DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
The response of 1/13/2026 include only arguments and no claim amendments, those arguments have been entered into the record. Claims 1 thru 20 are pending in this application.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed 1/13/2026 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Regarding independent claims 1, 8 and 15, the applicant argument is directed to the limitation of the inceptor has a backup flight control processor disposed therein. The applicant and the examiner agree that the references of Cutler et al and Hirvonen do not teach that the inceptor (yoke, stick, pedal, collective) has a processor disposed within the inceptor.
The Lawniczak et al reference was cited to teach the limitation of having a processor located or installed within an aircraft yoke or stick. The applicant admits that Lawniczak et al teach that the pilot stick includes a computer P[0077] (argument page 2 paragraph 5). The applicant further argues, “Absolutely nowhere does Lawniczak teach, or even remotely suggest, using the disclosed computer as a backup flight control processor to implement the recited functionality of the independent claims.” (argument page 2 paragraph 5). The examiner argues that the Lawniczak et al reference was not cited to teach the “computer as a backup flight control processor to implement the recited functionality”. The Cutler et al and Hirvonen references were cited to teach the claimed backup flight control processor and the claimed functionality of processor (see below rejections of claims 1, 8 and 15).
Lawniczak et al was cited to merely teach a location that a processor can be installed, such as a pilot stick. The installation of a processor at different locations, (such as front, center, overhead consoles, and the pilot stick) is a design or installation choice. The placement of a processor in a certain location does not provide patentable distinction, especially when Lawniczak et al teach the claimed location. The examiner maintains that the claimed functions of the processor are taught by the combination of Cutler et al and Hirvonen, and Lawniczak et al merely teach an installation location for a processor. Processors can be installed at any number of locations and still perform the intended functions.
Based on the above responses to the arguments and the below rejections, the rejection of claims 1 thru 20 are maintained.
Claim Interpretation
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(f):
(f) Element in Claim for a Combination. – An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The following is a quotation of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The claims in this application are given their broadest reasonable interpretation using the plain meaning of the claim language in light of the specification as it would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim element (also commonly referred to as a claim limitation) is limited by the description in the specification when 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is invoked.
As explained in MPEP § 2181, subsection I, claim limitations that meet the following three-prong test will be interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
(A) the claim limitation uses the term “means” or “step” or a term used as a substitute for “means” that is a generic placeholder (also called a nonce term or a non-structural term having no specific structural meaning) for performing the claimed function;
(B) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is modified by functional language, typically, but not always linked by the transition word “for” (e.g., “means for”) or another linking word or phrase, such as “configured to” or “so that”; and
(C) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is not modified by sufficient structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function.
Use of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim with functional language creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites sufficient structure, material, or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Absence of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is not to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is not interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites function without reciting sufficient structure, material or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Claim limitations in this application that use the word “means” (or “step”) are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action. Conversely, claim limitations in this application that do not use the word “means” (or “step”) are not being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action.
This application includes one or more claim limitations that do not use the word “means,” but are nonetheless being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, because the claim limitation(s) uses a generic placeholder that is coupled with functional language without reciting sufficient structure to perform the recited function and the generic placeholder is not preceded by a structural modifier. Such claim limitation(s) is/are: each effector control electronics configured to generate and supply flight control surface commands in claims 1, 8 and 15; and inertial data source configured to supply inertial data and air data source configured to supply air data in claims 4, 11 and 17.
Because this/these claim limitation(s) is/are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, it/they is/are being interpreted to cover the corresponding structure described in the specification as performing the claimed function, and equivalents thereof. The effector control electronics are interpreted to include digital bus transceiver 112, a suitable input/output (I/O) interface 114, and an effector processor 116 (P[0019] and Figures 1 and 2), in other words, any of the electronics that control electric motors or actuators. The inertial data source and air data source are interpreted as signals from aircraft sensors ([0024] and Figures 1 and 2).
If applicant does not intend to have this/these limitation(s) interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, applicant may: (1) amend the claim limitation(s) to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph (e.g., by reciting sufficient structure to perform the claimed function); or (2) present a sufficient showing that the claim limitation(s) recite(s) sufficient structure to perform the claimed function so as to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claim(s) 1 thru 20 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Cutler et al Patent Application Publication Number 2018/0239366 A1 in view of Hirvonen Patent Application Publication Number 2007/0164166 A1 and Lawniczak et al Patent Application Publication Number 2022/0212780 A1.
Regarding claim 1 Cutler et al teach the claimed fly by wire flight control system, a control system the requires electronics P[0026] and inputs processed through flight computers to activate the actuators (Figures 2, 4, 6 and 9), comprising:
the claimed plurality of effector control electronics with each effector control electronics coupled to selectively receive effector-specific flight control command data and each effector control electronics generates and supplies flight control surface commands to one or more effectors upon receipt of its effector specific flight control command data, “Lower level flight computer 1_602 as shown provides inputs to actuator 1_612. Lower level flight computer_2 604 provides inputs to actuator_2 614. Lower level flight computer_3 608 provides inputs to actuator_3 616. Lower level flight computer_4 610 provides inputs to actuator_4 618. The lower level flight computers may determine a speed for a rotor, a tilt angle of a flap, an amount of thrust used, or any other appropriate factor.” (P[0040] and Figure 6), the actuators equate to the claimed effectors, and the connections from the computers to the actuators equate to the claimed effector control electronics;
the claimed plurality of flight control computers where each flight control computer coupled to receive inceptor command data, and to selectively generate and supply the effector specific flight control command data upon receipt of the inceptor command data, “Inputs may comprise an input from a user interface. For example, a pilot may enter a latitude and longitude. Inputs may comprise conditions, such as a stipulation to avoid locations with bad weather, fly over areas of low population density, or to take the shortest path. The inputs may comprise an instruction to execute a complex flight trajectory. The higher level flight computer may determine an appropriate velocity or position for the aircraft based on the inputs. The higher level flight computer may automatically navigate or control the aircraft to achieve the desired velocity or position. The higher level flight computer may determine a desired attitude or desired rate of attitude change based on the inputs and provide the desired attitude or desired rate of attitude change to lower level flight computers. Higher level flight computer 600 determines instructions given to lower level flight computer_1 602, lower level flight computer_2 604, lower level flight computer_3 608, and lower level flight computer_4 610.” (P[0039] and Figure 6), the lower level computers equate to the claimed plurality of flight control computers, and the inputs from the user interface and pilot equate to the claimed receive inceptor command data; and
the claimed inceptor in operable communication with each effector control electronics and each flight control computer and the inceptor supplies the inceptor command data to the flight control computers, “higher level flight computer 970 receives inputs from pilot controls and sensors. The higher level flight computer may provide instruction to the lower flight computer based on the pilot controls and sensor information.” (P[0049] and Figure 9), and “the distributed flight control may enable pilot inputs to be directly provided to lower level flight computers” P[0054],
the claimed inceptor comprising a backup flight control processor, “higher level flight computer 970 receives inputs from pilot controls and sensors. The higher level flight computer may provide instruction to the lower flight computer based on the pilot controls and sensor information.” P[0049], the higher level flight computer equates to the claimed backup flight control processor, configured to:
the claimed receive a backup control mode signal indicating that the flight control computers are inoperable, “The flight computers may each comprise independent code or hardware to determine when to switch from listening to a higher level flight computer to listening to manual control. Control may be desired to switch over to a manual mode in the event a malfunction is detected in the higher level flight computer or an irregularity is detected. In some embodiments, the aircraft's actual state is tracked and compared to the aircraft's desired state. In the event the actual state does not track the desired state appropriately, the system may signal that a malfunction is detected.” P[0041]; and
the claimed in response to the backup control mode signal, to selectively generate and supply the effector-specific flight control command data, “In the event the higher level flight computer fails, a pilot is able to directly provide inputs to the lower level flight computers.” P[0054], wherein
the claimed interceptor is one of a yoke, side stick, collective or rudder pedal, “Pilot controls 946 may comprise one or more physical objects the pilot manipulates to adjust the aircraft's position. For example, a joystick, steering wheel, pedal, lever, or any other appropriate control may be used.” P[0048].
