DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application is being examined under the AIA first to invent provisions. In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
Response to Amendment
The amendments filed on 8/20/2025 have been entered.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 1-8 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Claim 1 recites “A travel vehicle configured for selectively mounting a standard HST and a high-specification HST. . . . the body frame structure configured to fix the standard HST and the high-specification HST rearward of the transmission” in lines 1-2. This recitation renders the claim as indefinite because it merely states an intended use, intended result, and/or functional language without setting forth a clear cut indication of the scope of the subject matter covered by the claim i.e. the structural limits of how the standard/high-specification HSTs are selectively mounted to the travel vehicle; and one having ordinary skill in the art would not know from the claim terms what structure is encompassed by the claim. See MPEP § 2173.05(g). Notwithstanding the permissible instances, the use of functional language in a claim may fail "to provide a clear-cut indication of the scope of the subject matter embraced by the claim" and thus be indefinite. In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 213 (CCPA 1971). For example, when claims merely recite a description of a problem to be solved or a function or result achieved by the invention, the boundaries of the claim scope may be unclear. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255, 85 USPQ2d 1654, 1663 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that the Supreme Court explained that a vice of functional claiming occurs "when the inventor is painstaking when he recites what has already been seen, and then uses conveniently functional language at the exact point of novelty") (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938)); see also United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 234, 55 USPQ 381 (1942) (holding indefinite claims that recited substantially pure carbon black "in the form of commercially uniform, comparatively small, rounded smooth aggregates having a spongy or porous exterior"). Further, without reciting the particular structure, materials or steps that accomplish the function or achieve the result, all means or methods of resolving the problem may be encompassed by the claim. Ariad Pharmaceuticals., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1353, 94 USPQ2d 1161, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). See also Datamize LLC v. Plumtree Software Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 75 USPQ2d 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2005) where a claim directed to a software based system for creating a customized computer interface screen recited that the screen be "aesthetically pleasing," which is an intended result and does not provide a clear cut indication of scope because it imposed no structural limits on the screen. Here, likewise, the recitation does not provide a clear cut indication of scope because it imposed no structural limits of how the standard and high-specification HSTs are or could be selectively mounted to the travel vehicle. As such, the recitation renders the claim as indefinite. “[W]here there is a great deal of confusion and uncertainty as to the proper interpretation of the claim limitations of a claim, it would not be proper to reject such a claim based on the basis of prior art.” See MPEP § 2173.06.
Claim 1 recites the limitation “wherein the opening comprises a diameter larger than a diameter of both i) a standard stabilizer for use with the standard HST and ii) a high-specification stabilizer for use with the high-specification HST, such that the stabilizer fixture is sized and configured to receive and fix the standard stabilizer during use with the standard HST and sized and configured to receive and fix the high specification stabilizer during use with the high-specification HST” in lines 8-12. This recitation is indefinite because the diameter of the opening of the stabilizer fixture is not based on an objective standard but on a subjective standard i.e. the unspecified diameter of a standard HST of an unspecified build and the unspecified diameter of a high-specification HST of an unspecified build. Whether or not a diameter of a stabilizer fixture is covered by the claims would depend upon, e.g., the varying sizes, shapes, and builds of standard and high-specification HSTs used with the travel vehicle. As such, the limitation renders the claim as indefinite.
