DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Objections
Claim 33 is objected to because of the following informalities:
“apparatus for providing a virtual environment” should be preceded with “an”.
In line 5 of claim 33, “simulation apparatus for simulating events…” should be preceded with “a”.
Appropriate correction is required.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 3, 9, 12-17, 21, 23-25, and 33-34 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Claim 3 recites “a subject”; it is unclear whether this is meant to refer to the subject recited in claim 1 or another subject. For examination purposes it will be assumed that “a subject” should be replaced with “the subject”.
Claim 9 recites “the domain” and “the server,” neither of which have antecedent basis.
Claim 12 recites “the domain device” and “the server,” neither of which have antecedent basis.
Claim 13 depends from claim 12, therefore it inherits the issues of claim 12 and is rejected for the same reasons.
Claim 14 recites “the required event,” which has no antecedent basis. For examination purposes it will be assumed that “the required event” refers to the event which is determined in claim 13.
Claim 15 recites “the domain,” which has no antecedent basis.
Claim 16 recites “a subject,” which is confusing for the same reasons given in the rejection of claim 3, and which will be interpreted similarly for examination purposes. Claim 16 also recites “the domain,” which has no antecedent basis.
Claim 17 recites “a subject” and “the domain,” which are at issue for the same reasons as in the rejection of claim 16 and will be interpreted similarly for examination purposes.
Claim 21 recites “the domain device,” which has no antecedent basis.
Claim 23 depends from claim 21, therefore it inherits the same issues and is rejected for the same reasons.
Claim 24 recites “the domain device” and “the server,” neither of which have antecedent basis.
Claim 25 recites “the domain device” and “the server,” neither of which have antecedent basis. Claim 25 also refers to “the progress of events.” This is confusing because claim 25 previously recites an event. For examination purposes it will be assumed that the above should be rewritten to recite “the progress of other events.”
Claim 34 recites “the subject sensors,” which has no antecedent basis. For examination purposes it will be assumed that the applicant intends to refer to the “one or more sensors” recited in claim 33.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(d):
(d) REFERENCE IN DEPENDENT FORMS.—Subject to subsection (e), a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers.
The following is a quotation of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, fourth paragraph:
Subject to the following paragraph [i.e., the fifth paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112], a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers.
Claim 22 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(d) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, 4th paragraph, as being of improper dependent form for containing a reference to a claim not previously set forth.
Claim 22 depends from claim 20, which is a canceled claim. For examination purposes it will be assumed that claim 22 should depend from claim 21.
Applicant may cancel the claim(s), amend the claim(s) to place the claim(s) in proper dependent form, rewrite the claim(s) in independent form, or present a sufficient showing that the dependent claim(s) complies with the statutory requirements.
Double Patenting
The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).
A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b).
The filing of a terminal disclaimer by itself is not a complete reply to a nonstatutory double patenting (NSDP) rejection. A complete reply requires that the terminal disclaimer be accompanied by a reply requesting reconsideration of the prior Office action. Even where the NSDP rejection is provisional the reply must be complete. See MPEP § 804, subsection I.B.1. For a reply to a non-final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.111(a). For a reply to final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.113(c). A request for reconsideration while not provided for in 37 CFR 1.113(c) may be filed after final for consideration. See MPEP §§ 706.07(e) and 714.13.
The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The actual filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA /25, or PTO/AIA /26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/applying-online/eterminal-disclaimer.
Claims 33/1-6, 33/9, 33/12-17, 33/21-25, 34/33/1-6, 34/33/9, 34/33/12-17, and 34/33/21-25 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claim 1 of copending Application No. 18/274169 in view of Fischer (US 20180353845 A1) and Mullen (US 20050049022 A1) and Kur (US 20190213901 A1).
Regarding claims 33/1-6, 33/9, 33/12-17, and 33/21-25, claim 1 of copending Application No. 18/274169 discloses the limitations of claims 33/1-6, 33/9, 33/12-17, and 33/21-25, respectively, save that the simulation apparatus for simulating events for an individual in a real environment comprises a system according to claims 1-6, 9, 12-17, and 21-25, respectively. However, these features would have been obvious in view of Fischer, Mullen, and Kur, as discussed in the 103 rejection of claims 33/1-6, 33/9, 33/12-17, and 33/21-25, respectively, found below.
