DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Applicant’s election without traverse of Group V, claims 15-28, in the reply filed on 24 April 2026 is acknowledged.
Applicant elects the Species of Lung without traverse.
Claims 1-14 and 29 have been cancelled.
Claim 19-22 and 24-25 have been withdrawn.
Claim 16 is withdrawn as being directed to a nonelected species.
Claims 15 and 17-18, 23 and 26-28 read on the Species of claim 23 and are presented for examination on the merits.
Note on claim interpretation: For purposes of examination the claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI). The pending claims elected for examination on the merits are claims directed to a composition, not its method of use. Furthermore, an intended use of a composition does not effectively limit the composition per se. Thus the language of claim 15 “is targeted for a reparative therapeutic indication towards a degenerative tissue disease that is specific to the tissue from which said fetal stromal cell is derived” amounts to an intended use of the exosome preparation.
Furthermore, the language “said exosome containing two or more of miR which are more than two-fold TPM in the fetal stromal cell than in an adult mesenchymal stem cell” is simply stating an inherent property of fetal stromal cells which are known to contain higher amounts of miRNA (see e.g, Sivajothi, (2016), [cited by Applicant in IDS filed 3/17/25]) .
Therefore, the BRI of the claims is any composition comprising inter alia an exosome derived from a fetal stromal cells from any tissue type such as lung.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims 15 and 17-18, 23 and 26-28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for pre-AIA the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64, 19 USPQ2d 1111, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1991), states that "applicant must convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention. The invention is, for purposes of the 'written description' inquiry, whatever is now claimed" (See page 1117). The specification does not "clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [he or she] invented what is claimed" (See Vas-Cath at page 1116).
The MPEP states that the purpose of the written description requirement is to ensure that the invention had possession, as of the filing date of the application, of the specific subject matter later claimed by him or her. The courts have stated:
“To fulfill the written description requirement, a patent specification must describe an invention and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention.’ Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F. 3d 1565, 1572, 41 USPQ2d 1961, 1966 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Gostelli, 872 F. 2d 1008, 1012, 10 USPQ2d 1614, 1618 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“[T]he description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.”). Thus, an applicant complies with the written description requirement “by describing the invention, with all its claimed limitations, no that which makes it obvious,” and by using “such descriptive means as words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc., that set forth the claimed invention.” Lockwood, 107 F. 3d at 1572, 41 USPQ2d at 1966.” Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 43 USPQ2d 1398.
In Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lily & Co. 598 F ad 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) en banc}, the Federal Circuit noted the importance of an application's disclosure, stating, “the hallmark of written description is disclosure.” A disclosure adequately describes an invention when it “reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Id. at 1354. “A ‘mere wish or plan’ for obtaining the claimed invention is not adequate written description.” Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbot Labs, 636 F.3d 1341, 1948 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
Satisfying the written description requirement “varies with the nature and scape of the invention at issue, and with the scientific and technologic knowledge already in existence.” Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F. 3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Federal Circuit explained what is required to meet the written description requirement in Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co:
This inquiry, as we have long held, is a question of fact. Ralston Purina, 772 F.2d at 575. Thus, we have recognized that determining whether a patent complies with the written description requirement will necessarily vary depending on the context. Capon v Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Specifically, the level of detail required to satisfy the written description requirement varies depending on the nature and scope of the claims and on the complexity and predictability of the relevant technology. Id. For generic claims, we have set forth a number of factors for evaluating the adequacy of the disclosure, including “the existing knowledge in the particular field, the extent and content of the prior art, the maturity of the science or technology, [and] the predictability of the aspect at issue." Id. at 1359.
A written description of a genus in biotechnological arts “requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, [or] chemical name” of the claimed subject matter sufficient to distinguish it from other materials. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 199 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The Federal Circuit reflected on Eli Lilly in Ariad while explaining how to sufficiently describe a genus in biotechnological applications:
We held that a sufficient description of a genus instead requires the disclosure of either a representative number of species fitting within the scope of the genus of structural features common to the members of the genus so that one of skill in the art can “visualize or recognize” the members of the genus. Id. at 1568-69. We explained that an adequate written description requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, physical properties, or other properties, of species falling within the genus sufficient to distinguish the genus from other materials. Id. at 1568 (quoting Fiers v. Revel 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993). We have also held that functional claim language can meet the written description requirement when the art has established a correlation between structure and function. See Enzo, 323 F.3d at 964 (quoting 66 Fed. Reg. 1099 (Jan. 5, 2001). But merely drawing a fence around the outer limits of a purported genus is not an adequate substitute for describing a variety of materials constituting the genus and showing that one has invented a genus and not just a species.
