DETAILED ACTION
1. The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
2. Acknowledgment is made of Applicant's Continuing Data: This application has PRO 63/391,175 filed 07/21/2022.
3. Receipt of Applicant’s Amendment filed 10/15/2025 is acknowledged. Claims 1-6 are pending in the application.
Information Disclosure Statement
4. The information disclosure statement (IDS) submitted are in compliance with the provisions of 37 CFR 1.97. Accordingly, the information disclosure statement is being considered by the examiner.
Claim Rejections – 35 USC § 103
5. In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
6. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
7. This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
8. Claims 1-6 are rejected under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA , 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Agarwal et al. (Pub. No. US 2022/0413843; hereinafter referred to as Agarwal), in view of NPL - Lasse Linkola “DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF MODULAR FRONTEND ARCHITECTURE ON EXISTING APPLICATION”; hereinafter referred to as Linkola.
As per claim 1, Agarwal discloses a method for adding a new component to a canvas definition, the method comprising:
determining a type of the new component (See p. [0004] – new component); determining an input and an output type of the new component (See p. [0033] – couple components based on type); creating a definition of the new component (See p. [0004, 0048] – created definition of model); creating a component factory (See creating identification by type and reference).
Although Agarwal discloses the provision of “state” when validating for coupling components; Agarwal does not explicitly states - connecting to a state of an application using one or more provided hooks.
Linkola discloses a design and implementation of modular frontend architecture on applications, in which connection is provided to a state via hooks - connecting to a state of an application using one or more provided hooks (See page 6 – hooks).
Agarwal and Linkola are directed to software program development, which are analogous prior art.
It would have been obvious to one ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention (first inventor to file provisions of the AIA ) to incorporate and combine Agarwal’s components definition and provision when adding components to canvas; and further combine it with Linkola’s JavaScript library for building user interfaces; thus, the combination allows for allows the creation of user-centric views by removing the arbitrary constraints imposed by canvas-type/hybrid-type approach (See Agarwal’s and Linkola’s abstracts/introduction, and background).
As per claim 2, Agarwal and Linkola disclose the method of claim 1 (See claim 1 rejection above, under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA , 35 USC § 103), wherein the new component is a parcel component (See Linkola’s page 32 – module bundlers).
As per claim 3, Agarwal and Linkola disclose the method of claim 1 (See claim 1 rejection above, under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA , 35 USC § 103), wherein the new component is initially not a parcel component, and the method comprises creating the parcel component (See Linkola’s pages 32-34 – creates bundler component).
As per claim 4, Agarwal and Linkola disclose the method of claim 1 (See claim 1 rejection above, under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA , 35 USC § 103), wherein the new component is not a parcel component, and the method further comprises: creating a component library; and adding the component library to a component runtime (See Linkola’s pages 34-38 – adding library).
As per claim 5, Agarwal and Linkola disclose the method of claim 1 (See claim 1 rejection above, under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA , 35 USC § 103), wherein the new component is authorable, and the method further comprises: creating an authored component; defining one or more authorable properties; and adding the authored component to a toolbar (See Linkola’s page 37 – defined properties and addition to toolbar).
As per claim 6, Agarwal and Linkola disclose the method of claim 1 (See claim 1 rejection above, under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA , 35 USC § 103), wherein the canvas definition is for use in an application in a canvas sandboxed in-frame (See Linkola’s pafge 36 - sandbox in-frame).
Response to Arguments
9. Applicant's arguments for independent and dependent claims have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
Claims 1-6 (§103 rejection):
Applicant’s Representative argues that the references cited do not teach or suggest: “…connecting to a state of an application using one or more provided hooks”, as presented in the independent claims.