Cutler et al do not explicitly teach the claimed plurality of flight control computers are inoperable, but instead teach the lower level flight computers control the flight operations when the higher level flight computer fails. The lower level flight computers of Cutler et al equate to the claimed plurality of flight control computers. A person having ordinary skill in the art would understand that a system capable of operating when one computer system fails another computer system is a functional backup (such as Cutler et al failure of the higher computer having the lower computers perform the operations). A person having ordinary skill in the art would also understand that the reverse failure would also be possible (lower computer failure and the higher computer takes over functions).
Hirvonen teaches, aircraft flight control systems implemented with a redundant, backup control system for a distributed fly-by-wire (FBW) flight control system P[0002], “the REU coupled to each actuator may be configured to determine the validity of the primary control signals on the primary paths 422 and pass the primary control commands to the actuators. For example, the REUs 421 and 431 may determine that the primary command signals on the primary paths 422 are valid and pass the primary command signals to the actuators 420 and 430. However, in the event that the primary channels 401 and 402 experience a general fault or the REUs determine that the primary command signals are invalid or absent, the REUs may revert to the backup control signal and use the backup control signal for the actuators. For example, the REU 431 may determine that the primary command signals on the primary paths 422 are invalid and revert to the backup command signal on the path 433 for controlling the position of the aileron 410.” P[0023], and when all the primary controllers have failed, the backup control system is needed P[0031].
The primary controllers of Hirvonen equate to the lower level flight computers Cutler et al, and also to the claimed plurality of flight control computers. And, the backup control system of Hirvonen equates to the higher level flight computer of Cutler et al, and to the claimed backup flight control processor. The combination of Cutler et al and Hirvonen would be implemented by keeping the aircraft functional no matter which computer(s) failed. It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the distributed flight control system of Cutler et al with the backup control for a distributed flight control system of Hirvonen in order to, with a reasonable expectation of success, protect the aircraft in the event of a generic fault in a complex primary control system (Hirvonen P[0008]).
Cutler et al and Hirvonen do not teach the claimed backup flight control processor is disposed within the inceptor. Cutler et al and Hirvonen lack teachings for identifying where the backup flight control computer is disposed, but still teach the functions of the backup flight control computer (see above rejection). Lawniczak et al teach the claimed control processor is disposed within the inceptor, the pilot stick comprises a computer 70 (P[0077]). Lawniczak et al teach that a computer processor may be installed or included (claimed disposed) within a pilot stick. This installed location of the computer would be combined with Cutler et al and Hirvonen as an alternate placement of the flight computers. It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the distributed flight control system of Cutler et al and the backup control for a distributed flight control system of Hirvonen with the pilot stick including a computer of Lawniczak et al in order to, with a reasonable expectation of success, reduce the mass, space and power consumption of the pilot stick (Lawniczak et al P[0013]).
Regarding claim 2 Cutler et al, Hirvonen and Lawniczak et al teach the claimed system of claim 1 (see above), Cutler et al teach the claimed each effector control electronics is configured to:
the claimed select the effector specific flight control command data from the inceptor in backup control mode and otherwise selects the effector specific flight control command data from the flight control computers, “switch 1200 receives a higher level flight computer desired attitude and a pilot desired attitude. Switch 1200 may determine on desired attitude to pass on to summation block 1202 based on whether the flight control system is in manual mode or automatic mode. Summation block [1202] may receive a desired attitude and an attitude estimate and determine an attitude error, or difference between the two. The attitude estimate may be an estimate of the aircraft's actual attitude.” (P[0061] and Figure 12), and “In the event the higher level flight computer fails, a pilot is able to directly provide inputs to the lower level flight computers.” P[0054],
the claimed synchronize the effector specific flight control command data with other effector control electronics if required, “Attitude controller 1204 as shown receives the attitude error and produces actuator commands for the aircraft based on the attitude error. The commands may be determined to eliminate the attitude error. Actuator commands are provided to safety block 1206. Safety block 1206 may prevent commands from being sent to actuators in the event the aircraft is already landed, in a take-off sequence, or in a landing sequence. In the event the aircraft is prepared to receive actuator commands, actuator commands are provided by the safety block to aircraft 1208. The aircraft's actuators may provide information on their state to sensors 1210. For example, a signal may be sent that the actuators changed position. In some embodiments, the aircraft's actuators change position based on received commands and the sensors detect the change in position. Information may not be explicitly sent from the aircraft to sensors.” (P[0061] and Figure 12), and
the claimed monitor closed loop control, “Sensors 1210 provide sensor data to attitude estimator 1212. Attitude estimator 1212 may process the sensor data received. For example, the attitude estimator may disregard signal noise. Attitude estimator 1212 may determine an estimate of the aircraft's attitude based on the sensor data. Attitude estimator 1212 may provide an attitude estimate to 1202.” P[0061], Figure 12 shows a closed loop for altitude commands, and “The lower level flight computers may perform full feedback control.” P[0040].
Regarding claim 3 Cutler et al, Hirvonen and Lawniczak et al teach the claimed system of claim 1 (see above), Cutler et al teach the claimed inceptor further comprises:
the claimed one or more inertial sensors in operable communication with the backup control surface processor and to supply inertial data, “The flight computers may comprise a processor, a set of sensors, and computer algorithms. The set of sensors may comprise a rate gyro, accelerometer, or magnetometer. In some embodiments, the flight computer is a board comprising several integrated circuits. For example, one integrated circuit may function as a microprocessor, whereas another functions as an accelerometer. Each flight computer may determine instructions for all actuators of the aircraft. The flight computer may determine instructions based on its inputs (e.g. desired attitude or desired attitude rate) and collected sensor data.” P[0034].
Regarding claim 4 Cutler et al, Hirvonen and Lawniczak et al teach the claimed system of claim 1 (see above), further comprising:
Cutler et al teach:
the claimed inertial data source in operable communication with the flight control computers and the backup flight control processor and supplies inertial data, “The flight computers may comprise a processor, a set of sensors, and computer algorithms. The set of sensors may comprise a rate gyro, accelerometer, or magnetometer. In some embodiments, the flight computer is a board comprising several integrated circuits. For example, one integrated circuit may function as a microprocessor, whereas another functions as an accelerometer. Each flight computer may determine instructions for all actuators of the aircraft. The flight computer may determine instructions based on its inputs (e.g. desired attitude or desired attitude rate) and collected sensor data.” P[0034], and “rate gyro 1100, accelerometer 1102, magnetometer 1104, and barometer 1106 provide sensor data to processor 1114” (P[0057] and Figure 11); and
the claimed air data source in operable communication with the flight control computers and the backup flight control processor and supplies air data, “Global positioning system 971, radar 972, and camera 973 are also installed on masterboard 974 and provide data to higher level flight computer 970. Camera 973 may comprise a stereo camera or infrared camera. Other sensors such as lidar or sonar may also provide data to the masterboard.” P[0047], and “rate gyro 1100, accelerometer 1102, magnetometer 1104, and barometer 1106 provide sensor data to processor 1114” (P[0057] and Figure 11).
