Detailed Action
This office action is in response to applicant’s submission filed on December 5, 2025. Claims 5-7 are canceled. Claims 1-4, and 8-20 are pending and rejected.
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Response to Amendment
This communication is in response to the amendment filed on December 5, 2025. The Examiner has acknowledged the amended claims 1, 11, and 18. Claims 1-4, and 8-20 are pending and are rejected.
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s Arguments (Remarks) filed December 5, 2025 have been fully considered, but are moot. Note that this action is made FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a).
Applicant’s arguments with respect to claims 1, 11, and 18 have been considered but are moot because the new ground of rejection does not rely on any reference applied in the prior rejection of record for any teaching or matter specifically challenged in the argument.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1-3, 11-13, and 18-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US 2021/0135851 A1 to Shimizu et al. (hereinafter, “Shimizu”) in view of US 2009/0097637 A1 to Boscher et al. (hereinafter, “Boscher”).
Regarding claim 1, Shimizu discloses: A method for secure encryption and decryption of a file, the method being executed by at least one processor of a computing system, the method comprising:
generating, by a first processor, a plurality of encryption isokeys, wherein the plurality of encryption isokeys include a first public isokey, a second public isokey, and a private isounit (“In this manner, the encrypted data generation device performs multiplication of public keys to generate a synthesis key. The encrypted data generation device encrypts secret information with the public keys of the party devices having the authority to decrypt the secret information, then generates a secret information ciphertext by encryption with the synthesis key, and makes the secret information ciphertext public. Each party device generates a decryption key fragment by using a private key and makes the decryption key fragment public. The fragment combining device generates a decryption key by multiplication of the decryption key fragments, generates an intermediate decrypted text using the decryption key, and makes the intermediate decrypted text public. The party device having the decryption authority decrypts the intermediate decrypted text by using the private key to restore the secret information. Therefore, the encryption processing system according to the first embodiment enables non-use of a highly reliable organization that generates a common key” [0026] [Examiner notes that this text shows how the processor (device) performs core cryptographic operations (multiplication of keys) generates a plurality of keys including public keys and a private isounit as it corresponds to the private keys held by each party's device. The claim is describing the key step; instead of just 1 public/private keypair, the system creates multiple public keys and a shared private-like structure (isounit) that is one unit/share of the private key material]),
encrypting, by the first processor, ciphertext associated with a message based on the plurality of encryption isokeys; receiving, by a second processor, the ciphertext associated with the message (“The encrypted data generation device encrypts secret information with the public keys of the party devices having the authority to decrypt the secret information, then generates a secret information ciphertext by encryption with the synthesis key, and makes the secret information ciphertext public” [0026] [Examiner notes that this text shows a ciphertext associated with the message (secret information) with the combination of public keys (synthesis key). Examiner also notes that by saying that the ciphertext is made public, it naturally implies that the parties with decryption authority will be able to receive it]);
obtaining, by the second processor, a plurality of decryption isokeys, wherein the plurality of decryption isokeys include the private isounit, a private decryption isokey, and the first public isokey (“Each party device generates a decryption key fragment by using a private key and makes the decryption key fragment public. The fragment combining device generates a decryption key by multiplication of the decryption key fragments, generates an intermediate decrypted text using the decryption key, and makes the intermediate decrypted text public. The party device having the decryption authority decrypts the intermediate decrypted text by using the private key to restore the secret information. Therefore, the encryption processing system according to the first embodiment enables non-use of a highly reliable organization that generates a common key” [0026] [Examiner notes that the private isounit is the individual share (a decryption key fragment and the fragment combining device is the second processor as it is the entity that receives all of the fragments (isounits) and performs the combination step (first processor was on the encryption side as it synthesized public keys, encrypted the secret, and generated the ciphertext and the second processor is on the decryption side as it collects fragments/isounits, combines them, and produces intermediate decrypted text). Also, the first public isokey (synthesis key) is implicitly used because the decryption algorithm relies on knowing the public key(s) that were used to encrypt the message]; “The decryption key fragment generation unit 33 is an example of a third generation unit, and generates a decryption key fragment using the private key of the own device and the random number information included in the encrypted data. The decryption key fragment generation unit 33 generates, using a random number, a fragment signature for verifying whether or not the generated decryption key fragment has been correctly generated by the party device 3. The decryption key fragment generation unit 33 generates fragment data including information on the decryption key fragment and the fragment signature, and passes the generated fragment data to the decryption key fragment transmission unit 31 b” [0049] [Examiner notes that in this embodiment, the private isounit (shared private-like structure) is specifically implemented as the random number included in the encrypted data]); and