A “representative number of species” must typify the entire claimed genus and account for variation between the species of the genus:
[A] patentee of a biotechnological invention cannot necessarily claim a genus after only describing a limited number of species because there may be unpredictably in the results obtained from species other than those specifically enumerated. Noelle v. Lederman, 355 F.3d 1343, 1350, 69 USPQ2d 1508, 1514 (Fed. Or. 2004).
In Ariad, the Court also addressed the presence of a genus within a method claim, in Rochester, we held invalid claims directed to a method of selectively inhibiting the COX-2 enzyme by administering a non-steroidal compound that selectively inhibits the COX-2 enzyme. Id. at 918. We reasoned that because the specification did not describe any specific compound capable of performing the claimed method and the skilled artisan would not be able to identify any such compound based on the specification’s function description, the specification did not provide an adequate written description of the claimed invention. Id. at 927-28. Ariad, at 1373.
The MPEP indicates:
The written description requirement for a claimed genus may be satisfied through sufficient description of a representative number of species by actual reduction to practice (see i)(A), above), reduction to drawings (see i)(B), above), or by disclosure of relevant, identifying characteristics, i.e., structure or other physical and/or chemical properties, by functional characteristics coupled with a known or disclosed correlation between function and structure, or by a combination of such identifying characteristics, sufficient to show the applicant was in possession of the claimed genus (see i)(C), above). See Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568, 43 USPQ2d at 1406.
What constitutes a “representative number” is an inverse function of the skill and knowledge in the art. Satisfactory disclosure of a “representative number” depends on whether one of skill in the art would recognize that the applicant was in possession of the necessary common attributes or features possessed by the members of the genus in view of the species disclosed. For inventions in an unpredictable art, adequate written description of a genus which embraces widely variant species cannot be achieved by disclosing only one species within the genus. See, e.g., Eli Lilly.
Applicant has provided extensive evidence in the specification of possession of an exosome preparation with elevated miRNAs of several-fold from fetal cardiac stromal cells. However, any evidence of any other tissue type is lacking.
There is no known means for predicting the capability of other exosome preparation, besides those specifically described in the Instant disclosure, with regard to any chemical or functional treatment effect. The skilled artisan could not even relatively predict what other exosome preparation would perform this function. Absent any discussion regarding correlation between structure and function, even the most skilled of artisans would need to guess what other extracts could potentially have the effect(s) listed in the claim(s).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 15 and 17-18, 23 and 26-28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more. Claim 15 (and claims dependent thereon) are directed to a composition comprising natural products. The claim(s) does/do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Effective January 7, 2019, subject matter eligibility determinations under 35 U.S.C. § 101 follow the procedure explained in the Federal Register notice titled 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance (Federal Register, Vol. 84, No.4, 50-57), which is found at: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-01-07/pdf/2018-28282.pdf. Applicants are kindly asked to review this guidance as well as MPEP 2106.
The statutory categories of invention under 35 U.S.C. 101 are processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter. However, certain members of these categories constitute judicial exceptions, i.e., the courts have determined that these entities are not patentable subject matter. These judicial exceptions include abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomena. The Office released guidance on December 16, 2014 for the examination of claims reciting natural products under 35 U.S.C. 101 in light of the recent Supreme Court decisions in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. (569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116, 106 USPQ2d 1972 (2013)) and Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories (566 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 101 USPQ2d 1961 (2012)), Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)) and Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. - 333 U.S. 127 (1948)). (inter alia). See eg. MPEP 2106.04(b)
The Supreme Court has explained that the judicial exceptions reflect the Court’s view that abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomena are "the basic tools of scientific and technological work", and are thus excluded from patentability because "monopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it." Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354, 110 USPQ2d at 1980 (quoting Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116, 106 USPQ2d at 1978 and Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965 (2012)). The Supreme Court’s concern that drives this "exclusionary principle" is pre-emption. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354, 110 USPQ2d at 1980. The Court has held that a claim may not preempt abstract ideas, laws of nature, or natural phenomena; i.e., one may not patent every "substantial practical application" of an abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon, even if the judicial exception is narrow.
While preemption is the concern underlying the judicial exceptions, it is not a standalone test for determining eligibility. Rapid Litig. Mgmt. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1052, 119 USPQ2d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Instead, questions of preemption are inherent in and resolved by the two-part framework from Alice Corp. and Mayo (the Alice/Mayo test referred to by the Office as Steps 2A and 2B). It is necessary to evaluate eligibility using the Alice/Mayo test, because while a preemptive claim may be ineligible, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate that a claim is eligible.