Regarding claim 5 Cutler et al, Hirvonen and Lawniczak et al teach the claimed system of claim 1 (see above), wherein Cutler et al teach the claimed flight control effectors are further configured to determine that the flight control computers are inoperable and in response supply the backup control mode signal, “The flight computers may each comprise independent code or hardware to determine when to switch from listening to a higher level flight computer to listening to manual control. Control may be desired to switch over to a manual mode in the event a malfunction is detected in the higher level flight computer or an irregularity is detected. In some embodiments, the aircraft's actual state is tracked and compared to the aircraft's desired state. In the event the actual state does not track the desired state appropriately, the system may signal that a malfunction is detected.” P[0041], and “In the event the higher level flight computer fails, a pilot is able to directly provide inputs to the lower level flight computers.” P[0054].
Cutler et al do not explicitly teach the claimed flight control computers are inoperable, but instead teach the lower level flight computers control the flight operations when the higher level flight computer fails. The lower level flight computers of Cutler et al equate to the claimed plurality of flight control computers. A person having ordinary skill in the art would understand that a system capable of operating when one computer system fails another computer system is a functional backup (such as Cutler et al failure of the higher computer having the lower computers perform the operations). A person having ordinary skill in the art would also understand that the reverse failure would also be possible (lower computer failure and the higher computer takes over functions).
Hirvonen teaches, aircraft flight control systems implemented with a redundant, backup control system for a distributed fly-by-wire (FBW) flight control system P[0002], “the REU coupled to each actuator may be configured to determine the validity of the primary control signals on the primary paths 422 and pass the primary control commands to the actuators. For example, the REUs 421 and 431 may determine that the primary command signals on the primary paths 422 are valid and pass the primary command signals to the actuators 420 and 430. However, in the event that the primary channels 401 and 402 experience a general fault or the REUs determine that the primary command signals are invalid or absent, the REUs may revert to the backup control signal and use the backup control signal for the actuators. For example, the REU 431 may determine that the primary command signals on the primary paths 422 are invalid and revert to the backup command signal on the path 433 for controlling the position of the aileron 410.” P[0023], and when all the primary controllers have failed, the backup control system is needed P[0031].
The primary controllers of Hirvonen equate to the lower level flight computers Cutler et al, and also to the claimed plurality of flight control computers. And, the backup control system of Hirvonen equates to the higher level flight computer of Cutler et al, and to the claimed backup flight control processor. The combination of Cutler et al and Hirvonen would be implemented by keeping the aircraft functional no matter which computer(s) failed. It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the distributed flight control system of Cutler et al and the pilot stick including a computer of Lawniczak et al with the backup control for a distributed flight control system of Hirvonen in order to, with a reasonable expectation of success, protect the aircraft in the event of a generic fault in a complex primary control system (Hirvonen P[0008]).
Regarding claims 6 and 7 Cutler et al, Hirvonen and Lawniczak et al teach the claimed system of claim 1 (see above), wherein Cutler et al teach:
the claimed effector control electronics are further configured to determine that the flight control computers are inoperable, and the claimed generate and supply the backup mode signal (claim 7), “The flight computers may each comprise independent code or hardware to determine when to switch from listening to a higher level flight computer to listening to manual control. Control may be desired to switch over to a manual mode in the event a malfunction is detected in the higher level flight computer or an irregularity is detected. In some embodiments, the aircraft's actual state is tracked and compared to the aircraft's desired state. In the event the actual state does not track the desired state appropriately, the system may signal that a malfunction is detected.” P[0041], and “In the event the higher level flight computer fails, a pilot is able to directly provide inputs to the lower level flight computers.” P[0054]; and
the claimed inceptor further comprises a backup mode switch that is configured in response to user input to generate and supply the backup control mode signal, “The flight computers may each comprise independent code or hardware to determine when to switch from listening to a higher level flight computer to listening to manual control. Control may be desired to switch over to a manual mode in the event a malfunction is detected in the higher level flight computer or an irregularity is detected. In some embodiments, the aircraft's actual state is tracked and compared to the aircraft's desired state. In the event the actual state does not track the desired state appropriately, the system may signal that a malfunction is detected. A pilot's controls may comprise a switch, button, application, or other mechanism to select a mode.” P[0041].
Cutler et al do not teach the claimed generate and supply an alert signal in response to the flight control computers being inoperable. Hirvonen teaches, “The primary flight controller 220 may also provide data for other functions by other transmission paths such at path 280, which may provide data for a crew alerting system ("CAS") and maintenance announcements, and path 232, which may provide data for an active control function 230 or other feedback devices for the cockpit or pilots.” P[0049], and “The backup or backup flight control system may be monitored during the normal operation, so that, at the least, its existence may be assured if it is needed. As an example of one embodiment of the present invention, the backup control signal received by the smart actuator 260 from the backup controller 240 and the directional bus 242 may be verified or monitored via the primary control systems. The backup control signal may be processed by, for example, the smart actuator 260 and transmitted on the bi-directional bus 222 to the primary controller 220. The primary control system may then analyze the backup control signal to ensure the integrity of the backup control system. In the event that the backup control signal received by the primary controller 220 is not accurate, the pilots or operators may be alerted.” P[0056].
A person of ordinary skill in the art (and aircraft crewmembers) would understand that an alert will be issued to the crew or pilot whenever a malfunction occurs with the aircraft. It is well known in the art and by flight crews to be aware of warning indications when there is a failure of any critical piece of equipment. The claimed flight control computers would equate to a critical piece of equipment, and the alert provided by Hirvonen would be provided for the failure of these computers. Additionally, Cutler et al do not explicitly teach the claimed plurality of flight control computers are inoperable, but instead teach the lower level flight computers control the flight operations when the higher level flight computer fails. A person having ordinary skill in the art would understand that a system capable of operating when one computer system fails another computer system is a functional backup (such as Cutler et al failure of the higher computer having the lower computers perform the operations). A person having ordinary skill in the art would also understand that the reverse failure would also be possible (lower computer failure and the higher computer takes over functions).
Hirvonen teaches, aircraft flight control systems implemented with a redundant, backup control system for a distributed fly-by-wire (FBW) flight control system P[0002], “the REU coupled to each actuator may be configured to determine the validity of the primary control signals on the primary paths 422 and pass the primary control commands to the actuators. For example, the REUs 421 and 431 may determine that the primary command signals on the primary paths 422 are valid and pass the primary command signals to the actuators 420 and 430. However, in the event that the primary channels 401 and 402 experience a general fault or the REUs determine that the primary command signals are invalid or absent, the REUs may revert to the backup control signal and use the backup control signal for the actuators. For example, the REU 431 may determine that the primary command signals on the primary paths 422 are invalid and revert to the backup command signal on the path 433 for controlling the position of the aileron 410.” P[0023], and when all the primary controllers have failed, the backup control system is needed P[0031].