decrypting, by the second processor, the message associated with the ciphertext based on the plurality of decryption isokeys (“The fragment combining device 4 collects decryption key fragments to generate a decryption key, and decrypts a secret information ciphertext using the decryption key to generate an intermediate decrypted text. The fragment combining device 4 makes the intermediate decrypted text public. The fragment combining device 4 includes a public network communication unit 41, a decryption key fragment verification unit 42, and an intermediate decrypted text generation unit 43” [0053]),
Shimizu does not explicitly disclose: wherein the private isounit is associated with a respective communication session between a sender and a receiver, the communication session comprising more than one message; wherein the decryption comprises: obtaining a RSA version of the ciphertext associated with the message based on the private isokey, and decrypting the message based on the RSA version of the ciphertext and the plurality of decryption isokeys.
However, Boscher discloses: wherein the private isounit is associated with a respective communication session between a sender and a receiver, the communication session comprising more than one message (“Systems and/or methods are presented that facilitate secure electronic communication of data. A cryptographic component can be employed that can include a randomized exponentiation component that can utilize a generated random number to facilitate randomizing a message during exponentiation of the message to facilitate securing the data” [0025]; “Such arrangements can enable entities to be authenticated to each other, and to use information in certificates (e.g., public keys) and private keys, session keys, Traffic Encryption Keys (TEKs), cryptographic-system-specific keys, and/or other keys, to encrypt and decrypt messages communicated between entities” [0057] [Examiner notes that the “generated random number” used by the randomized exponentiation component is analogous to the isounit l as they both act as secret values used in cryptographic processing. Since the random number is generated per message, it inherently associated with that particular communication between sender and receiver. The text explicitly frames this process as part of secure electronic communication which implies a sender-receiver relationship. It describes the message being encrypted using this per-message randomization, which uses the idea of assigning a unique isounit per communication fulfilling a secure back and forth. Examiner also notes that the second text explicitly establishes a sender-receiver relationship through authenticated exchanges and the use of session keys enables encryption and decryption of multiple messages between sender and receiver which corresponds to a communication session comprising more than one message. Examiner also notes that although the reference teaches generating a random number for each exponentiation execution on message data, this does not preclude the messages from belonging to the same communication session. The reference facilitates secure electronic communication of data and a communication session inherently includes the exchange of multiple messages and it is well known in cryptographic communication systems that different messages within the same communication session may utilize different random values to enhance security. Therefore, the randomized exponentiation component may generate different random numbers for different messages while still operating within a communication session comprising more than one message]);
wherein the decryption comprises: obtaining a RSA version of the ciphertext associated with the message based on the private isokey (“Systems and/or methods are presented that facilitate secure electronic communication of data. A cryptographic component can be employed that can include a randomized exponentiation component that can utilize a generated random number to facilitate randomizing a message during exponentiation of the message to facilitate securing the data. In accordance with one aspect, the randomized exponentiation component can employ a right-to-left square-and-multiply algorithm (also referred to herein as a right-to-left algorithm or Russian Peasant algorithm), or a variation thereof, to facilitate exponentiation of the message data with the exponent associated with the message. During exponentiation of the message, the value of the message data can be multiplied by the random number and/or the random number can be utilized to modify the message data to facilitate obfuscating the data values from attackers who attempt to learn the exponent and/or message data. In accordance with another aspect, a results value check can be performed to facilitate determining whether the exponentiation was performed without error, where the results of the exponentiation can be provided as an output if there is no error, or no output or an output of "error" can be provided if there was an error in the exponentiation thereby securing data from fault attacks” [0025]; “In accordance with still another aspect of the disclosed subject matter, the cryptographic component 102 can employ a CRT-RSA-based algorithm to facilitate efficient exponentiation of a received message to facilitate, for example, generation of a digital signature associated with the message. The CRT-RSA-based algorithm can also include a right-to-left algorithm component to facilitate secure exponentiation. The randomized exponentiation component 104 can receive a message M and a CRT key (e.g., exponent) associated therewith that can be comprised of p, q, dp=d mod q-1, dq=d mod q-1, Apq=p (-1) mod q, for example, where p and q can be sub-moduli of a modulus N, such that N=p*q, and dp, dq, and Apq can be variables associated with the CRT algorithm that can facilitate performance of the calculations in accordance with the CRT algorithm” [0040]; “With regard to the electronic communication of sensitive information, encryption/decryption techniques can be utilized to protect such information from being accessed by undesired persons (e.g., attackers, hackers). For example, public key encryption can be utilized to secure information electronically communicated between devices. For example, when sending a message, an entity can utilize a public key, which can be published and made available to users, to encrypt the message data. The encrypted message can be sent to a recipient, who can utilize a private key, which can be known to the recipient but not others, so that the encrypted message data can be decrypted and the message can be perceived in a usable form” [0002] [Examiner notes that the text explicitly describes multiplying the message by a random number during exponentiation, which is exactly what the isounit (l) does, for the purpose of randomizing the ciphertext to prevent identical messages from producing identical outputs (the same as claim limitation). It is also showing the mod n aspect since that is a known RSA-style encryption and N is the modulus used for all modular arithmetic, which is public, just like the first public isokey (modular arithmetic with a public modulus). These texts disclose employing a CRT-RSA algorithm to perform modular exponentiation of input data using private key parameters and outputting the result, which constitutes obtaining an RSA-processed version of the data based on the private key, which corresponds to obtaining an RSA version of the ciphertext associated with the message based on the private isokey. The last text was brought it because it discloses encrypting message data using a public key to generate an encrypted message (ciphertext associated with the message)]), and
decrypting the message based on the RSA version of the ciphertext and the plurality of decryption isokeys (“Given an m-bit exponent associated with a message, the randomized exponentiation component 104 can facilitate generating and/or receiving a randomly generated number (e.g., binary number with a value ranging from 0 to 2 1024-1). The randomly generated number can be generated in a secure manner so as to reduce or minimize discovery of such number by an attacker. Further, the random number can be different for each exponentiation execution on message data. The randomized exponentiation component 104 can facilitate randomizing and/or modifying the message data based on the randomly generated number. For example, the binary value of the message data can be multiplied by the binary value of the random number to facilitate randomizing the exponentiation of the message data. The randomized exponentiation component 104 can exponentiate the randomized message in accordance with an algorithm (e.g., right-to-left algorithm). Once the randomized message data has been exponentiated with the exponent, the preliminary results can be analyzed to determine whether there was an error or fault in the exponentiation, as more fully described herein. If there was no error in the exponentiation, a preliminary result associated with the decrypted data and/or digital signature can be modified based on the random number value (e.g., by multiplying the value of such preliminary result by the inverse of the random number value) to reach a final result of the exponentiation, where the final result can be the decrypted data or digital signature, for example, and can be provided as output” [0030] [Examiner notes that the undoing of the random number by saying, “the preliminary result associated with the decrypted data... can be modified based on the random number value (e.g., by multiplying the value of such preliminary result by the inverse of the random number value) to reach a final result...” shows that there is a modular inverse step in the decryption which matches with the division formula of C=C/l. The multiplying of l in encryption is undone by dividing in encryption which means it is the exact opposite formula in order to successfully decrypt so it has to be based on that decryption formula. Examiner also notes that this reference discloses that the randomized exponentiation component exponentiates a randomized message using the RSA exponent and then processed the preliminary result by applying the inverse of the random number to produce the final result, which can be the decrypted message. The exponentiation uses multiple components of the private key (for example, the CRT parameters and the randomized number), which corresponds to the clamed plurality of decryption isokeys. The input to the process is the RSA-transformed message (RSA version of the ciphertext), and the output is explicitly the decrypted data]).