Regarding claims 34/33/1-6, 34/33/9, 34/33/12-17, and 34/33/21-25, claim 1 of copending Application No. 18/274169 in view of Fischer, Mullen, and Kur, teaches the limitations of claims 33/1-6, 33/9, 33/12-17, and 33/21-25, respectively. Furthermore, the limitations of claim 34 in combination with claims 33/1-6, 33/9, 33/12-17, and 33/21-25, respectively, would have been obvious in view of Fischer, Mullen, and Kur, as discussed in the 103 rejection of claims 34/33/1-6, 34/33/9, 34/33/12-17, and 34/33/21-25, respectively, found below.
This is a provisional nonstatutory double patenting rejection.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claims 1-6, 9, 12-17, 21-25, 33/1-6, 33/9, 33/12-17, 33/21-25, 34/33/1-6, 34/33/9, 34/33/12-17, and 34/33/21-25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Fischer (US 20180353845 A1) in view of Mullen (US 20050049022 A1) and Kur (US 20190213901 A1).
Regarding claim 1, Fischer discloses a system, the system comprising:
a subject device to be worn by a subject and to receive sensor data from sensors (Fig. 2, gaming vest 200; ¶32: gaming vest has a plurality of infrared sensors for detecting infrared beams from a laser tag sword).
Fischer does not explicitly disclose that the system is for monitoring the behavior of a human or animal subject; that a plurality of subject sensors for monitoring the subject’s behavior including one or more body worn or carried sensors; and that the subject device receives sensor data from the subject sensors.
Mullen discloses a system for allowing players in different physical locations to play on the same virtual playfield (Abstract).
Kur discloses a system for monitoring the behavior of a human or animal subject (Abstract: “A motion tracking system tracks motion of one or more users”), the system comprising: a plurality of subject sensors for monitoring the subject’s behavior including one or more body worn or carried sensors (Abstract: “A motion tracking system tracks motion of one or more users. In embodiments, the users wear one or more sensors on their bodies to allow tracking by the motion tracking system”).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to incorporate the teachings of Mullen and Kur with the invention of Fischer by: configuring the system to monitoring the behavior of a human subject; providing a plurality of subject sensors for monitoring the subject’s behavior including one or more body worn or carried sensors; and causing the subject device to receive sensor data from the subject sensors. Doing so would enable multiple people in different physical locations to play laser tag by using virtual environment where the real motions of real players are sensed and translated into virtual motions of virtual players. Then the vest on a person may receive data corresponding to actions in the virtual environment and perform its functions, such as notifying its wearer of a hit.
Note that while Fischer’s invention involves melee weapons (Abstract), Fischer does disclose that laser tag games often incorporate guns (¶3-4; ¶60). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art practicing the invention of Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur to include laser tag guns as well as melee weapons so that players have the option to play laser tag with laser guns as well as melee weapons.
Finally, Fischer discloses that its gaming vests may have speakers or LEDs which activate to indicate a hit (¶32). Fischer also teaches that players may receive a vibration when a hit occurs (¶57). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to incorporate these teachings of Fischer into the subject device in the invention of Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur so a player is notified when they are hit by someone in the virtual environment.
Regarding claim 2, Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur teaches the limitations of claim 1, and further teaches that the subject sensors comprise one or more of position sensors (Kur, Abstract: the motion tracking system may sense position through sensors on a user; see rejection of claim 1).
Regarding claim 3, Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur teaches the limitations of claim 1. Furthermore, Fischer discloses that the subject sensors comprise one or more sensors on equipment carried by the subject (Abstract: each player may have melee weapons, and “the laser tag melee weapons contain infrared emitters, infrared receivers, microprocessors, accelerometers, and gyroscopes.”).
Regarding claim 4, Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur teaches the limitations of claim 1, and further teaches that the subject sensors comprise one or more remote sensors configured to sense one or more behaviors of the subject (see rejection of claim 1 and Kur, ¶44: the motion tracking system 130 can include “one or more cameras” and “temperature sensors, proximity sensors, noise sensors, and/or other suitable sensors”).
Regarding claim 5, Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur teaches the limitations of claim 1, and further teaches that the subject device comprises a personal situation monitoring device configured to inform the subject about a current situation (the vest informs the subject when they are hit).