It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the distributed flight control system of Cutler et al and the pilot stick including a computer of Lawniczak et al with the backup control for a distributed flight control system with alerting of the crew for computer failures of Hirvonen in order to, with a reasonable expectation of success, protect the aircraft in the event of a generic fault in a complex primary control system (Hirvonen P[0008]).
Regarding claim 8 Cutler et al teach the claimed vehicle, an aircraft (Figures 3A and 3B), comprising:
the claimed vehicle body, the fuselage 300 (Figure 3A) and the fuselage 350 (Figure 3B); and
the claimed fly-by-wire flight control system disposed within the vehicle body, a control system the requires electronics P[0026] and inputs processed through flight computers to activate the actuators (Figures 2, 4, 6 and 9), the fly-by-wire flight control system comprising:
the claimed plurality of effector control electronics with each effector control electronics coupled to selectively receive effector-specific flight control command data and each effector control electronics generates and supplies flight control surface commands to one or more effectors upon receipt of its effector specific flight control command data, “Lower level flight computer 1_602 as shown provides inputs to actuator 1_612. Lower level flight computer_2 604 provides inputs to actuator_2 614. Lower level flight computer_3 608 provides inputs to actuator_3 616. Lower level flight computer_4 610 provides inputs to actuator_4 618. The lower level flight computers may determine a speed for a rotor, a tilt angle of a flap, an amount of thrust used, or any other appropriate factor.” (P[0040] and Figure 6), the actuators equate to the claimed effectors, and the connections from the computers to the actuators equate to the claimed effector control electronics;
the claimed plurality of flight control computers where each flight control computer coupled to receive inceptor command data, and to selectively generate and supply the effector specific flight control command data upon receipt of the inceptor command data, “Inputs may comprise an input from a user interface. For example, a pilot may enter a latitude and longitude. Inputs may comprise conditions, such as a stipulation to avoid locations with bad weather, fly over areas of low population density, or to take the shortest path. The inputs may comprise an instruction to execute a complex flight trajectory. The higher level flight computer may determine an appropriate velocity or position for the aircraft based on the inputs. The higher level flight computer may automatically navigate or control the aircraft to achieve the desired velocity or position. The higher level flight computer may determine a desired attitude or desired rate of attitude change based on the inputs and provide the desired attitude or desired rate of attitude change to lower level flight computers. Higher level flight computer 600 determines instructions given to lower level flight computer_1 602, lower level flight computer_2 604, lower level flight computer_3 608, and lower level flight computer_4 610.” (P[0039] and Figure 6), the lower level computers equate to the claimed plurality of flight control computers, and the inputs from the user interface and pilot equate to the claimed receive inceptor command data; and
the claimed inceptor in operable communication with each effector control electronics and each flight control computer and the inceptor supplies the inceptor command data to the flight control computers, “higher level flight computer 970 receives inputs from pilot controls and sensors. The higher level flight computer may provide instruction to the lower flight computer based on the pilot controls and sensor information.” (P[0049] and Figure 9), and “the distributed flight control may enable pilot inputs to be directly provided to lower level flight computers” P[0054],
the claimed inceptor comprising a backup flight control processor, “higher level flight computer 970 receives inputs from pilot controls and sensors. The higher level flight computer may provide instruction to the lower flight computer based on the pilot controls and sensor information.” P[0049], the higher level flight computer equates to the claimed backup flight control processor, configured to:
the claimed receive a backup control mode signal indicating that the flight control computers are inoperable, “The flight computers may each comprise independent code or hardware to determine when to switch from listening to a higher level flight computer to listening to manual control. Control may be desired to switch over to a manual mode in the event a malfunction is detected in the higher level flight computer or an irregularity is detected. In some embodiments, the aircraft's actual state is tracked and compared to the aircraft's desired state. In the event the actual state does not track the desired state appropriately, the system may signal that a malfunction is detected.” P[0041]; and
the claimed in response to the backup control mode signal, to selectively generate and supply the effector-specific flight control command data, “In the event the higher level flight computer fails, a pilot is able to directly provide inputs to the lower level flight computers.” P[0054], wherein
the claimed interceptor is one of a yoke, side stick, collective or rudder pedal, “Pilot controls 946 may comprise one or more physical objects the pilot manipulates to adjust the aircraft's position. For example, a joystick, steering wheel, pedal, lever, or any other appropriate control may be used.” P[0048].
Cutler et al do not explicitly teach the claimed plurality of flight control computers are inoperable, but instead teach the lower level flight computers control the flight operations when the higher level flight computer fails. The lower level flight computers of Cutler et al equate to the claimed plurality of flight control computers. A person having ordinary skill in the art would understand that a system capable of operating when one computer system fails another computer system is a functional backup (such as Cutler et al failure of the higher computer having the lower computers perform the operations). A person having ordinary skill in the art would also understand that the reverse failure would also be possible (lower computer failure and the higher computer takes over functions).
Hirvonen teaches, aircraft flight control systems implemented with a redundant, backup control system for a distributed fly-by-wire (FBW) flight control system P[0002], “the REU coupled to each actuator may be configured to determine the validity of the primary control signals on the primary paths 422 and pass the primary control commands to the actuators. For example, the REUs 421 and 431 may determine that the primary command signals on the primary paths 422 are valid and pass the primary command signals to the actuators 420 and 430. However, in the event that the primary channels 401 and 402 experience a general fault or the REUs determine that the primary command signals are invalid or absent, the REUs may revert to the backup control signal and use the backup control signal for the actuators. For example, the REU 431 may determine that the primary command signals on the primary paths 422 are invalid and revert to the backup command signal on the path 433 for controlling the position of the aileron 410.” P[0023], and when all the primary controllers have failed, the backup control system is needed P[0031].
The primary controllers of Hirvonen equate to the lower level flight computers Cutler et al, and also to the claimed plurality of flight control computers. And, the backup control system of Hirvonen equates to the higher level flight computer of Cutler et al, and to the claimed backup flight control processor. The combination of Cutler et al and Hirvonen would be implemented by keeping the aircraft functional no matter which computer(s) failed. It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the distributed flight control system of Cutler et al with the backup control for a distributed flight control system of Hirvonen in order to, with a reasonable expectation of success, protect the aircraft in the event of a generic fault in a complex primary control system (Hirvonen P[0008]).
Cutler et al and Hirvonen do not teach the claimed backup flight control processor is disposed within the inceptor. Cutler et al and Hirvonen lack teachings for identifying where the backup flight control computer is disposed, but still teach the functions of the backup flight control computer (see above rejection). Lawniczak et al teach the claimed control processor is disposed within the inceptor, the pilot stick comprises a computer 70 (P[0077]). Lawniczak et al teach that a computer processor may be installed or included (claimed disposed) within a pilot stick. This installed location of the computer would be combined with Cutler et al and Hirvonen as an alternate placement of the flight computers. It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the distributed flight control system of Cutler et al and the backup control for a distributed flight control system of Hirvonen with the pilot stick including a computer of Lawniczak et al in order to, with a reasonable expectation of success, reduce the mass, space and power consumption of the pilot stick (Lawniczak et al P[0013]).