Claim 1 recites “a common connected section configured to connect to a standard connection section provided on a front surface of the standard HST and a high-specification connection section provided on a front surface of the high-standard HST” in lines 6-8. This recitation renders the claim as indefinite because it merely states an intended use, intended result, and/or functional language without setting forth a clear cut indication of the scope of the subject matter covered by the claim i.e. the structural limits the connection structure insofar as whether it positively requires particular HST structure; and one having ordinary skill in the art would not know from the claim terms what structure is encompassed by the claim. See MPEP § 2173.05(g). Notwithstanding the permissible instances, the use of functional language in a claim may fail "to provide a clear-cut indication of the scope of the subject matter embraced by the claim" and thus be indefinite. In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 213 (CCPA 1971). For example, when claims merely recite a description of a problem to be solved or a function or result achieved by the invention, the boundaries of the claim scope may be unclear. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255, 85 USPQ2d 1654, 1663 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that the Supreme Court explained that a vice of functional claiming occurs "when the inventor is painstaking when he recites what has already been seen, and then uses conveniently functional language at the exact point of novelty") (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938)); see also United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 234, 55 USPQ 381 (1942) (holding indefinite claims that recited substantially pure carbon black "in the form of commercially uniform, comparatively small, rounded smooth aggregates having a spongy or porous exterior"). Further, without reciting the particular structure, materials or steps that accomplish the function or achieve the result, all means or methods of resolving the problem may be encompassed by the claim. Ariad Pharmaceuticals., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1353, 94 USPQ2d 1161, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). See also Datamize LLC v. Plumtree Software Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 75 USPQ2d 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2005) where a claim directed to a software based system for creating a customized computer interface screen recited that the screen be "aesthetically pleasing," which is an intended result and does not provide a clear cut indication of scope because it imposed no structural limits on the screen. Here, likewise, the recitation does not provide a clear cut indication of scope because it imposed no structural limits of how the standard and high-specification HSTs are or could be selectively mounted to the travel vehicle. As such, the recitation renders the claim as indefinite. “[W]here there is a great deal of confusion and uncertainty as to the proper interpretation of the claim limitations of a claim, it would not be proper to reject such a claim based on the basis of prior art.” See MPEP § 2173.06.
Claim 6 recites “a first transmission shaft exposed from the common connected section and configured to connect to an HST input shaft of the standard HST and an HST input shaft of the high-specification HST; and a second transmission shaft exposed from the common connected section and configured to connect to an HST output shaft of the standard HST and an HST output shaft of the high-specification HST.” This recitation renders the claim as indefinite because it merely states an intended use, intended result, and/or functional language without setting forth a clear cut indication of the scope of the subject matter covered by the claim i.e. it is ambiguous as to whether the HST input shafts are positively recited e.g. it does not impose the structural limits of how the transmission shafts are connected to the respective input shafts; and one having ordinary skill in the art would not know from the claim terms what structure is encompassed by the claim. See MPEP § 2173.05(g). Notwithstanding the permissible instances, the use of functional language in a claim may fail "to provide a clear-cut indication of the scope of the subject matter embraced by the claim" and thus be indefinite. In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 213 (CCPA 1971). For example, when claims merely recite a description of a problem to be solved or a function or result achieved by the invention, the boundaries of the claim scope may be unclear. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255, 85 USPQ2d 1654, 1663 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that the Supreme Court explained that a vice of functional claiming occurs "when the inventor is painstaking when he recites what has already been seen, and then uses conveniently functional language at the exact point of novelty") (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938)); see also United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 234, 55 USPQ 381 (1942) (holding indefinite claims that recited substantially pure carbon black "in the form of commercially uniform, comparatively small, rounded smooth aggregates having a spongy or porous exterior"). Further, without reciting the particular structure, materials or steps that accomplish the function or achieve the result, all means or methods of resolving the problem may be encompassed by the claim. Ariad Pharmaceuticals., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1353, 94 USPQ2d 1161, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). See also Datamize LLC v. Plumtree Software Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 75 USPQ2d 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2005) where a claim directed to a software based system for creating a customized computer interface screen recited that the screen be "aesthetically pleasing," which is an intended result and does not provide a clear cut indication of scope because it imposed no structural limits on the screen. Here, likewise, the recitation does not provide a clear cut indication of scope because it is ambiguous as to whether the HST input shafts are positively recited i.e. it does not impose the structural limits of how the transmission shafts are connected to the respective input shafts; and one having ordinary skill in the art would not know from the claim terms what structure is encompassed by the claim. As such, the recitation renders the claim as indefinite. “[W]here there is a great deal of confusion and uncertainty as to the proper interpretation of the claim limitations of a claim, it would not be proper to reject such a claim based on the basis of prior art.” See MPEP § 2173.06.