Thus, it would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains, to combine the
method of Shimizu with the added structure of Boscher in order to be able to successfully secure the messages communicated between the sender and the receiver [Boscher 0025] and to successfully decrypt the encryption formula that has includes the randomization aspect of the message during exponentiation of the message data which facilitated securing the message and associated exponent from being discovered by attackers via side-channel attacks even more [Boscher 0007].
Claim 11 recites substantially the same limitation as claim 1, in the form of a device for implementing the corresponding method, therefore it is rejected under the same rationale. Examiner wants to note that the memory configured to store program code aspect is taught in paragraph 0103, “The main memory 51 is a memory for storing a program, halfway results of program execution, and the like.” Examiner also wants to note that the at least one processor configured to read the program code and operate as instructed by the program code and the other code aspects throughout the claim is taught in paragraph 0101, “In the first and second embodiments, the encrypted data generation device 2, the party device 3, and the fragment combining device 4 have been described. However, by realizing the configurations of the encrypted data generation device 2, the party device 3, and the fragment combining device 4 with software, an encrypted data generation program, a party program, and a fragment combining program having similar functions may be obtained, respectively. A computer (information processing apparatus) for executing the encrypted data generation program will now be described. The party program and the fragment combining program are executed by similar computers.”
Claim 18 recites substantially the same limitation as claim 1, in the form of a non-transitory computer readable medium comprising computer readable program code for implementing the corresponding system, therefore it is rejected under the same rationale.
Regarding claims 2, 12, and 19, a combination of Shimizu-Boscher disclose all limitations of claim 1/11/18.
Shimizu does not explicitly disclose: wherein encrypting the ciphertext is based on (M^e)l mod(n), where M is an integer message between 0 to n-1, l is the private isounit, n is the first public isokey, and é is the second public isokey.
However, Boscher discloses: wherein encrypting the ciphertext is based on (M^e)l mod(n), where M is an integer message between 0 to n-1, l is the private isounit, n is the first public isokey, and é is the second public isokey (“Systems and/or methods are presented that facilitate secure electronic communication of data. A cryptographic component can be employed that can include a randomized exponentiation component that can utilize a generated random number to facilitate randomizing a message during exponentiation of the message to facilitate securing the data. In accordance with one aspect, the randomized exponentiation component can employ a right-to-left square-and-multiply algorithm (also referred to herein as a right-to-left algorithm or Russian Peasant algorithm), or a variation thereof, to facilitate exponentiation of the message data with the exponent associated with the message. During exponentiation of the message, the value of the message data can be multiplied by the random number and/or the random number can be utilized to modify the message data to facilitate obfuscating the data values from attackers who attempt to learn the exponent and/or message data. In accordance with another aspect, a results value check can be performed to facilitate determining whether the exponentiation was performed without error, where the results of the exponentiation can be provided as an output if there is no error, or no output or an output of "error" can be provided if there was an error in the exponentiation thereby securing data from fault attacks” [0025]; “In accordance with still another aspect of the disclosed subject matter, the cryptographic component 102 can employ a CRT-RSA-based algorithm to facilitate efficient exponentiation of a received message to facilitate, for example, generation of a digital signature associated with the message. The CRT-RSA-based algorithm can also include a right-to-left algorithm component to facilitate secure exponentiation. The randomized exponentiation component 104 can receive a message M and a CRT key (e.g., exponent) associated therewith that can be comprised of p, q, dp=d mod q-1, dq=d mod q-1, Apq=p (-1) mod q, for example, where p and q can be sub-moduli of a modulus N, such that N=p*q, and dp, dq, and Apq can be variables associated with the CRT algorithm that can facilitate performance of the calculations in accordance with the CRT algorithm” [0040] [Examiner notes that the text explicitly describes multiplying the message by a random number during exponentiation, which is exactly what the isounit (l) does, for the purpose of randomizing the ciphertext to prevent identical messages from producing identical outputs (the same as claim limitation). It is also showing the mod n aspect since that is a known RSA-style encryption and N is the modulus used for all modular arithmetic, which is public, just like the first public isokey (modular arithmetic with a public modulus)]).