In response to the preceding arguments, examiner respectfully submits that the reference cited teaches those limitations. As presented in the rejection above, Linkola discloses design and implementation of a modular frontend architecture for applications, where connection to application state is achieved through hooks. Applicant’s Representative states that Linkola merely discloses general background information about React’s hooks, and does not provide the actual elimination of arbitrary limitations from current tools. However, the claims are silent, and do not specify what functionality other than just connecting state of an application via hooks. By definition, and besides the background information about hooks provided by Linkola, React provides built-in hooks included on its library, that enable a plurality of functionalities for extracting and connecting stateful logic to components without the need to rewrite and define a class; in other words, adding React state to function components. The combination of the references cited would eliminate the need for converting functional components into class components/constructors, simplifying code by improving reusability while creating interactive and dynamic UI. Therefore, based on what the claim language currently defines, the Examiner maintains that the reference cited discloses and suggests these limitations.
Arguments directed to the dependent claims are based on the independent claims, and they have been addressed in the response to arguments section above.
Also, please see:
MPEP - 2111.01 Plain Meaning [R-11.2013]
II. IT IS IMPROPER TO IMPORT CLAIM LIMITATIONS FROM THE SPECIFICATION
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“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not part of the claim. For example, a particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment.” Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875, 69 USPQ2d 1865, 1868 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See also Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906, 69 USPQ2d 1801, 1807 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussing recent cases wherein the court expressly rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to that embodiment); E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1369, 67 USPQ2d 1947, 1950 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Interpretation of descriptive statements in a patent’s written description is a difficult task, as an inherent tension exists as to whether a statement is a clear lexicographic definition or a description of a preferred embodiment. The problem is to interpret claims ‘in view of the specification’ without unnecessarily importing limitations from the specification into the claims.”); Altiris Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1371, 65 USPQ2d 1865, 1869-70 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Although the specification discussed only a single embodiment, the court held that it was improper to read a specific order of steps into method claims where, as a matter of logic or grammar, the language of the method claims did not impose a specific order on the performance of the method steps, and the specification did not directly or implicitly require a particular order). See also subsection IV., below. When an element is claimed using language falling under the scope of 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, 6th paragraph (often broadly referred to as means- (or step-) plus- function language), the specification must be consulted to determine the structure, material, or acts corresponding to the function recited in the claim. In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 29 USPQ2d 1845 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (see MPEP § 2181- MPEP § 2186).
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In In re Zletz, supra, the examiner and the Board had interpreted claims reading “normally solid polypropylene” and “normally solid polypropylene having a crystalline polypropylene content” as being limited to “normally solid linear high homopolymers of propylene which have a crystalline polypropylene content.” The court ruled that limitations, not present in the claims, were improperly imported from the specification. See also In re Marosi, 710 F.2d 799, 802, 218 USPQ 289, 292 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“'claims are not to be read in a vacuum, and limitations therein are to be interpreted in light of the specification in giving them their ‘broadest reasonable interpretation.'” (quoting In re Okuzawa, 537 F.2d 545, 548, 190 USPQ 464, 466 (CCPA 1976)). The court looked to the specification to construe “essentially free of alkali metal” as including unavoidable levels of impurities but no more.). Compare In re Weiss, 989 F.2d 1202, 26 USPQ2d 1885 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (unpublished decision - cannot be cited as precedent) (The claim related to an athletic shoe with cleats that “break away at a preselected level of force” and thus prevent injury to the wearer. The examiner rejected the claims over prior art teaching athletic shoes with cleats not intended to break off and rationalized that the cleats would break away given a high enough force. The court reversed the rejection stating that when interpreting a claim term which is ambiguous, such as "'a preselected level of force,' we must look to the specification for the meaning ascribed to that term by the inventor.” The specification had defined “preselected level of force” as that level of force at which the breaking away will prevent injury to the wearer during athletic exertion).
Conclusion
10. THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to FRANCISCO JAVIER APONTE whose telephone number is (571)270-7164. The examiner can normally be reached on M-F: 8-4.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, James Trujillo can be reached on 571-272-3677. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/FRANCISCO J APONTE/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2151 02/19/2026.