DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Election/Restrictions
Applicant’s election without traverse in the reply filed on 5/18/2026 is acknowledged:
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Claims 73-75 and 78-99 cover the elected invention and are treated on the merits, below. Claims 76 and 77 are withdrawn from consideration as exclusively covering a non-elected invention.
Specification
REQUIREMENTS FOR PATENT APPLICATIONS CONTAINING NUCLEOTIDE AND/OR AMINO ACID SEQUENCE DISCLOSURES
Items 1) and 2) provide general guidance related to requirements for sequence disclosures.
37 CFR 1.821(c) requires that patent applications which contain disclosures of nucleotide and/or amino acid sequences that fall within the definitions of 37 CFR 1.821(a) must contain a "Sequence Listing," as a separate part of the disclosure, which presents the nucleotide and/or amino acid sequences and associated information using the symbols and format in accordance with the requirements of 37 CFR 1.821 - 1.825. This "Sequence Listing" part of the disclosure may be submitted:
In accordance with 37 CFR 1.821(c)(1) via the USPTO patent electronic filing system (see Section I.1 of the Legal Framework for Patent Electronic System (https://www.uspto.gov/PatentLegalFramework), hereinafter "Legal Framework") as an ASCII text file, together with an incorporation-by-reference of the material in the ASCII text file in a separate paragraph of the specification as required by 37 CFR 1.823(b)(1) identifying:
the name of the ASCII text file;
ii) the date of creation; and
iii) the size of the ASCII text file in bytes;
In accordance with 37 CFR 1.821(c)(1) on read-only optical disc(s) as permitted by 37 CFR 1.52(e)(1)(ii), labeled according to 37 CFR 1.52(e)(5), with an incorporation-by-reference of the material in the ASCII text file according to 37 CFR 1.52(e)(8) and 37 CFR 1.823(b)(1) in a separate paragraph of the specification identifying:
the name of the ASCII text file;
the date of creation; and
the size of the ASCII text file in bytes;
In accordance with 37 CFR 1.821(c)(2) via the USPTO patent electronic filing system as a PDF file (not recommended); or
In accordance with 37 CFR 1.821(c)(3) on physical sheets of paper (not recommended).
When a “Sequence Listing” has been submitted as a PDF file as in 1(c) above (37 CFR 1.821(c)(2)) or on physical sheets of paper as in 1(d) above (37 CFR 1.821(c)(3)), 37 CFR 1.821(e)(1) requires a computer readable form (CRF) of the “Sequence Listing” in accordance with the requirements of 37 CFR 1.824.
If the "Sequence Listing" required by 37 CFR 1.821(c) is filed via the USPTO patent electronic filing system as a PDF, then 37 CFR 1.821(e)(1)(ii) or 1.821(e)(2)(ii) requires submission of a statement that the "Sequence Listing" content of the PDF copy and the CRF copy (the ASCII text file copy) are identical.
If the "Sequence Listing" required by 37 CFR 1.821(c) is filed on paper or read-only optical disc, then 37 CFR 1.821(e)(1)(ii) or 1.821(e)(2)(ii) requires submission of a statement that the "Sequence Listing" content of the paper or read-only optical disc copy and the CRF are identical.
This application contains polynucleotide and/or polypeptide sequence information. Applicant is required to review the specification for compliance with the above.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims 73-75 and 78-99 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
The rejected claims cover methods of delivering a binding peptide comprising administering binding polypeptide-effector moiety conjugate.
To satisfy the written-description requirement, the specification must describe every element of the claimed invention in sufficient detail so that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that the inventor possessed the claimed invention at the time of filing. Vas-Cath, 935 F.3d at 1563; see also Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (patent specification must describe an invention and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that “the inventor invented the claimed invention”); In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“the description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed”).
With regard to the recited genus of binding polypeptides and effector moieties, the following applies:
Ariad Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2010) states that “...a generic claim may define the boundaries of a vast genus of chemical compounds...the question may still remain whether the specification, including the original claim language, demonstrates that the applicant invented species sufficient to support a claim to a genus”. See page 1171.