Regarding claim 9 Cutler et al, Hirvonen and Lawniczak et al teach the claimed vehicle of claim 8 (see above), Cutler et al teach the claimed each effector control electronics is configured to:
the claimed select the effector specific flight control command data from the inceptor in backup control mode and otherwise selects the effector specific flight control command data from the flight control computers, “switch 1200 receives a higher level flight computer desired attitude and a pilot desired attitude. Switch 1200 may determine on desired attitude to pass on to summation block 1202 based on whether the flight control system is in manual mode or automatic mode. Summation block [1202] may receive a desired attitude and an attitude estimate and determine an attitude error, or difference between the two. The attitude estimate may be an estimate of the aircraft's actual attitude.” (P[0061] and Figure 12), and “In the event the higher level flight computer fails, a pilot is able to directly provide inputs to the lower level flight computers.” P[0054],
the claimed synchronize the effector specific flight control command data with other effector control electronics if required, “Attitude controller 1204 as shown receives the attitude error and produces actuator commands for the aircraft based on the attitude error. The commands may be determined to eliminate the attitude error. Actuator commands are provided to safety block 1206. Safety block 1206 may prevent commands from being sent to actuators in the event the aircraft is already landed, in a take-off sequence, or in a landing sequence. In the event the aircraft is prepared to receive actuator commands, actuator commands are provided by the safety block to aircraft 1208. The aircraft's actuators may provide information on their state to sensors 1210. For example, a signal may be sent that the actuators changed position. In some embodiments, the aircraft's actuators change position based on received commands and the sensors detect the change in position. Information may not be explicitly sent from the aircraft to sensors.” (P[0061] and Figure 12), and
the claimed monitor closed loop control, “Sensors 1210 provide sensor data to attitude estimator 1212. Attitude estimator 1212 may process the sensor data received. For example, the attitude estimator may disregard signal noise. Attitude estimator 1212 may determine an estimate of the aircraft's attitude based on the sensor data. Attitude estimator 1212 may provide an attitude estimate to 1202.” P[0061], Figure 12 shows a closed loop for altitude commands, and “The lower level flight computers may perform full feedback control.” P[0040].
Regarding claim 10 Cutler et al, Hirvonen and Lawniczak et al teach the claimed vehicle of claim 8 (see above), Cutler et al teach the claimed inceptor further comprises:
the claimed one or more inertial sensors in operable communication with the backup control surface processor and to supply inertial data, “The flight computers may comprise a processor, a set of sensors, and computer algorithms. The set of sensors may comprise a rate gyro, accelerometer, or magnetometer. In some embodiments, the flight computer is a board comprising several integrated circuits. For example, one integrated circuit may function as a microprocessor, whereas another functions as an accelerometer. Each flight computer may determine instructions for all actuators of the aircraft. The flight computer may determine instructions based on its inputs (e.g. desired attitude or desired attitude rate) and collected sensor data.” P[0034].
Regarding claim 11 Cutler et al, Hirvonen and Lawniczak et al teach the claimed vehicle of claim 8 (see above), further comprising:
Cutler et al teach:
the claimed inertial data source in operable communication with the flight control computers and the backup flight control processor and supplies inertial data, “The flight computers may comprise a processor, a set of sensors, and computer algorithms. The set of sensors may comprise a rate gyro, accelerometer, or magnetometer. In some embodiments, the flight computer is a board comprising several integrated circuits. For example, one integrated circuit may function as a microprocessor, whereas another functions as an accelerometer. Each flight computer may determine instructions for all actuators of the aircraft. The flight computer may determine instructions based on its inputs (e.g. desired attitude or desired attitude rate) and collected sensor data.” P[0034], and “rate gyro 1100, accelerometer 1102, magnetometer 1104, and barometer 1106 provide sensor data to processor 1114” (P[0057] and Figure 11); and
the claimed air data source in operable communication with the flight control computers and the backup flight control processor and supplies air data, “Global positioning system 971, radar 972, and camera 973 are also installed on masterboard 974 and provide data to higher level flight computer 970. Camera 973 may comprise a stereo camera or infrared camera. Other sensors such as lidar or sonar may also provide data to the masterboard.” P[0047], and “rate gyro 1100, accelerometer 1102, magnetometer 1104, and barometer 1106 provide sensor data to processor 1114” (P[0057] and Figure 11).
Regarding claim 12 Cutler et al, Hirvonen and Lawniczak et al teach the claimed vehicle of claim 8 (see above), wherein Cutler et al teach the claimed flight control effectors are further configured to determine that the flight control computers are inoperable and in response supply the backup control mode signal, “The flight computers may each comprise independent code or hardware to determine when to switch from listening to a higher level flight computer to listening to manual control. Control may be desired to switch over to a manual mode in the event a malfunction is detected in the higher level flight computer or an irregularity is detected. In some embodiments, the aircraft's actual state is tracked and compared to the aircraft's desired state. In the event the actual state does not track the desired state appropriately, the system may signal that a malfunction is detected.” P[0041], and “In the event the higher level flight computer fails, a pilot is able to directly provide inputs to the lower level flight computers.” P[0054].
Cutler et al do not explicitly teach the claimed flight control computers are inoperable, but instead teach the lower level flight computers control the flight operations when the higher level flight computer fails. The lower level flight computers of Cutler et al equate to the claimed plurality of flight control computers. A person having ordinary skill in the art would understand that a system capable of operating when one computer system fails another computer system is a functional backup (such as Cutler et al failure of the higher computer having the lower computers perform the operations). A person having ordinary skill in the art would also understand that the reverse failure would also be possible (lower computer failure and the higher computer takes over functions).
Hirvonen teaches, aircraft flight control systems implemented with a redundant, backup control system for a distributed fly-by-wire (FBW) flight control system P[0002], “the REU coupled to each actuator may be configured to determine the validity of the primary control signals on the primary paths 422 and pass the primary control commands to the actuators. For example, the REUs 421 and 431 may determine that the primary command signals on the primary paths 422 are valid and pass the primary command signals to the actuators 420 and 430. However, in the event that the primary channels 401 and 402 experience a general fault or the REUs determine that the primary command signals are invalid or absent, the REUs may revert to the backup control signal and use the backup control signal for the actuators. For example, the REU 431 may determine that the primary command signals on the primary paths 422 are invalid and revert to the backup command signal on the path 433 for controlling the position of the aileron 410.” P[0023], and when all the primary controllers have failed, the backup control system is needed P[0031].
The primary controllers of Hirvonen equate to the lower level flight computers Cutler et al, and also to the claimed plurality of flight control computers. And, the backup control system of Hirvonen equates to the higher level flight computer of Cutler et al, and to the claimed backup flight control processor. The combination of Cutler et al and Hirvonen would be implemented by keeping the aircraft functional no matter which computer(s) failed. It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the distributed flight control system of Cutler et al and the pilot stick including a computer of Lawniczak et al with the backup control for a distributed flight control system of Hirvonen in order to, with a reasonable expectation of success, protect the aircraft in the event of a generic fault in a complex primary control system (Hirvonen P[0008]).