Claim 7 recites “a common connected section configured to connect to a standard connection section provided on a front surface of the standard HST and a high-specification connection section provided on a front surface of the high-standard HST [parent claim 1]. . . . wherein the standard HST is a shoeless-type HST, and the high-specification HST is a shoe-type HST.” in lines 6-8. This recitation renders the claim as indefinite because it merely states an intended use, intended result, and/or functional language without setting forth a clear cut indication of the scope of the subject matter covered by the claim i.e. it imposes no structural limits on the connection structure insofar as e.g. whether it positively requires particular HST structure such as a shoeless-type and shoe-type HST; and one having ordinary skill in the art would not know from the claim terms what structure is encompassed by the claim. See MPEP § 2173.05(g). Notwithstanding the permissible instances, the use of functional language in a claim may fail "to provide a clear-cut indication of the scope of the subject matter embraced by the claim" and thus be indefinite. In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 213 (CCPA 1971). For example, when claims merely recite a description of a problem to be solved or a function or result achieved by the invention, the boundaries of the claim scope may be unclear. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255, 85 USPQ2d 1654, 1663 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that the Supreme Court explained that a vice of functional claiming occurs "when the inventor is painstaking when he recites what has already been seen, and then uses conveniently functional language at the exact point of novelty") (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938)); see also United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 234, 55 USPQ 381 (1942) (holding indefinite claims that recited substantially pure carbon black "in the form of commercially uniform, comparatively small, rounded smooth aggregates having a spongy or porous exterior"). Further, without reciting the particular structure, materials or steps that accomplish the function or achieve the result, all means or methods of resolving the problem may be encompassed by the claim. Ariad Pharmaceuticals., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1353, 94 USPQ2d 1161, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). See also Datamize LLC v. Plumtree Software Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 75 USPQ2d 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2005) where a claim directed to a software based system for creating a customized computer interface screen recited that the screen be "aesthetically pleasing," which is an intended result and does not provide a clear cut indication of scope because it imposed no structural limits on the screen. Here, likewise, the recitation does not provide a clear cut indication of scope because it imposes no structural limits on the connection structure insofar as e.g. whether it positively requires particular HST structure such as a shoeless-type and shoe-type HST. As such, the recitation renders the claim as indefinite. “[W]here there is a great deal of confusion and uncertainty as to the proper interpretation of the claim limitations of a claim, it would not be proper to reject such a claim based on the basis of prior art.” See MPEP § 2173.06.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claim(s) 1-8 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Ohkubo et al. (U.S. P.G. Publication No. 2013/0298546 A1; “Ohkubo”) in view of Nakaoka et al. (U.S. P.G. Publication No. 2014/0345964 A1; “Nakaoka”).
Ohkubo discloses:
Regarding claim 1:
A travel vehicle (depicted in FIG. 1) configured for selectively mounting a standard HST and a high-specification HST (via spline connection depicted in FIG. 3; see MPEP § 2125) comprising:
a body frame structure (6, 7, 8) to which a transmission (10) is fixed (depicted in FIG. 1), the body frame structure configure to fix standard HST and the standard HST and the high-specification HST rearward of the transmission (via spline connection depicted in FIG. 3; FIG. 1-2 depict the HST as fixed to the rear side of the transmission 10, see ¶ 54; see MPEP § 2125); and
and wherein the transmission includes a rear surface provided with a common connected section (FIG. 2-3 depicts the transmission, on its rearward side, interfacing with the HST 18) configured to connect to a standard connection section provided on a front surface of the standard HST and a high-specification connection section provided on a front surface of the high-standard HST (via spline connection depicted in FIG. 3; see MPEP § 2125).
However, Ohkubo does not expressly disclose a stabilizer fixture disposed rearward of the body frame structure and having an opening.
Nakaoka teaches a stabilizer fixture (93; FIG. 13, 14, 15) disposed rearward of a body frame structure (FIG. 13 depicts a rear view of the body frame structure F wherein the fixture 93 is depicted as being located at the rear of the frame structure) and having an opening (FIG. 14-15 depict the fixture 93 as having an opening through which a stabilizer 43 extends) to support a stabilizer that serves to inhibit sudden up-down movement when an outside force vertically displaces one of the right and left rear wheels (¶¶ 69-70).
It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify, with a reasonable expectation of success, Ohkubo to include a stabilizer fixture disposed rearward of the body frame structure and having an opening, as taught by Nakaoka, to support a stabilizer that serves to inhibit sudden up-down movement when an outside force vertically displaces one of the right and left rear wheels.