Regarding claim 6, Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur teaches the limitations of claim 1. Furthermore, Fischer discloses that its system further comprises a server arranged to receive sensor data from the subject device and to transmit instructions based on the subject sensor data (¶47: “All devices may communicate with a central server. Each device may have infrared emitters and infrared receivers. The operations described herein may be performed by microprocessors on any device or the central server.”), and it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to extend this to the invention of Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur to facilitate communication between devices.
Regarding claim 9, Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur teaches the limitations of claim 1. In the following, consider two players, where the first player is the “subject” and the second player is playing from a remote location identified with the “domain”. Then, Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur teaches that the system comprises a plurality of domain sensors arranged to detect one or more events in a domain (the sensors for the second player), wherein a server (see rejection of claim 6) is arranged to receive sensor data from the domain sensors and to transmit instructions based on the domain sensor data (for example, to communicate movement of the second player to the first player); and a plurality of subject actuators for causing one or more events at the subject in response to instructions from the server (in the case where the second player shoots and hits the first player in the virtual environment, the first player’s vest may vibrate; see rejection of claim 1).
Regarding claim 12, Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur teaches the limitations of claim 1, and further teaches that the system is configured to implement a set of rules for causing events based on sensor data (rules for communicating movement, updating the virtual environment, responding to shots with a laser gun or attacks with a melee weapon, etc.). In the following, consider a first player as the “subject” and a remote second player in a “domain” i.e. remote environment. Let the second player’s vest be a “domain device”.
Fischer discloses that players may use a sword or shield to block hits. In response to this, the sword or shield may command a vest to ignore incoming infrared (IR) data (such as from laser guns) for a short period of time (¶57).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to incorporate the teachings of Fischer with the invention of Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur by configuring one or both of the subject device and a domain device to implement at least one of the rules independently of a server (such as implementing a rule in the vest to forego a vibration for a predetermined time in response to a command from a sword of shield to block a hit). Doing so would allow the vests to perform a local function quickly.
Regarding claim 13, Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur teaches the limitations of claim 12. Furthermore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art practicing the invention of Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur to configure one or both of the subject device and the domain device to process sensor data to determine whether to cause an event or to transmit the data to the server for the server to determine whether to cause an event. Doing so would enable the vests to work independently to perform some events, or to defer to a central system to make a determination for events where other information can also be taken into account.
Regarding claim 14, Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur teaches the limitations of claim 13. Furthermore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art practicing the invention of Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur to cause the rules to prioritize certain events according to certain sensor data or combinations of sensor data, and the determination is according to the priority of the determined event (such as in a blocking situation, where a Bluetooth command from a shield to a vest implementing a block has priority over buffered IR data; see ¶57 of Fischer). Doing so would be useful to maintain a clear response in a case where competing data is received in rapid succession.
Regarding claim 15, Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur teaches the limitations of claim 1. Defining the “domain” as in claim 9, the subject would be outside a domain (see rejection of claim 9).
Regarding claim 16, Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur teaches the limitations of claim 1. Furthermore, defining the “domain” as in claim 9 (see rejection of claim 9), it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art practicing the invention of Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur to cause the system to provide the subject with a simulated view of an area in which a domain is apparently situated, so that a first player may visualize a second player in the virtual environment.
Regarding claim 17, Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur teaches the limitations of claim 1. Furthermore, defining the “domain” as in claim 9 (see rejection of claim 9), it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art practicing the invention of Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur to cause the system to provide the subject with a simulated view of a domain from a perspective not available to the subject, so that a first player may visualize a second player in the virtual environment.
Regarding claim 21, Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur teaches the limitations of claim 1. In the following, let the “domain” and “domain device” be defined as in claim 12 (see rejection of claim 12). Consider that Fischer discloses that a vest may receive both IR signals and Bluetooth signals (¶57; see also rejection of claim 14). Consider also that Fischer teaches that any of the devices may comprise a microprocessor (¶47).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to incorporate the teachings of Fischer with the invention of Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur by configuring one or both of the subject device and a domain device to record sensor data from multiple sensors, wherein data is received from different sensors at different rates and the device is configured to record different proportions of data from different sensors. Doing so would be useful in facilitating a vest’s ability to determine e.g. whether a block prevents a hit or not (see rejection of claim 14; a vest’s processor may receive and buffer IR and Bluetooth sensor data; these data may be of different rates and proportions, or in any case one would expect that the IR and Bluetooth will not always exactly correspond in rate and proportion).
