless access identifier, then a secured WiFi connection to the information sensitive service center 605 is established through WiFi enabled routers 611 and therefore, no VPN connection is initiated. Further, the secured local network is enabled with security protocols such as Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2-PSK), and the like”).
It would have been obvious to one of the ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the system of Wang et al. with NPL-5GS by incorporating the features as taught by Durbin in order to provide a more effective and efficient system that is capable of having the trusted access point is infrastructure equipment forming part of the wireless communications network. The motivation is to support an improved method for identifying pre-existing risk assessment data for protecting data and/or traffic transferred over the public wireless network on devices (see [col 1 ln 31-32]).
Allowable Subject Matter
Claims 8 and 11 are objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed 03/04/2026 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
Applicant states in remarks “the Office Action asserts that Wang describes a communication device being in an inactive state during transmission of a request to receive service (Office Action, p. 5). However, Wang merely describes that a UE 116 and Sub Rem server 560 release a TLS session (Wang, [0078]). There is no mention in Wang of whether, after release of the TLS session, the UE 116 enters an inactive state or not. On the contrary, it appears that in Wang the UE 116 does not have an opportunity to enter an inactive state because Wang describes that the UE 116 and a new access point form a new association after release of the TLS session (Id.). Thus, contrary to the assertions in the Office Action, Wang does not disclose or suggest "the communications device being in an inactive state in which it retains a context from a previous communications session with the core network via the trusted access point" as defined in Claim 1”.
Examiner respectfully disagrees. Wang et al. teaches the claimed limitation "the communications device being in an inactive state in which it retains a context from a previous communications session with the core network via the trusted access point". The applicant argues that “there is no mention in Wang of whether, after release of the TLS session, the UE 116 enters an inactive state or not”. The response is that the prior art teaches that the UE 116, after release of the TLS session, enters in an inactive states. (Note: the TLS (Transport Layer Security) session is defined as (a) the TLS session in wireless is a secure, encrypted, and authenticated connection established between a mobile device (client) and a server to protect data transmitted over Wi-Fi or cellular networks.
(b) if the User Equipment (UE) TLS session is released, the UE typically becomes inactive at the application or session layer for the time being, often transitioning to a lower-power state (like RRC_IDLE or RRC_INACTIVE) on the wireless radio network, depending on the network configuration.
© a User Equipment (UE) typically retains the TLS session context after a disconnection from the TLS session and allowing it to resume the session rather than performing a full handshake again.
Wang et al. teaches that the TLS session, previously established with Sub Rem server 560, is released. When the TLS session of the UE 116 is released, the UE 116 typically becomes inactive (as describe above in (b).
Further, Wang et al. also teaches that the UE 116 retains the TLS session context after a disconnection as described above in ©.
Wang et al. teaching is based on establishing and disconnecting of the TLS session of the UE 116 to become inactive and to retain a context as claimed in the feature "the communications device being in an inactive state in which it retains a context from a previous communications session with the core network via the trusted access point". Therefore, the rejection is proper and maintained.
The applicant states in the remarks “NPL-5GS does not cure the above deficiencies in Wang. Therefore, no combination of Wang and NPL-5GS discloses or suggests every feature recited in Claim 1, and Claim 1 is believed to be in condition for allowance together with any claim depending therefrom”.
The examiner respectfully disagrees. It is a general statement as the applicant is mentioning (a) about the deficiencies of Wang, and (b) it is not being cured. It is a broad statement as the deficiencies and its cure have not been described. It is, therefore, difficult to the examiner for giving a proper response .
The applicant states in the remarks “claims 39-40 are likewise believed to be in condition for allowance. Withdrawal of the rejection of Claims 1, 7, 12, 39, and 40 under 35 U.S.C. 103 is respectfully requested”.
The examiner respectfully disagrees. Since the rejections of the claim 1 as explained above are proper and maintained, the independent claims 39-40, similar to the claim 1, will also be remained rejected.
The applicant states in the remarks “the other rejections under 35 U.S.C. 103 rely on Wang for the above-distinguished features. However, Wang does not disclose or suggest the above-distinguished features, alone or in combination with any other art of record. Therefore, it is believed that a prima facie case of obviousness cannot be maintained. Withdrawal of the rejection of Claims 2-6, 9, 11, and 13-17 under 35 U.S.C. 103 is respectfully requested”.
The examiner respect fully disagrees. As described above that the rejections of the independent claim 1 is maintained, its dependent claims 2-17 will also be remained rejected.
Conclusion
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to SYED M BOKHARI whose telephone number is (571)270-3115. The examiner can normally be reached Monday through Friday.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Kwang B Yao can be reached at 5712723182. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
/SYED M BOKHARI/ Examiner, Art Unit 2473
3/27/2026
/KWANG B YAO/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2473