Products of Nature: When a law of nature or natural phenomenon is claimed as a physical product, the courts have often referred to the exception as a "product of nature". Products of nature are considered to be an exception because they tie up the use of naturally occurring things, but they have been labeled as both laws of nature and natural phenomena. See Myriad 133 S. Ct. at 2116-17, 106 USPQ2d at 1979 (claims to isolated DNA held ineligible because they "claim naturally occurring phenomena" and are "squarely within the law of nature exception"); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130, 76 USPQ 280, 281 (1948) (claims to bacterial mixtures held ineligible as "manifestations of laws of nature" and "phenomena of nature"). Step 2A of the Office’s eligibility analysis uses the terms "law of nature" and "natural phenomenon" as inclusive of "products of nature".
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It is important to keep in mind that product of nature exceptions include both naturally occurring products and non-naturally occurring products that lack markedly different characteristics from any naturally occurring counterpart. Instead, the key to the eligibility of all non-naturally occurring products is whether they possess markedly different characteristics from its closest naturally occurring counterpart.
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When a claim recites a nature-based product limitation, examiners use the markedly different characteristics analysis discussed in MPEP § 2106.04(c) to evaluate the nature-based product limitation and determine the answer to Step 2A. Nature-based products, as used herein, include both eligible and ineligible products and merely refer to the types of products subject to the markedly different characteristics analysis used to identify product of nature exceptions.
The Markedly Different Characteristics Analysis
The markedly different characteristics analysis is part of Step 2A, because the courts use this analysis to identify product of nature exceptions. If the claim includes a nature-based product that has markedly different characteristics, then the claim does not recite a product of nature exception and is eligible. If the claim includes a nature-based product that does not exhibit markedly different characteristics from its closest naturally occurring counterpart in its natural state, then the claim is directed to a "product of nature" exception (Step 2A: YES), and requires further analysis in Step 2B to determine whether any additional elements in the claim add significantly more to the exception.
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Nature-based Product Claim Analysis
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Where the claim is to a nature-based product by itself, the markedly different characteristics analysis should be applied to the entire product.
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Where the claim is to a nature-based product produced by combining multiple components, the markedly different characteristics analysis should be applied to the resultant nature-based combination, rather than its component parts. Where the claim is to a nature-based product in combination with non-nature based elements, the markedly different characteristics analysis should be applied only to the nature-based product limitation. For a product-by-process claims, the analysis turns on whether the nature-based product in the claim has markedly different characteristics from its naturally occurring counterpart.
The markedly different characteristics analysis compares the nature-based product limitation to its naturally occurring counterpart in its natural state. Markedly different characteristics can be expressed as the product’s structure, function, and/or other properties, and are evaluated based on what is recited in the claim on a case-by-case basis. If the analysis indicates that a nature-based product limitation does not exhibit markedly different characteristics, then that limitation is a product of nature exception. If the analysis indicates that a nature-based product limitation does have markedly different characteristics, then that limitation is not a product of nature exception.
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Because the markedly different characteristics analysis compares the nature-based product limitation to its naturally occurring counterpart in its natural state, the first step in the analysis is to select the appropriate counterpart(s) to the nature-based product.
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When there are multiple counterparts to the nature-based product, the comparison should be made to the closest naturally occurring counterpart. When the nature-based product is a combination produced from multiple components, the closest counterpart may be the individual nature-based components of the combination. Because there is no counterpart mixture in nature, the closest counterparts to the claimed mixture are the individual components of the mixture, i.e., each naturally occurring species by itself. See, e.g., Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130, 76 USPQ at 281 (comparing claimed mixture of bacterial species to each species as it occurs in nature).
Markedly changed characteristics can include structural, functional, chemical changes. In order to show a marked difference, a characteristic must be changed as compared to nature, and cannot be an inherent or innate characteristic of the naturally occurring counterpart or an incidental change in a characteristic of the naturally occurring counterpart. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2111, 106 USPQ2d at 1974-75. Thus, in order to be markedly different, applicant must have caused the claimed product to possess at least one characteristic that is different from that of the counterpart.
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If there is no change in any characteristic, the claimed product lacks markedly different characteristics, and is a product of nature exception.
The claims are directed to a composition comprising nature-based compounds (i.e. an exosome derived from a fetal stromal cell), which is not markedly different from its closest naturally-occurring counterpart because there is no indication that their combination or preparation has caused the nature-based product to have any characteristics that are markedly different from the closest naturally-occurring product and the claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. The rationale for this determination is explained below:
Step 1: Determine if the claims are directed to one of the four statutory categories of patentable subject matter identified by 35 U.S.C. 101: a process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter. YES, the claims are directed to a composition of matter which is a statutory category within at least one of the four categories of patent eligible subject matter.
