DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
Claim Status
Claims 18-20 are canceled.
Claims 1-17 are pending and are examined on the merits in this prosecution.
Previous Rejections
Applicant’s arguments, filed January 5, 2026, have been fully considered. Rejections and/or objections not reiterated from previous office actions are hereby withdrawn. The following rejections and/or objections are either reiterated or newly applied. They constitute the complete set presently being applied to the instant application.
CLAIM REJECTIONS
Obviousness Rejection
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966), that are applied for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
1) Claims 1-3, 7-9, 11-13, and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over De Barra (WO 2022/058448 A1; cited in IDS dated 8/16/2024; of record), in view of Oliveira (“Bioglass-based scaffolds coated with silver nanoparticles: Synthesis, processing and antimicrobial activity,” J Biomed Mater Res. 2020; 108: 2447–2459) and Yin (“The Antibacterial Mechanism of Silver Nanoparticles and Its Application in Dentistry,” International Journal of Nanomedicine 2020: 15 2555- 2562 2555).
De Barra teaches a two part hardenable composition comprising a powder first part and a liquid second part that, when combined, form a glass ionomer cement which hardens to a solid mass. The composition comprises an inorganic glass in the powder first part, an aqueous carrier in the liquid second part and an acid-functional polymer in the powder first part and/or the liquid second part. The composition also comprises an at least partially water-miscible additive in the first and/or second parts that extends the working time of the glass ionomer cement upon mixing of the first and second parts (Abstract; pg 2, [11]).
De Barra teaches the powder first part comprises an inorganic glass such as calcium aluminosilicate glass (pg 3, [19]; pg 4, [24]). This teaching reads on claims 1 (in part), 2-3, 11 (in part), 12-13, and 17 (in part). De Barra further teaches an inorganic glass such as a silver oxide glass may be included in the powder composition (pg 4, [23]).
De Barra teaches the acid-functional powder may be in both the powder and liquid compositions (Abstract), and further teaches suitable acid-functional powders include polyvinyl phosphonic acid and acrylic acid and combinations thereof (pg 8, [52] and [53]).
For the method of claim 11, De Barra teaches mixing the liquid and powder compositions (pg 12, [76]).
While De Barra teaches the glass may have an average particle size of at least 0.005 micron (5 nm; pg 5, [30]), De Barra does not teach the newly added limitation of a silver-doped 45S bioactive glass comprising a plurality of silver nanoparticles wherein the plurality of silver nanoparticles have sizes in the range of 8-15 nm.
Oliveira and Yin teach the missing elements of De Barra.
Oliveira teaches 45S5 Bioglass-based scaffolds coated with silver nanoparticles possess antimicrobial activity (Title; Abstract). Oliveira teaches Ag-NPs with a mean hydrodynamic diameter equal to 38.6 nm (pg 2455, right column), a particle size outside of the range recited in the penultimate line of claim 1.
For claim 1, the Examiner calculates that the 1% by weight amount of silver in the 45S5 Bioglass beads taught by Oliveira (pg 2425, Figure 8) comprises less silver by mole percent than the claimed silver-doped 45S5 bioactive glass. However, one of ordinary skill would be motivated to increase the molar percentage of silver on the bioactive glass in order to increase the efficacy of the glass and prolong the antimicrobial effect.
For claims 7-9 and 15, Oliveira teaches the nanoparticulate bioactive glass containing 1% Ag nanoparticles by weight is effective for killing bacteria, and De Barra teaches the glass powder is present in 40 to 99.9% of the composition (pg 5, [70]).
Yin teaches silver nanoparticles possess a broad spectrum of antibacterial, antifungal and antiviral properties. Silver nanoparticles have the ability to penetrate bacterial cell walls, changing the structure of cell membranes, resulting in cell death. Their efficacy is due not only to their nanoscale size but also to their large ratio of surface area to volume (Abstract). Yin teaches silver nanoparticles have a diameter of less than 100 nm (pg 2555, Introduction), and silver nanoparticles smaller than 10 nm can enter bacterial cells and cause cell damage (pg 2557, left column). This diameter of silver nanoparticle is within the claimed range, resulting in prima facie obviousness.
Examiner’s Reply to Attorney Arguments dated 1/5/2026
1. Rejection of claims 1-3, 7-9, 11-13, 15, and 18-20 under 35 U.S.C. $103 over De Barra and El-Kady
Applicant' s arguments with respect to claims 1-3, 7-9, 11-13, and 15 have been considered but are moot because the new ground of rejection, necessitated by applicant’s amendment, does not rely on the El-Kady reference found in the prior rejection. It is also acknowledged that claims 18-20 have been canceled by the applicant.
2. Rejection of claims 4-6, 10, 14, and 16-17 under 35 U.S.C. §103 over De Barra, El-Kady, and Wilde
Applicant’s arguments with respect to the prior art of Wilde regarding the copolymer have been fully considered and are persuasive. The rejection of claims 4-6, 10, 14, and 16-17 under 35 U.S.C. §103 over De Barra, El-Kady, and Wilde has been withdrawn.
Potentially Allowable Subject Matter (Claim Objections)
Claims 4-6, 10, 14, and 16-17 recite a weight ratio of a polyacrylic acid to PVPA of from 90:10 to 99:1. These claims recite a rang that does not appear to be found in the bioactive glass prior art. For example, the prior art of Akinmade (“Glass Polyalkenoate Dental Cements based on Physical Blends of Poly(acrylic acid) and Poly(vinyl phosphonic acid),” Polymer International 1994, 81-88) discloses dental cements with a “compressive strength of around 160 MPa, which easily exceeds the minimum specified for a restorative cement. In general, the highest compressive strengths were obtained using blends of modified PVPA with PAA of molecular weight < 2 x 105 (Ell) at a blend ratio > 3: 1. As such, Akinmade teaches away from a cement with a ratio of polyacrylic acid to PVPA of greater than 90:10 to greater than 99:1.
CONCLUSION
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to MICHAEL P COHEN whose telephone number is (571)270-7402. The examiner can normally be reached on M-Th 8:30-5:30; F 9-4.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Sahana Kaup, can be reached on (571) 272-6897. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/MICHAEL P COHEN/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1612
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