The written description requirement for a claimed genus may be satisfied through sufficient description of a representative number of species by actual reduction to practice, reduction to drawings, or by disclosure of relevant, identifying characteristics, i.e., structure or other physical and/or chemical properties, by functional characteristics coupled with a known or disclosed correlation between function and structure, or by a combination of such identifying characteristics, sufficient to show the applicant was in possession of the claimed genus. See Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568, 43 USPQ2d at 1406.
See also Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1571, 39 USPQ2d 1895, 1905 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (a “laundry list” disclosure of every possible moiety does not constitute a written description of every species in a genus because it would not “reasonably lead” those skilled in the art to any particular species.
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206, 18 USPQ2d 1016, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 1991) states that “it is well established in our law that conception of a chemical compound requires that the inventor be able to define it so as to distinguish it from other materials, and to describe how to obtain it”.
A description of a genus may be achieved by means of a recitation of a representative number of species falling within the scope of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus, which features constitute a substantial portion of the genus, so that one of skill in the art can “visualize or recognize” the members of the genus (Emphasis added). Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F3d 1559, 1569, 43 USPQ2d 1398, 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
A “representative number of species” means that the species which are adequately described are representative of the entire genus. Thus, when there is substantial variation within the genus, one must describe a sufficient variety of species to reflect the variation within the genus. The disclosure of only one species encompassed within a genus adequately describes a claim directed to that genus only if the disclosure “indicates that the patentee has invented species sufficient to constitute the gen[us].” See Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 966, 63 USPQ2d at 1615; Noelle v. Lederman, 355 F.3d 1343, 1350, 69 USPQ2d 1508, 1514 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Fed. Cir. 2004)(“[A] patentee of a biotechnological invention cannot necessarily claim a genus after only describing a limited number of species because there may be unpredictability in the results obtained from species other than those specifically enumerated.”). “A patentee will not be deemed to have invented species sufficient to constitute the genus by virtue of having disclosed a single species when ... the evidence indicates ordinary artisans could not predict the operability in the invention of any species other than the one disclosed.” In re Curtis, 354 F.3d 1347, 1358, 69 USPQ2d 1274, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
In Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly (43 USPQ2d 1398-1412), the court held that a generic statement which defines a genus of nucleic acids by only their functional activity does not provide an adequate written description of the genus. The court indicated that, while applicants are not required to disclose every species encompassed by a genus, the description of the genus is achieved by the recitation of a representative number of species falling within the scope of the claimed genus. At section B(i), the court states, "An adequate written description of a DNA ... requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties, not a mere wish or plan for obtaining the claimed chemical invention."
Courts have stated that “[i]n claims involving [non-genetic] chemical materials, generic formulae usually indicate with specificity what the generic claims encompass. One skilled in the art can distinguish such a formula from others and can identify many of the species that the claims encompass. Accordingly, such a formula is normally an adequate description of the claimed genus.” Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1089 (1998). (emphasis added).
There is no such specificity here, nor could one skilled in the art identify any particular binding polypeptides or effector moieties encompassed by the claims. Specifically, Applicant fails to disclose any other binding polypeptides or effector moieties, besides those specifically identified in the specification and claims, and in relation to the above, these disclosed species or subgenre do not represent the substantial variety covered by the genus of binding polypeptides and effector moieties.
With regard to the functional definition of binding polypeptide or effector moiety, the specification does not clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that he or she invented what is claimed (see Vas-Cath at page 1116) because the specification contains almost no information by which a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the inventors possessed the all of the recited peptides or compounds. At best, it simply indicates that one should test an infinite number of peptides or compounds to see if the peptides or compounds can perform the required functions. In this connection, the specification contains no generic structural characteristics of those binding polypeptides and effector moieties which perform the required functions, besides those instantly disclosed, see In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litigation, 583 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[A]t the end of the day, the specification, even read in light of the knowledge of those skilled in the art, does no more than state a hypothesis and propose testing to determine the accuracy of that hypothesis. That is not sufficient.”).