Ohkubo as modified above further teaches the following:
Regarding claim 1 (continued):
Wherein the opening comprises a diameter larger than a diameter of both i) a standard stabilizer for use with the standard HST (FIG. 13-15 in Nakaoka depict the stabilizer fixture 93 having an opening that has a diameter larger than that of stabilizer 43 which is capable for use with a standard HST) and ii) a high-specification stabilizer for use with the high-specification HST (FIG. 13-15 in Nakaoka depict the stabilizer fixture 93 having an opening that has a diameter larger than that of stabilizer 43 which is capable for use with a high-specification HST), such that the stabilizer fixture is sized and configured to receive and fix the standard stabilizer during use with the standard HST and sized and configured to receive and fix the high specification stabilizer during use with the high-specification HST (FIG. 13-15 in Nakaoka depict the stabilizer fixture 93 having an opening that has a diameter larger than that of stabilizer 43 which is capable for use with a standard or high-specification HST).
Regarding claim 2:
The travel vehicle according to claim 1, wherein the body frame structure is provided with a common fixing frame (at 2, 7, 8) configured to connect to the standard HST and the high-specification HST (via splines as seen in FIG. 3; ¶ 54, “As shown in FIG. 1 and FIG. 2, an engine 9, a transmission case 10 and a hydrostatic step less speed changer apparatus 18 are connected to each other to form a single unit. And, this unit is supported to the rear portions of the right and left main frames 6 in such a manner that the engine 9 is disposed forwardly.”).
Regarding claim 3:
The travel vehicle according to claim 1, wherein the body frame structure comprises a pair of left and right main frames (6; ¶ 50, 53) extending in a front-rear direction of a body of the travel vehicle (depicted in FIG. 1), and a pair of left and right upper frames (7; ¶ 50) extending in the front-rear direction of the body above the main frames (FIG. 1 depicts vertical frames 7 extending in an upward direction relative to the main frames 6), and defines an access space for mounting the standard HST and the high- specification HST to the body frame structure (FIG. 1 depicts relatively unencumbered access to the HST 18 compared to e.g. the transmission 10; see MPEP § 2125).
Regarding claim 4:
The travel vehicle according to claim 1, wherein the body frame structure further comprises a common guard support section configured to support a rear guard for guarding a rearward protruding section of the standard HST and a rear guard for guarding a rearward protruding section of the high-specification HST (FIG. 1 reasonably depicts the HST being surrounded by a frame structure at least on its upper and lower sides that is supported by the body frame structure; see MPEP § 2125).
Regarding claim 5:
The travel vehicle according to claim 1,wherein: the standard stabilizer is configured to connect a left rear wheel unit and a right rear wheel unit and used while the standard HST is mounted (¶¶ 69-70 in Nakaoka); or the high-specification stabilizer configured to connect the left rear wheel unit and the right rear wheel unit, having a shape different from that of the standard HST, and used while the high-specification HST is mounted.
Regarding claim 6:
The travel vehicle according to The travel vehicle according to wherein the common connected section comprises: a first transmission shaft (44) exposed from the common connected section and configured to connect to an HST input shaft of the standard HST and an HST input shaft of the high-specification HST (See shaft portion disposed within 18 connected to shaft portion near 44 in FIG. 3); and a second transmission shaft (45) exposed from the common connected section and configured to connect to an HST output shaft of the standard HST and an HST output shaft of the high-specification HST (see shaft portion disposed within HST 18 connected to shaft portion at 45).
Regarding claim 7:
The travel vehicle according to claim 1 wherein the standard HST is a shoeless-type HST and the high-specification HST is a shoe-type HST (FIG. 3 depicts a shoeless type i.e. standard HST; per claim 1, see above, a high-specification HST is not clearly positively recited and thus not limiting here).
Regarding claim 8:
The travel vehicle according to claim 1 wherein the stabilizer fixture extends rearward of the body frame structure (depicted in FIG. 13-15 in Nakaoka) and the opening is a generally U-shaped opening (FIG. 14-15 in Nakaoka reasonably depict/disclose the opening that accommodates the stabilizer 43 as having a curved shape i.e. U-shape; see MPEP § 2125).
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s amendments to the claims filed 8/20/2025 have been fully considered and have required new grounds of rejection is made in view of Ohkubo in view of Nakaoka as well as 35 USC § 112 , as described supra.
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure. Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to DANIEL D YABUT whose telephone number is (571)270-5526. The examiner can normally be reached on Monday through Friday from 9:00 AM to 5:00 PM.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor John Olszewski can be reached on (571) 272-2706. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see http://pair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
/DANIEL D YABUT/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3617
Prosecution Insights