Regarding claim 22, Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur teaches the limitations of claim 21. Furthermore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art practicing the invention of Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur to configure one or both of the subject and device sensors to record sensor data according to the level of confidence in the data accuracy, so as to filter out data that is clearly inaccurate (such as if a faulty sensor continuously sends a saturated signal).
Regarding claim 23, Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur teaches the limitations of claim 21. Furthermore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art practicing the invention of Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur to configure one or both of the subject and device sensors to determine the level of accuracy of data from one sensor based on data from another sensor, so as to discover faulty sensors (if one of multiple sensors gives a constant signal, but the others vary in reasonable ways, one may conclude that the first sensor is faulty).
Regarding claim 24, Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur teaches the limitations of claim 1. Furthermore, defining the “domain” and “domain device” as in claim 12 (see rejection of claim 12), it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art practicing the invention of Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur to configure a domain device to determine whether an instruction from a server to cause an event (such as a vibration due to a hit) has already been implemented, in order to avoid causing the event again.
Regarding claim 25, Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur teaches the limitations of claim 1. Furthermore, defining the “domain” and “domain device” as in claim 12 (see rejection of claim 12), and considering the scenario of blocking a hit (see rejection of claim 14), Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur teaches that a domain device is configured to receive an instruction from a server to cause an event (such as a vibration in response to a hit from a laser gun from a person in a remote location), and to determine before implementing the instruction whether the timing of the instructed event is suitable having regard to the progress of events or received sensor data (such as if a block was implemented within a predefined time of the shot from the other player’s laser gun).
Regarding claim 33/1, Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur teaches the limitations of claim 1, and further teaches a system allowing virtual and real events to take place contemporaneously and to influence each other (as when two physically remote players play laser tag in the same virtual environment; see rejection of claim 1), the system comprising:
an apparatus for providing a virtual environment to a real individual (each player sees the virtual environment; see Abstract of Mullen); and
one or more sensors for sensing activity by a real individual in a real environment (see Kur, Abstract and rejection of claim 1); and
a simulation apparatus for simulating events for an individual in a real environment using physical effects (that is, a system which simulates a hit on a physical player by a physical response of a player’s vest; see rejection of claim 1); the system being configured such that:
an action by a real individual in the virtual environment causes the simulation of an event in real time for another real individual in a real environment, by the simulation apparatus (that is, a second player’s virtual character performs shoots, and in response a first player is notified of a hit); and
an action by a real individual in the real environment causes the simulation of an event in real time in the virtual environment for the other real individual (that is, a first player’s trigger pull on a laser gun simulates a shot in the virtual environment for the second player).
Finally, the simulation apparatus for simulating events for an individual in a real environment comprises a system according to claim 1 (it comprises a vest, which is a system in claim 1; note that stating the simulation apparatus comprises “a system according to claim 1” can reasonably be interpreted as comprising some set of interacting things in agreement with claim 1).
Regarding claims 33/2-6, 33/9, 33/12-17, and 33/21-25, Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur teaches the limitations of claims 2-6, 9, 12-17, and 21-25, respectively. Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur further teaches the limitations of claim 33 (see rejection of claim 33/1), and that the simulation apparatus for simulating events for an individual in a real environment comprises a system according to claims 2-6, 9, 12-17, and 21-25, respectively (each of claims 2-6, 9, 12-17, and 21-25 depend from claim 1, therefore all comprise the vest taught in claim 1, therefore the simulation apparatus comprises a system (the vest) according to any of claims 2-6, 9, 12-17, and 21-25).
Regarding claim 34/33/1-6, 34/33/9, 34/33/12-17, and 34/33/21-25, Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur teaches the limitations of claims 33/1-6, 33/9, 33/12-17, and 33/21-25. Fischer in view of Mullen and Kur further teaches that the one or more sensors comprises position sensing (Kur, Abstract: the motion tracking system may sense position through sensors on a user; see rejection of claim 1).
Conclusion
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ETHAN WESLEY EDWARDS
Examiner
Art Unit 2857
/E.W.E./ Examiner, Art Unit 2857
/ANDREW SCHECHTER/ Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2857