The Examiner acknowledges that a working example or exemplified embodiment is not necessarily a requirement for description. However, where a generic claim term is present in a claim, as in the present application, and defined only by functional characteristics, the specification must convey enough information, e.g., via sufficient representative examples, to indicate invention of species sufficient to constitute the genus. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 967 2 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The written description requirement “requires a description of an invention, not an indication of a result that one might achieve if one made that invention.” Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Novozymes A/S v. DuPont Nutrition Biosciences APS, 723 F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“A patent...‘is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion.’ ... For that reason, the written description requirement prohibits a patentee from ‘leaving it to the ... industry to complete an unfinished invention.’” (citations omitted)).
Accordingly, the specification lacks adequate written description for the recited binding polypeptides and effector moieties.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 73-75 and 78-99 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
The structural criteria of the recited binding polypeptides and glycan effector moieties that binds to a receptor on a cell are not generically defined.
Claim 99 recites the effector moiety of Formula (I), but does not include M6P, as required by claim 95.
The “targeting moiety” in the definition of X of Formula (I) (claim 99) does not have antecedent basis.
It is also unclear how the effector moiety of claim 99 includes the targeting moiety (i.e., an antibody or antigen binding fragment thereof).
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(d):
(d) REFERENCE IN DEPENDENT FORMS.—Subject to subsection (e), a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers.
The following is a quotation of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, fourth paragraph:
Subject to the following paragraph [i.e., the fifth paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112], a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers.
Claims 91 and 92 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(d) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, 4th paragraph, as being of improper dependent form for failing to further limit the subject matter of the claim upon which it depends, or for failing to include all the limitations of the claim upon which it depends.
The oxidation steps in the rejected claims do not further limit the methods of those claims upon which the rejected claims depend.
Applicant may cancel the claim(s), amend the claim(s) to place the claim(s) in proper dependent form, rewrite the claim(s) in independent form, or present a sufficient showing that the dependent claim(s) complies with the statutory requirements.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims73-75 and 78-99 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over U.S. Patent No. 8,063,015 to DeFrees et al. (DeFrees).
DeFrees teaches glycan remodeling of antibodies to generate glycans having a terminal mannose-6-phosphate moiety. See Figure 26, for example:
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FIG. 28, comprising FIG. 28A to FIG. 28Z and FIG. 28AA to FIG. 28CC, is a list of peptides and antibodies used as conjugates, including those internalized upon binding and those targeting the recited cells.
FIG. 42, comprising FIGS. 42A to 42M, sets forth exemplary schemes for remodeling glycan structures on Factor VIII. FIG. 42A are the formulas for the glycans that bind to the N-linked glycosylation sites (A and A') and to the O-linked sites (B) of the Factor VIII peptides. FIGS. 42B to 42F are diagrams of contemplated remodeling steps of the peptides in FIG. 42A based on the type of cell the peptide is expressed in and the desired remodeled glycan structure. FIG. 42G are the formulas for the glycans that bind to the N-linked glycosylation sites (A and A') and to the O-linked sites (B) of the Factor VIII peptides. FIGS. 42H to 42M are diagrams of contemplated remodeling steps of the peptides in FIG. 42G based on the type of cell the peptide is expressed in and the desired remodeled glycan structures. The glycans have GalNAc or Sia moieties. See, for example:
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DeFrees teaches a general method for enhancing Fc immune effector function in any preparation of IgG molecules containing N-linked oligosaccharides in the CH2 domain, typically at Asn 297.
The recited sialic acid linkages are taught:
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The difference between DeFrees and the claimed conjugates is that DeFrees does not teach the invention with particularity so as to amount to anticipation (See M.P.E.P. § 2131: "[t]he identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the ... claim." Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The elements must be arranged as required by the claim, but this is not an ipsissimis verbis test, i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 15 USPQ2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990).). However, based on the above, DeFrees teaches the structural elements of the claimed conjugates with sufficient guidance, particularity, and with a reasonable expectation of success, that the invention would be prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill (the prior art reference teaches or suggests all the claim limitations with a reasonable expectation of success. See M.P.E.P. § 2143).
The rejected claims also require a specific targeting to bonding polypeptide ratios. However, there are a limited and finite number of ratios for a given antibody.
