DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Election/Restrictions
Applicant’s election without traverse of group I and oxide solid electrolyte species, claims 1-14 in the reply filed on 6 May 2026 is acknowledged.
Claims 15-20 are withdrawn from further consideration pursuant to 37 CFR 1.142(b) as being drawn to a nonelected invention.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claims 1 , 2 and 4-14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US 2017/0338522A1 (Hu) .
Regarding claims 1, 2 and 8, Hu teaches a solid-state ion-conducting battery comprises a porous solid state electrolyte (SSE) layer disposed in between a cathode and an anode ([0017[ , [0046] and [0058]), and one or more interfacial layers, wherein the cathode comprises a cathode-side current collector and a cathode active material, the anode comprises an anode-side current collector and an anode material on the anode current collector([[0056], 0063]-[0066] and Figs 2, 6 and 7).
Hu teaches at least a portion of a surface of an interfacial layer is in contact with at least a portion of a surface of an SSE material between the SSE material and an anode material ([0035]), and the interfacial layer can comprise one or more discrete layers of interfacial layer materials ([0043]), thus the presence of two discrete interlayers.
Hu further teaches that the interfacial material may comprise polyethylene oxide ([0039]), which meets a water-soluble first binder, and copolymers such as poly(vinylidenefluoride-co-hexafluoropropylene, which meets the claimed second binder, and renders the claimed combination of first layer comprising a water soluble polyethylene oxide binder in contact with the SSE material layer and the second layer comprising a poly(vinylidenefluoride-co-hexafluoropropylene organic binder in contact with the anode layer obvious.
It has been held that the mere fact that a reference suggests a multitude of possible combinations does not in and of itself make any one of these combinations less obvious, citing Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Itis also well settled that a reference stands for all of the specific teachings thereof as well as the inferences one of ordinary skill in the art would have reasonably been expected to draw therefrom. See In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1264-65 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
Regarding claim 4, Hu teaches that the interfacial layer can be a continuous layer that can contact all of the surfaces of an SSE material ([0035]), thus the presence of the first continuous layer disposed on the SSE layer and the second continuous layer disposed between the first layer and the anode current collector.
Regarding claims 5 and 6, Hu teaches the pores of the SSE material of 50% porosity is filled with interfacial material (Fig,. 3, [0017], [0051] and [0056]), which meets 50 percent or greater of pores being filled.
Regarding claims 7 and 9, Hu teaches that the interfacial layer further comprises up to 20% ionic salt and/or an organic solvent ([0039]-[0041]), thus the amount of the polyethylene oxide or poly(vinylidenefluoride-co-hexafluoropropylene can be less than 80% weight percent, which encompasses the claimed amount of the first or second binder.
One of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made would have found it obvious to include the polyethylene oxide or poly(vinylidenefluoride-co-hexafluoropropylene at the instantly claimed range since it has been held that in the case where the claimed ranges “overlap or lie inside range disclosed by the prior art” a prima facie case of obviousness exists. In re Wertheim, 541 f. 2d 257,191 USPQ 90(CCPA 1976). See MPEP 2144.05.I.
Generally, differences in ranges will not support the patentability of subject matter encompassed by the prior art unless there is evidence indicating such ranges is critical. See MPEP 2144.05, In re Boesch, 617 F2d 272, 205 USPQ 215 (CCPA 1980); In re Aller, 220 F2d 454, 456, 105 USPQ 233, 235 (CCPA 1955) and In re Hoeschele, 406 F2d 1403, 160 USPQ 809 (CCPA 1969).
Regarding claims 10 and 14, Hu teaches that anode material can be selected from lithium metal, silicon, conducting carbon materials (e.g., graphite, carbon black, carbon nanotubes and graphene ([0067]), and exemplified lithium metal present across the interfacial layer (Fig. 5 and [0056]).
Regarding claim 11, Hu does not teach the claimed thickness range, however, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to adjust the thickness in order to obtain a workable product. Case law has held that:
A. Changes in Size/Proportion
In re Rose, 220 F.2d 459, 105 USPQ 237 (CCPA 1955) (Claims directed to a lumber package "of appreciable size and weight requiring handling by a lift truck" were held unpatentable over prior art lumber packages which could be lifted by hand because limitations relating to the size of the package were not sufficient to patentably distinguish over the prior art.); In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 189 USPQ 143 (CCPA 1976) ("mere scaling up of a prior art process capable of being scaled up, if such were the case, would not establish patentability in a claim to an old process so scaled." 531 F.2d at 1053, 189 USPQ at 148.).
In Gardner v. TEC Syst., Inc., 725 F.2d 1338, 220 USPQ 777 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 830, 225 USPQ 232 (1984), the Federal Circuit held that, where the only difference between the prior art and the claims was a recitation of relative dimensions of the claimed device and a device having the claimed relative dimensions would not perform differently than the prior art device, the claimed device was not patentably distinct from the prior art device.
See MPEP 2144.04 IV. A.
Regarding claims 12 and 13, Hu teaches the solid state electrolyte can be Li7La3Zr2O12 ([0046]), which meets the claimed solid electrolyte.
Claim 3 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Hu as applied to claims 1 , 2 and 4-14 in view of US2002/0112846A1 (Skotheim).
The teachings of Hu are set forth above.
Regarding claim 3, while teaching the interfacial material comprises polymer gel electrolyte ([0031] and [0039]-[0040]), Hu does not teach the presence of a polyimide.
Skotheim teaches polyimide can function as gel polymer electrolytes ([0180]).
At the time the invention was made it would have been obvious for a person of ordinary skill in the art to utilize the gel polymer electrolyte of Skotheim as the interfacial material of Hu since it has been held that it is prima facie obviousness to use a known material based on its suitability for its intended use, i.e., a polymer gel electrolyte. See MPEP 2144.06(II) and 2144.07; In re Fout, 675 F2d 297, 213 USPQ 532 (CCPA 1982); Sinclair & Carroll Co v Interchemical Corp, 325 US 327, 65 USPQ 297 (1945); In re Leshin, 227 F2d 197, 125 USPQ 416 (CCPA 1960) and Ryco, Inc v Ag-Bag Corp, 857 F2d 1418, 8 USPQ2d 1323 (Fed Cir 1988).
Conclusion
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to AIQUN LI whose telephone number is (571)270-7736. The examiner can normally be reached Monday-Friday 9:00 am -4:00 pm.
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/AIQUN LI/ Ph.D., Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1766
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