Regarding claims 13 and 14 Cutler et al, Hirvonen and Lawniczak et al teach the claimed vehicle of claim 8 (see above), wherein Cutler et al teach:
the claimed effector control electronics are further configured to determine that the flight control computers are inoperable, and the claimed generate and supply the backup mode signal (claim 14), “The flight computers may each comprise independent code or hardware to determine when to switch from listening to a higher level flight computer to listening to manual control. Control may be desired to switch over to a manual mode in the event a malfunction is detected in the higher level flight computer or an irregularity is detected. In some embodiments, the aircraft's actual state is tracked and compared to the aircraft's desired state. In the event the actual state does not track the desired state appropriately, the system may signal that a malfunction is detected.” P[0041], and “In the event the higher level flight computer fails, a pilot is able to directly provide inputs to the lower level flight computers.” P[0054]; and
the claimed inceptor further comprises a backup mode switch that is configured in response to user input to generate and supply the backup control mode signal, “The flight computers may each comprise independent code or hardware to determine when to switch from listening to a higher level flight computer to listening to manual control. Control may be desired to switch over to a manual mode in the event a malfunction is detected in the higher level flight computer or an irregularity is detected. In some embodiments, the aircraft's actual state is tracked and compared to the aircraft's desired state. In the event the actual state does not track the desired state appropriately, the system may signal that a malfunction is detected. A pilot's controls may comprise a switch, button, application, or other mechanism to select a mode.” P[0041].
Cutler et al do not teach the claimed generate and supply an alert signal in response to the flight control computers being inoperable. Hirvonen teaches, “The primary flight controller 220 may also provide data for other functions by other transmission paths such at path 280, which may provide data for a crew alerting system ("CAS") and maintenance announcements, and path 232, which may provide data for an active control function 230 or other feedback devices for the cockpit or pilots.” P[0049], and “The backup or backup flight control system may be monitored during the normal operation, so that, at the least, its existence may be assured if it is needed. As an example of one embodiment of the present invention, the backup control signal received by the smart actuator 260 from the backup controller 240 and the directional bus 242 may be verified or monitored via the primary control systems. The backup control signal may be processed by, for example, the smart actuator 260 and transmitted on the bi-directional bus 222 to the primary controller 220. The primary control system may then analyze the backup control signal to ensure the integrity of the backup control system. In the event that the backup control signal received by the primary controller 220 is not accurate, the pilots or operators may be alerted.” P[0056].
A person of ordinary skill in the art (and aircraft crewmembers) would understand that an alert will be issued to the crew or pilot whenever a malfunction occurs with the aircraft. It is well known in the art and by flight crews to be aware of warning indications when there is a failure of any critical piece of equipment. The claimed flight control computers would equate to a critical piece of equipment, and the alert provided by Hirvonen would be provided for the failure of these computers. Additionally, Cutler et al do not explicitly teach the claimed plurality of flight control computers are inoperable, but instead teach the lower level flight computers control the flight operations when the higher level flight computer fails. A person having ordinary skill in the art would understand that a system capable of operating when one computer system fails another computer system is a functional backup (such as Cutler et al failure of the higher computer having the lower computers perform the operations). A person having ordinary skill in the art would also understand that the reverse failure would also be possible (lower computer failure and the higher computer takes over functions).
Hirvonen teaches, aircraft flight control systems implemented with a redundant, backup control system for a distributed fly-by-wire (FBW) flight control system P[0002], “the REU coupled to each actuator may be configured to determine the validity of the primary control signals on the primary paths 422 and pass the primary control commands to the actuators. For example, the REUs 421 and 431 may determine that the primary command signals on the primary paths 422 are valid and pass the primary command signals to the actuators 420 and 430. However, in the event that the primary channels 401 and 402 experience a general fault or the REUs determine that the primary command signals are invalid or absent, the REUs may revert to the backup control signal and use the backup control signal for the actuators. For example, the REU 431 may determine that the primary command signals on the primary paths 422 are invalid and revert to the backup command signal on the path 433 for controlling the position of the aileron 410.” P[0023], and when all the primary controllers have failed, the backup control system is needed P[0031].
It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the distributed flight control system of Cutler et al and the pilot stick including a computer of Lawniczak et al with the backup control for a distributed flight control system with alerting of the crew for computer failures of Hirvonen in order to, with a reasonable expectation of success, protect the aircraft in the event of a generic fault in a complex primary control system (Hirvonen P[0008]).
Regarding claim 15 Cutler et al teach the claimed fly by wire flight control system, a control system the requires electronics P[0026] and inputs processed through flight computers to activate the actuators (Figures 2, 4, 6 and 9), comprising:
the claimed plurality of effector control electronics with each effector control electronics coupled to selectively receive effector-specific flight control command data and each effector control electronics generates and supplies flight control surface commands to one or more effectors upon receipt of its effector specific flight control command data, “Lower level flight computer 1_602 as shown provides inputs to actuator 1_612. Lower level flight computer_2 604 provides inputs to actuator_2 614. Lower level flight computer_3 608 provides inputs to actuator_3 616. Lower level flight computer_4 610 provides inputs to actuator_4 618. The lower level flight computers may determine a speed for a rotor, a tilt angle of a flap, an amount of thrust used, or any other appropriate factor.” (P[0040] and Figure 6), the actuators equate to the claimed effectors, and the connections from the computers to the actuators equate to the claimed effector control electronics;
the claimed plurality of flight control computers where each flight control computer coupled to receive inceptor command data, and to selectively generate and supply the effector specific flight control command data upon receipt of the inceptor command data, “Inputs may comprise an input from a user interface. For example, a pilot may enter a latitude and longitude. Inputs may comprise conditions, such as a stipulation to avoid locations with bad weather, fly over areas of low population density, or to take the shortest path. The inputs may comprise an instruction to execute a complex flight trajectory. The higher level flight computer may determine an appropriate velocity or position for the aircraft based on the inputs. The higher level flight computer may automatically navigate or control the aircraft to achieve the desired velocity or position. The higher level flight computer may determine a desired attitude or desired rate of attitude change based on the inputs and provide the desired attitude or desired rate of attitude change to lower level flight computers. Higher level flight computer 600 determines instructions given to lower level flight computer_1 602, lower level flight computer_2 604, lower level flight computer_3 608, and lower level flight computer_4 610.” (P[0039] and Figure 6), the lower level computers equate to the claimed plurality of flight control computers, and the inputs from the user interface and pilot equate to the claimed receive inceptor command data; and
the claimed inceptor in operable communication with each effector control electronics and each flight control computer and the inceptor supplies the inceptor command data to the flight control computers, “higher level flight computer 970 receives inputs from pilot controls and sensors. The higher level flight computer may provide instruction to the lower flight computer based on the pilot controls and sensor information.” (P[0049] and Figure 9), and “the distributed flight control may enable pilot inputs to be directly provided to lower level flight computers” P[0054],
the claimed inceptor comprising a backup flight control processor, “higher level flight computer 970 receives inputs from pilot controls and sensors. The higher level flight computer may provide instruction to the lower flight computer based on the pilot controls and sensor information.” P[0049], the higher level flight computer equates to the claimed backup flight control processor, configured to:
the claimed receive a backup control mode signal indicating that the flight control computers are inoperable, “The flight computers may each comprise independent code or hardware to determine when to switch from listening to a higher level flight computer to listening to manual control. Control may be desired to switch over to a manual mode in the event a malfunction is detected in the higher level flight computer or an irregularity is detected. In some embodiments, the aircraft's actual state is tracked and compared to the aircraft's desired state. In the event the actual state does not track the desired state appropriately, the system may signal that a malfunction is detected.” P[0041]; and