Thus, it would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains, to combine the
method of Shimizu with the added structure of Boscher in order to randomize the message during exponentiation of the message data to facilitate securing the message and associated exponent from being discovered by attackers via side-channel attacks [Boscher 0007].
Regarding claims 3, 13, and 20, a combination of Shimizu-Boscher disclose all limitations of claim 1/11/18.
Shimizu does not explicitly disclose: wherein decrypting the ciphertext is based on (C^f)l mod(n), where C = C/I , C is the ciphertext, l is the private isounit, n is the first public isokey, and f is the private decryption isokey.
However, Boscher discloses: wherein decrypting the ciphertext is based on (C^f)l mod(n), where C = C/I , C is the ciphertext, l is the private isounit, n is the first public isokey, and f is the private decryption isokey (“Given an m-bit exponent associated with a message, the randomized exponentiation component 104 can facilitate generating and/or receiving a randomly generated number (e.g., binary number with a value ranging from 0 to 2 1024-1). The randomly generated number can be generated in a secure manner so as to reduce or minimize discovery of such number by an attacker. Further, the random number can be different for each exponentiation execution on message data. The randomized exponentiation component 104 can facilitate randomizing and/or modifying the message data based on the randomly generated number. For example, the binary value of the message data can be multiplied by the binary value of the random number to facilitate randomizing the exponentiation of the message data. The randomized exponentiation component 104 can exponentiate the randomized message in accordance with an algorithm (e.g., right-to-left algorithm). Once the randomized message data has been exponentiated with the exponent, the preliminary results can be analyzed to determine whether there was an error or fault in the exponentiation, as more fully described herein. If there was no error in the exponentiation, a preliminary result associated with the decrypted data and/or digital signature can be modified based on the random number value (e.g., by multiplying the value of such preliminary result by the inverse of the random number value) to reach a final result of the exponentiation, where the final result can be the decrypted data or digital signature, for example, and can be provided as output” [0030] [Examiner notes that the undoing of the random number by saying, “the preliminary result associated with the decrypted data... can be modified based on the random number value (e.g., by multiplying the value of such preliminary result by the inverse of the random number value) to reach a final result...” shows that there is a modular inverse step in the decryption which matches with the division formula of C=C/l. The multiplying of l in encryption is undone by dividing in encryption which means it is the exact opposite formula in order to successfully decrypt so it has to be based on that decryption formula]).
Thus, it would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains, to combine the
method of Shimizu with the added structure of Boscher in order to be able to successfully decrypt the encryption formula that has includes the randomization aspect of the message during exponentiation of the message data which facilitated securing the message and associated exponent from being discovered by attackers via side-channel attacks even more [Boscher 0007].
Claims 4, 8-10, and 14-17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US 2021/0135851 A1 to Shimizu et al. (hereinafter, “Shimizu”) in view of US 2009/0097637 A1 to Boscher et al. (hereinafter, “Boscher”) and in further view of US 6904150 B1 to Dent.
Regarding claims 4 and 14, a combination of Shimizu-Boscher disclose all limitations of claim 1/11.
Shimizu-Boscher do not explicitly disclose: wherein the private isounit is a randomly selected number that is larger than a value of the message to be encrypted.
However, Dent discloses: wherein the private isounit is a randomly selected number that is larger than a value of the message to be encrypted (“The binary value of the resulting message is then compared to the sender's encryption modulus. If the binary value of the message is greater than or equal to the sender's encryption modulus, at least one bit of the error detection code is altered to reduce the binary value of the message below the sender's encryption modulus” [Abstract] [Examiner notes that the reason why the isounit needs to be larger than a value of the message is because if it is smaller, the arithmetic (modular operations, inverse, etc.) might fail. Therefore, an isounit larger than the message is necessary in order to guarantee proper encryption and decryption. This ties into the text above because it explicitly compares the message value to the modulus before encryption. This mirrors the reason the isounit must be bigger, to ensure the arithmetic stayed valid within the modulus. It also describes modifying the message so it fits under the modulus. This is functionally the same rationale as choosing a big enough isounit as we need to ensure the product of the message multiplied by the isounit (any random number) does not exceed the modulus or create arithmetic issues. Once the message is confirmed small enough, encryption processed (multiplying the isounit by the message works correctly in the encryption formula). Since this text shows a system ensuring the message value is within a safe numeric range, it is interpreted as showing exactly why the isounit must be larger than the message, therefore no novelty is shown by this limitation]).