In this manner, it would have been obvious to one have ordinary skill in the art at the time that applicant’s inventions was made to have made conjugates with the recited ratios with a reasonable expectation that the resulting conjugate would be useful in treating diseases. In this connection, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to choose from this finite number of ratio options with a reasonable expectation of success of producing a conjugate with a functional ratio.
Specifically, the ratio value affects the efficacy of the drug, as low drug loading reduces the potency, while high drug loading can negatively affect pharmacokinetics (PK)1 and toxicity. Indeed, it would have been routine to make conjugates with different ratios to find one that is pharmaceutically acceptable.
With regard to any unpredictability associated with these ratios, the notion that unpredictability confers patentability in cases of known conjugates should be disregarded since a rule of law equating unpredictability to patentability, applied in this case, would mean that any conjugate based on a different ratio would be separately patentable, simply because the formation and properties of each conjugate must be verified through testing. This cannot be the proper standard since the expectation of success need only be reasonable, not absolute.
Here, DeFrees provide the reasonable expectation of success, as outlined above. Namely, the references demonstrate the reasonable expectation of success since the references sufficiently characterize the instant conjugates. Again, the expectation of success need only be reasonable, as it is here, and not absolute, (“obviousness does not require absolute predictability, only a reasonable expectation of success, i.e., a reasonable expectation of obtaining similar properties. See, e.g., In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903, 7 USPQ2d 1673, 1681
(Fed. Cir. 1988).”).
With regard to any alleged unexpected property possessed by those conjugates with the recited ratios, it is error to assume that any superior property is unexpected, especially in the instant case, where the pharmacodynamic and pharmacokinetic properties of different conjugates are not predictable. In this case, given the range of possible ratios, one skilled in the art would expect different ratios to provide conjugates having a range of properties, some of which would be superior, and some of which would be inferior.
Rather, Applicant has conducted a common optimization of the known ratios to produce the claimed conjugates, which is routine. Specifically, Applicant engaged in routine, verification testing to optimize selection of one of several known and clearly suggested ratios to prepare a pharmaceutically-acceptable conjugate. In this regard, creating a “product or process that is more desirable, for example because it is stronger, cheaper, cleaner, faster, lighter, smaller, more durable, or more efficient . . . to enhance commercial opportunities . . . is universal—and even common-sensical.” see DyStar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356 at 1368.
Therefore, the recited conjugates with therecited ratios of targeting moiety to binding polypeptide is obvious.
The oxidation steps in claims 91 and 92 do not further limit the recited conjugates.
Double Patenting
The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).
A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b).
The filing of a terminal disclaimer by itself is not a complete reply to a nonstatutory double patenting (NSDP) rejection. A complete reply requires that the terminal disclaimer be accompanied by a reply requesting reconsideration of the prior Office action. Even where the NSDP rejection is provisional the reply must be complete. See MPEP § 804, subsection I.B.1. For a reply to a non-final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.111(a). For a reply to final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.113(c). A request for reconsideration while not provided for in 37 CFR 1.113(c) may be filed after final for consideration. See MPEP §§ 706.07(e) and 714.13.
The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The actual filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA /25, or PTO/AIA /26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/applying-online/eterminal-disclaimer.
Claims 73-75 and 78-99 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-39 of U.S. Patent No. 10995148. Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other.
Specifically, the conflicting claims cover conjugates that anticipate those covered by the rejected claims. Alternatively, the difference between the conjugates covered by the conflicting claims and those covered by the rejected claims is that the conflicting claims may not recite the instant conjugates with particularity so as to amount to anticipation (See M.P.E.P. § 2131: "[t]he identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the ... claim." Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The elements must be arranged as required by the claim, but this is not an ipsissimis verbis test, i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 15 USPQ2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990).). However, the conflicting claims recite the structural elements of the instant conjugates with sufficient guidance, particularity, and with a reasonable expectation of success, that the invention would be prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill (the prior art reference teaches or suggests all the claim limitations with a reasonable expectation of success. See M.P.E.P. § 2143).