the claimed in response to the backup control mode signal, to selectively generate and supply the effector-specific flight control command data, “In the event the higher level flight computer fails, a pilot is able to directly provide inputs to the lower level flight computers.” P[0054],
the claimed each effector control electronics is configured to:
the claimed determine that the flight control computers are inoperable, “Control may be desired to switch over to a manual mode in the event a malfunction is detected in the higher level flight computer or an irregularity is detected.” P[0041],
the claimed select the effector specific flight control command data from the inceptor in backup control mode and otherwise selects the effector flight control command data from the flight control computers, “switch 1200 receives a higher level flight computer desired attitude and a pilot desired attitude. Switch 1200 may determine on desired attitude to pass on to summation block 1202 based on whether the flight control system is in manual mode or automatic mode. Summation block [1202] may receive a desired attitude and an attitude estimate and determine an attitude error, or difference between the two. The attitude estimate may be an estimate of the aircraft's actual attitude.” (P[0061] and Figure 12), and “In the event the higher level flight computer fails, a pilot is able to directly provide inputs to the lower level flight computers.” P[0054],
the claimed synchronize the effector specific flight control command data with other effector control electronics if required, “Attitude controller 1204 as shown receives the attitude error and produces actuator commands for the aircraft based on the attitude error. The commands may be determined to eliminate the attitude error. Actuator commands are provided to safety block 1206. Safety block 1206 may prevent commands from being sent to actuators in the event the aircraft is already landed, in a take-off sequence, or in a landing sequence. In the event the aircraft is prepared to receive actuator commands, actuator commands are provided by the safety block to aircraft 1208. The aircraft's actuators may provide information on their state to sensors 1210. For example, a signal may be sent that the actuators changed position. In some embodiments, the aircraft's actuators change position based on received commands and the sensors detect the change in position. Information may not be explicitly sent from the aircraft to sensors.” (P[0061] and Figure 12), and
the claimed monitor closed loop control, “Sensors 1210 provide sensor data to attitude estimator 1212. Attitude estimator 1212 may process the sensor data received. For example, the attitude estimator may disregard signal noise. Attitude estimator 1212 may determine an estimate of the aircraft's attitude based on the sensor data. Attitude estimator 1212 may provide an attitude estimate to 1202.” P[0061], Figure 12 shows a closed loop for altitude commands, and “The lower level flight computers may perform full feedback control.” P[0040], and wherein
the claimed interceptor is one of a yoke, side stick, collective or rudder pedal, “Pilot controls 946 may comprise one or more physical objects the pilot manipulates to adjust the aircraft's position. For example, a joystick, steering wheel, pedal, lever, or any other appropriate control may be used.” P[0048].
Cutler et al do not explicitly teach the claimed plurality of flight control computers are inoperable, but instead teach the lower level flight computers control the flight operations when the higher level flight computer fails. The lower level flight computers of Cutler et al equate to the claimed plurality of flight control computers. A person having ordinary skill in the art would understand that a system capable of operating when one computer system fails another computer system is a functional backup (such as Cutler et al failure of the higher computer having the lower computers perform the operations). A person having ordinary skill in the art would also understand that the reverse failure would also be possible (lower computer failure and the higher computer takes over functions).
Hirvonen teaches, aircraft flight control systems implemented with a redundant, backup control system for a distributed fly-by-wire (FBW) flight control system P[0002], “the REU coupled to each actuator may be configured to determine the validity of the primary control signals on the primary paths 422 and pass the primary control commands to the actuators. For example, the REUs 421 and 431 may determine that the primary command signals on the primary paths 422 are valid and pass the primary command signals to the actuators 420 and 430. However, in the event that the primary channels 401 and 402 experience a general fault or the REUs determine that the primary command signals are invalid or absent, the REUs may revert to the backup control signal and use the backup control signal for the actuators. For example, the REU 431 may determine that the primary command signals on the primary paths 422 are invalid and revert to the backup command signal on the path 433 for controlling the position of the aileron 410.” P[0023], and when all the primary controllers have failed, the backup control system is needed P[0031].
The primary controllers of Hirvonen equate to the lower level flight computers Cutler et al, and also to the claimed plurality of flight control computers. And, the backup control system of Hirvonen equates to the higher level flight computer of Cutler et al, and to the claimed backup flight control processor. The combination of Cutler et al and Hirvonen would be implemented by keeping the aircraft functional no matter which computer(s) failed. It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the distributed flight control system of Cutler et al with the backup control for a distributed flight control system of Hirvonen in order to, with a reasonable expectation of success, protect the aircraft in the event of a generic fault in a complex primary control system (Hirvonen P[0008]).
Cutler et al and Hirvonen do not teach the claimed backup flight control processor is disposed within the inceptor. Cutler et al and Hirvonen lack teachings for identifying where the backup flight control computer is disposed, but still teach the functions of the backup flight control computer (see above rejection). Lawniczak et al teach the claimed control processor is disposed within the inceptor, the pilot stick comprises a computer 70 (P[0077]). Lawniczak et al teach that a computer processor may be installed or included (claimed disposed) within a pilot stick. This installed location of the computer would be combined with Cutler et al and Hirvonen as an alternate placement of the flight computers. It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the distributed flight control system of Cutler et al and the backup control for a distributed flight control system of Hirvonen with the pilot stick including a computer of Lawniczak et al in order to, with a reasonable expectation of success, reduce the mass, space and power consumption of the pilot stick (Lawniczak et al P[0013]).
Regarding claim 16 Cutler et al, Hirvonen and Lawniczak et al teach the claimed system of claim 15 (see above), Cutler et al teach the claimed inceptor further comprises:
the claimed one or more inertial sensors in operable communication with the backup control surface processor and to supply inertial data, “The flight computers may comprise a processor, a set of sensors, and computer algorithms. The set of sensors may comprise a rate gyro, accelerometer, or magnetometer. In some embodiments, the flight computer is a board comprising several integrated circuits. For example, one integrated circuit may function as a microprocessor, whereas another functions as an accelerometer. Each flight computer may determine instructions for all actuators of the aircraft. The flight computer may determine instructions based on its inputs (e.g. desired attitude or desired attitude rate) and collected sensor data.” P[0034].
Regarding claim 17 Cutler et al, Hirvonen and Lawniczak et al teach the claimed system of claim 15 (see above), further comprising:
Cutler et al teach:
the claimed inertial data source in operable communication with the flight control computers and the backup flight control processor and supplies inertial data, “The flight computers may comprise a processor, a set of sensors, and computer algorithms. The set of sensors may comprise a rate gyro, accelerometer, or magnetometer. In some embodiments, the flight computer is a board comprising several integrated circuits. For example, one integrated circuit may function as a microprocessor, whereas another functions as an accelerometer. Each flight computer may determine instructions for all actuators of the aircraft. The flight computer may determine instructions based on its inputs (e.g. desired attitude or desired attitude rate) and collected sensor data.” P[0034], and “rate gyro 1100, accelerometer 1102, magnetometer 1104, and barometer 1106 provide sensor data to processor 1114” (P[0057] and Figure 11); and
the claimed air data source in operable communication with the flight control computers and the backup flight control processor and supplies air data, “Global positioning system 971, radar 972, and camera 973 are also installed on masterboard 974 and provide data to higher level flight computer 970. Camera 973 may comprise a stereo camera or infrared camera. Other sensors such as lidar or sonar may also provide data to the masterboard.” P[0047], and “rate gyro 1100, accelerometer 1102, magnetometer 1104, and barometer 1106 provide sensor data to processor 1114” (P[0057] and Figure 11).