Step 2A: PRONG ONE: Evaluate whether the claim recites a Judicial Exception
(e.g., law of nature, natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea). YES, the claims are product claims reciting something that appears to be a nature-based product (i.e., an exosome derived from a fetal stromal cell) which is not markedly different from the closest naturally-occurring counterpart (i.e., the individual nature-based products).
Note: with respect to extracts of natural products, the closest naturally-occurring counterpart is always the same compounds found in the extract, present in the non-isolated form in the source material. Extracts that are made simply by separating the extracted components from the non-extracted components, is a partitioning process that absent any specific chemical modification, merely separates the compounds leaving their activities unchanged. Exosomes are secreted by most cells types including fetal stromal cells. Ingredients (e.g., miRNAs) recited in the claims are natural products that would occur naturally; thus, the claims involve the use of judicial exceptions. There is no indication in the record of any markedly different characteristics (either structural or functional) of the composition as broadly claimed. For example, there is no evidence of record of a structural difference between the extract(s) in the claimed composition and that of their nature-based counterparts. Consequently, the claimed compositions are structurally the same as their closest naturally- occurring counterparts.
Nor is there any difference in functional characteristics. To show a marked difference, the characteristic(s) must be changed as compared it closest natural-occurring counterpart. For example, and assertion of changed functionality must be accompanied with evidence of a comparison of the claimed composition with its closest naturally-occurring counterpart and should apply to the full scope of the claim. Furthermore, inherent or innate characteristics of the naturally occurring counterpart cannot show a marked difference. Likewise, differences in the characteristics that came about or were produced independently of any effort or influence by Applicant cannot show a marked difference.
The recitation of specific amounts of the ingredients does not affect this analysis because it is well known and routine in the art to mix specific amounts of active ingredients with additional ingredients. Therefore, the claim is not meaningfully limited and does not amount to significantly more than each product of nature by itself. Finally, the claimed mixture is like the novel bacterial mixture of Funk Brothers, which was held ineligible because each species of bacteria in the mixture (like each component in the instantly claimed mixture) continued to have “the same effect it always had”, i.e., it lacked markedly different characteristics. Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948), discussed in Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2117. While not discussed in the opinion, it is noted that several of the claims held ineligible in Funk Brothers recited specific amounts of the bacterial species in the mixture, e.g., claims 6, 7 and 13. Funk Brothers, 333 U.S. at 128 n.1.
Thus, there is no evidence of record to indicate that the claimed product is markedly different, structurally, chemically, functionally, than its closest naturally occurring counterpart.
PRONG TWO: Evaluate whether the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application. The claims are directed to a composition, not its practical use such as a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition.
Thus the cited claims are directed to a judicial exception to patentable subject matter.
Step 2b: Determine whether the claim directed to a judicial exception provides an inventive concept. For example, the claims may recite additional elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. In the instant case, NO, the claims are directed to an extract composition without any other components that could add significantly more to the exception. No other specific limitations other than what is well-understood, routine and conventional in the field at a high level of generality have been added to the claimed nature-based product (e.g., addition of well-known ingredients).
Thus, the claimed product is not eligible subject matter under current 35 USC 101 standards.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claim(s) 15 and 17-18, and 26-28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Sivajothi (2016) [cited by Applicant in IDS filed 3/17/25].
Sivajothi discloses that 26 miRNAs were up regulated and 6 down regulated by more than 2-fold in HS (fetal heart stroma) compared to BM MSC (Figure 4.5). Three (miR-1, miR-133a and miR-206) of the up regulated miRNAs have functions in myogenesis and cardiomyocyte development and two (miR-20a and miR-26a) have function in stem cell differentiation. Of particular note was miR-206, which was up regulated by more than one thousand-fold in HS. miR-206 has been reported as a muscle specific miR that promotes muscle differentiation and regulates connexin 43 expression during skeletal muscle development. In addition, miR-1 and miR-206 has been reported to be upregulated in the heart following myocardial infarction compared to normal heart.
Thus the cited reference teaches a composition comprising an an exosome derived from a fetal stromal cells and is deemed to anticipate the claims, given their BRI.
Conclusion
No claims are allowed
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to RUSSELL G FIEBIG whose telephone number is (571)270-5366. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 8-4.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Anand Desai can be reached at 5712720947. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/RUSSELL G FIEBIG/Examiner, Art Unit 1655
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