Here, the conflicting claims may recite conjugates were the instant claims recite methods of using the conjugates. However, the specification of the conflicting claims disclose the utility of the recited conjugates as covered by the instant methods of using the conjugates, see Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd., v. Eli Lilly and Co. where the district court ruled that the claims of the ‘826 patent were invalid in light of the ‘614 patent which disclosed gemcitabine’s use in cancer treatment, but did not claim it. In making this ruling, the district court relied on the Federal Circuit’s earlier rulings on double patenting of compound claims, mainly Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc, v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F. 3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 518 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In both of these cases, the Federal Circuit found claims of a later patent invalid for obviousness-type double patenting where an earlier patent claimed a compound, disclosing its utility in the specification, and a later patent claimed a method of using the compound for a use described in the specification of the earlier patent. The cases also established that in determining the scope of compound claims for a double patenting rejection one must look to the specification to interpret the utility of the compound.
Claims 73-75 and 78-99 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-25 of U.S. Patent No. 9701753. Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other.
Specifically, the conflicting claims cover conjugates that anticipate those covered by the rejected claims. Alternatively, the difference between the conjugates covered by the conflicting claims and those covered by the rejected claims is that the conflicting claims may not recite the instant conjugates with particularity so as to amount to anticipation (See M.P.E.P. § 2131: "[t]he identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the ... claim." Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The elements must be arranged as required by the claim, but this is not an ipsissimis verbis test, i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 15 USPQ2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990).). However, the conflicting claims recite the structural elements of the instant conjugates with sufficient guidance, particularity, and with a reasonable expectation of success, that the invention would be prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill (the prior art reference teaches or suggests all the claim limitations with a reasonable expectation of success. See M.P.E.P. § 2143).
Here, the conflicting claims may recite conjugates whereas the instant claims recite methods of using the conjugates. However, the specification of the conflicting claims disclose the utility of the recited conjugates as covered by the instant methods of using the conjugates, see Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd., v. Eli Lilly and Co. where the district court ruled that the claims of the ‘826 patent were invalid in light of the ‘614 patent which disclosed gemcitabine’s use in cancer treatment, but did not claim it. In making this ruling, the district court relied on the Federal Circuit’s earlier rulings on double patenting of compound claims, mainly Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc, v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F. 3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 518 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In both of these cases, the Federal Circuit found claims of a later patent invalid for obviousness-type double patenting where an earlier patent claimed a compound, disclosing its utility in the specification, and a later patent claimed a method of using the compound for a use described in the specification of the earlier patent. The cases also established that in determining the scope of compound claims for a double patenting rejection one must look to the specification to interpret the utility of the compound.
Claims 73-75 and 78-99 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 5-17 of U.S. Patent No. 11807690. Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other.
Specifically, the conflicting claims cover conjugates that anticipate those covered by the rejected claims. Alternatively, the difference between the conjugates covered by the conflicting claims and those covered by the rejected claims is that the conflicting claims may not recite the instant conjugates with particularity so as to amount to anticipation (See M.P.E.P. § 2131: "[t]he identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the ... claim." Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The elements must be arranged as required by the claim, but this is not an ipsissimis verbis test, i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 15 USPQ2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990).). However, the conflicting claims recite the structural elements of the instant conjugates with sufficient guidance, particularity, and with a reasonable expectation of success, that the invention would be prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill (the prior art reference teaches or suggests all the claim limitations with a reasonable expectation of success. See M.P.E.P. § 2143).
Here, the conflicting claims may recite methods of treating HER2 positive cancer. However, the instant methods of delivering a binding polypeptide would be an invariable aspect of treating HER2 positive cancer since it also requires administering the instant conjugates.
Claims 73-75 and 78-99 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 5-8, 11-16, 19-22 of U.S. Patent No. 9790268. Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other.
Specifically, the conflicting claims cover conjugates that anticipate those covered by the rejected claims. Alternatively, the difference between the conjugates covered by the conflicting claims and those covered by the rejected claims is that the conflicting claims may not recite the instant conjugates with particularity so as to amount to anticipation (See M.P.E.P. § 2131: "[t]he identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the ... claim." Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The elements must be arranged as required by the claim, but this is not an ipsissimis verbis test, i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 15 USPQ2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990).). However, the conflicting claims recite the structural elements of the instant conjugates with sufficient guidance, particularity, and with a reasonable expectation of success, that the invention would be prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill (the prior art reference teaches or suggests all the claim limitations with a reasonable expectation of success. See M.P.E.P. § 2143).