Regarding claim 18 Cutler et al, Hirvonen and Lawniczak et al teach the claimed system of claim 15 (see above), wherein Cutler et al teach the claimed flight control effectors are further configured to determine that the flight control computers are inoperable and in response supply the backup control mode signal, “The flight computers may each comprise independent code or hardware to determine when to switch from listening to a higher level flight computer to listening to manual control. Control may be desired to switch over to a manual mode in the event a malfunction is detected in the higher level flight computer or an irregularity is detected. In some embodiments, the aircraft's actual state is tracked and compared to the aircraft's desired state. In the event the actual state does not track the desired state appropriately, the system may signal that a malfunction is detected.” P[0041], and “In the event the higher level flight computer fails, a pilot is able to directly provide inputs to the lower level flight computers.” P[0054].
Cutler et al do not explicitly teach the claimed flight control computers are inoperable, but instead teach the lower level flight computers control the flight operations when the higher level flight computer fails. The lower level flight computers of Cutler et al equate to the claimed plurality of flight control computers. A person having ordinary skill in the art would understand that a system capable of operating when one computer system fails another computer system is a functional backup (such as Cutler et al failure of the higher computer having the lower computers perform the operations). A person having ordinary skill in the art would also understand that the reverse failure would also be possible (lower computer failure and the higher computer takes over functions).
Hirvonen teaches, aircraft flight control systems implemented with a redundant, backup control system for a distributed fly-by-wire (FBW) flight control system P[0002], “the REU coupled to each actuator may be configured to determine the validity of the primary control signals on the primary paths 422 and pass the primary control commands to the actuators. For example, the REUs 421 and 431 may determine that the primary command signals on the primary paths 422 are valid and pass the primary command signals to the actuators 420 and 430. However, in the event that the primary channels 401 and 402 experience a general fault or the REUs determine that the primary command signals are invalid or absent, the REUs may revert to the backup control signal and use the backup control signal for the actuators. For example, the REU 431 may determine that the primary command signals on the primary paths 422 are invalid and revert to the backup command signal on the path 433 for controlling the position of the aileron 410.” P[0023], and when all the primary controllers have failed, the backup control system is needed P[0031].
The primary controllers of Hirvonen equate to the lower level flight computers Cutler et al, and also to the claimed plurality of flight control computers. And, the backup control system of Hirvonen equates to the higher level flight computer of Cutler et al, and to the claimed backup flight control processor. The combination of Cutler et al and Hirvonen would be implemented by keeping the aircraft functional no matter which computer(s) failed. It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the distributed flight control system of Cutler et al and the pilot stick including a computer of Lawniczak et al with the backup control for a distributed flight control system of Hirvonen in order to, with a reasonable expectation of success, protect the aircraft in the event of a generic fault in a complex primary control system (Hirvonen P[0008]).
Regarding claims 19 and 20 Cutler et al, Hirvonen and Lawniczak et al teach the claimed system of claim 15 (see above), wherein Cutler et al teach:
the claimed effector control electronics are further configured upon determining that the flight control computers are inoperable, and the claimed generate and supply the backup mode signal (claim 7), “The flight computers may each comprise independent code or hardware to determine when to switch from listening to a higher level flight computer to listening to manual control. Control may be desired to switch over to a manual mode in the event a malfunction is detected in the higher level flight computer or an irregularity is detected. In some embodiments, the aircraft's actual state is tracked and compared to the aircraft's desired state. In the event the actual state does not track the desired state appropriately, the system may signal that a malfunction is detected.” P[0041], and “In the event the higher level flight computer fails, a pilot is able to directly provide inputs to the lower level flight computers.” P[0054]; and
the claimed inceptor further comprises a backup mode switch that is configured in response to user input to generate and supply the backup control mode signal, “The flight computers may each comprise independent code or hardware to determine when to switch from listening to a higher level flight computer to listening to manual control. Control may be desired to switch over to a manual mode in the event a malfunction is detected in the higher level flight computer or an irregularity is detected. In some embodiments, the aircraft's actual state is tracked and compared to the aircraft's desired state. In the event the actual state does not track the desired state appropriately, the system may signal that a malfunction is detected. A pilot's controls may comprise a switch, button, application, or other mechanism to select a mode.” P[0041].
Cutler et al do not teach the claimed generate and supply an alert signal in response to the flight control computers being inoperable. Hirvonen teaches, “The primary flight controller 220 may also provide data for other functions by other transmission paths such at path 280, which may provide data for a crew alerting system ("CAS") and maintenance announcements, and path 232, which may provide data for an active control function 230 or other feedback devices for the cockpit or pilots.” P[0049], and “The backup or backup flight control system may be monitored during the normal operation, so that, at the least, its existence may be assured if it is needed. As an example of one embodiment of the present invention, the backup control signal received by the smart actuator 260 from the backup controller 240 and the directional bus 242 may be verified or monitored via the primary control systems. The backup control signal may be processed by, for example, the smart actuator 260 and transmitted on the bi-directional bus 222 to the primary controller 220. The primary control system may then analyze the backup control signal to ensure the integrity of the backup control system. In the event that the backup control signal received by the primary controller 220 is not accurate, the pilots or operators may be alerted.” P[0056].
A person of ordinary skill in the art (and aircraft crewmembers) would understand that an alert will be issued to the crew or pilot whenever a malfunction occurs with the aircraft. It is well known in the art and by flight crews to be aware of warning indications when there is a failure of any critical piece of equipment. The claimed flight control computers would equate to a critical piece of equipment, and the alert provided by Hirvonen would be provided for the failure of these computers. Additionally, Cutler et al do not explicitly teach the claimed plurality of flight control computers are inoperable, but instead teach the lower level flight computers control the flight operations when the higher level flight computer fails. A person having ordinary skill in the art would understand that a system capable of operating when one computer system fails another computer system is a functional backup (such as Cutler et al failure of the higher computer having the lower computers perform the operations). A person having ordinary skill in the art would also understand that the reverse failure would also be possible (lower computer failure and the higher computer takes over functions).
Hirvonen teaches, aircraft flight control systems implemented with a redundant, backup control system for a distributed fly-by-wire (FBW) flight control system P[0002], “the REU coupled to each actuator may be configured to determine the validity of the primary control signals on the primary paths 422 and pass the primary control commands to the actuators. For example, the REUs 421 and 431 may determine that the primary command signals on the primary paths 422 are valid and pass the primary command signals to the actuators 420 and 430. However, in the event that the primary channels 401 and 402 experience a general fault or the REUs determine that the primary command signals are invalid or absent, the REUs may revert to the backup control signal and use the backup control signal for the actuators. For example, the REU 431 may determine that the primary command signals on the primary paths 422 are invalid and revert to the backup command signal on the path 433 for controlling the position of the aileron 410.” P[0023], and when all the primary controllers have failed, the backup control system is needed P[0031].
It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the distributed flight control system of Cutler et al and the pilot stick including a computer of Lawniczak et al with the backup control for a distributed flight control system with alerting of the crew for computer failures of Hirvonen in order to, with a reasonable expectation of success, protect the aircraft in the event of a generic fault in a complex primary control system (Hirvonen P[0008]).
Related Art
The examiner points to Richter et al PGPub 2012/0138751 A1 as related art, but not relied upon for any rejection. Richter et al includes a flight control device comprising a flight computer P[0052] and the flight control device 50 includes a control function which receives control commands from the control input device P[0055].
Conclusion
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
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/DALE W HILGENDORF/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3662