DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112 The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a): (a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention. The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112: The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. Claims 1-9, 12, 13, 16, 19, 21-28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention. The rejected claims recite a GHR-106 monoclonal antibody or antigen-binding fragment thereof. To satisfy the written-description requirement, the specification must describe every element of the claimed invention in sufficient detail so that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that the inventor possessed the claimed invention at the time of filing. Vas-Cat h, 935 F.3d at 1563; see also Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc ., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (patent specification must describe an invention and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that “the inventor invented the claimed invention”); In re Gosteli , 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“the description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed”). With regard to the recited genus of GHR-106 monoclonal antibod ies, the following applies: Ariad Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2010) states that “...a generic claim may define the boundaries of a vast genus of chemical compounds...the question may still remain whether the specification, including the original claim language, demonstrates that the applicant invented species sufficient to support a claim to a genus”. See page 1171. The written description requirement for a claimed genus may be satisfied through sufficient description of a representative number of species by actual reduction to practice, reduction to drawings, or by disclosure of relevant, identifying characteristics, i.e., structure or other physical and/or chemical properties, by functional characteristics coupled with a known or disclosed correlation between function and structure, or by a combination of such identifying characteristics, sufficient to show the applicant was in possession of the claimed genus . See Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568, 43 USPQ2d at 1406. See also Fujikawa v. Wattanasin , 93 F.3d 1559, 1571, 39 USPQ2d 1895, 1905 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (a “laundry list” disclosure of every possible moiety does not constitute a written description of every species in a genus because it would not “reasonably lead” those skilled in the art to any particular species. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206, 18 USPQ2d 1016, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 1991) states that “it is well established in our law that conception of a chemical compound requires that the inventor be able to define it so as to distinguish it from other materials, and to describe how to obtain it”. A description of a genus may be achieved by means of a recitation of a representative number of species falling within the scope of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus, which features constitute a substantial portion of the genus, so that one of skill in the art can “visualize or recognize” the members of the genus (Emphasis added). Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F3d 1559, 1569, 43 USPQ2d 1398, 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1997). A “representative number of species” means that the species which are adequately described are representative of the entire genus. Thus, when there is substantial variation within the genus, one must describe a sufficient variety of species to reflect the variation within the genus . The disclosure of only one species encompassed within a genus adequately describes a claim directed to that genus only if the disclosure “indicates that the patentee has invented species sufficient to constitute the gen[us].” See Enzo Biochem , 323 F.3d at 966, 63 USPQ2d at 1615; Noelle v. Lederman, 355 F.3d 1343, 1350, 69 USPQ2d 1508, 1514 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Fed. Cir. 2004)(“[A] patentee of a biotechnological invention cannot necessarily claim a genus after only describing a limited number of species because there may be unpredictability in the results obtained from species other than those specifically enumerated.”). “A patentee will not be deemed to have invented species sufficient to constitute the genus by virtue of having disclosed a single species when ... the evidence indicates ordinary artisans could not predict the operability in the invention of any species other than the one disclosed.” In re Curtis, 354 F.3d 1347, 1358, 69 USPQ2d 1274, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly (43 USPQ2d 1398-1412), the court held that a generic statement which defines a genus of nucleic acids by only their functional activity does not provide an adequate written description of the genus . The court indicated that, while applicants are not required to disclose every species encompassed by a genus, the description of the genus is achieved by the recitation of a representative number of species falling within the scope of the claimed genus. At section B( i ), the court states, "An adequate written description of a DNA ... requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties, not a mere wish or plan for obtaining the claimed chemical invention." Courts have stated that “[ i ]n claims involving [non-genetic] chemical materials, generic formulae usually indicate with specificity what the generic claims encompas s. One skilled in the art can distinguish such a formula from others and can identify many of the species that the claims encompass. Accordingly, such a formula is normally an adequate description of the claimed genus.” Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co ., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denie d, 523 U.S. 1089 (1998). (emphasis added). There is no such specificity here, nor could one skilled in the art identify particular GHR-106 monoclonal antibod ies encompassed by the claims. Specifically, Applicant fails to disclose any other GHR-106 monoclonal antibod ies , besides those covered by the specific SEQ ID NO’s in the specification and claims, and in relation to the above, these disclosed species or subgenre do not represent the substantial variety covered by the genus of GHR-106 monoclonal antibody . With regard to the functional definition of the GHR-106 monoclonal antibody , t he specification does not clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that he or she invented what is clai med (see Vas-Cath at page 1116) because t he specification contains almost no information by which a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the inventors possessed the all of the recited compounds. At best, it simply indicates that one should test an inordinate number of antibodies to see if the antibodies can perform the required binding of GHR-106 . In this connection, the specification contains no generic structural characteristics of those antibodies which bind GnRH , besides those antibodies instantly disclosed , s ee In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litigation, 583 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[A]t the end of the day, the specification, even read in light of the knowledge of those skilled in the art, does no more than state a hypothesis and propose testing to determine the accuracy of that hypothesis. That is not sufficient.”). The Examiner acknowledges that a working example or exemplified embodiment is not necessarily a requirement for description. However, where a generic claim term is present in a claim, as in the present application, and defined only by functional characteristics, the specification must convey enough information, e.g., via sufficient representative examples, to indicate invention of species sufficient to constitute the genus. Enzo Biochem , Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 967 2 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The written description requirement “requires a description of an invention, not an indication of a result that one might achieve if one made that invention.” Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Novozymes A/S v. DuPont Nutrition Biosciences APS, 723 F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“A patent...‘is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion.’ ... For that reason, the written description requirement prohibits a patentee from ‘leaving it to the ... industry to complete an unfinished invention.’” (citations omitted)). Accordingly, the specification lacks adequate written description for the recited GHR-106 monoclonal antibod ies . Claims 16 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention. Claim 16 recites percent identities of the heavy and light chains of the instant GHR-106 monoclonal antibodies. In this regard, the question of how much homology is required to claim a variant of a known nucleic acid sequence when the function of the nucleic acid is recited in the claims was addressed in Ex parte Livshits (Appeal 2013-001807; US Patent Application 11/106,455): https://www.bradley.com/insights/publications/2016/02/how-much-homology-is-enough-under--112 Wherein, the PTAB agreed with the Examiner that a PHOSITA could envision sequences that met the percent identity requirement and hybridized under the recited conditions to SEQ ID NO:3. Further, the Examiner admitted that by using conservative substitutions, a PHOSITA could likely envision a DNA sequence that encoded a polypeptide having the same tertiary structure as the polypeptide encoded by SEQ ID NO:3. However, the PTAB found there was no teaching that the conservation of structure (whether in the DNA or encoded polypeptide) would be a surrogate for conservation of the function claimed (over-expression of L-amino acids in the culture medium). In other words, PTAB wanted some teaching as to which of a 5 percent of residues of the in the recited single domain antibody could be altered while still conserving the function of the encoded polypeptide. The specification demonstrated the recited function for the polypeptide encoded by SEQ ID NO:3, but offered no teaching as to what regions of the recited protein were critical for conservation of the recited function and which regions could be modified. The PTAB stated that the specification “leaves it to others to discover the nature and scope of substitutions, deletions, and insertions that can be made to arrive at a 95% homology sequence that additionally allows for recited activity.” The applicants attempted to use BLAST homology data to argue that a PHOSITA would be able to address the issue, but the evidence was accorded little weight and characterized as an “invitation to experiment” by the PTAB. In the instant case, even though polypeptides could be envisioned by the PHOSTIA which could be easily tested as set forth in the specification for conservation of the recited anti- GnRH function, this is not enough to describe the structure so that a PHOSITA could determine beforehand whether or not a particular structure meets the functional requirements. Also, a PHOSITA cannot determine if the claimed variants accomplish the recited anti- GmRH function from the specification itself in order to meet the written description requirement. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b): (b ) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA), second paragraph: The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the appl icant regards as his invention. Claims 1-9, 12, 13, 16, 17 19, 21-28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention. The intended structure of the GHR-106 antibody is unclear. Although applicant discloses sequences of this antibody, it is unclear what sequences, and portions thereof, Applicant intends to cover by the recited GHR-106 antibody. The criteria of “sex related hormone” is not defined. Other than the diseases listed in claim 9, the sex hormone-related condition or disorder is a condition that is known to be treatable by the administration of known GnRH antagonists, wherein the known GnRH antagonists optionally comprise antide or cetrorelix are unclear. It is unclear what conditions or disorders Applicant intends to cover by “reproductive disease” or “ovarian disorders” (claim 9), and moreover, these terms generically cover specific conditions listed in the claim. Therefore, it is unclear what scope of diseases Applicant intends to cover. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made. Claim s 1-9, 12, 13, 16, 17 19, 21-28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over WO 2019/153075 ( WO 075 ) , in view of: Behre et al., Journal of Clinical Endocrinology and Metabolism. May 1997, Vol. 82, pp. 1403-1408 ( Behre ) ; and Lee et al., Global Journal of Reproductive Medicine. April 2017 (04-2017), Vol. 1, page 001, ISSN 2585-8594 ( Lee ). WO 075 discloses the use of the antibody GHR-106 as an antagonist against GnRH receptor and suggests the use of said antibody to block luteinizing hormone /follicle-stimulating hormone (LH/FSH) release and control ovulation. WO 075 also teaches that said antibody has a longer half-life than cetrorelix and suggests the use of said antibody to treat any condition that can be treated by GnRH antagonists including antide or cetrorelix . The GHR-106 antibody is the same as that covered by the instant claims: WO 075 may fail to explicitly teach use of GHR-106 to regulate a level of a sex related hormone in a mammalian subject. However, the claims recite administering the GHR-106 monoclonal antibody or an antigen-binding fragment thereof to the mammalian subject. WO 075 discloses the use of the antibody GHR-106 as an antagonist against GnRH . Any observed effect of the antibody, such as those recited in the claims, is a necessary aspect of administering the anti-GHR-106 antibody, as disclosed by WO 075, see MPEP 2112.01 ( “Products of identical chemical composition can not have mutually exclusive properties.” In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709, 15 USPQ2d 1655, 1658 (Fed. Cir. 1990). A chemical composition and its properties are inseparable. Therefore, if the prior art teaches the identical chemical structure, the properties applicant discloses and/or claims are necessarily present. Id. ”). Nonetheless, WO 07 teaches the use of the antibody GHR-106 as an antagonist against GnRH receptor and suggests the use of said antibody to block luteinizing hormone (LH)/follicle-stimulating hormone (FSH) release and control ovulation. WO 075 also teaches that said antibody has a longer half-lif e than cetrorelix and suggests the use of said antibody to treat any condition that can be treated by GnRH antagonists including antide or cetrorelix . Also, Behre teaches the use of the GnRH antagonist cetrorelix to regulate the levels of luteinizing hormone, follicle-stimulating hormone, and testosterone in men. In this connection Lee teaches that the antibody GHR-106 is bioequivalent to GnHR analogs and suggests the use of said antibody to regulate fertility and to treat sex hormone-sensitive cancers . The difference between WO 075 and the claimed inventions is that WO 075 does not teach the invention with particularity so as to amount to anticipation (See M.P.E.P. § 2131: "[t]he identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the ... claim." Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co ., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The elements must be arranged as required by the claim, but this is not an ipsissimis verbis test, i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Bond , 910 F.2d 831, 15 USPQ2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990).). However, based on the above, WO 075 teaches the elements of the claimed invention with sufficient guidance, particularity, and with a reasonable expectation of success, that the invention would be prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill (the prior art reference teaches or suggests all the claim limitations with a reasonable expectation of success. See M.P.E.P. § 2143). Double Patenting The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg , 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman , 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi , 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum , 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel , 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington , 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969). A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA. A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b). The filing of a terminal disclaimer by itself is not a complete reply to a nonstatutory double patenting (NSDP) rejection. A complete reply requires that the terminal disclaimer be accompanied by a reply requesting reconsideration of the prior Office action. Even where the NSDP rejection is provisional the reply must be complete. See MPEP § 804, subsection I.B.1. For a reply to a non-final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.111(a). For a reply to final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.113(c). A request for reconsideration while not provided for in 37 CFR 1.113(c) may be filed after final for consideration. See MPEP §§ 706.07(e) and 714.13. The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The actual filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA/25, or PTO/AIA/26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/applying-online/eterminal-disclaimer . Claims 1-9, 12, 13, 16, 17 19, 21-28 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting a s being unpatentable over claims 1-17 of U.S. Patent No. 11021541 . Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other . Specifically, the methods covered in the conflicting claims anticipate those covered in the rejected claims. Alternatively, the difference between the conflicting claims and the instant methods is that the conflicting claims do not recite the instant methods with particularity so as to amount to anticipation (See M.P.E.P. § 2131: "[t]he identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the ... claim." Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co ., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The elements must be arranged as required by the claim, but this is not an ipsissimis verbis test, i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Bond , 910 F.2d 831, 15 USPQ2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990).). However, the conflicting claims recite the elements of the instant methods invention with sufficient guidance, particularity, and with a reasonable expectation of success, that the invention would be prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill (the prior art reference teaches or suggests all the claim limitations with a reasonable expectation of success. See M.P.E.P. § 2143). Namely , the claims recite administering the GHR-106 monoclonal antibody or an antigen-binding fragment thereof to the mammalian subject. The conflicting claims recite the use of the antibody GHR-106 as an antagonist against GnRH. Any observed effect of the antibody, such as those recited in the claims, is a necessary aspect of administering the anti-GHR-106 antibody, as recited by the conflicting claims , see MPEP 2112.01 (“Products of identical chemical composition can not have mutually exclusive properties.” In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709, 15 USPQ2d 1655, 1658 (Fed. Cir. 1990). A chemical composition and its properties are inseparable. Therefore, if the prior art teaches the identical chemical structure, the properties applicant discloses and/or claims are necessarily present. Id.”). Claims 1-9, 12, 13, 16, 17 19, 21-28 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-17 of U.S. Patent No. 8163283 . Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other. Specifically, the methods covered in the conflicting claims (claims 16 and 17) anticipate those covered in the rejected claims. Alternatively, the difference between the conflicting claims and the instant methods is that the conflicting claims do not recite the instant methods with particularity so as to amount to anticipation (See M.P.E.P. § 2131: "[t]he identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the ... claim." Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The elements must be arranged as required by the claim, but this is not an ipsissimis verbis test, i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 15 USPQ2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990).). However, the conflicting claims recite the elements of the instant methods invention with sufficient guidance, particularity, and with a reasonable expectation of success, that the invention would be prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill (the prior art reference teaches or suggests all the claim limitations with a reasonable expectation of success. See M.P.E.P. § 2143). Namely, the claims recite administering the GHR-106 monoclonal antibody or an antigen-binding fragment thereof to the mammalian subject. The conflicting claims recite the pharmaceutical use of the antibody GHR-106. Any observed effect of the antibody, such as those recited in the claims, is a necessary aspect of administering the anti-GHR-106 antibody, as recited by the conflicting claims, see MPEP 2112.01 (“Products of identical chemical composition can not have mutually exclusive properties.” In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709, 15 USPQ2d 1655, 1658 (Fed. Cir. 1990). A chemical composition and its properties are inseparable. Therefore, if the prior art teaches the identical chemical structure, the properties applicant discloses and/or claims are necessarily present. Id.”). T he conflicting claims may recite the GHR-106 antibody whereas the instant claims recite methods of use . However, the specification of the conflicting patents disclose s the utility of the recited antibodies as covered by the instant methods of using the antibodies , see Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd., v. Eli Lilly and Co . where the district court ruled that the claims of the ‘826 patent were invalid in light of the ‘614 patent which disclosed gemcitabine’s use in cancer treatment, but did not claim it. In making this ruling, the district court relied on the Federal Circuit’s earlier rulings on double patenting of compound claims, mainly Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc, v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F. 3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 518 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In both of these cases, the Federal Circuit found claims of a later patent invalid for obviousness-type double patenting where an earlier patent claimed a compound, disclosing its utility in the specification, and a later patent claimed a method of using the compound for a use described in the specification of the earlier patent. The cases also established that in determining the scope of compound claims for a double patenting rejection one must look to the specification to interpret the utility of the compound. Conclusion Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to FILLIN "Examiner name" \* MERGEFORMAT KARL J PUTTLITZ whose telephone number is FILLIN "Phone number" \* MERGEFORMAT (571)272-0645 . The examiner can normally be reached on Monday to Friday from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's acting supervisor, Gregory Emch , can be reached at telephone number 571-272-8149. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see http://pair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). /KARL J PUTTLITZ/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1646