Thus, it would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains, to combine the
method of Shimizu-Boscher with the added structure of Dent in order to be able to successfully go through the encryption/decryption formulas without error.
Regarding claims 8 and 15, a combination of Shimizu-Boscher disclose all limitations of claim 1/11.
Shimizu discloses: wherein the first public isokey is based on the private isounit The synthesis key generation unit 22 a generates a random number. The synthesis key generation unit 22 a generates one synthesis key by exponentiating the multiplication result of the public keys by the generated random number. The reason for exponentiation with a random number is to suppress the synthesis key generated from the public keys from normally being the same. The synthesis key generation unit 22 a may convert the generated synthesis key into a fixed-length synthesis key using a hash function” [0031] [Examiner notes here that the synthesis key is the first public isokey]).
Shimizu-Boscher do not explicitly disclose: wherein the first public isokey is based on the private isounit and more than one prime number.
However, Dent discloses: wherein the first public isokey is based on the private isounit and more than one prime number (“One of the most popular public key algorithms is the RSA algorithm, named after its three inventors--Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman. The RSA algorithm takes a message M and encrypts it using the formula C=M.sup.E mod N, where N is the product of two large prime numbers P, Q chosen at random... The exponent E and modulus N are used as the public key” [0006] [Examiner bring this text to show that N is the public isokey and it is based on 2 prime numbers]).
Thus, it would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains, to combine the
method of Shimizu-Boscher with the added structure of Dent in order to show how and why the numbers are connected.
Regarding claims 9 and 16, a combination of Shimizu-Boscher disclose all limitations of claim 1/11.
Shimizu-Boscher do not explicitly disclose: wherein the second public isokey is based on the private isounit and the first public isokey.
However, Dent discloses: wherein the second public isokey is based on the private isounit and the first public isokey (“One of the most popular public key algorithms is the RSA algorithm, named after its three inventors--Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman. The RSA algorithm takes a message M and encrypts it using the formula C=M.sup.E mod N, where N is the product of two large prime numbers P, Q chosen at random. The exponent E is a number relatively prime to (P-1)(Q-1)” [0006] [Examiner notes that this text explicitly ties E to Phi(N), which itself is defined directly from P and Q (same primes that define N, the first public isokey). Phi(N) = (P-1)(Q-1) and because E is restricted by the condition involving (P-1)(Q-1), which comes from the same P and Q that built N, that means E is tied to N (connected through the same private prime numbers)]).
Thus, it would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains, to combine the
method of Shimizu-Boscher with the added structure of Dent in order to show how and why the numbers are connected.
Regarding claims 10 and 17, a combination of Shimizu-Boscher disclose all limitations of claim 1/11.
Shimizu-Boscher do not explicitly disclose: wherein the private decryption isokey is based on the second public isokey.
However, Dent discloses: wherein the private decryption isokey is based on the second public isokey (“One of the most popular public key algorithms is the RSA algorithm, named after its three inventors--Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman. The RSA algorithm takes a message M and encrypts it using the formula C=M.sup.E mod N, where N is the product of two large prime numbers P, Q chosen at random. The exponent E is a number relatively prime to (P-1)(Q-1)” [0006] [Examiner notes that in the decryption formula stated in claim 3 above, the private decryption isokey f is the number used to "undo" the exponentiation done by the second public isokey e. To make this work, f is calculated using Phi(N), which depends on the first public isokey N (the product of the prime numbers). Specifically, f is chosen so that multiplying it by e gives 1 modulo Phi(N). This means f directly depends on e (second public isokey)]).
Thus, it would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains, to combine the
method of Shimizu-Boscher with the added structure of Dent in order to show how and why the numbers are connected.
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the date of this final action.
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/SARON MATTHEWOS WORKU/Examiner, Art Unit 2408
/LINGLAN EDWARDS/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2408