Here, the conflicting claims may recite conjugates whereas the instant claims recite methods of using the conjugates. However, the specification of the conflicting claims disclose the utility of the recited conjugates as covered by the instant methods of using the conjugates, see Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd., v. Eli Lilly and Co. where the district court ruled that the claims of the ‘826 patent were invalid in light of the ‘614 patent which disclosed gemcitabine’s use in cancer treatment, but did not claim it. In making this ruling, the district court relied on the Federal Circuit’s earlier rulings on double patenting of compound claims, mainly Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc, v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F. 3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 518 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In both of these cases, the Federal Circuit found claims of a later patent invalid for obviousness-type double patenting where an earlier patent claimed a compound, disclosing its utility in the specification, and a later patent claimed a method of using the compound for a use described in the specification of the earlier patent. The cases also established that in determining the scope of compound claims for a double patenting rejection one must look to the specification to interpret the utility of the compound.
Claims 73-75 and 78-99 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 6-8, 11-16, 19-22, 34 of U.S. Patent No. 9790268. Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other.
Specifically, the conflicting claims cover conjugates that anticipate those covered by the rejected claims. Alternatively, the difference between the conjugates covered by the conflicting claims and those covered by the rejected claims is that the conflicting claims may not recite the instant conjugates with particularity so as to amount to anticipation (See M.P.E.P. § 2131: "[t]he identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the ... claim." Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The elements must be arranged as required by the claim, but this is not an ipsissimis verbis test, i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 15 USPQ2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990).). However, the conflicting claims recite the structural elements of the instant conjugates with sufficient guidance, particularity, and with a reasonable expectation of success, that the invention would be prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill (the prior art reference teaches or suggests all the claim limitations with a reasonable expectation of success. See M.P.E.P. § 2143).
Here, the conflicting claims may recite conjugates whereas the instant claims recite methods of using the conjugates. However, the specification of the conflicting claims disclose the utility of the recited conjugates as covered by the instant methods of using the conjugates, see Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd., v. Eli Lilly and Co. where the district court ruled that the claims of the ‘826 patent were invalid in light of the ‘614 patent which disclosed gemcitabine’s use in cancer treatment, but did not claim it. In making this ruling, the district court relied on the Federal Circuit’s earlier rulings on double patenting of compound claims, mainly Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc, v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F. 3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 518 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In both of these cases, the Federal Circuit found claims of a later patent invalid for obviousness-type double patenting where an earlier patent claimed a compound, disclosing its utility in the specification, and a later patent claimed a method of using the compound for a use described in the specification of the earlier patent. The cases also established that in determining the scope of compound claims for a double patenting rejection one must look to the specification to interpret the utility of the compound.
Claims 73-75 and 78-99 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 4, 5, 8-15 of U.S. Patent No. 11807690. Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other.
Specifically, the conflicting claims cover conjugates that anticipate those covered by the rejected claims. Alternatively, the difference between the conjugates covered by the conflicting claims and those covered by the rejected claims is that the conflicting claims may not recite the instant conjugates with particularity so as to amount to anticipation (See M.P.E.P. § 2131: "[t]he identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the ... claim." Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The elements must be arranged as required by the claim, but this is not an ipsissimis verbis test, i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 15 USPQ2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990).). However, the conflicting claims recite the structural elements of the instant conjugates with sufficient guidance, particularity, and with a reasonable expectation of success, that the invention would be prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill (the prior art reference teaches or suggests all the claim limitations with a reasonable expectation of success. See M.P.E.P. § 2143).
Here, the conflicting claims may recite methods of treating a neoplastic disorder. However, the instant methods of delivering a binding polypeptide would be an invariable aspect of treating neoplastic disorder since it also requires administering the instant conjugates.
Conclusion
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/KARL J PUTTLITZ/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1646
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